LISA ADKINS v. JUSTICE CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; AND KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD
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RENDERED: MAY 2, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000766-MR
LISA ADKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00952
v.
JUSTICE CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; AND
KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The Appellant, Lisa Adkins (“Adkins”), seeks
review of an order of dismissal of the Franklin Circuit Court.
The Appellees are the Justice Cabinet/Department of Corrections
and the Kentucky Personnel Board.
Adkins appealed to the
circuit court from a final order of the Personnel Board.
The
circuit court dismissed on ground that the Personnel Board, an
indispensable party, was never served with summons.
We reverse.
On August 30, 1999, Adkins filed an appeal with the
Personnel Board, alleging that she “was terminated as a
correctional officer during her probationary period because of
her gender and without cause.”
On July 18, 2000, the Personnel
Board issued a final order adopting the recommended order of the
hearing officer, denying her appeal.
The final order states
that it may be appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court in
accordance with KRS 18A.100 and 13B.140
On August 17, 2000, Adkins filed a “NOTICE OF APPEAL
FROM FINAL ORDER OF KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD,” in the Franklin
Circuit Court.
The notice states: “The Personnel Board is added
as an indispensable party to this Appeal.
The Board is
requested to transmit and certify the official record to the
Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 1313.140(3)[sic].”
The
certificate of service reflects that copies of the notice were
served by U.S. mail on August 17, 2000, upon Hon. Mark A. Sipek,
attorney for Corrections,1 and upon Mr. Hansen Williams, Kentucky
Personnel Board.
The circuit court’s docket sheet reflects that
summonses were issued on August 17, 2000, to the Justice
Cabinet, Department of Corrections, and to the Kentucky
Personnel Board; however, those summonses were never served.
1
Mr. Sipek is now the attorney for the Appellee, Kentucky
Personnel Board.
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On
August 22, 2000, the record from the Personnel Board was
transferred and filed, accompanied by a cover letter addressed
to the circuit clerk.
On September 8, 2000, the Justice Cabinet filed an
answer.
On April 3, 2001, Adkins filed a motion requesting that
the court review and reverse the Personnel Board’s final order.
On May 29, 2001, the Personnel Board filed a motion to dismiss,
on ground that it was an indispensable party “or at least a
party necessary to be named to perfect an appeal of an
administrative action.”
The Personnel Board maintained that it
had never been served with summons and that the 30-day time
period for filing the action, under KRS 13B.140 had long since
expired.
Adkins filed a response, contending that KRS
13B.140(1) does not require service of summons, and that the
Board had effectively entered an appearance, by certifying the
record on appeal.
On January 29, 2002, the Franklin Circuit Court
entered an order of dismissal.
The order provides, in relevant
part:
Adkins argues that there exists a conflict
between the Kentucky Civil Rules of Procedure and
KRS 13B.140. CR 1(2) states that when the
procedural requirements of a statute are
inconsistent with the Civil Rules the statutory
procedures will prevail. Adkins argues that KRS
13B.140 requires only a petition to be served
upon the appropriate parties while CR 3.01
requires service of summons in order to initiate
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an action. Therefore, she argues they are
inconsistent.
Adkins’ argument on this point is imprecise
logic. There is no inconsistency between the two
provisions. KRS 13B.140 states in part, “copies
of the petition shall be served by the petitioner
on the agency and all parties of record.” There
is nothing in KRS 13B.140 that is inconsistent or
would override the Civil Rules as they apply with
regards to service of summons. KRS 13B.140 is
silent as to service of summons. KRS 13B.140 is
also silent as to the payment of filing fees and
signing of pleadings; however these clearly
apply. Silence does not create an inconsistency.
Furthermore, this type of appeal is an original
action filed in the Franklin County Circuit
Court. Commonwealth Transportation Cabinet v.
City of Campbellsville, Ky. App., 740 S.W.2d 162
(1987). The Board is by statute an indispensable
party to such action. Hammond v. Department for
Human Resources, Ky. App., 652 S.W.2d 91 (1983).
Since the Board is an indispensable party, it is
also necessary that the Board be served with
summons to initiate an action against them. CR
3.01. Strict compliance is required where the
legislature has statutorily granted the right of
appeal from an action of an administrative
agency. See Board of Adjustments of City of
Richmond v. Flood, Ky., 531 S.W.2d 1 (1978). No
inconsistency exists between the statute and the
civil rules in this case. The statute has been
interpreted by the Courts to include the Civil
Rules through such decisions as Hammond. 652
S.W.2d 91. Adkins did not properly commence the
action against the Board. Accordingly, they must
be dismissed as a party.
The circuit court held that the Personnel Board did
not waive service of summons by certifying the record on appeal;
further, that Adkins could not amend service of summons under CR
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4.16, where summons was never served.
Accordingly, the circuit
court granted the motion to dismiss the Personnel Board.
On February 21, 2002, the Justice Cabinet/Department
of Corrections filed a renewed motion to dismiss, on ground that
the Personnel Board was an indispensable party to the appeal.
On May 20, 2002, the circuit court granted the motion and
dismissed the appeal.
On April 11, 2002, Adkins filed a notice of appeal to
this Court.
On appeal, Adkins asserts that:
(A) THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE
KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD AS AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY TO THE APPEAL UNDER KRS 18A.100 AND
13B.140. THE BOARD’S ONLY DUTY IS TO CERTIFY THE
RECORD, A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT.
(B) THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY APPLYING THE CR
TO PERFECTING AN APPEAL UNDER KRS 13B.140 AND KRS
18A.100.
(C)
THE SUPREME COURT HAS ADOPTED A SUBSTANTIVE
[sic] COMPLIANCE STANDARD TOWARDS PERFECTION
OF APPEALS THAT PERMITS APPELLANT TO HAVE
HER APPEAL HEARD ON THE MERITS.
First, we address the argument that the circuit court
erred in applying the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
CR 1
is entitled “Title and scope of rules.” Subsection (2) provides:
These Rules govern procedure and practice in all
actions of a civil nature in the Court of Justice
except for special statutory proceedings, in
which the procedural requirements of the statute
shall prevail over any inconsistent procedures
set forth in the Rules. Regulations and manuals
published by the Administrative Office of the
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Courts upon authorization of the Supreme Court
relating to internal policy and administration
within the Court of Justice shall have the same
effect as if incorporated in the Rules.
(Emphasis added).
KRS 18A.100 provides:
(1) Any final order of the board either upholding
or invalidating the dismissal, demotion,
suspension, or other penalization of a classified
or an unclassified employee may be appealed
either by the employee or by the appointing
authority.
(2) The party aggrieved may appeal a final order
by filing a petition with the clerk of the
Franklin Circuit Court in accordance with KRS
Chapter 13B.
(Emphasis added).
KRS 13B.140 is entitled “Judicial review of final
order” and provides:
(1) All final orders of an agency shall be
subject to judicial review in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter. A party shall
institute an appeal by filing a petition in the
Circuit Court of venue, as provided in the
agency's enabling statutes, within thirty (30)
days after the final order of the agency is
mailed or delivered by personal service. If
venue for appeal is not stated in the enabling
statutes, a party may appeal to Franklin Circuit
Court or the Circuit Court of the county in which
the appealing party resides or operates a place
of business. Copies of the petition shall be
served by the petitioner upon the agency and all
parties of record. The petition shall include
the names and addresses of all parties to the
proceeding and the agency involved, and a
statement of the grounds on which the review is
requested. The petition shall be accompanied by
a copy of the final order.
Adkins argues that the civil rules do not apply to an
appeal from an administrative order to the circuit court.
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We
disagree.
KRS 23A.010(4) provides that “[t]he Circuit Court may
be authorized by law to review the actions or decisions of
administrative agencies, special districts or boards.
Such
review shall not constitute an appeal but an original action.”
CR 3.01 provides “A civil action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint with the court and the issuance of summons in good
faith.”
We agree with the circuit court that there is no
inconsistency between the provisions of KRS 13B.140, which
requires filing of a petition in circuit court, and CR 3.01
which provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint with the court and the issuance of summons in
good faith.”
2
The trial court did not believe the Personnel Board
had waived the defense of insufficiency of service of process,
because CR 12.08(1) “does not state that any other participation
in the case, such as certifying the record, will waive the
defense.”
However, CR 12.08(1) does not enumerate the ways in
2
See for example KRS 243.560, dealing with alcoholic beverage
licenses, which contemplates service by summons although KRS
13B.140 is silent on the issue. Subsection (2) provides that
“The person aggrieved by a final order may file a petition in
. . . the Franklin Circuit Court in accordance with KRS Chapter
13B.” Subsection (3) provides that ”The board and the licensee
or applicant shall be necessary parties to any appeals. . . .
[T]he board, when served with the summons, . . . shall appear
and defend the action of the board in refusing, revoking, or
suspending the license in question. (Emphasis added).
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which a defendant, by its conduct, may be estopped from
objecting to a defect in service; rather, the rule specifies the
defenses that are waived if not properly presented.
As the circuit court noted, this is a case where the
legislature has “statutorily granted” the right of appeal.
KRS
13B.140(b) mandates that “[w]ithin twenty (20) days after
service of the petition, . . . the agency shall transmit to the
reviewing court the original or certified copy of the official
record of the proceeding under review.”
Here, the Personnel
Board complied with the statutory mandate and transmitted the
certified record to the Clerk of the Franklin Circuit Court by
letter dated August 21, 2000.
The letter references both the
caption of the circuit court case and the civil action number,
“Lisa Adkins vs. Justice Cabinet Department of Corrections and
Personnel Board Civil Action No. 00-CI-00952.”
The letter
states “Pursuant to KRS 13B.140(3), please find attached the
information required to be submitted by this office as it
relates to the above-referenced case number.”
The letter is
signed by R. Hanson Williams, Executive Director of the Kentucky
Personnel Board, and is copied to Hon. Andrew J. Ruzicho
[Adkins’ counsel] and Hon. Mark A. Sipek [then counsel for
Justice Cabinet/Corrections].
The Personnel Board’s position that the appeal should
be dismissed for failure of service of summons is inconsistent
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with its conduct.
By transmitting the record, the Personnel
Board recognized that the appeal was pending in the circuit
court.
The Personnel Board acted like it was subject to the
court’s jurisdiction -- it had no duty to do anything unless it
had been served.
Service by summons is implicit in KRS 13B.140,
because appeals to the circuit court are treated as original
actions to which the civil rules apply, where not in conflict.
It is fundamental that one should not be permitted to
take two inconsistent positions in a proceeding, to the
prejudice of another.3
Under the circumstances, we hold that the
Personnel Board waived the right to object to personal
jurisdiction.
We reverse the order of dismissal of the Franklin
Circuit Court and remand for further proceedings as necessary to
a determination on the merits.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Andrew J. Ruzicho
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY
PERSONNEL BOARD:
Mark A. Sipek
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JUSTICE
CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS:
John T. Damron
Frankfort, Kentucky
3
See Rowe v. Shepherd, Ky. 283 S.W.2d 188 (1955).
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