CLAUDE JOHNSON, GRANVILLE JOHNSON, MOLLIE THORNBURY, PRISCILLA STILTNER, ESTATES OF BEN JOHNSON AND HAZEL JOHNSON, MARTHA KINDER and CHARLIE JOHNSON v. RAY THORNBURY, CHURCH AND MULLINS CORPORATION, APPALACHIAN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND PANTHER LAND CORPORATION
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000833-MR
CLAUDE JOHNSON, GRANVILLE JOHNSON,
MOLLIE THORNBURY, PRISCILLA STILTNER,
ESTATES OF BEN JOHNSON AND HAZEL JOHNSON,
MARTHA KINDER and CHARLIE JOHNSON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00698
RAY THORNBURY, CHURCH AND
MULLINS CORPORATION, APPALACHIAN
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
AND PANTHER LAND CORPORATION
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Several heirs and estates of deceased heirs
of John Johnson appeal from a summary judgment entered by the
Pike Circuit Court in favor of Ray Thornbury, Church and Mullins
Corporation, Appalachian Mineral Development Corporation, and
Panther Land Corporation.
We affirm.
John Johnson owned 375 acres of land known as Tract 42
on Three-Mile Creek in Pike County, Kentucky.
In 1964,
Bethlehem Minerals Company claimed ownership to the mineral
rights of this property contrary to Johnson’s ownership rights.
After Johnson forcefully evicted a survey team from Bethlehem
from the property, Bethlehem filed suit against Johnson in the
Pike Circuit Court.
Bethlehem was allowed to continue with its
survey operations during the pendency of the case, and in 1968
it removed more than 3,000 tons of coal from the disputed
property without giving notice to the court or Johnson that it
was conducting mining operations on the property.
In 1970, Johnson entered into a lease agreement with
another coal company, Church and Mullins Corporation.
In 1971,
Bethlehem filed an amended complaint in the Pike Circuit Court
adding Church and Mullins as a named defendant and seeking to
quiet title to the mineral rights to the property.
Bethlehem
also obtained a temporary injunction against Johnson and Church
and Mullins prohibiting them from conducting further mining
pending a determination as to the ownership of the mineral
rights.
Bethlehem continued its mining operations while the
case was pending, and it eventually removed several hundred
thousand tons of coal from the property.
In 1975, Johnson and Church and Mullins learned of
Bethlehem’s continued operations and filed suit claiming willful
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trespass.1
While the claim was pending, Johnson came into
contact with Ray Thornbury.
Thornbury was then active as a “go
between” for labor and management for the United Mine Workers
Union.
Johnson apparently sought out Thornbury to seek
assistance in carrying his end of the pending litigation with
Bethlehem.
On October 21, 1977, Johnson, Thornbury, and Church
and Mullins signed an agreement addressing issues concerning the
pending legal action with Bethlehem.
The agreement first
addressed how litigation expenses would be handled as well as
how any recovery would be divided.
The agreement specified that
one-third of the proceeds from any recovery from Bethlehem would
be paid to Johnson and that the remaining two-thirds of the
proceeds would go to Church and Mullins.
The agreement also
addressed the parties’ intent to enter into future agreements.
According to the terms of this portion of the agreement, Church
and Mullins was to release any and all interest it held based on
the original 1970 lease back to Johnson.
Johnson then agreed to
lease to Thornbury, and Thornbury agreed to sublease to Church
and Mullins.
On February 21, 1978, Johnson entered into a set of
agreements concerning the mineral rights to the disputed
1
It is unclear from the record whether this claim was asserted as a
counterclaim in the 1964 case or was filed as a separate action.
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property.
The first document, identified as the “Master Lease,”
was between Johnson and Thornbury.
The second document, known
as the “Master Sublease,” was from Johnson and Thornbury to
Church and Mullins.
The Master Sublease was for a 25-year
period with an option to renew for an additional 25 years.
The Master Lease did not contain any contingent
provisions.
The Master Sublease contained at least two
provisions tied to the entry of a nonappealable order in the
litigation with Bethlehem.
The first provision stated that
minimum royalties would be due Thornbury “commencing sixty (60)
days after the entry of the final nonappealable order
adjudicating the leasor [Johnson] as owner of the minerals on
Tract 42.”
The second provision stated that Church and Mullins
agreed to commence operations upon Tract 42 within six months
after the entry of a final nonappealable order adjudicating
Johnson as the owner of the minerals on the property.
Johnson died in 1984.
After a 1986 judgment by the
trial court and subsequent appellate proceedings before this
court, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered an opinion on June 4,
1992, finally deciding the dispute between Bethlehem, Johnson,
and Church and Mullins.
See Church and Mullins Corp. v.
Bethlehem Minerals Co., Ky., 887 S.W.2d 321 (1992).
The court
upheld the trial court’s recognition of Johnson’s ownership
interest and its determination that Bethlehem was a willful
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trespasser.
As the Johnson heirs and Church and Mullins had
stipulated to the terms contained in the 1977 agreement, the
Johnson heirs received one-third of an award of $16,947,778
(after expenses and attorney fees were first deducted).
The
supreme court denied a petition for rehearing in November 1994.
On January 25, 1994, following the supreme court’s
opinion in the Bethlehem litigation, but before the petition for
rehearing was denied, the mineral rights to Tract 42 were
subleased yet again.
Church and Mullins, along with its sole
shareholder, Appalachian Mineral Development Corporation,
entered into a sublease contract with Panther Land Corporation.
Panther then began the necessary preparatory action required to
begin mining operations, including initiating the permitting
process.2
On May 21, 1998, the Johnson heirs filed a complaint
in the Pike Circuit Court against Thornbury, Church and Mullins,
Appalachian Mineral, and Panther.
Count I of the complaint
alleged that the Master Lease and Master Sublease entered into
on February 21, 1978, were void because Johnson did not
knowingly enter into the agreements.
alleged fraud and/or mistake.
This count essentially
Count II challenged the validity
of the agreements based on Johnson’s alleged lack of capacity.
2
Panther did not actually begin removing coal until May 1998.
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Count III sought an injunction to enjoy further mining on Tract
42.
The Johnson heirs filed an amended complaint in
November 1998 asserting claims for breach of contract.
Specifically, they alleged that mining did not begin within six
months of the nonappealable order in the Bethlehem litigation as
required by the Master Sublease.
They further alleged that the
terms of the Master Lease were unconscionable as to the amount
of royalties to be paid to Johnson.
The trial court entered summary judgment against the
Johnson heirs on November 22, 1999.
The Johnson heirs filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied based on a
procedural issue.
A panel of this court subsequently reversed
the trial court on the procedural issue.
Upon remand the trial
court held a second hearing on the motion to reconsider, and it
again denied the motion.
This appeal by the Johnson heirs
followed.
The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of
the appellees and against the Johnson heirs on two separate
grounds.
First, the trial court held that the Johnson heirs
could not contest the validity of the 1978 Master Lease and
Master Sublease because they asserted that the leases were valid
in the Bethlehem litigation.
Second, the trial court held that
the appellees were entitled to summary judgment because the
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applicable statutes of limitation had run on the Johnson heirs’
claims.
On appeal, the Johnson heirs first argue that their
claims contesting the validity of the 1978 leases are neither
barred by res judicata or any other theory of estoppel nor are
they barred by any statutes of limitation.
Because we conclude
that Counts I and II of the Johnson heirs’ complaint were barred
by statutes of limitation, we will not address whether their
claims were also barred by res judicata or any other theory of
estoppel.
Count I of the complaint alleged that Johnson did not
knowingly enter into the 1978 leases but that he was induced to
enter into such leases due to fraud and/or mistake.
Citing KRS3
413.120(12), the trial court held that the five-year statute of
limitation therein was applicable and that any action based on
fraud or mistake should have been brought within five years
after the execution of the leases.
The Johnson heirs argue that the trial court erred in
its holding that the five-year limitation period began to run at
the signing of the leases.
They contend that their cause of
action did not accrue until the conclusion of the Bethlehem
litigation.
3
In support of that argument, the Johnson heirs
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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point to the fact that the royalty payments to Thornbury under
the Master Sublease were tied to the conclusion of the Bethlehem
litigation and that the Master Sublease also contained a clause
requiring Church and Mullins to commence operations within six
months after the conclusion of the Bethlehem litigation.4
In support of their arguments, the Johnson heirs cite
Forwood v. City of Louisville, 283 Ky. 208, 140 S.W.2d 1048
(1940).
Quoting general authority, the court therein stated
that “[w]here a party’s right depends upon the happening of a
certain event in the future, the cause of action accrues and the
statute begins to run only from the time when the event
happens.”
283 Ky. at 214.
We are not persuaded by this argument.
Johnson signed
the leases in 1978, and the Johnson heirs acknowledged that they
were aware of the leases as early as 1982.
The Master Lease
between Johnson and Thornbury did not contain any condition
contingent upon the settlement of the Bethlehem litigation.
As
for the Master Sublease, while it contained provisions that were
contingent upon the conclusion of the Bethlehem litigation, it
also gave Church and Mullins rights that could be exercised
without restriction.
For example, paragraph 12 of the Master
Sublease gave Church and Mullins the right to “sell, assign,
4
The Johnson heirs overlook the fact that the Master Lease from
Johnson to Thornbury did not contain conditions tied to the conclusion
of the Bethlehem litigation.
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transfer and sublease (this sublease) without restriction.”
In
short, we agree with the trial court that Count I of the Johnson
heirs’ complaint based on fraud and/or mistake was barred by KRS
413.120(12) when it was filed in 1998.
Count II of the Johnson heirs’ complaint alleged that
Johnson lacked the capacity to enter into the Master Lease and
Master Sublease.
The trial court held in its judgment that this
claim was barred by the statute of limitation set forth in KRS
413.090(2).
That statute provides, in part, that an action upon
a written contract shall be commenced within fifteen years after
the cause of action first accrued.
Id.
As the leases were
entered into in 1978, the court reasoned that the action had to
have been brought by no later than 1993.
The Johnson heirs
again argue that the cause of action did not accrue until after
the conclusion of the Bethlehem litigation.
Assuming the
fifteen-year statute of limitation in KRS 413.090(2) is
applicable to this claim, we again agree with the trial court
that the action was time-barred for the reasons set forth above.
Next, the Johnson heirs contend that the trial court
did not address their contention that the Master Lease from
Johnson to Thornbury was unconscionable.
While it is true that
the court did not address this issue in its judgment, we
conclude that it effectively did so when it denied the motion to
reconsider.
There was no provision in the Master Lease that
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Johnson would receive an increase on the price-per-ton for coal
mined as the years passed.
However, the Master Sublease to
Church and Mullins contained a provision for an increase for
price-per-ton equal to the standard and customary royalty then
in effect for other coal leases in Pike County.
The Johnson
heirs argue that provisions such as that in the Master Lease
have been found to be unconscionable.
The only authority cited
by the Johnson heirs to support their argument is Kansas Baptist
Conv. v. MESA Operating Ltd. Partnership, 864 P.2d 204 (Ks.
1993).
We reject this argument by the Johnson heirs for two
reasons.
First, other than by their arguments above which we
have rejected, the Johnson heirs do not demonstrate why this
claim would not also be time-barred due to the fifteen-year
statute of limitation set forth in KRS 413.090(2).
Second, the
Johnson heirs have not cited any Kentucky authority and have not
otherwise persuaded us why relief should be given on this
ground.
In fact, they failed to make reference in their brief
to any evidence that the lease term regarding royalties to
Johnson was unconscionable.
The Master Lease may have been a
bad bargain, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the lease provision was unconscionable.
The Johnson heirs also argue that summary judgment in
favor of the appellees was not warranted because there were fact
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issues regarding whether the Master Sublease was breached.
Again, although the trial court did not specifically address
these allegations, we conclude that it rejected these arguments
when it ruled on the Johnson heirs’ motion to reconsider.
In this regard, the Johnson heirs first argue that the
Master Sublease required mining to begin within six months after
the entry of a nonappealable final order in the Bethlehem
litigation and that such mining did not commence within that
time.
The Bethlehem litigation was finally concluded in 1994
when the Kentucky Supreme Court denied Bethlehem’s petition for
rehearing.
Panther concedes that it did not begin mining coal
until 1998, well after six months from the entry of the
nonappealable final order.
Paragraph 6 of the Master Sublease provided that
Church and Mullins agreed to “commence operations” upon Tract 42
within six months after the entry of the order.
Because
Panther, as a subleasee of Church and Mullins, waited four years
before beginning mining operations, the Johnson heirs assert
that the lease provision was violated.
On the other hand,
Panther cites Litton v. Mountaineer Land Co., Ky., 796 S.W.2d
860 (1990), and argues that the term “commence operations” has a
broader meaning that the mere removal of the first bucket of
coal.
Panther asserts that it commenced operations “to the
extent of permitting, exploration and construction of
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infrastructure” within the time period stated in the Master
Sublease.
The Johnson heirs do not dispute this assertion, but
they rely on the fact that the actual mining did not begin until
1998.
We agree with Panther that the Litton case is
dispositive.
As the court therein stated, “surface mining
requires more than mere removal of coal.”
Id. at 861.
In the
case sub judice, the Johnson heirs do not dispute that Panther
began operations, in accordance with the provision in the Master
Sublease, which would eventually lead to the actual mining of
coal.
Again, we find no error in the granting of summary
judgment in favor of the appellees.
Finally, the Johnson heirs contend that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on the breach of lease
issue because there were fact issues concerning whether the
property taxes were paid in accordance with the Master Sublease.
This allegation was not raised in either the complaint or
amended complaint.
Nevertheless, we find no merit in the
argument.
The appellees argue that even if the taxes had not
been paid, they were never given notice and an opportunity to
cure the breach as required by the contract.
Further, citing
Duff v. Duff, 205 Ky. 10, 265 S.W. 305, 306 (1924), the
appellees assert that even if there was a breach of the lease in
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this regard, the remedy would be for a claim for damages not a
claim for forfeiture of the entire contract.
As the Johnson
heirs have not disputed this argument, we accept it.
The judgment of the Pike Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Ronald D. Bowling
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, RAY
THORNBURY, CHURCH AND MULLINS
and APPALACHIAN MINERAL
DEVELOPMENT CORP.:
Herman W. Lester
Pikeville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, PANTHER
LAND CORP.:
Robert J. Patton
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
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