BRIAN VOLTZ v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 30, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001014-MR
BRIAN VOLTZ
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O'MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 96-CR-002370 AND 01-CR-000989
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
Brian Voltz appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court revoking his probation and executing his
sentences for Robbery in the Second Degree1 and Possession of a
Firearm by a Convicted Felon2.
We affirm.
Voltz pled guilty in case no. 96-CR-002370 to robbery
in the second degree.
At the time of his plea, he was a
juvenile who had been waived over to Jefferson Circuit Court,
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.030.
2
KRS 527.040.
Division 12.
He received a sentence of seven years -- probated
for five years.
On September 27, 2001, Voltz entered an Alford plea3 to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in case no. 01-CR000989 in Division 16 of Jefferson Circuit Court.
In exchange
for his plea of guilty, the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss
charges of possession of a controlled substance with a firearm
implicated and one count of possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon.
The Commonwealth also agreed to recommend a
sentence of five years to be probated and to remand a motion to
revoke his probation in Division 12.
Voltz was sentenced to
five years for the Division 16 offenses to run consecutively
with respect to the seven-year sentence in the previous Division
12 case for a total of 12 years to serve -- probated to five
years.
Voltz’s probation officer filed a special supervision
report in Division 16 on December 17, 2001,4 advising the court
that Voltz had registered positive in a urinalysis test for
recent use of marijuana and codeine; consequently, Voltz had
been directed to a substance abuse coordinator for an evaluation
3
Pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27
L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
4
The order revoking Voltz’s probation refers to a special supervision
report supposedly dated December 5, 2001. The report is actually
dated December 17, 2001, with his last probation office contact on
December 5, 2001 -- the date on which he tested positive for marijuana
use.
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and referral for treatment.
The probation officer filed a
subsequent report on January 24, 2002, informing the court that
the Jefferson Family Court had entered a Domestic Violence Order
(DVO) against Voltz based on an incident with his live-in
girlfriend.
In light of these incidents, a probation revocation
hearing was held in Division 16 on April 1, 2002.
The court
found that Voltz:
. . . violated his probation based upon the
Special Supervision Reports dated December
5, 2001 and January 24, 2002 and the record
of the Family Court proceedings in which
there was uncontroverted proof and a finding
of threats and use of physical force,
resulting in a lump to her arm and soreness
to her body.
The trial court entered the following order:
This five (5) year sentence is to run
consecutive to the seven (7) year sentence
imposed in Division 12 in its order entered
the 14th day of February, 1997 in Case No.
96CR2370 for a total sentence of twelve (12)
years to serve.
Voltz raises several arguments on appeal.
He contends
that his right to due process was violated because his admission
in Family Court was not entered knowingly and voluntarily.
Therefore, it should not have been used against him in the
parole revocation hearing.
He also contends that the trial
court abused its discretion and violated his due right to due
process by allowing the Commonwealth to consolidate the two
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actions (the drug report and the entry of domestic violence
order) without prior notice and a hearing.
Finally, he claims
that the court abused its discretion by imposing a penalty for
marijuana use in excess of that which is permitted by law.
At the hearing on the motion for revocation, the
Commonwealth submitted a videotape of the Family Court
proceedings.
While appellate counsel maintains that this issue
was preserved, our careful review of the record reveals that
Voltz’s counsel offered no objection to the admission of the
tape.
Thus, it is unpreserved for appellate review.
However,
even if counsel had objected properly, we believe that the tape
would have been admissible.
A person subject to loss of status as a probationer no
longer enjoys the “full panoply of rights accorded to one yet
not convicted.”
Childers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 593 S.W.2d
80, 81 (1980), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92
S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).
Voltz argues that he should
have received a Miranda5 warning from the trial judge before he
was questioned.
In Childers, this court addressed that point
and held that statements obtained without benefit of Miranda
warnings were admissible in a probation revocation hearing.
Questioning by a trial judge does not require the Miranda
Id.
warning usually associated with and required during custodial
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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interrogation.
In Tiryung v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 717 S.W.2d
503, 504 (1986), we noted the diminished due-process status
afforded to a probationer by holding that a trial court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking probation when it admitted
evidence which may have been illegally seized.
We do not
believe that the trial court abused its discretion in this case
in admitting court proceedings concerning the domestic violence
order.
In the alternative, Voltz argues that he could not
have known that an argument with his girlfriend could result in
the revocation of his probation.
At the time of his sentencing
in Division 16, the court carefully stated that it was granting
probation on the recommendation of the Commonwealth -- and that
without that recommendation, Voltz would not have been granted
probation.
The court emphatically informed Voltz that any
infraction -- no matter how arguably minimal -- would result in
revocation of his probation.
There was evidence that Voltz not
only threatened but also injured his girlfriend to support the
issuance of the domestic violence order against him.
In
addition, he also tested positive for marijuana use.
Either
incident alone was sufficient to support the revocation of his
probation.
Voltz next argues that it was improper for the trial
court to revoke his probation on both merged convictions without
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notice and a hearing on the merger of the two.
Again, contrary
to the claims of appellate counsel, we have uncovered no
objection in the record; therefore, this issue has not been
preserved for appellate review.
We have, however, examined the
issue despite the preservation problem.
The requirements to insure adequate due process in the
context of a probation revocation hearing include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations
of [probation]; (b) disclosure to the
[probationer] of evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers;
and (f) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking [probation]. Robinson
v. Commonweath, Ky. App., 86 S.W.3d 54,
56 (2002), citing Morrissey at 489, 92 S.Ct.
2593.
The record reveals that Voltz received adequate notice and a
proper hearing as to his two violations.
Due process did not
entitle him to an initial hearing on the propriety of merging
the two charges as a condition precedent to proceeding to a
hearing on the merged issues.
Voltz last argues that revoking his probation for
marijuana use was tantamount to sentencing him to twelve years
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for a misdemeanor offense.
While Voltz has failed to preserve
this argument for review, we have nonetheless examined this
argument and find it to be without merit.
Voltz was sentenced
to seven years for robbery in the second degree and to five
years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Because
he committed the second offense while on probation for the first
offense, the sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a
total of twelve years.
His combined offenses committed while on
probation sufficed to serve as a proper basis for its
revocation.
He is serving twelve years for serious offenses.
Smoking marijuana did not result in a twelve-year sentence;
however, it was one of two catalysts that properly caused the
revocation of the privilege of probation.
Voltz’s own ill-
chosen course of conduct cannot be mis-characterized as a
violation of due process by the judge.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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