WILLIAM WAFORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000725-MR
WILLIAM WAFORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00098
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
William “Billy” Waford (hereinafter Waford or
the Appellant) appeals from the judgment of the Franklin Circuit
Court, which denied his motion to vacate his conviction for
manslaughter in the first degree.
We affirm.
As a result of the jury’s verdict of guilty, on April
1, 1998, Waford was sentenced to twenty years in the
penitentiary.
Waford filed a motion for a new trial which was
denied on July 17, 1998.
Thereafter, Waford appealed his
conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed the
conviction on September 28, 2000.
Subsequently Waford filed a motion to vacate his
conviction pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42, alleging six specific instances in which he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
supplemental memorandum filed.
evidentiary hearing was held.
Counsel was appointed and a
On August 6, 2001, an
The Franklin Circuit Court
entered an order denying Waford’s RCr 11.42 motion on March 13,
2002.
This appeal followed.1
Under RCr 11.42, “the movant has the burden to
establish convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial
right which would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by
the post-conviction proceeding.”
S.W.3d 878, 884 (2000).
Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17
Waford alleges six instances in which
he received ineffective assistance, resulting in the violation
of his constitutional rights.
To succeed, a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-prong
Strickland standard.
First the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient, in that he made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
1
After his RCr 11.42 motion was denied, Waford filed a timely notice of
appeal and motion to proceed in forma pauperis on April 5, 2002. On August
2, 2002, the Department of Public Advocacy’s motion to withdraw as counsel
for Waford and to allow Waford to file a pro se brief was granted.
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guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Furthermore,
the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Gall v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
In McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694
(1986), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained:
The twin standard for such review is the
proper measure of attorney performance or
simple reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and whether the alleged
errors of the attorney resulted in prejudice
to the accused. The defendant must
demonstrate that there is a reasonable
possibility that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
trial would have been different.
721 S.W.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
Unless both prongs of the
Strickland test are satisfied, “it cannot be said that the
conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable” and ineffective
assistance of counsel has not been shown.
Gall, 702 S.W.2d at
39-40.
In determining whether counsel was effective, the
“performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances.”
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Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688.
In Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619, 625
(2000), the court held that “[d]epending on the circumstances,
there are many ways a case may be tried.
The test for
effectiveness of counsel is not what the best attorney would
have done, but whether a reasonable attorney would have acted,
under the circumstances, as defense counsel did at trial.”
When
assessing reasonableness, “every effort [must] be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . [and] to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
There is a strong presumption that
“counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.”
Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, Ky., 998
S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
In determining whether there is a “reasonable
possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the trial would have been different,” McQueen, 721
S.W.2d at 697, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show
that the error by counsel had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 89
S.W.3d 380, 386 (2002) (citing Strickland).
A reasonable
probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine the
outcome.”
Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 151, 160
(2001) (citing Strickland).
All of the evidence presented
should be considered in a decision on prejudice.
-4-
Sanders, 89
S.W.3d at 387.
In making this determination, “the critical
issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel was
so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the
hands of probable victory”—that counsel’s errors “caused the
defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.”
Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 441 (2001) (citing
United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992)).
First, Appellant argues that trial counsel was
ineffective when he failed to investigate Appellant’s contention
that an unknown black man shot the victim.
This argument fails
both prongs of Strickland.
Counsel’s performance was not deficient.
As held in
Foley:
Although we certainly recognize the
necessity for complete investigation by
defense counsel, we must conclude that a
reasonable investigation is not an
investigation that the best criminal defense
lawyer in the world, blessed not only with
unlimited time and resources, but also with
the benefit of hindsight would conduct. It
is only reasonable for any lawyer to place
certain reliance on his client. The
investigation must be reasonable under all
the circumstances.
17 S.W.3d at 885 (citations omitted).
Here, trial counsel decided to attack the weaknesses
in the Commonwealth’s case, which was based solely on
circumstantial evidence, rather than pursue the theory now
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propounded by Appellant.
Trial counsel “must enjoy great
discretion in trying a case, especially with regard to trial
strategy and tactics . . . [and the court] must be especially
careful not to second-guess or condemn in hindsight [his
decisions].”
(1998).
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 317
In Strickland, the court held that “counsel has a duty
. . . to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.
In any ineffectiveness case, a
particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed
for reasonableness in all circumstances, applying a heavy
measure of deference to counsel’s judgment.”
466 U.S. at 691.
Appellant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was reasonable.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that had counsel
investigated, the outcome of the trial would have been
different.
The “evidence” Appellant contends mandated an
investigation is simply not persuasive.
It appears that trial
counsel chose to pursue a different defense and trial strategy
for good reason.
Appellant also argues that he received ineffective
assistance when trial counsel failed to present mitigating
evidence during the penalty phase of the trial.
Under RCr
11.42, “the movant has the burden to establish convincingly that
he was deprived of some substantial right which would justify
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the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction
proceeding.”
Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 884 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
Appellant’s arguments fall short in meeting
this burden.
A careful review of the record and caselaw reveals
that counsel was not ineffective.
“Trial counsel has no
absolute duty to present mitigating character evidence at all,
nor is counsel required to present all available evidence in
order to render effective assistance.”
Hodge v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 68 S.W.3d 338, 343 (2001)(citations omitted).
However, in
Hodge:
An attorney has a duty to conduct a
reasonable investigation, including an
investigation of the defendant's background,
for possible mitigating evidence.2 In
evaluating whether counsel has discharged
this duty to investigate, develop, and
present mitigating evidence, we follow a
three-part analysis. First, it must be
determined whether a reasonable
investigation should have uncovered such
mitigating evidence. If so, then a
determination must be made whether the
failure to put this evidence before the jury
was a tactical choice by trial counsel. If
so, such a choice must be given a strong
presumption of correctness, and the inquiry
is generally at an end. If the choice was
not tactical and the performance was
deficient, then it must be determined
whether there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result would have been
different.
2
“If there was no investigation, then [counsel’s] performance was deficient.”
Hodge, 68 S.W.3d at 344.
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Id. at 344 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added in
original)(citations omitted).
The circuit court, in its order denying Appellant’s
RCr 11.42 motion, did not record any determination it made as to
whether trial counsel conducted any investigation for mitigating
evidence.
Upon review of the record, it appears that a
reasonable decision was made not to investigate, satisfying
Strickland.3
Counsel decided to abandon any investigation for
mitigating evidence because Appellant was resolute in his
devotion to pursuing acquittal and counsel reasonably
determined, we believe, that the search for mitigating evidence
would be futile.
While such latter rationale for not investigating has
been reproached, Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.
1997), viewed in the totality of the circumstances, as it must,
Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 441-42 (2001), such
decision was not unreasonable and did not render counsel
ineffective.
As illustrated by the testimony of witnesses
proffered by Appellant, the mitigation evidence is less than
convincing, especially in light of his seven prior felony
3
“[C]ounsel has a duty . . . to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a
particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel’s judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
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convictions.4
Thus, having determined that a more efficient use
of resources would be to pursue evidence of acquittal, counsel’s
decision not to investigate mitigation evidence is easily seen
as one of strategy and tactics.
Tactical decisions carry a
strong presumption of reasonableness.
Hodge, 68 S.W.3d at 344.
Appellant has failed to persuade us otherwise.5
Even if we held counsel’s performance deficient,
Appellant still must show that “but for” these errors, the
outcome would have been different.
been made.
Id.
No such showing has
The “mitigating” testimony proffered by Appellant
would not be sufficient to overcome the impact of his seven
prior felony convictions.
There is no reasonable possibility
that the introduction of the mitigation evidence now proffered
by Appellant (see Brief of Appellant, pp. 13-14) would have
induced the jury to impose a lesser sentence.
Appellant next argues that he received ineffective
assistance when counsel failed to object to the testimony of
Cleo Waford.
Specifically, Cleo Waford (Appellant’s brother)
testified that Helen Hale (Appellant’s sister) called him after
the shooting and stated, “Somebody shot Wilbur, I think Billy
4
Additionally, “had counsel introduced [mitigating] evidence, the prosecution
might have introduced evidence in rebuttal, such as victim impact testimony,
which would have made the jury even [more] likely to impose the [maximum
sentence].” Hodge, 68 S.W.3d at 343.
5
Importantly, this strategy was successful. Appellant was not convicted of
murder, as charged, but rather, he was convicted of the lesser-included
offense of manslaughter. This is itself, in a sense, mitigation.
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did it.”
Brief of Appellant, p. 17.
untenable.
Appellant’s position is
We are not persuaded that he “was deprived of some
substantial right which would justify the extraordinary relief”
requested.
Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 884 (citation omitted).
In light of the “strong presumption” language of
Strickland, counsel’s failure to object was not unreasonable.
Counsel was concerned that excessive objections would irritate
the jury and believed that he could discredit Cleo Waford’s
testimony during cross-examination of the original speaker,
Helen Hale.
While counsel may have misjudged the situation, we
are unable to say that his performance was deficient.
“A
defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel
adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.”
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1997)(citations
omitted).
“It is not the function of this Court to usurp or
second guess counsel's trial strategy.”
Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619, 624 (2000).
Baze v. Commonwealth,
In this regard counsel’s
performance was not deficient.
Moreover, the exclusion of this evidence would not
render a different outcome a reasonable possibility.
Counsel,
in his cross-examination of Hale, elicited testimony casting
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doubt upon the credibility of the statement now in issue.6
In
view of the Commonwealth’s other strong evidence establishing
Appellant’s guilt, we cannot say that the testimony in question
contributed to the jury’s finding of guilt and certainly was not
so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the result of the
trial or to snatch “defeat from the hands of probable victory.”
Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 441 (citation omitted).
In his fourth argument Appellant claims he received
ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to interview
potential witnesses before trial.
He contends that these
interviews would have revealed information regarding “Wes” and
other black men allegedly involved, provided grounds for
impeachment of Cynthia Anderson’s testimony, and prevented
counsel from placing a damaging statement before the jury.
Our thorough examination of the record reveals that
these contentions are without merit.
For the reasons discussed
above, we do not find that counsel was ineffective when he chose
not to interview witnesses or otherwise investigate the alleged
involvement of an unknown black man or other black men whom
appellant alleged chased the victim.
Appellant has failed to
establish convincingly or otherwise persuade us that counsel’s
performance was deficient or that any errors caused counsel to
6
Hale’s testimony revealed that she was extremely intoxicated on the evening
in question and that she did not remember most of the evening’s events,
including any statement she made to Cleo Waford implicating defendant in the
shooting. Brief for Appellant, pp. 19-20.
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be so ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of
probable victory.
His arguments are conclusory, unsupported by
any evidence, and hence unpersuasive.
It may have been prudent
for counsel to thoroughly interview all potential witnesses and
in some way memorialize their statements, but “a reasonable
investigation is not an investigation that the best criminal
defense lawyer in the world, blessed not only with unlimited
time and resources, but also with the benefit of hindsight would
conduct.”
Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 885.
Counsel’s performance was
not ineffective.
Appellant next contends that he received ineffective
assistance when “counsel allowed the Commonwealth to obtain a
two week continuance to prepare it’s [sic] case, thus granting
the Commonwealth a tactical advantage, contrary to the
Appellant’s interests.”
Brief for Appellant, p. 23.
Regardless of any alleged deficiency in performance by counsel,
Appellant’s assertion that the Commonwealth received a “tactical
windfall” as a result of the continuance is completely
unsupported by facts or law.
Again Appellant has not
established “convincingly” that he “was deprived of some
substantial right which would justify the extraordinary relief”
requested.
Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 884.
Finally, Appellant argues that the cumulative effect
of counsel’s errors rendered his assistance ineffective.
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In
McQueen, the court held that “defense counsel was not
ineffective as a result of cumulative error. In view of the fact
that the individual allegations have no merit, they can have no
cumulative value.”
721 S.W.2d at 701 (emphasis added).
Here,
as discussed above, Appellant’s contentions that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel have no merit; thus, their
cumulative effect cannot amount to same.
Based upon a review of all the evidence, we do not
find that the circuit court erred when it denied Appellant’s RCr
11.42 motion to vacate his conviction for manslaughter in the
first degree.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Franklin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William Waford, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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