CHARLES SMITH; AND EDDIE HARRELL v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF MIDDLESBOROUGH
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October 24, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
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Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000738-MR
CHARLES SMITH; AND
EDDIE HARRELL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00027
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF MIDDLESBOROUGH
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Charles Smith and Eddie Harrell (hereinafter
appellants) have appealed from an order of the Bell Circuit
Court entered on February 6, 2002, which dismissed their
complaint against the Housing Authority of Middlesborough on the
ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
Having
concluded that the Bell Circuit Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
The appellants were maintenance employees of the
Housing Authority of Middlesborough, a public housing authority.2
As maintenance employees, their employment was governed by a
personnel policy which contained the following provision
concerning compensation for “on call” work:
“ON CALL EMPLOYEES. An “On Call” employee
is an employee working for the Housing
Authority on a regular shift and is then
required to be available to meet work
requirements which arise outside of the
employee’s normal duty hours.
“On Call” maintenance employees who are
provided a dwelling unit at reduced rent for
restriction of time, shall be paid one and
one-half times their basic hourly rate for
all hours worked in excess of eight.
Maintenance employees who are not furnished
a dwelling unit at reduced rents, and are
required to be available after their normal
duty hours, shall be paid for their
restriction of time and the equivalent of
one hour at one and one-half times the basic
hourly rate for each day they are required
to be “On Call.” In addition, these
employees shall be paid at the rate of one
and one-half times their basic hourly rate
for all hours worked in excess of eight.
While the personnel policy provided that employees
would receive pay at one and one-half times their basic hourly
pay rate for all hours worked in excess of eight hours a day,
the policy also provided that any employee who agreed to have a
restriction on his personal time by making himself available for
2
Jack Standifer, who was also a maintenance employee for the Housing
Authority, was initially a party to this action along with the appellants,
but he did not join in this appeal.
-2-
this overtime work would either be provided a dwelling unit at
reduced rent, or be paid a sum equivalent to one and one-half
times his basic hourly pay rate for each day he was required to
be “on call.”
The appellants claim that they had an oral
contract of employment with the Housing Authority, the terms of
which were consistent with those provided in the personnel
policy with regard to being “on call”.
On January 20, 1998, the appellants filed a complaint
in the Bell Circuit Court seeking backpay for the days they
claimed to have been “on call” from January 1991 through May
1997.
On December 4, 1998, the trial court granted the
appellants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability.
Following a bench trial on the issue of damages, the
trial court entered a judgment in favor of the appellants.
Housing Authority then appealed to this Court.3
The
On August 25,
2000, in an unpublished opinion, this Court vacated both the
trial court’s entry of summary judgment on the issue of
liability, and the trial court’s judgment awarding damages to
the appellants.
The matter was remanded to the trial court
after this Court found that there was a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the appellants were “on call” or
“subject to call” under the agreement.
3
1999-CA-000765-MR.
-3-
On remand, the trial court scheduled a jury trial for
May 15, 2001, but it was continued to January 17, 2002.
On the
day of the scheduled trial, the Housing Authority filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Housing
Authority argued that under KRS4 Chapter 337 original
jurisdiction for wage and hour claims was vested in the Kentucky
Labor Cabinet, not the circuit court.
On February 6, 2002, the
trial court granted the Housing Authority’s motion to dismiss,
on the grounds that the appellants’ claims were requests for
“overtime pay” under KRS Chapter 337 and the appellants were
required to file their claims with the Kentucky Labor Cabinet.
In dismissing the appellants’ complaint, the trial court ruled
that their claims against the Housing Authority fell “squarely
within KRS Chapter 337, particularly KRS 337.285,” and that the
appellants’ “claims for compensation due [must] be filed with
the Labor Cabinet.”
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the appellants argue that the complaint
filed below “does not allege a violation of any of the
provisions contained within KRS 337.020 to 337.405,” and that
the circuit court did in fact have subject-matter jurisdiction
to adjudicate their claims.
We agree.
We preface our analysis by noting that there have been
some major misunderstandings in this case.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-
The circuit court in
its order dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
states that “[n]o matter how the [appellants] couch their claims
the claims are essentially requests for overtime pay.”
simply incorrect.
This is
The appellants are claiming additional pay
for making themselves available to be called in to work pursuant
to their contract; they are not claiming “on call” or “overtime
pay” pursuant to Chapter 337.
The amicus curiae brief filed by
the Secretary of the Labor Cabinet further demonstrates the
misunderstandings in this case.
The Secretary takes the
position that the circuit court should be affirmed, but he
incorrectly refers to the claims as being by “employees who
believe that their employers have violated Kentucky’s wage and
hour laws[.]”
To the contrary, the appellants have alleged a
contract violation, not a statutory wage and hour violation.
The Secretary even acknowledges in his brief “that all claims
for violations of wage and hour laws, absent an express or
implied employment contract, must be brought before the Labor
Cabinet” [emphasis added].
However, the Secretary fails to
recognize that the appellants had an express contract.
In Noel v. Season-Sash, Inc.,5 this Court held that for
Chapter 337 to be constitutional, its application must be
limited to “those instances where an employee alleges he is not
receiving the benefits mandated by the wage and hour chapter[.]”
5
Ky.App., 722 S.W.2d 901, 902 (1986).
-5-
The Court explained the types of cases in which the Kentucky
Labor Cabinet has original jurisdiction:
To reiterate, the Commissioner of Labor
has original jurisdiction, as held in the
Early6 case, only in those wage and hour
disputes in which the duty to provide the
benefits sought by the claimant derives
solely from the statute and not from an
agreement between the parties as to the
terms and conditions of employment and, of
course, in those situations in which the
parties agree to have their disputes
resolved by the administrative route and who
thereby waive their right to seek a judicial
remedy [emphasis added].7
The Court noted that to rule otherwise would constitute a
violation of the Kentucky Constitution.8
In the case sub judice, the appellants have alleged
that they reached an agreement with the Housing Authority for
compensation which provided them with additional pay as
consideration for making themselves available to be called in to
work.
This additional pay went above and beyond the
statutorily-mandated wage requirements.
Further, this alleged
express contract is supported by the written language in the
6
Early v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, Ky.App., 690 S.W.2d 398 (1985).
7
Noel, supra at 903.
8
Id. at 902-03 (holding that “[t]here is no language in this chapter that
hints that the legislature intended for the labor commissioner to hear
disputes between employer and employees alleging violations of contracts.
Certainly such a statute would not be consistent with and therefore would be
repugnant to several sections of our Constitution, specifically Section 109
which provides, ‘[t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested
exclusively in one Court of Justice . . . ,’ and Section 112(5) which
provides that the ‘Circuit Court shall have original jurisdiction of all
justiciable causes not vested in some other court’”).
-6-
personnel policy.9
“The general rule is that where the alleged
express contract is oral the evidence to support it must be
clear and convincing.”10
The Housing Authority does not dispute
the fact that the written language in the personnel policy
supports the oral contract claimed by the appellants.
Hence,
the appellants have properly alleged a claim for additional
unpaid compensation pursuant to an oral contract with the
Housing Authority which exceeds the statutorily-mandated
minimum.
Accordingly, as Noel makes clear, this claim properly
comes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit
court.
In addition to the constitutional limits that apply to
Chapter 337 as discussed in Noel, the rules of statutory
interpretation also require us to hold that the circuit court
has subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims.
It is the
duty of the courts to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the Legislature.11
In determining legislative intent, a court
must refer to the language of the statute and it is not at
liberty to add or to subtract from the statute or to interpret
it at variance with the clear language employed.12
All statutes
9
“‘When there is an actual promise the contract is said to be express[.]’”
Sullivan’s Adm’r v. Sullivan, 248 Ky. 744, 748, 59 S.W.2d 999, 1001
(1933)(quoting 6 R.C.L. p. 587).
10
11
Corbin’s Ex’rs v. Corbin, 302 Ky. 208, 213, 194 S.W.2d 65, 68 (1946).
Hale v. Combs, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 146, 151 (2000).
12
Id.
-7-
should be interpreted so as to give meaning to each provision in
accord with the statute as a whole.13
The interpretation should
not be done in such a way as to render any part of the statute
meaningless or ineffectual.14
A court should construe a statute
so as to render it constitutional if it can be done without
violence to its intent.15
A statute should not be interpreted so
as to bring about an unreasonable result.16
We conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of
Chapter 337 is the one recognized by this Court in Noel, i.e.,
that its administrative jurisdictional limitations only apply
when the employee’s claim involves an unpaid, statutorilymandated wage.
Every employee will have either an express or
implied contract for payment of compensation from his employer
for the work that he performs.
There is no statutory basis or
logical reason to interpret Chapter 337 as the trial court has
done, so that the application of the exclusive jurisdiction of
the administrative procedures in Chapter 337 turns on whether
the employee was an employee-at-will.
Simply stated, there is
no reasonable basis for an interpretation of the statute that
13
Destock #14, Inc. v. Logsdon, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 952, 957 (1999).
14
Stevenson v. Anthem Casualty Insurance Group, Ky., 15 S.W.3d 720, 724
(1999).
15
Magruder v. Griffith, 274 Ky. 293, 297, 118 S.W.2d 694, 696 (1938).
16
Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., Ky.,
983 S.W.2d 493, 500 (1998).
-8-
would treat a claim for unpaid compensation which exceeds the
statutorily-mandated minimum that is made by an employee who
does not have employment termination rights differently from the
same claim by an employee who has employment termination rights.
The purpose of Chapter 337 is to establish minimum standards for
payment for work to protect an employee from being exploited by
an employer, regardless of whether the employee has employment
termination rights.
Employees, such as the appellants, who have
contracted with their employers for compensation which exceeds
the statutorily-mandated minimums have retained their
constitutional right to litigate their unpaid claims in the
courts.
Further, considering the broad statutory definition of
“wages,”17 if the Labor Cabinet’s jurisdiction is not limited to
the statutorily-mandated minimum compensation requirements, then
the Cabinet would have to adjudicate employee claims for unpaid
wages that would include such compensation as a bonus, employeepurchase discounts, employer-furnished uniforms and employeetravel-expense reimbursement.
This plethora of claims could
possibly overwhelm the Labor Cabinet and make a mockery of its
17
KRS 337.010(1)(c) provides: “‘Wages’ includes any compensation due to an
employee by reason of his employment, including salaries, commissions, vested
vacation pay, overtime pay, severance or dismissal pay, earned bonuses, and
any other similar advantages agreed upon by the employer and the employee or
provided to employees as an established policy. The wages shall be payable
in legal tender of the United States or checks on banks convertible into cash
on demand at full face value, subject to the allowances made in this
chapter[.]”
-9-
enforcement powers on behalf of employees who are being denied
their statutorily-mandated minimum compensation.
Accordingly, the order of the Bell Circuit Court
dismissing the appellants’ complaint is reversed and this matter
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT:
I
agree that this case must be remanded to Bell Circuit Court for
further proceedings, but I write separately to explain what I
consider to be the dispositive issue.
Both of the other opinions have focused on whether the
claims at issue are properly described as disputes over the
failure to pay statutorily-mandated overtime or whether the
compensation allegedly due is of a contractual nature.
The
distinction in the nature of the payment is relevant because, so
the reasoning goes, the Labor Cabinet has exclusive jurisdiction
to determine factual issues if the case is one dealing with
statutory overtime, but the circuit court has jurisdiction if
this is a contract case.
However, I do not consider this
distinction relevant because in either case, the Labor Cabinet
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lacks jurisdiction under the current version of Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) Chapter 337.
Both Early v. Campbell County Fiscal Court,18 and Noel
v. Season-Sash, Inc.,19 were premised on a version of KRS 337.310
which has since been amended.
The statute in effect at the time
those two cases were decided provided as follows:
(1) All questions of fact arising under KRS
337.020 to 337.405 except as provided in
this section, shall be decided by the
secretary. There shall be no appeal from
the decision of the secretary on any
question of fact, but there shall be a right
of review by the circuit court. Either
party may, within twenty (20) days after the
rendition of a final order of the secretary,
by petition appeal to the circuit court that
would have jurisdiction to try an action for
breach of contract.
(2) The review is limited to determining
whether or not:
(a) The secretary or director acted
without or in excess of his powers;
(b) The order or decision was procured
by fraud;
(c) The order or decision is not in
conformity to the provisions of KRS
337.020 to 337.405; and
(d) If findings of fact are in issue,
whether they support the order or
decision.
18
Ky. App., 690 S.W.2d 398 (1985).
19
Ky. App., 722 S.W.2d 901 (1987).
-11-
(3) The circuit court shall enter judgment
affirming, modifying, or setting aside the
order or decision.20
Early recognized the apparent conflict between this
version of KRS 337.310(1) and KRS 337.385(1), which provides
that unpaid wage claims “may be maintained in any court of
competent jurisdiction.”21
This Court reconciled the conflict by
holding that KRS 337.310(1) provided exclusive original
jurisdiction to the Labor Cabinet, while 337.385(1) provided a
right of review by the circuit court.
In 1996, KRS 337.310 was substantially amended.22
Following amendment, the statute reads as follows:
All orders or decisions of the secretary
issued or made under KRS 337.020 to 337.405
may be appealed, and upon appeal an
administrative hearing shall be conducted in
accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.23
However, nowhere else in Chapter 337 is there a statute which
authorizes the secretary to make such “orders or decisions.”
The only statute in KRS 337 which delegates power to the Labor
Cabinet is KRS 337.295, which authorizes the commissioner to
issue regulations under KRS 337.275 to 325, 337.345 and 337.385
to 337.405, dealing with the application of those statutes and
definitions of terms contained therein.
However, there is no
20
KRS 337.310 (Michie 1994).
21
Supra, n.19, at 339.
22
See Acts of 1996, ch. 318, § 313, effective July 15, 1996.
23
KRS 337.310 (Michie 2001).
-12-
provision of 337.295 which delegates adjudicative power to the
Labor Cabinet.
Likewise, KRS Chapter 13B does not confer authority
upon the Labor Cabinet in the absence of other statutory
delegation.
KRS 13B “creates only procedural rights,”24 and
speaks of an agency head exercising the authority delegated to
the agency by other statute.25
“The subject-matter jurisdiction of an administrative
agency is limited solely to that granted by Legislature.”26
“It
is fundamental that administrative agencies are creatures of
statute and must find within the statute warrant for the
exercise of any authority which they claim.”27
The authority of
an administrative agency “is limited to a direct implementation
of the functions assigned to the agency by [] statute,” and
“[i]t is our responsibility to ascertain the intention of the
legislature from the words used in enacting the statute rather
than surmising what may have been intended but was not
24
KRS 13B.020(1).
25
KRS 13B.030(1). See also KRS 13B.140(1) and (2), which govern judicial
review of administrative decisions in the absence of a more specific
provision in the agency’s enabling statute(s).
26
Auxier v. Commonwealth, Bd. Of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, Ky. App.,
553 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1977), citing Johnson v. Correll, Ky., 332 S.W.2d 843
(1960); Department of Conservation v. Sowders, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 464 (1951).
See also Custard Insurance Adjusters, Inc. v. Aldridge, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 284,
287 (2001).
27
Department for Natural Resources v. Stearns Coal and Lumber Co., Ky., 563
S.W.2d 471 (1978), citing 1 Am.Jur.2d. Administrative Law § 70 (1962). See
also Kerr v. Kentucky St. Bd. Of Registration, Ky. App., 797 S.W.2d 714, 717
(1990).
-13-
expressed.”28
“Any doubts concerning existence or extent of an
administrative agency’s power should be resolved against the
agency.”29
As mentioned above, there is no statute currently in
KRS Chapter 337 which delegates exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate factual dispute to the Labor Cabinet.
And, in fact,
there is no statute delegating any adjudicative authority
whatsoever.
While the Cabinet as amicus relies on KRS 13B, as
has been noted that chapter is procedural only and does not
serve to delegate substantive jurisdiction to any administrative
agency.
Likewise, the Cabinet’s reliance on its own regulation
contained at 803 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) 1:035
is misplaced, both because the regulation is premised on the
pre-1996 version of KRS 337.310(1) and because “an
administrative agency cannot, by its rules and regulations,
amend, alter, enlarge, or limit the terms of a legislative
enactment.”30
Accordingly, 803 KAR 1:035 cannot be said to
confer adjudicative authority on the Labor Cabinet where none
has been statutorily provided.
28
Flying J Travel Plaza v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Ky., 928
S.W.2d 344 (1996), citing Kentucky Ass’n of Chiropractors, Inc. v. Jefferson
Co. Medical Society, Ky., 549 S.W.2d 817 (1977).
29
United Sign, Ltd. v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Ky. App., 44
S.W.3d 794, 798 (2000).
30
Curtis v. Belden Electronic Wire & Cable, Ky. App., 760 S.W.2d 97, 99
(1988).
-14-
Because of the change in KRS Chapter 337, there is
currently no adjudicative jurisdiction delegated to the Labor
Cabinet with respect to disputes arising under that chapter.
Early and Noel are no longer relevant because they expressly
relied on the pre-1996 version of KRS 337.310(1).
All factual
questions arising under KRS 337 are to be brought in “any court
of competent jurisdiction” as contemplated by KRS 337.385(1),
which in this instance is Bell Circuit Court.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
Respectfully, I dissent
from the majority opinion as I would hold that the appellants’
claims arose from a wage and hour dispute as opposed to a
contract dispute, and that the Labor Cabinet would retain
original jurisdiction to decide the matter.
I also dissent from
Judge Huddleston’s concurring opinion as I believe the Labor
Cabinet still maintains the authority to act.
I disagree with the appellants’ contention that as the
compensation they were claiming did not involve a violation of
KRS 337.020 through KRS 337.405, they were not therefore
required to proceed under that chapter.
KRS 337.010(1)(c)
provides the definition of the term “wages” for purposes of the
Chapter 337:
“Wages” include any compensation due to an
employee by reason of his employment,
including salaries, commissions, vested
vacation pay, over-time pay, severance or
dismissal pay, earned bonuses, and any other
-15-
similar advantage agreed upon by the
employer and the employee or provided to
employees as an established policy.
(emphasis added.)
I agree with the Housings Authority’s contention that the
appellants’ claims involve wage concerns.
803 KAR 1:065
specifically discusses what constitutes working time as it
applies to KRS 337.275 and KRS 337.285, the latter dealing
specifically with overtime.
The regulation provides a
definition for “on-call time,” which is an issue to be decided
in this action.
Here, the appellants argue that they were
entitled to more wages for days that they were “on call” as
opposed to “subject to call” pursuant to the Housing Authority’s
personnel policy.
The statute and regulations specifically
address this issue.
Separate and apart from the over-time issue, I believe
that KRS 337.060 provides another basis for bringing the
appellants’ claims under the wage and hour statute.
KRS
337.060(1) provides that “[n]o employer shall withhold from any
employee any part of the wage agreed upon.”
The appellants
obviously believed that the Housing Authority was withholding a
portion of their respective wages to which they were claiming
entitlement.
Lastly, the certified record contains a copy of the
Labor Cabinet’s investigation and report regarding the 1997
complaint filed by unknown Housing Authority maintenance
-16-
employees addressing the same “on-call” issue.
At the oral
argument held in this matter, counsel for the appellants
indicated that he did not know whether his clients were the
individuals who filed this complaint, and that in any event he
was not surprised that no relief was granted because the Labor
Cabinet did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.
While it
is true that the identities of the complaining maintenance
employees could not be disclosed, the statement regarding the
Labor Cabinet’s decision is nevertheless misleading as the Labor
Cabinet investigator actually made a determination of fact as to
whether the individuals were “on call” or “subject to call”
pursuant to the personnel policy.
Additionally, the Labor
Cabinet asserted that it had jurisdiction over this issue as a
wage and hour dispute in its amicus curiae brief.
Therefore, I would hold that the circuit court did not
err in finding that the claims arose under KRS Chapter 337 and
that the Labor Cabinet had original jurisdiction.
I also disagree with the majority opinion’s holding
that the Housing Authority’s personnel policy is a contract,
making the appellants’ claim an exception to the rule that the
matter must be brought before the Labor Cabinet.
In Noel v. Season-Sash, Inc., Ky.App., 722 S.W.2d 901
(1986), the employer and employee entered into an employment
contract for certain wages and benefits, meaning that any
-17-
dispute arising from the employment contract must be brought
before the circuit court rather than before the Labor Cabinet.
In particular, this Court held that “the Commissioner of Labor
has original jurisdiction, as held in the Early case, only in
those wage and hour disputes in which the duty to provide the
benefits sought by the claimant derives solely from the statute
and not from an agreement between the parties as to the terms
and conditions of employment. . . .”
Id. at 903.
In order for
this exception to apply, the appellants had to establish that a
contract existed between themselves and the Housing Authority,
and they argued that the personnel policy constituted a
contract.
In Nork v. Fetter Printing Company, Ky.App., 738
S.W.2d 824 (1987), this Court addressed whether personnel
policies and company handbooks create contracts, and in
reviewing Fetter’s handbook, found nothing in it that expressly
created a contract, and stated that “[i]t contains policy
statements which Fetter management admittedly strove to follow,
but this is not tantamount to an expression of a contractual
agreement where the language is not contractual.”
Id. at 825.
The opinion went on to state, “[p]olicy and procedure manuals
are to be commended.
They can, when followed, remove an element
of arbitrariness from employment relationships and thereby
improve the entire atmosphere of the workplace.
-18-
A contract they
do not necessarily make. . . .”
Id. at 827.
Although I
recognize that Nork dealt with wrongful discharge and when
employment is “at will”, I believe that the principles addressed
in Nork apply in the present appeal.
Based upon Nork, I do not
believe that the Housing Authority’s personnel policy rose to
the level of a contract.
Therefore, I would hold that the Noel
decision as it relates to contract disputes is inapplicable here
and that the circuit court was correct in finding that the
personnel policy did not constitute a contract under Kentucky
law.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would
therefore affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
Bradley C. Freeman
Corbin, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Glenn L. Greene, Jr.
Harlan, Kentucky
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF ON BEHALF
OF KENTUCKY LABOR CABINET:
Kembra Sexton Taylor
Frankfort, Kentucky
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