COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. DAVID BEAN
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RENDERED: APRIL 25, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001048-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00195
v.
DAVID BEAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has appealed from
the Hopkins Circuit Court’s April 19, 2002, order granting David
Bean’s (hereinafter “Bean”) motion for a new trial pursuant to
RCr 10.02.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
properly ruled that the Commonwealth’s introduction of testimony
regarding Bean’s prior bad acts prejudiced the jury to the
extent that a new trial was warranted.
a new trial.
We affirm and remand for
On July 24, 2001, the grand jury indicted Bean for
possession of a controlled substance and for being a persistent
felony offender, second degree, stemming from an April 26, 2001,
arrest.
A bench warrant was issued when Bean failed to appear
at his arraignment, and he was eventually arrested on the bench
warrant on October 3, 2001.
He entered a plea of not guilty on
October 5, 2001.
The matter proceeded to trial on April 2, 2002.
The
Commonwealth presented testimony to establish that on April 26,
2001, Bean entered a Madisonville, Kentucky, area Wal-Mart
establishment, where he was noticed acting suspiciously by loss
prevention officer Brad Ramsey (hereinafter “Ramsey”) while
buying a package of lithium batteries.
Lithium batteries can be
used in the production of methamphetamine, a controlled
substance.
Ramsey notified the police department and identified
Bean to Officer William Poe (hereinafter “Officer Poe”) upon his
arrival.
Officer Poe approached the vehicle Bean and his
companion Joseph Franklin (hereinafter “Franklin”) as they
entered it, and asked Bean, who was entering the driver’s side,
for his name and identification.
Officer Poe discovered that
there was an outstanding warrant for Bean’s arrest, had him exit
the vehicle, and arrested him.
Following the arrest, Officer
Poe conducted a search of the vehicle and recovered a blue pill
bottle under the driver’s seat containing two corner baggies of
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a brownish substance later determined to be methamphetamine.
At
no time did Officer Poe see Bean holding the Wal-Mart bag
containing the package of lithium batteries, which was recovered
from Franklin’s possession.
Bean presented testimony to the effect that the
Mercury Tracer he was driving on April 26, 2001, belonged to his
wife, Tonie Bean.
She had owned the car for less than a year,
and frequently lent the car to relatives and friends to use in
exchange for gasoline.
Bean and Tonie had been experiencing
marital difficulties, which had escalated to such an extent in
February of 2001 that Tonie obtained an emergency protective
order against her husband.
It was for a violation of this order
that Bean was arrested by Officer Poe on April 26, 2001.
Upon
cross-examination and without any objection, the Commonwealth
elicited testimony from Tonie that she had recommended on the
EPO that Bean enter a drug abuse program.
Bean testified in his
own defense, denying having entered the general merchandise
portion of Wal-Mart that day, and admitted only to entering the
garden area.
He denied buying any lithium batteries or having
any knowledge of the drugs recovered from the vehicle.
On
cross-examination, the Commonwealth followed up on its earlier
line of questioning regarding the EPO by asking Bean why Tonie
would have recommended drug treatment.
The trial court
overruled Bean’s objection to this line of questioning,
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reasoning that the same testimony had been admitted earlier
during Tonie’s testimony.
Bean then admitted that he smoked
marijuana.
At the close of the defense’s case-in-chief, the trial
court held an in-chambers hearing.
At that time, Bean’s counsel
renewed his objection to the introduction of testimony regarding
drug use.
Counsel requested that the trial court admonish the
jury to disregard the irrelevant testimony.
The Commonwealth
objected, noting that the testimony was elicited in follow-up to
prior testimony from Tonie to which Bean did not object.
However, the Commonwealth did not have a problem with an
admonishment to the jury regarding the EPO and marijuana use.
The trial court then reconsidered its prior ruling, sustained
Bean’s objection, and informed counsel that an admonishment
would be given to the jury to disregard any testimony relating
to drug problems that inspired the DVO and Bean’s marijuana use.
The court ruled that the testimony had no relevance to the
charge for which Bean was being tried.
The trial court noted
that it would revisit the issue post-trial in the event of a
conviction.
The jury found Bean guilty as charged after
deliberating for less than thirty minutes, and returned a sixyear sentence based upon the PFO II conviction.
Bean timely
filed a motion for new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02, arguing that
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the Commonwealth did not provide prior notice of the
introduction of prior bad acts pursuant to KRE 404(c).
The
Commonwealth argued that the admonition cured any error there
might have been, and that in any event Bean was not
substantially prejudiced.
Following a brief hearing, the trial
court granted the motion for a new trial on April 19, 2002, as
follows:
This matter is before the court on
defendant’s Motion for New Trial pursuant to
RCr 10.02. Pursuant to said rule, the court
may grant a new trial for any cause which
prevented the defendant from having a fair
trial, or if required in the interest of
justice.
In this case there were several
statements made by the defendant in response
to questions by the Commonwealth that were
very prejudicial. The Commonwealth argues
that the defendant opened the door for such
discussion and the particular questions that
were asked by bringing up the subject of his
EPO on direct. However, based on the facts
of this case, it was necessary for the
defendant to at least bring up the subject
in order to explain why he was originally
arrested in the first place (there was an
outstanding warrant pursuant to the EPO).
This evidence does not open the door as to
any questions regarding the specifics of the
same. In fact, such questions are not
relevant to this action involving the
possession of methamphetamine.
Evidence of the terms of the EPO,
however, was highly prejudicial. In
response to questions about the same, the
Commonwealth elicited information to the
effect that drug treatment was ordered for
the defendant because of marijuana use. The
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Commonwealth compounded the prejudicial
affect of this evidence by specifically
asking about the drug rehabilitation
program, with follow up questions about
marijuana use and what the defendant may or
may not have done with his own drugs. There
was an objection to this line of questioning
which the court overruled. After reviewing
the evidence which resulted from said
questions, the court sustained the objection
and gave an admonition to the jury.
However, the court does not believe that the
admonition corrected the problem because the
defendant was charged with a drug offense
and such testimony would have been
prejudicial to the jury. As such, the
substantial rights of the defendant were
impaired in that he did not receive a fair
trial pursuant to Castle v. Commonwealth, 44
S.W.3d 790 (Ky.Ct.App. 2000) and Schaefer v.
Commonwealth, [Ky., 622 S.W.2d 218] (1996).
For the reasons stated above, the
defendant’s Motion for New Trial is hereby
GRANTED.
This appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that Bean was not
entitled to relief under RCr 10.26 because 1) the alleged error
did not generate a substantial possibility that the result would
have been any different; 2) the trial court’s admonition
sufficiently addressed the situation; and 3) the basis of the
motion for new trial did not support his request for relief.
the other hand, Bean argues that the trial court did not abuse
On
its discretion under RCr 10.02 in ordering a new trial.
It is well settled in Kentucky that the decision to
grant or deny a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the
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trial court.
Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 761 (1962).
Therefore, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, we must
affirm.
RCr 10.02(1) provides that “[u]pon motion of a
defendant, the court may grant a new trial for any cause which
prevented the defendant from having a fair trial, or if required
in the interest of justice.”
Additionally, RCr 10.02(2)
provides that “the court on its own initiative may order a new
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial
on a motion of a defendant, and in the order shall specify the
grounds therefor.”
We cannot hold that the trial court abused its sound
discretion in granting Bean a new trial.
We agree with the
trial court that Bean sufficiently preserved this issue for
review by objecting to the line of questioning regarding the EPO
and his use of marijuana during his own testimony.
In our
review of the facts of this case, we note that Bean was being
tried for possession of methamphetamine; Bean testified during
cross-examination by the Commonwealth that he smoked marijuana,
which is wholly different from the manufactured drug,
methamphetamine.
Any admission elicited by the Commonwealth as
to prior or current drug use very possibly could have prejudiced
the jury to a substantial degree.
Additionally, we agree with
the trial court’s observation that the Commonwealth compounded
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the problem by asking Bean more follow up questions regarding
what he does with his own drugs.
Based upon the facts of this
case, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in granting Bean a new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order
granting Bean’s motion for a new trial is affirmed and the
matter is remanded for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler
Attorney General
Emily Holt
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, KY
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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