KELLY JO ANDERSON (F/K/A KELLY JO THURMAN) v. DONALD GREGORY THURMAN
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RENDERED:
August 1, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000832-MR
KELLY JO ANDERSON (F/K/A KELLY JO THURMAN)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00157
v.
DONALD GREGORY THURMAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Kelly Jo Anderson (formerly Kelly Jo Thurman)
appeals from an order of the Anderson Circuit Court which
granted her motion to increase the child-support obligation of
her former husband, Donald Gregory Thurman.
She argues that the
trial court erred by failing to include Donald’s capital gains
as income in its calculation under the child-support guidelines,
and by failing to make the modification of support retroactive
to the date she filed her motion seeking an exchange of
financial information.
We agree that the trial court erred by
excluding the capital gains from Donald’s income.
However, the
trial court did not err by making the modification of support
effective only from the date that Kelly Jo filed that motion.
Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
Kelly Jo and Donald Thurman were married on April 6,
1991.
Two children were born of the marriage.
In August of
1999, Donald filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in
the Shelby Circuit Court.
On April 19, 2000, that court entered
a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage and adopting their
separation and property settlement agreement.
Under that agreement, the parties agreed to joint
custody of the children, with Kelly Jo designated as the primary
residential custodian.
Donald agreed to pay child support in
the amount of $500.00 per month for 60 days, and $152.87 per
week thereafter.
In May of 2001, Donald filed a motion to
increase his visitation and to set a specific holiday visitation
schedule.
He also moved the court to transfer the action to
Anderson County, where all of the parties and the children now
reside.
As Kelly Jo had no objection to the motion for a change
of venue, the Shelby Circuit Court ordered the case transferred
to the Anderson Circuit Court on June 12, 2001.
2
Around the same time, Kelly Jo filed a motion to
require the parties to exchange financial information to
determine if a child-support modification was warranted.
Prior
to transferring the case, the Shelby Circuit Court granted the
motion.
Following the transfer, Kelly Jo renewed her motion,
which the Anderson Circuit Court granted in an order entered on
October 2, 2001.
On January 24, 2002, Kelly Jo formally made a motion
for modification of child support.
She noted that Donald had
reported $16,419.00 of capital gains on his 2000 tax return and
$2,096.00 of capital gains on his 2001 tax return.
Based on the
application of the child-support guidelines, Kelly Jo sought
child support in the amount of $1,146.28.
In an order entered on March 21, 2002, the trial court
held it had the discretion to exclude the capital gains from its
calculation of Donald’s income.
Based upon the application of
the child-support guidelines to the parties’ income without
consideration of the capital gains, the trial court ordered that
Donald’s child support obligation be increased to $218.30 per
week, or $946.00 per month.
The trial court also denied Kelly
Jo’s motion to make the increase retroactive to June of 2001.
Rather, the court made the increase retroactive only to January
1, 2002.
This appeal followed.
3
Kelly Jo first argues that the trial court erred by
excluding Donald’s capital gains income from its calculation
under the child-support guidelines.
We agree.
In Clary v.
Clary,1 this court noted that KRS 403.212(2)(b) defines "gross
income" broadly to include income from any source and explicitly
includes capital gains.
The statute does not specifically
exclude non-recurring income and the list includes items, such
as bonuses, gifts, severance pay, and prizes, that are typically
Consequently, Clary holds that
singular, non-recurring events.
when a parent receives income from a non-recurring event, the
trial court must include that amount in the year received and
then apply the guidelines pursuant to the table in KRS 403.212
to determine the child-support obligation.2
Based upon its reading of Clary, the trial court
concluded that it had discretion to refuse to include capital
gains as gross income.
incorrect.
This interpretation of Clary was
Although a court has discretion to deviate from the
amount established under the guidelines, it does not have
discretion to exclude a party’s capital gains from his or her
gross income.
1
Ky. App., 54 S.W.3d 568 (2001).
2
Id. at 574.
4
Donald urges that, given the unique circumstances of
this case, his capital gains income for 2000 and 2001 should not
be considered when calculating his child-support obligation.
Donald states that he realized these gains from the sale of
marital property, and that he used the proceeds to reimburse
Kelly Jo for her interest in the marital residence and the
retirement accounts, as required by the property settlement
agreement.
Donald also notes that he had been required to pay
taxes on these gains.
Consequently, Donald argues that the
trial court should not be required to consider these capital
gains when calculating his income for child-support purposes.
We are not unsympathetic to this reasoning.
However,
KRS 403.212(2)(b) and Clary require the trial court to include
capital gains as gross income, even if the gain is based upon a
single, non-recurring sale.
A trial court is not permitted to
consider the reasons why the gains were realized.
Moreover, KRS
403.211(3) requires a trial court to make a specific finding
that the application of the child-support guidelines would be
unjust or inappropriate before it may deviate from the amount
specified by the guidelines.
The trial court made no such
findings, nor does Donald argue that any of the factors set out
in KRS 403.211(3)(a)-(g) apply in this case.
Consequently, we hold that the trial court’s
calculation of Donald’s income was clearly erroneous, and this
5
matter must be remanded to the trial court for a proper
calculation of his child-support obligation.
We recognize that,
since Donald’s capital gains were based on a non-recurring
event, he will have to return to court to seek another
adjustment of his support obligation.
While this will
undoubtedly be inconvenient for both parties, we must conclude
that this is what the statute requires.
Kelly Jo next argues that the trial court erred by
making the modification of child support retroactive only to
January of 2002, rather than June of 2001.
We disagree.
“The
provisions of any decree respecting child support may be
modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the
filing of the motion for modification . . . ”.3
Kelly Jo’s June
7, 2001 motion, in which she asked the court to require the
parties to exchange financial information, cannot be considered
the equivalent of a motion to modify child support.4
3
KRS 403.213(1). See also Giacalone v. Giacalone, Ky. App., 876
S.W.2d 616, 620 (1994).
4
Kelly Jo’s motion states, in pertinent part, as follows: “Comes
the Petitioner and moves the Court to require the parties to
exchange current financial information for the purpose of
determining whether it is appropriate for there to be a
modification of the child support. Petitioner then moves the
Court that if the financial income of the parties and the
recognized expenses justify a modification of the child support,
then said child support should be modified”.
While the second
sentence of the motion could be construed as a motion to modify
child support, the language used is conditional upon the court
entering an order requiring an exchange of financial
6
Furthermore, there is no allegation that Donald engaged in any
unnecessary delay which prevented Kelly Jo from filing an
earlier motion to modify child support.
Consequently, the trial
court did not err in making the modification of support
retroactive to January of 2002.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Anderson Circuit
Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a
re-calculation of the child support as set out in this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Michael J. Judy
Johnson, Judy, True &
Guarnieri, LLP
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael L.
Michael L.
Associates
Frankfort,
Hawkins
Hawkins &
PLLC
Kentucky
information. Indeed, her January 24, 2002, motion asks the
trial court to enter an amended support order based upon the
information provided by Donald. Consequently, we do not read
her motion as a current motion to modify child support, but only
as expressing an intention to move for a modification of child
support should the financial information support it.
7
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