EUNA FAYE RICHARDSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000823-MR
EUNA FAYE RICHARDSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00017
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Euna Faye Richardson has appealed from the
final judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered by the
Fayette Circuit Court on March 26, 2002, which convicted her of
assault in the third degree1 and alcohol intoxication.2
Having
concluded that Richardson’s level of intoxication was a factual
issue for the jury to resolve and that any error on the part of
the trial court was harmless, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.025.
2
KRS 222.202.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute.
On October 21, 2001, at approximately 11:20 p.m., Officer
Richard Rice of the Lexington Metro Police Department (LMPD) was
assisting a fellow officer with a traffic stop at the corner of
Seventh Street and Harry Alley in Lexington, Kentucky, when a
bystander informed him that a woman was passed out in the street
around the corner.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Rice found
Richardson sitting in the street at the intersection of Seventh
and Limestone.
Officer Rice approached Richardson and asked her
to move out of the street, which she refused to do.
Consequently, Officer Rice grabbed Richardson by the arm and
placed her on the sidewalk.
Officer Rice then attempted to
obtain Richardson’s name and address, which she refused to
provide.
According to Officer Rice, Richardson was very
belligerent and combative.
Suspecting that Richardson might be
intoxicated, Officer Rice administered a preliminary breath test
which indicated that Richardson had a blood alcohol content of
.126.
At this point, Richardson was handcuffed, placed under
arrest, and transported to the Fayette County Detention Center.
Once they arrived at the detention center, Officer
Rice escorted Richardson to a small holding room located within
the detention center.3
Officer Rice instructed Richardson to
3
The holding room serves as a vestibule to the triage or intake area of the
detention center. Arrestees are placed in the holding room while the
arresting officer completes the necessary paperwork. After this process is
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take a seat on a metal bench located within the room while he
completed the necessary paperwork.
Officer Rice then proceeded
through an open door to a separate room directly adjacent to the
holding room, at which time he began filling out his report.
Richardson, however, refused to cooperate and demanded that
Officer Rice take her directly to jail.
Richardson refused to
remain seated and she began yelling at Officer Rice.
At this
point, Officer Glenna Baker, an employee of the detention
center, opened the door to the holding room and asked Officer
Rice if he was finished filling out his report.
Officer Rice
informed Officer Baker that he had a few more questions for
Richardson.
Richardson then proceeded through the door that led
to the triage area and informed Officer Baker that she was ready
to go to jail.
Officer Baker told Richardson that she needed to
return to the holding room until Officer Rice completed his
report.
Richardson responded, “What do you want me to do?
Do
you want me to go back out there and suck that nigger’s dick?”
Officer Baker again told Richardson, who was still handcuffed,
that she needed to return to the holding room until Officer Rice
completed his report.
At first, Richardson appeared to comply,
however, she abruptly turned around and kicked Officer Baker in
completed, the arrestee is escorted through a door which leads to the triage
area. At this point, the arrestee is transferred to a detention center
officer, patted down, and a booking record is compiled.
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the stomach.
Richardson was then subdued and placed in a
holding cell.4
On January 8, 2002, Richardson was indicted by a
Fayette County grand jury for assault in the third degree and
alcohol intoxication.
On January 18, 2002, Richardson was
arraigned and pled not guilty to the charges.
Richardson’s case
was tried before a Fayette County jury on February 28, 2002.
Prior to the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case
in chief, but after the jury was impaneled and sworn, Richardson
filed a motion in limine to suppress the racial epithet
concerning Officer Rice.
Richardson claimed the statement was
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The Commonwealth argued that
the statement went to Richardson’s state of mind since it was so
close in time to the alleged assault.
The trial court denied
the motion in limine but agreed to admonish the jury not to
consider the statement as evidence of Richardson’s guilt.
Officers Rice, Baker, Estes, and Tringali testified on
behalf of the Commonwealth.
Each officer described in detail
the events that transpired at the detention center on the
evening of October 21, 2001, and the early morning hours of
October 22, 2001.
In sum, Officer Baker testified that
Richardson was hostile and verbally combative from the moment
she arrived at the detention center.
4
Officer Baker recounted
Officer Ben Estes and Officer Gina Tringali, both employees of the detention
center, assisted Officer Baker in subduing Richardson.
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her instructions for Richardson to return to the holding room
and Richardson’s lewd, racially derogatory comment.5
Officer
Baker then went on to testify that when she told Richardson to
return to the holding room for the second time, Richardson
abruptly turned around and kicked her in the stomach.
Officers
Rice, Estes, and Tringali all testified that they witnessed
Richardson kick Officer Baker in the stomach.
Each officer also
stated that Richardson appeared to be intoxicated when she was
brought into the detention center.6
After the Commonwealth
rested its case, Richardson moved for a directed verdict of
acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, which was
summarily denied.
Richardson testified in her own defense and denied
having any recollection of the events that transpired at the
detention center on the evening of October 21, 2001, and the
early morning hours of October 22, 2001.
Richardson claimed
that she started drinking tequila when she woke up on October
21, 2001.
Richardson stated that she proceeded to Al’s Bar,
which is located in Lexington, sometime between 12:00 and 1:00
5
At this point, defense counsel requested an admonition.
admonished the jury as follows:
The trial court
The testimony that the defendant made a racial
comment shall not be used to draw an inference that
the defendant is guilty of the charged offenses on
account of whatever her views on race might be.
6
When asked if Richardson seemed very intoxicated, Officer Tringali responded
in the negative.
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p.m. that afternoon.
According to Richardson, she left Al’s Bar
sometime prior to 4:00 p.m. and proceeded to the Waterin’ Hole
Saloon, another Lexington bar.
Richardson stated that she
started drinking double shots of tequila once she arrived at the
Waterin’ Hole.
Richardson testified that the last thing she
remembered was playing pool at the Waterin’ Hole around 4:00
p.m. that afternoon.
Richardson further testified that she woke
up in the detention center the following morning with a hangover
and absolutely no recollection of the events that transpired the
night before.
After resting her case, Richardson again moved
for a directed verdict of acquittal based on insufficiency of
the evidence, which was also denied.
The jury found Richardson guilty of assault in third
degree and alcohol intoxication.
The jury instructions read, in
relevant part, as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 2
THIRD DEGREE ASSAULT
You will find the Defendant guilty of ThirdDegree Assault under this Instruction, if,
and only if, you believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
following:
A. That in this county on or about the 21st
day of October, 2001 and before the finding
of the Indictment herein, she intentionally
inflicted a physical injury upon Glenna
Baker;
AND
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B. That Glenna Baker was an employee of
Fayette County Detention Center.7
. . .
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
THIRD DEGREE ASSAULT
If you do not find the Defendant guilty
under Instruction No. 2, you will find the
Defendant guilty of Third-Degree Assault
under this Instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about the 21st
day of October, 2001 and before the finding
of the Indictment herein, she wantonly
inflicted physical injury upon Glenna Baker;
AND
B. That Glenna Baker was an employee of the
Fayette County Detention Center and the
Defendant was a person confined in that
facility.8
. . .
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
If you do not find the Defendant guilty
under Instruction No. 2 or 3, you will find
the Defendant guilty of Fourth-Degree
Assault under this Instruction if, and only
if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about [the]
21st day of October, 2001 and within 12
months before the finding of the Indictment
7
See KRS 508.025(1)(a).
8
See KRS 508.025(1)(b).
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herein, she wantonly caused physical injury
to Glenna Baker by kicking her.9
. . .
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
INTOXICATION DEFENSE
Even though the defendant might otherwise be
guilty of Intentional Third-Degree Assault
under Instruction No. 2, you shall not find
her guilty under those instructions if at
the time she committed the offense (if she
did so), she was so intoxicated that she did
not form the intention to commit the
offense.
. . .
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
DEFINITIONS
Intentionally--A person acts intentionally
with respect to a result or to conduct when
her conscious objective is to cause that
result or to engage in that conduct.
. . .
Wantonly--A person acts wantonly with
respect to a result or to a circumstance
when he is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of
such nature and degree that disregard
thereof constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation. A
person who creates such a risk but is
unaware thereof solely by reason of
voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly
with respect thereto.
9
See KRS 508.030.
-8-
The jury found Richardson guilty under Instruction No. 2.
On March 26, 2002, the trial court sentenced
Richardson to an indeterminate term of confinement not to exceed
23 months.10
This appeal followed.
Richardson argues on appeal that the trial court erred
by not granting her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
Richardson’s argument in this regard is two-fold.
First,
Richardson claims the Commonwealth failed to prove that she
possessed the requisite degree of intent required under KRS
508.025(1)(a).
Second, Richardson claims the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury that she could be found guilty
under KRS 508.025(1)(b).
The standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is well established.
In Commonwealth v. Benham,11 our Supreme Court stated:
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
10
Richardson was ordered to pay a $25.00 fine for the alcohol intoxication
conviction.
11
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
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jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable
for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal [citation omitted].
Richardson contends that the trial court should have
granted a directed verdict of acquittal in her favor because the
Commonwealth failed to prove the requisite degree of intent
required under KRS 508.025(1)(a), which reads, in relevant part,
as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the
third degree when the actor:
(a) Recklessly, with a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument, or intentionally
causes or attempts to cause physical injury
to:
. . .
2. An employee of a detention facility[.]
In order to obtain a conviction under KRS
508.025(1)(a), the Commonwealth was required to prove that
Richardson acted intentionally.12
Voluntary intoxication is a
defense to a criminal charge only when it “‘negatives the
12
See, e.g., Robert G. Lawson and William H. Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law,
§ 9-2(d)(2) at 377 (1998).
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existence of an element of the offense.’”13
“If the posture of
the evidence is such that an issue of fact is raised showing
intoxication to such a degree that the defendant was unable to
form the requisite intent where the charge is for a specific
intent crime, then the defendant is entitled to an instruction
on this defense[.]”14
There was evidence at trial that Richardson was
extremely intoxicated when the assault occurred.
Thus,
Richardson properly received a jury instruction on this issue.
Richardson was not, however, entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
The testimony elicited at trial demonstrates that
Richardson’s level of intoxication was disputed.
Simply put,
“[Richardson’s] alcohol intoxication may have been at a level to
support being arrested for public intoxication but still not to
a level where she did not know what she was doing.”15
There was
sufficient evidence to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that Richardson was so intoxicated
that she did not form the intent to assault Officer Baker, but
13
Rogers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 86 S.W.3d 29, 44 (2002) (quoting Mishler v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 556 S.W.2d 676, 679 (1977)). See also Kentucky Criminal
Law, supra § 2-6(b)(1) at 86.
14
Mishler, supra at 680.
15
Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670, 677 (1991). See also Meadows
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 511, 513 (1977); and Jewell v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Payne v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 867, 870 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909, 72
L.Ed.2d 167, 102 S.Ct. 1758 (1982). “Mere drunkenness will not raise the
defense of intoxication.” Id.
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there was also sufficient evidence to support a finding that she
acted intentionally in assaulting Officer Baker.
Thus, the
question of whether Richardson was so intoxicated that she was
incapable of forming intent as required under the statute was a
factual issue for the jury to resolve.16
Richardson next argues that the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury that she could be found guilty
under KRS 508.025(1)(b),17 which reads, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the
third degree when the actor:
(b) Being a person confined in a detention
facility . . . inflicts physical injury upon
. . . an employee of the facility.18
Richardson contends that KRS 508.025(1)(b) only
applies to “prison inmates.”
Richardson asserts that she was
not an “inmate” because she had not been booked into the
detention center database when the assault occurred.
We reject
16
See Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1997). “[Q]uestions
of credibility and weight of the evidence are jury matters.” Id. See also
Schwachter v. United States, 237 F.2d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 1956). “[A] trial
judge in a criminal case cannot weigh the evidence or judge the credibility
of witnesses and take from the jury a controverted question of material fact,
no matter how strongly he may be of the opinion that the evidence established
the fact beyond a reasonable doubt” [citations omitted]. Id.
17
This argument is rendered moot in light
level of intoxication was a factual issue
Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, we
eliminate any doubt as to the validity of
18
of our conclusion that Richardson’s
for the jury to resolve.
will address this issue so as to
Richardson’s conviction.
KRS 508.025(1)(b) does not expressly designate a culpable mental state. In
Covington v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 849 S.W.2d 560, 562 (1992), this Court
held that KRS 508.025(1)(b) requires a mens rea of intentionally or wantonly.
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this argument.
KRS 508.025(1)(b) draws no distinction between
arrestees who have yet to be booked and “inmates.”
The statute
applies to all persons “confined in a detention facility.”
There is no dispute that the Fayette County Detention Center is
a detention facility.19
Moreover, Richardson was clearly
confined within the detention center when the assault occurred.20
Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury that
Richardson could be found guilty under KRS 508.025(1)(b) if she
acted wantonly.
Furthermore, since Richardson was found guilty
under Instruction No. 2, there was no need for the jury to even
consider Richardson’s guilt under Instruction No. 3.
Richardson next contends that the trial court
committed reversible error when it failed to exclude the racial
epithet concerning Officer Rice.
We disagree.
First and foremost, this issue is unpreserved.
RCr 9.22 imposes upon a party the duty
to make “known to the court the action he
desires the court to take or his objection
to the action of the court . . . .” Failure
to comply with this rule renders an error
19
In Fulton v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 849 S.W.2d 553, 556 (1992), this Court
held that the booking area of a jail fell within the statutory definition of
detention facility as it appears in KRS 520.010(4). We find the same
reasoning applicable to the case sub judice.
20
Richardson argues that she was not confined in the detention center because
she was still in the custody of Officer Rice when the assault occurred. We
find no merit in this contention. Richardson was clearly “confined” when the
assault occurred. The statute does not require the defendant to be in the
custody of an employee of the detention facility at the time of the assault.
The statute simply requires the defendant to be “a person confined in a
detention facility.”
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unpreserved. Bowers v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
555 S.W.2d 241 (1977). If a party claims
entitlement to a mistrial, he must timely
ask the court to grant him such relief.
Jenkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 795
(1972). Further, we have held that failure
to move for a mistrial following an
objection and an admonition from the court
indicates that satisfactory relief was
granted. “It is well within the realm of
valid assumption that counsel was satisfied
with the court’s admonition to the jury.”
Hunter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 4, 6
(1972). From the foregoing it is clear that
a party must timely inform the court of the
error and request the relief to which he
considers himself entitled. Otherwise, the
issue may not be raised on appeal.21
As previously discussed, Richardson requested an
admonition, which she received.
request a mistrial.
Richardson did not, however,
“[F]ailure to move for a mistrial following
an objection and admonition from the court indicates
satisfactory relief was granted.”22
Stated otherwise, “[i]t was
incumbent on [Richardson], if [she] felt that the admonition was
inadequate, to move the trial court for a further admonition or
to move for a mistrial” [citation omitted].23
Notwithstanding, any error on the part of the trial
court in this respect was clearly harmless in light of the
overwhelming evidence against Richardson.
21
Officer Baker
West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1989).
22
Derossett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 867 S.W.2d 195, 197 (1993). See also
Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 1.10 at 3 (3d ed.
1993 and Supp. 2002).
23
Lewis v. Charolais Corp., Ky.App., 19 S.W.3d 671, 676 (1999).
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testified that Richardson kicked her in the stomach.
Furthermore, Officers Rice, Estes, and Tringali all testified
that they witnessed Richardson kick Officer Baker in the
stomach.
Thus, we cannot say “there is any reasonable
possibility that absent the error, the verdict would have been
any different” [citations omitted].24
Finally, Richardson alleges that the prosecutor
incorrectly stated the law regarding intent in his closing
argument.
This issue is also unpreserved as Richardson failed
to object during the Commonwealth’s closing argument.25
Nevertheless, Richardson urges us to review her argument under
RCr 10.26, which provides as follows:
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
After a thorough review of the prosecutor’s closing
argument, we were unable to conclude that a palpable error
occurred.
When the prosecutor’s entire argument is considered,
it can be reasonably argued that he did not misstate the law
24
Renfro v. Commonwealth, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 795, 797 (1995). See also Harman
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 898 S.W.2d 486, 489 (1995); and RCr 9.24.
25
RCr 9.22.
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regarding intent.
Thus, whether any error occurred during the
prosecutor’s closing argument is debatable and certainly not
palpable.26
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the judgment of
conviction and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Andrew DeSimone
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
26
United States v. Henning, 286 F.3d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 2002).
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