ELIZABETH L. BLAIR v. JAMES W. GREEN
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RENDERED: JUNE 27, 2003; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000977-MR
ELIZABETH L. BLAIR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-004170
v.
JAMES W. GREEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
In this personal injury action filed against
dermatologist James W. Green (hereinafter “Green”), Elizabeth L.
Blair (hereinafter “Blair”) has appealed from the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s final judgment entered December 6, 2001,
following a jury trial, and from the order denying her motion for
a new trial entered April 8, 2002.
Having considered the
parties’ briefs and oral arguments, the extensive record, and the
applicable case law, we affirm.
During the time period relative to this action, Green
was a board certified dermatologist who began practicing medicine
in 1980.
Because of an increase in business, Green hired Cathy
Richardson as a licensed physician’s assistant (hereinafter “PA”)
in 1998.
Shortly thereafter, Green hired her son, Corey
Richardson (hereinafter “Richardson”), as a surgical assistant.
Richardson had also been trained and certified as a PA, but had
lost his California PA license.
Therefore, Green hired
Richardson in a position with less medical responsibility.
Over
time, Green allowed Richardson to assume greater responsibilities
until he was effectively working as a PA.
Blair first sought treatment from Green on January 5,
1999, for complaints of an itchy back.
When conservative
treatment failed to resolve her complaints, Green performed a
series of kenalog steroid injections in her back, which
apparently resulted in some temporary dimpling on the skin of her
back.
At the time of her first office visit, she inquired about
the possibility of undergoing liposuction, and later discussed
this with the appropriate person in Green’s office.
Blair
underwent her first liposuction procedure in April 1999,
performed by both Green and Richardson.
She returned for
additional liposuction in October 1999, which was performed by
Richardson.
Green stated that he was present during the second
procedure.
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In June 2000, Richardson was arrested for practicing
medicine without a license.
The Jefferson County Grand Jury for
the September 2000 term later indicted both Green and Richardson
on 117 counts of Assault I and 117 counts of Wanton Endangerment
I, and indicted Richardson on one count of unlawful practice of
medicine without a license and for being a persistent felony
offender.1
On March 28, 2001, during the criminal trial of that
matter, Green and Richardson chose to enter guilty pleas.
Green
entered a guilty plea pursuant to Alford v. North Carolina, 394
U.S. 956 (1969), to amended charges of complicity to unlawful
practice of medicine and twenty counts of wanton endangerment I,
and also agreed to plead guilty to any insurance fraud cases that
arose out of the action.
His twelve-month and one-year
concurrent sentences were probated for five years on the
condition that he pay restitution and serve six months on home
incarceration.
On June 28, 2000, just following Richardson’s arrest,
Blair filed a complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court, naming only
Green as a defendant and alleging medical negligence in both the
kenalog injections and the liposuction procedures.
that:
She claimed
(1) Green failed to adequately supervise Richardson; (2)
committed battery; (3) failed to obtain her informed consent; and
1
Blair was named in the indictment as the victim in counts for both assault
and wanton endangerment.
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(4) that Green’s conduct was outrageous.
Likewise, she alleged
that Green negligently administered the kenalog injections.
A number of similar lawsuits were eventually filed in
Jefferson Circuit Court, which were consolidated for common
discovery purposes.
However, the suits were not consolidated for
trial, and Blair’s case was later removed from common discovery.
As the most senior of the lawsuits filed, Blair’s case was the
first to proceed to trial on November 27, 2001.
At the close of
her case, both Blair and Green moved the trial court for directed
verdicts on the issues of medical negligence, informed consent,
negligent hiring, battery, and outrageous conduct.
The trial
court denied both parties’ motions as well as their renewed
motions presented at the close of Green’s case.
The matter
proceeded to the jury on instructions of negligence, lack of
informed consent, failure to exercise the proper care and skill
in hiring and supervising employees, battery, and punitive
damages.2
Blair requested damages in amounts not to exceed $1000
for battery; $7000 for medical expenses; $19,000 for past and
future physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering; and
$5,000,000 in punitive damages.
The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Green on the negligence, informed consent and battery
instructions, and found for Blair on the hiring and supervising
and punitive damages instructions.
2
The jury awarded Blair $2000
Blair withdrew her claim for outrageous conduct.
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for pain and suffering and $2000 in punitive damages.
Accordingly, on December 6, 2001, the circuit court entered a
judgment against Green for $4000.
On December 14, 2001, Blair filed a motion to set aside
the judgment pursuant to CR 59 and CR 60, arguing that there were
errors of law during the trial, that the verdict was contrary to
the law, that the damages awarded were inadequate, that the trial
court’s abuse of discretion deprived her of a fair trial, and
that a directed verdict on battery should have been granted.
Green filed an objection, and following an oral hearing, the
trial court denied the motion on April 8, 2002.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Blair argues that the trial court should
have granted her motions for directed verdict on negligence,
battery, and informed consent; that the trial court improperly
excluded evidence of Green’s similar acts and conduct; that the
trial court improperly limited discovery; that Green admitted
that his treatment fell below the standard of care; and that
Green’s admission of gross negligence was improperly ignored.
In
her argument regarding the directed verdict on negligence, Blair
includes an allegation that an inconsistency in the verdict
requires reversal for a new trial.
In his brief, Green opposed
each of Blair’s arguments, and further argued that the jury’s
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finding regarding the administering of the kenalog injections not
be disturbed as Blair did not address it in her brief.
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICTS
The standard of review for an appellate court in
reviewing a decision of a trial court on a motion for directed
verdict made pursuant to CR 50.01 is well settled in the
Commonwealth:
In ruling on either a motion for a
directed verdict or a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, a trial court is
under a duty to consider the evidence in the
strongest possible light in favor of the
party opposing the motion. Furthermore, it
is required to give the opposing party the
advantage of every fair and reasonable
inference which can be drawn from the
evidence. And, it is precluded from entering
either a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.
unless there is a complete absence of proof
on a material issue in the action, or if no
disputed issue of fact exists upon which
reasonable men could differ.
Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky.App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
Furthermore, an appellate court’s standard for reviewing a trial
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is whether the
decision was clearly erroneous.
599 (2001).
Miller v. Swift, Ky., 42 S.W.3d
We hold that the trial court properly denied Blair’s
motions for a directed verdict in each instance.
1) NEGLIGENCE
Blair first argues that Green was negligent per se due
to the violation of the licensing statutes, and that as such, she
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was entitled to a directed verdict on negligence, citing Newman
v. Lee, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 293 (1971).
We agree with Green’s
argument on this issue and his interpretation of the Newman case
as it applies to the matter before us.
Furthermore, we agree
with Green’s argument and his reliance upon Lewis v. B&R Corp.,
Ky.App., 56 S.W.3d 432 (2001), to the effect that even if Green
were negligent per se, Blair failed to prove through any expert
testimony that his negligence was a substantial factor in causing
her injuries.
Blair next argues that the jury’s verdict was
inconsistent because she received a favorable verdict only on the
negligent hiring instruction, but not on an independent tort from
which her damages arose.
On the other hand, Green argues that
the verdict was consistent, and that in any event Blair failed to
timely raise the issue.
We agree with Blair’s contention that a
jury’s verdict must be consistent.3
In Callis v. Owensboro-
Ashland Co., Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d 806, 808 (1977), this Court
stated, “[t]he true test to be applied in reconciling apparent
conflicts between the jury’s answers is whether the answers may
fairly be said to represent a logical and probable decision on
the relevant issue as submitted.”
3
Again, we agree with Green’s
We note that in her brief, Blair cited to two cases in support of her
proposition that jury verdicts must be consistent. One of those cases has
been explicitly overruled, and the other has been implicitly overruled.
However, Blair’s proposition regarding consistency in jury verdicts remains
valid.
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argument that the jury’s verdict was in no way inconsistent.
It
is very logical to conclude that the jury determined that Blair
incurred no damages from a tort independent of the negligent
hiring, but only sustained mental and/or emotional suffering as a
result of the negligent hiring and supervision.
We also note
that counsel for Blair specifically accepted the instructions
prior to their submission to the jury, and did not object to the
alleged inconsistent verdict immediately upon its return.
Breathitt Funeral Home v. Neace, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 490 (1969).
2) BATTERY
In support of this argument, Blair avers that Green
allowed Richardson to unlawfully “touch” her during the
liposuction procedures, thereby necessitating a directed verdict
on the battery claim in her favor.
On the other hand, Green
relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Vitale v. Henchey,
Ky., 24 S.W.3d 651 (2000), and argues that the jury must
determine as a question of fact whether a battery took place and
that Blair failed to prove that there was an intent to cause
unlawful or offensive contact with her.
Furthermore, Green
argues that there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to
determine from an objective standard that Richardson’s
participation would not have violated a reasonable person’s sense
of personal dignity.
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We agree with Green’s argument that there was
sufficient evidence in the record regarding whether he intended
to cause unlawful or offensive contact to Blair to defeat her
motion for a directed verdict and to allow the matter to go to
the jury.
3) INFORMED CONSENT
Blair argues that Richardson performed illegal medical
procedures on her with the agreement and assistance of Green,
thereby causing her to be touched without her consent.
However,
Green argues that the informed consent forms obtained prior to
both liposuction procedures adequately informed Blair of the
risks or hazards of the proposed procedure based upon the
testimony of the expert witnesses, including that of Blair’s
expert witness, Dr. Dubou.
Furthermore, Green argues that
Blair’s claim that the lack of informed consent arose from his
failure to tell her Richardson did not have a PA’s license is in
reality a claim for battery, citing Vitale v. Henchey, supra.
We
again agree with the trial court’s determination that there was
sufficient evidence to defeat Blair’s motion for a directed
verdict and to allow the issue to go to the jury for a factual
finding.
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PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY ISSUES
1) EXCLUSION OF GREEN’S SIMILAR ACTS AND CONDUCT
Blair argues that the trial court improperly excluded
evidence of Green’s similar acts during which he conspired to
allow Richardson to illegally perform medical procedures on other
patients.
This limited the jury’s access to proof, which in turn
affected its decision regarding punitive damages.
Blair
apparently claims that the trial court excluded evidence from two
witnesses who were both patients of Green, which would have
established that Green was aware of Richardson’s actions and that
he voluntarily collaborated in Richardson’s actions, as well as
the pervasive extent of his actions.
Green argues that the other
patients Blair sought to call as witnesses did not meet the
“similar occurrences” requirement, that Blair did not preserve
their testimony by avowal, and that Blair had adequate
opportunities to present proof regarding the likelihood of harm
to others, profitability and duration.
We first note that Blair has not indicated in her brief
exactly where in the record this issue was preserved for review,
hindering our ability to review this matter.
However, we are
aware of the trial court’s August 31, 2001, order granting
Green’s August 17, 2001, motion in limine to exclude testimony
from other of Green’s patients.
In her response to this motion,
Blair argued that she only wanted to introduce their testimony
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for the limited purpose of illustrating that Green misrepresented
Richardson’s qualifications, and that she had no intention of
introducing evidence of his treatment of them.
The trial court
granted the motion in limine and excluded the testimony,
reasoning that although the evidence was relevant and probative,
its effect would be unduly prejudicial based upon the nature of
the case.
Pursuant to KRE 404(b)(1), evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove a person’s character
unless it is offered for another purpose, “such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
In Bell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 882 (1994), the Supreme Court set
out a three-prong test regarding the admission of evidence
concerning other crimes, wrongs or acts, which includes the
relevance and probativeness of the evidence as well as whether
its prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
Pursuant to Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945
(1999),
[t]he balancing of the probative value of
such evidence against the danger of undue
prejudice is a task properly reserved for the
sound discretion of the trial judge. . . .
The standard of review is whether there has
been an abuse of that discretion. . . . The
test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
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unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles. (citations omitted)
In the present matter, the trial court found that the evidence
of similar acts was both relevant and probative, but that it was
unduly prejudicial.
Having reviewed the decision, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
the motion in limine and not allowing Blair to introduce
testimony from any of Green’s other patients.
Blair has also argued that the trial court erred by
not allowing her to introduce testimony regarding the likelihood
of harm to others, profitability, and duration.
Again, we agree
with Green that Blair had the opportunity to present such
evidence and did in fact produce some such evidence.
2) LIMITATION ON PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
Blair argues that the trial court improperly limited
her discovery by 1) staying discovery in all civil actions
against Green pending the resolution of criminal proceedings
against him, 2) finding that Green had a right to assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege and then not allowing her an adverse
inference instruction based upon his refusal to testify, 3)
temporarily consolidating the civil actions for common discovery
purposes, and 4) appointing a guardian ad litem for Richardson.
Green countered each argument in his brief.
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As to the issue of consolidation for common discovery,
the Court of Appeals in Ray v. Stone, Ky.App., 952 S.W.2d 220,
223 (1997), stated, “[t]he civil rules afford a trial court
broad power to control discovery and prevent its abuse.”
As in
the Ray case, Blair cannot establish that she was deprived of
her meaningful right to discovery.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing for common discovery based upon
the large number of lawsuits against Green and Richardson for
which similar discovery would be propounded.
Furthermore, Blair
was permitted to withdraw from common discovery months prior to
trial and to proceed with her own discovery.
Therefore, she
cannot argue that she was denied the opportunity to obtain
discovery.
Furthermore, we agree with Green that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in staying the matter or in making
its determination regarding Green’s right to assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
The trial court stayed the matter only as
it pertained to the discovery of information that may require
Green or Richardson to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, and
the stay only lasted about four months.
Additionally, Green
never asserted his Fifth Amendment right so that Blair would not
be entitled to a reverse inference instruction.
Lastly, we cannot determine what harm as far as
increased costs Blair could have incurred as a result of the
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appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Following the trial in the
matter, the trial court assigned the cost associated to the
guardian ad litem to Green.
GREEN’S “ADMISSIONS”
1) ADMISSION OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE DURING ALFORD PLEA
Blair argues that the trial court improperly excluded
Green’s admission, made during his Alford4 plea at his criminal
trial, that he was grossly negligent, likening this statement to
a judicial admission.
Green, on the other hand, argues that the
trial court properly excluded this statement pursuant to KRE 410
and properly excluded the avowal testimony of investigator Art
Rodgers in regard to the Alford plea.
It is undisputed that the testimony Blair sought to
introduce into evidence was Green’s statement made during his
Alford plea that he was grossly negligent in the matter.
Blair
is correct that Green made this statement on the record and in
open court.
However, KRE 410(2) provides that “evidence of the
following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding,
admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a
participant in the plea discussions: . . .
(2) . . . a plea
under Alford v. North Carolina, 394 U.S. 956 (1969).”
KRE
410(3) also provides that statements made during the course of
an Alford plea negotiation are also inadmissible.
4
Therefore,
Alford v. United States, 400 U.S. 24, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162,
171 (1970).
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the trial court properly excluded both Green’s statement and the
avowal testimony of Art Rodgers and did not abuse its discretion
in doing so.
2) ADMISSION ON CROSS-EXAMINATION DURING TRIAL
Finally, we address Blair’s argument that Green
admitted during the trial that his medical treatment of her fell
below the standard of care, entitling her to a directed verdict
on liability.
Green argues that he never admitted that the
medical treatment rendered to Blair fell below the standard of
care.
Green merely acknowledged that in retrospect, he should
not have used Richardson in the way that he did, although at the
time he thought he was using him as a surgical assistant.
We agree with Green that this issue properly went to
the jury for a factual finding regarding whether the level of
medical treatment provided was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
William Clifton Travis
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Gregory King
Louisville, KY
Stephen C. Hall
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen C. Hall
Louisville, KY
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