JIMMY "BO" BUSH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 3, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000721-MR
JIMMY “BO” BUSH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MENIFEE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00009-002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Jimmy Bush appeals from a judgment of the Menifee
Circuit Court, entered March 8, 2002, finding him guilty of
tampering with physical evidence in violation of KRS 524.100 and
of second-degree arson in violation of KRS 513.030.
The court
sentenced him to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling
fifteen years.
Bush contends that the trial court violated his
constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial and that
the court erred by admitting gruesome pictures into evidence and
by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense theories of
duress and choice of evils.
We affirm.
In February 1998, in the course of an illegal drug
transaction at Bush’s Pendleton County residence, Danny Trent,
Bush’s friend and neighbor, shot and killed David Koch with a
rifle.
Because Trent was confined to a wheelchair, he and Bush
were obliged to enlist their wives to help load Koch’s body into
Koch’s pick-up truck and drive it to a remote area of Menifee
County.
There, in separate locations, Bush set fire to both the
body and the truck.
The crime soon came to light, and indictments issued
from both Pendleton and Menifee Counties.
In Pendleton County
Bush and Trent were charged with murder; in Menifee County that
pair and their wives were charged with evidence tampering and
arson.
Apparently Bush pled guilty in Pendleton County to
robbery and the wives pled guilty to reduced charges in Menifee
County.
Bush received a jury trial on his Menifee County
charges in January 2002.
By then Bush was divorced, and at
trial both his former wife and Trent’s wife testified for the
Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth’s proof also included Bush’s
description of the shooting to the Pendleton County prosecutor
and testimony by the police officers who had discovered and
identified Koch’s remains.
The Commonwealth’s theory was that
Koch had been carrying $6,000.00 in cash and that Trent had
2
killed him to steal the money.
Bush, the Commonwealth alleged,
had at least countenanced the killing, had taken half the money,
and had participated in the attempt to conceal the crime.
Bush’s theory, which counsel attempted to develop through crossexamination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, was that Trent had
acted alone in killing Koch and had then forced the others to
help with the cover-up.
At the close of proof, the court ruled that the
evidence would not support a finding that Trent had coerced Bush
to help hide Koch’s body and the truck and thus refused to
instruct the jury on the defense theories of duress and choice
of evils.
Bush contends that the evidence did support these
instructions and that the trial court’s failure to give them
rendered the trial unfair.
We disagree.
Bush is correct, of course, that the trial court’s
duty to instruct on the whole law of the case “requires
instructions applicable to every state of the case deducible or
supported to any extent by the testimony.”1
He claims that he
was entitled to instructions on the defenses of duress and
choice-of-evils based on the testimony of the two wives to the
effect that they had felt oppressed throughout the trip to
Menifee County with Koch’s body by the sense that Trent might do
1
Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (1999).
3
anything and was apt to hurt anyone who crossed him.
The only
testimony about specific threats, however, came from Trent’s
wife.
She testified that upon her arrival at Bush’s residence
Trent told her he would kill her unless she helped move Koch’s
body to his truck.
Later, she testified, Trent had threatened
her with a knife when she refused to remove the truck’s cd
player.
Although our Supreme Court has cautioned that even
implausible defense theories are entitled to instructions if
there is an evidentiary basis for them,2 we agree with the trial
court that in this case the evidentiary basis was lacking.
The defenses of duress and choice of evils both
require evidence that the defendant engaged in the otherwise
criminal conduct in response to a specific and imminent threat
of force or substantial injury in circumstances that left him no
reasonable alternative but to violate the law.3
The wives’
testimony that they were apprehensive during this ordeal and
that Trent directed what were apparently habitual threats toward
his wife, does not amount even to some evidence that Trent
specifically threatened Bush so as to leave him no reasonable
alternative but to aid in covering-up Koch’s murder.
2
The trial
Id.
3
KRS 501.090; KRS 503.030; Taylor v. Commonwealth, supra; Senay
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 650 S.W.2d 259 (1983).
4
court did not err when it refused Bush’s tendered duress and
choice-of-evil instructions.
Bush also contends that the trial court should not
have permitted the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence
photographs of Koch’s body, one taken where the body was found
about three weeks after the killing and one taken during the
autopsy.
The general rule is that photographs depicting the
state of the body as the defendant left it are admissible
notwithstanding that such photographs may be painful or
distressing to see.4
Photographs depicting conditions of the
body unrelated to the crime, however, are far less relevant, and
courts have not hesitated to exclude them.5
This case is somewhat unusual in that the crime
charged is not the murder but the covering-up of the murder.
Alterations to the body tending to hide it or to make it
difficult to identify, even shocking alterations such as the
burning and animal mutilation here, are relevant to this charge
and may be proved.
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion, therefore, by admitting the photograph depicting
Koch’s body as it was found.
Nor did it abuse its discretion by
admitting the autopsy photo, which provided strong proof of the
4
Adkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 779 (2003).
5
Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793 (1991).
5
victim’s identity and otherwise only showed again the conditions
depicted in the other photo.
Finally, Bush contends that he was denied both
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
The
statute upon which he relies is KRS 500.110, which provides that
a person who has begun a term of imprisonment at a Kentucky
penal or correctional institute and who faces untried charges in
any jurisdiction of the state on the basis of which a detainer
is lodged against him, may, by providing proper notice to the
charging authority and corresponding court, obtain a trial upon
those charges within 180 days.
The record does not indicate when Bush entered upon a
term of imprisonment in this state, but apparently he had done
so by February 11, 2000, when Menifee County lodged a detainer
against him based on the charges then pending in this case.
On
September 7, 2000, Bush filed on his own behalf in the Menifee
Circuit Court a motion for “a fast and speedy trial.”
He based
the motion on the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
The Commonwealth responded to the constitutional
claim on September 19, 2000, and the trial court denied the
motion without hearing or explanation by order entered January
17, 2001.
Bush contends that Menifee County’s detainer and his
motion for a speedy trial satisfy KRS 500.110’s conditions and
that he was thus entitled to a trial within 180 days of
6
September 7, 2000, or to a showing in open court that there was
good cause for delay.
There is no dispute that Bush was not tried within
that period or provided with a good-cause hearing.
We are not
persuaded, however, that Bush’s September 7th motion invoked KRS
500.110.
In construing the similar provisions of the interstate
agreement on detainers (KRS 440.450 et seq.) our Supreme Court
in Ellis v. Commonwealth,6 stated that
Ellis’ motion for a speedy trial makes no
reference to the I.A.D. or the 180-day time
limitation. He cites only the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, the
Indiana Constitution and the Indiana Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The motion cannot be
considered as a request for disposition
under K.R.S. 440.450.7
Bush’s motion, likewise, referred to the federal constitution
and the general right to a speedy trial, but not to KRS 500.110
or to the statutory 180-day time limit.
The motion, therefore,
cannot be considered a request for disposition under the
statute.
Nor are we persuaded that Bush’s constitutional right
was violated.
As he notes, it took the Commonwealth more than
three-and-a-half years to bring him to trial.
in April 1998 and not tried until January 2002.
He was indicted
6
Ky., 828 S.W.2d 360 (1992).
7
Id. at 360.
7
The United
States Supreme Court, however, has noted that delays of this
length are sometimes justified, particularly where the defendant
is responsible for the delay or acquiesces in it.8
occasioned by a co-defendant is also justified.9
Delay
These were the
factors before the trial court.
The parties agreed that the more serious Pendleton
County charges should be tried before the Menifee County
charges.
Apparently co-defendant Trent’s Pendleton County trial
was postponed several times due to Trent’s poor health.
Bush
acquiesced in several continuances based upon the Pendleton
County delays, including one granted in January 2001, after his
motion for a speedy trial.
until November 2001.
He did not object to a continuance
The January 2002 trial, however, followed
that objection reasonably promptly.
Nor did the delay prejudice Bush’s defense.
Bush has
identified no evidence lost to him because of the delay nor has
he identified any unfair advantage gained by the Commonwealth.
He complains that had the trial been conducted prior to his
divorce his wife would not have testified against him.
Even if
this was the case, however (and it is by no means certain that
it would have been), it does not amount to undue prejudice.
8
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182
(1972).
9
Gabow v. Commonwealth, Ky., 34 S.W.2d 63 (2000).
8
Trent’s wife would still have testified, and of the two her
testimony was the more inculpatory.
Bush has suggested no
reason to think that the result of an earlier trial would have
been any different.
In sum, the delay in bringing Bush to trial, although
unfortunate, was amply justified by events beyond the trial
court’s control.
Notwithstanding that delay, Bush’s trial was
fundamentally fair; it was impaired neither by painful but
relevant photographs nor by the court’s refusal to give
unwarranted instructions.
Accordingly we affirm the March 8,
2002, judgment of the Menifee Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
9
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