LLOYD HAMILTON v. CHRISTINA HAMILTON
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RENDERED:
October 10, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2002-CA-000625-MR
LLOYD HAMILTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT OVERSTREET, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-00513
v.
CHRISTINA HAMILTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, Chief Judge; McANULTY, Judge; and HUDDLESTON,
Senior Judge.1
HUDDLESTON, Senior Judge:
dissolving
1
his
marriage
Lloyd Hamilton appeals from a decree
to
Christina
Hamilton
in
which
the
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge
by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b)
of the Kentucky Constitution and Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 21.580.
circuit
court
commissioner
regarding
considered
adopted
in
the
the
the
entirety,2
its
award
report
of
factors
of
forth
domestic
overruling
maintenance
set
the
in
his
relations
objections3
to
Christina.
KRS
403.200,4
Having
the
court
2
According to Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 52.01, the “findings of
a commissioner, to the extent the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court.”
3
In
the
instant
case
and
commonly
throughout
this
jurisdiction, the term “exception” or some variation thereof is
used to describe the procedure by which a party obtains trial
court review of the report of a DRC pursuant to CR 53.06.
In
actuality, CR 53.06 does not contain the term “exception” but
rather speaks of “objections.”
In keeping with the rule, we
will use the term “objection” throughout this opinion.
4
KRS 403.200 provides:
(1)
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following
dissolution of a marriage by a court which lacked personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a
maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that
the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks
sufficient
property,
including
marital
property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable
needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate
employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition
or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not
be required to seek employment outside the home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for
such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him,
and his ability to meet his needs independently, including
the extent to which a provision for support of a child
2
determined that Christina “is entitled to maintenance of $400.00
per month until she either dies, remarries or reaches age 65,
whichever first occurs,” dependent upon her medical condition
and subject to the court’s continuing supervision.
Lloyd and Christina married on February 27, 1988.
Two
children were born of the marriage, namely Kara Marie, on May
22, 1990, and Stacy Lynn, on November 29, 1995.
In August 1997,
Christina underwent surgery to remove a cerebellar astrocytoma
tumor,
and
she
Christina
filed
November
14,
reconciliation
has
a
been
unable
petition
for
1997.
which
to
since
dissolution
However,
lasted
work
until
the
May
of
parties’
1999,
at
that
time.
marriage
on
attempted
which
point
Christina moved from the marital residence.
living with the party includes a sum for that party as
custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The
marriage;
(d)
standard
of
living
established
during
the
The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of
the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance.
3
Both parties had “well-paying jobs” at Toyota Motor
Manufacturing
during
the
marriage.
Prior
to
Christina worked in the body-weld department.
her
surgery,
It is undisputed
that Christina is currently disabled and can no longer perform
her
previous
production
job.5
team
Lloyd
member
remains
and
earns
employed
an
at
annual
Toyota
gross
as
income
a
of
approximately $60,000.00 to $62,000.00.
Unable to maintain the
admittedly
the
lavish
lifestyle
to
which
couple
had
grown
accustomed on his salary alone, Lloyd filed for a Chapter 7
liquidation
Division,
in
on
the
United
August
6,
States
1999.
Bankruptcy
All
of
Court,
Lloyd’s
Lexington
debts
were
discharged as a result of those proceedings.
In a “property settlement and child custody agreement”
filed on May 26, 2000, Lloyd and Christina resolved all issues
concerning child custody, visitation and the division of marital
property, reserving the issues of maintenance and child support
for
later
decision.
Pursuant
to
the
agreement,
Lloyd
and
Christina agreed to share joint custody of the children with
Christina being the primary residential custodian.
Prior to the
hearing on the reserved issues, the DRC advised both parties
that
he
planned
to
consider
Lloyd’s
5
total
annual
income,
Lloyd concedes that the “[m]edical evidence produced showed
conclusively” that Christina is “totally disabled.”
4
including his “performance award” payment and overtime earnings,
in determining child support.6
Christina
receives
a
combined
disability
security income of $1,524.00 per month.
and
social
In addition, she has
received a benefit payment of $602.12 each month from UNUM Life
Insurance Company of America since the onset of her disability,
although she is currently not receiving that payment as UNUM is
applying it toward her account balance that accumulated when
UNUM
overpaid
her
previously.
Further,
those
payments
are
contingent upon her disability status which, in turn, is subject
to periodic reviews by the company.
Christina’s
reported
that
she
treating
has
physician,
chronic
poor
Dr.
Larry
balance,
C.
suffers
Burns,
from
persistent double vision and headaches, and requires a cane for
walking.
She
also
has
abdominal
symptoms of nausea and diarrhea.
6
problems
with
recurring
In his estimation, Christina
In a letter of February 15, 2000, an associate from the
Human Resources department at Toyota explained that overtime is
“normally worked on a daily basis.”
Although the “overtime is
mandatory,” it is “not guaranteed,” but, rather, “is worked on
an as-needed basis.” Likewise, neither the bonus amount nor the
payment itself is guaranteed as it is “based on numerous factors
dealing with the company’s success.”
In a letter of March 15,
2000, the same associate clarified that the performance award
payments are given in May and November each year and are “based
on the individual’s earnings for the qualified period.” At that
point, the award was “guaranteed to be at 10% of eligible
earnings.” Although the payments had remained at 12% since they
began, there was “no guarantee” that the additional 2% would
continue.
5
has probably reached maximum medical improvement as her physical
condition had not improved in more than one year as of June
2000.
In
his
status
report
of
June
28,
2000,
Dr.
Burns
concluded that Christina “cannot return to work in the position
she previously held.
In order to return to the work force, if
that is even possible, [she] will require significant retraining
and
specific
accommodations
at
the
work
site.”
Dr.
Burns
imposed restrictions of no driving, no operating machinery, no
“close
eye
work,”
no
working “at heights.”
prolonged
standing
or
walking,
and
no
He described her prognosis for recovery
as poor.
At
parties
and
the
hearing,
reviewed
the
DRC
documentary
heard
testimony
evidence
from
including
both
their
respective projections of monthly income and expenses as well as
medical reports from Dr. Burns.
While acknowledging Christina’s
restrictions,
argued
Lloyd
nonetheless
that
Christina
is
not
“totally” disabled7 but, rather, is capable of performing four
hours of sedentary to heavy activity per day meaning she could
work in a limited or part-time capacity.
potential
income
along
with
her
7
disability
In his view, this
benefits
and
the
In contrast, on appeal Lloyd acknowledges that when the
medical evidence was received, “it was evident that Christina
was permanently and totally disabled and was eligible to receive
maintenance if needed.”
6
child support are sufficient to provide for her reasonable needs
and, therefore, she is not entitled to maintenance.
Christina
disagreed with that contention as did the DRC.
In
a
report
filed
on
January
16,
2001,
the
DRC
submitted proposed of fact consistent with the foregoing factual
summary.
parties
Of particular significance here, he observed that the
had
entered
into
a
partial
settlement
agreement
and
“further agreed” that Christina was entitled to receive $902.00
per month in child support based on their respective monthly
incomes
and
the
statutory
guidelines.
Having
set
forth
the
relevant facts, the DRC then engaged in an analysis of the law
governing awards of maintenance.
To
begin,
the
DRC
noted
that
Kentucky
courts
“are
reluctant to refuse maintenance to a disabled or seriously ill
spouse.”8
Citing Russell, the court observed that an increase in
disability
although
benefits
“[t]his
Supplemental
maintenance
results
approach
Income
has
in
not
(SSI)
or
always
a
of
decreased
offsetting
other
been
maintenance
Social
disability
followed
as
Williams v. Williams and Calloway9 v. Calloway10.
8
awards
award
Security
against
evidenced
by
Again relying
In support of this proposition, the DRC relied upon Russell
v. Russell, Ky. App., 878 S.W.2d 24 (1994); Leitsch v. Leitsch,
Ky. App., 839 S.W.2d 287 (1992); and James v. James, Ky. App.,
618 S.W.2d 187 (1981).
9
Ky., 789 S.W.2d 781 (1990).
7
upon James, the DRC further observed that “when a spouse seeking
maintenance had a present injury or disability, the amount and
duration
of
maintenance
could
be
subjected
to
the
[court’s]
continuing supervision.”
Next,
considering
the
an
DRC
award
correctly
of
explained
maintenance
the
that
court,
prior
to
“lacking
agreement of the parties, must assign non-marital property and
equitably divide the marital property between the parties.”
In
their partial settlement agreement, Lloyd and Christina divided
their marital personal property and agreed that they owned “no
real
property
in
common.”
According
to
the
DRC,
the
only
marital property of significant value that Christina received
was a pickup truck that the parties had purchased for $6,500.00.
As a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, “most of the marital
debts had been discharged.”
Citing Clark v. Clark,11 the DRC observed that under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.200, awarding maintenance is
a matter within the discretion of the court and, as the party
seeking
maintenance,
Christina
had
the
burden
of
proof.
To
prevail, she “must satisfy the two-part test contained in KRS
403.200(1)(a) and (b).”
10
Ky. App., 832 S.W.2d 890 (1992).
11
Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56 (1990).
8
A
determination
of
whether
Christina
lacked
“sufficient property” necessarily required the court to evaluate
whether the property allotted to her was adequate to provide for
Relying upon Newman v. Newman,12 the DRC
her “reasonable needs.”
noted
that
Kentucky
has
defined
“reasonable
needs”
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
that
Christina
lacks
sufficient
property
to
as
the
In concluding
provide
for
her
reasonable needs, the DRC engaged in the following analysis:
The parties had an extravagant lifestyle and both
were employed at Toyota Manufacturing in good[-]paying
jobs
with
a
$100,000.00.
a
boat
and
[combined]
yearly
income
that
exceeded
They took expensive vacations, acquired
accumulated
expensive
non-essential
personal property.
[Christina], since the onset of her tumor and the
resulting surgery in 1997, finds herself in financial
circumstances
[Lloyd].
radically
different
from
those
of
her
[Lloyd] is thirty-four years of age, in good
health, and employed at Toyota Manufacturing with an
annual salary of approximately $60,000.00.
[Lloyd],
because of his employment, can sustain [the] standard
of
12
living
enjoyed
during
Ky., 597 S.W.2d 137 (1980).
9
the
marriage.
There
was
little marital property to allocate, with [Christina]
receiving
only
$6,000.00.
a
vehicle
valued
at
approximately
Obviously, she has insufficient property
to provide for her reasonable needs.
Because of [her]
disability, her lack of property, and her inability to
work, a significant disparity in standard of living is
certain to result.
Equity
contributed
through
would
dictate
[substantially
[both]
her
that
to
a
the
employment
spouse
family
[and]
who
income],
performing
homemaker chores, should not be left in circumstances
radically disparate from those of her former spouse.
In fact, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has required
trial [c]ourts to remedy significant disparity through
maintenance awards.[13]
Therefore, it is the finding of
the Court that [Christina] has established she lacks
sufficient
property
to
provide
for
her
reasonable
needs.
Upon
determining
that
Christina
had
satisfied
the
first prong, the DRC then evaluated whether Christina is able to
support herself through appropriate employment as follows:
13
Roberts v. Roberts, Ky. App., 744 S.W.2d 433 (1988);
Atwood v. Atwood, Ky. App., 643 S.W.2d 263 (1982); Combs v.
Combs, 622 S.W.2d 679 (1981).
10
[Christina] is thirty-three years of age with a
high school education and one and one-half years of
college.
Her
positions
at
computed
employment
the
history
University
operator
at
W.T.
of
includes
Kentucky
Young
clerical
and
Storage
as
a
Company.
Prior to her disabling illness, she was employed in a
well[-]paying job at Toyota Manufacturing in the bodyweld department.
It
is
undisputed
that
she
is
working her previous job at Toyota.
opportunity
to
observe
disabled
The Court had the
[Christina’s]
condition at the hearing of this matter.
revealed
that
[Christina]
disabilities.
She
slow movement.
ha[s]
exhibited
an
from
physical
Observation
severe
unsteady
functional
gait
with
Her movement was poorly coordinated
and she walked with the aid of a cane.
The Court has
carefully reviewed the medical records of her treating
physician,
[her]
Dr.
Larry
functional
restrictions
he
Burns,
abilities,
has
physical condition.
placed
and
his
assessments
limitations,
on
her
because
of
and
the
of
her
Even employment of a sedentary
nature would pose problems for [Christina] because of
her
impaired
vision
and
chronic
accompanying nausea and vomiting.
11
dizziness
with
the
Based
Christina
is
appropriate
upon
the
foregoing,
presently
full
or
unable
to
part-time
the
DRC
support
concluded
herself
employment
that
through
because
of
her
disabilities.
Accordingly, Christina met the requirements of
KRS
thereby
403.200(1)
satisfying
her
burden
of
proof
which
entitled her to maintenance with the amount and duration of the
award to be determined.
In resolving this question, the DRC
properly considered the enumerated factors of KRS 403.200(2):
The parties have been married for over twelve years.
[Christina],
prior
disabilities,
contributed
marital
estate
and
to
to
the
onset
of
her
substantially
the
family’s
to
illness
the
standard
and
financial
of
living
through well[-]paying employment at Toyota Manufacturing.
She is now disabled and, through no fault of her own, is
unable to support herself through gainful employment.
She
has no financial resources other than disability benefits.
The
living
ability
Court
has
expenses
to
considered
and
meet
given
his
own
the
parties’
independent
consideration
to
needs
supplementing
while
[Lloyd’s]
[Christina’s] needs through maintenance.
[Lloyd] is employed at a well[-]paying job at Toyota
Manufacturing
$60,000.00.
with
an
annual
salary
of
approximately
The parties have little or no marital debt,
12
having
discharged
most
of
their
debt
through
bankruptcy
proceedings.[14]
Kentucky, in adopting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act,
embraced
the
Act’s
“rehabilitative
maintenance”
[provision pursuant to which] a maintenance award [is] to
be made for a limited period to enable a spouse to acquire
needed education or job skills that would permit financial
[In James, however, the
independence and self[-]support.
Court] seemed to indicate a reluctance to award limited
duration maintenance to a seriously ill or disabled spouse.
Also see Russell, supra.
Presently,
[Christina’s]
physical
condition
and
disabilities would limit her ability to acquire new skills
and
become
self-sufficient.
Likewise,
her
physical
condition presently makes her basically unemployable.
Having considered the statutory factors and governing
case
law,
permanent
the
DRC
recommended
maintenance
whichever occurs first.
until
she
that
Christina
either
dies
or
be
awarded
remarries,
Because her physical condition could
improve, however, the DRC further recommended that the amount
14
Christina objected to this statement, explaining that she
“has not requested relief in bankruptcy and has been paying
credit card balances from marital debt which have outstanding
balances of approximately [$6,000.00].”
13
and duration of maintenance should be subject to the court’s
continuing
allowing
supervision
for
the
consistent
child
support
with
that
James.
Specifically
Christina
receives
as
custodian of the parties’ two minor children as well as her
monthly disability benefits, the DRC concluded that Christina is
entitled to receive $400.00 per month in maintenance.
Both
Lloyd
and
Christina
filed
objections
to
the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations of the
DRC.
Relevant for present purposes,15 Lloyd filed the following
two objections:
1.
The [DRC] erred in finding that [Christina] was
entitled to an award of maintenance of $400.00 per
month to be paid by [Lloyd]
2.
The [DRC] erred in finding that [Christina] was
in need of maintenance.
According to Lloyd, the DRC “erred in not taking into
account the fact that the parties had been enjoying a lifestyle
that was not realistic and actually resulted in [Lloyd]” filing
for bankruptcy.
Lloyd further argued that although Christina’s
itemized list of monthly expenses reflected that she required
15
Christina objected to the “assignment of marital debt and
division of 401K property between the parties.” Because she did
not appeal from the supplemental recommendations, however,
further elaboration as to those issues is unnecessary.
14
$2,969.00 per month to provide for her reasonable needs, her
testimony on cross-examination revealed that “the items listed
were inflated and incorrect in many instances.”
In his view,
the recommendations “skipped over the ‘needs’ and concentrated
on the disability of [Christina], which was not contested.”
Noticeably absent from Lloyd’s objections is any mention
of child support.
finding
that
he
Since Lloyd did not object to the DRC’s
and
Christina
had
agreed
that
she
would
be
entitled to receive $902.00 per month in child support, he is
precluded from doing so on appeal.
Even if Lloyd had properly
preserved this argument for review, however, the outcome would
be the same as there is substantial evidence to support the
determination
regarding
his
income
and
the
court
properly
applied the statutory guidelines in calculating the award.16
Following oral arguments on the parties’ objections,
the court directed the DRC to make additional findings.
October
10,
2001,
the
DRC
conducted
a
hearing
at
which
testimony and exhibits were limited to those objections.
supplemental
report
entered
on
November
15,
2001,
On
the
In a
the
DRC
observed that the parties had offered no new proof “that would
alter the Court’s original findings in regard to maintenance.”
16
See KRS 403.210 et seq. and Keplinger v. Keplinger, Ky.
App., 839 S.W.2d 566 (1992).
15
According
to
the
DRC,
although
the
extent
of
Christina’s disability was originally the subject of debate, it
was “apparently undisputed” at the time of the rehearing.
In
relevant
as
part,
the
DRC
summarized
his
prior
reasoning
follows:
The Court has given consideration to the factors
required [by] KRS 403.[200](2), considering the length
of
the
marriage
contribution
marital
and
years),
[]
both
that
estate
earned
(12
parties
have
(both
fairly
$60,000.00
worked
equal
each),
at
the
made
Toyota
[salaries]
financial
to
the
Manufacturing
$50,000.00-
[current]
the
of
financial
circumstances of each party (husband employed earning
$60,000.00-62,000.00 with little debt), the health of
the parties (wife disabled) and the expenses of the
parties.
With
respect
to
marital
property,
the
DRC
again
observed that the only item of value Christina received as a
result
of
the
agreement
was
the
pickup
truck,
“which
had
apparently decreased in value and was valued for tax purposes at
$3,000.00 and currently the engine is blown.”
foregoing,
the
“specifically
DRC
declined
indicating”
to
that
16
alter
his
Christina
Based upon the
original
had
findings,
sustained
her
burden of proof under KRS 403.200(1)(a) and (b) by establishing
that she lacks sufficient property, including marital property,
to provide for her reasonable needs and is totally disabled.
Accordingly, he made the same recommendation as to the amount
and duration of maintenance, reiterating that “there is a great
disparity” between the financial resources of the parties.
Upon reviewing the supplemental recommendations of the
DRC,
the
court
found
that
Christina
“acknowledged
specific
amounts with regard to her list of expenses which have not been
challenged as inflated.”
As the “amounts acknowledged were of
record, and considered by the [DRC],” the court found no error
in that regard.
In its view, the DRC had recognized that the
parties had been living beyond their means, contrary to Lloyd’s
assertion,
and
also
gave
due
regard
to
the
effect
of
the
bankruptcy as well as Christina’s disability in formulating his
recommendations.
Christina
had
maintenance
Further,
satisfied
by
her
satisfying
the
DRC
burden
the
correctly
of
proof
statutory
determined
with
that
respect
requirements
to
and
properly considered the factors contained in KRS 403.200(2) in
determining the amount and duration of the award.
On February
26, 2002, the court “affirmed and adopted in full” both the
initial and supplemental findings of fact, conclusions of law
and recommendations of the DRC.
17
On
appeal,
the
sole
issue
preserved
for
review
is
whether Christina is entitled to maintenance or, as alleged by
Lloyd, the lower court erred in awarding $400.00 per month to
Christina “when she failed to show that her needs were not being
met by her income.”
dire
situation,”
While admitting that Christina is “in a
Lloyd
argues
that
the
DRC
was
“swayed
by
[Christina’s] permanent disability to the complete disregard of
the
evidence,
the
burden
of
proof,
and
the
evidence”
establishing that Christina does not currently need that support
nor is he able to provide it.
Likewise, Lloyd acknowledges that
“courts have recently insisted” that maintenance awards can be
used to remedy disparity in the lifestyles of the parties but
contends “there is little or no disparity” between his lifestyle
and that of Christina at this point.17
Our
established.
standard
of
review
“Since
this
case
in
this
context
is
well-
was
tried
before
the
court
without a jury, its factual findings ‘shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.’”18
If a factual finding is supported by substantial
17
According to Lloyd, “the only difference is that Christina
has money left over at the end of them month” while he is being
forced to operate at a $50.00 deficit each month.
18
Cole v. Gilvin, Ky. App., 59 S.W.3d 468, 472 (2001); Ky. R.
Civ. Proc. (CR) 52.01.
18
evidence, it is not clearly erroneous.19
“Substantial evidence
is evidence of substance and relevant consequence sufficient to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.
within
the
province
credibility
of
‘It is
of
the
fact-finder
to
determine
the
witnesses
and
the
to
be
the
weight
given
evidence.’”20
With respect to the report of the DRC, the court “may
adopt, modify or reject it, in whole or in part, and may receive
further evidence or may recommit it with instructions.
the
trial
court
has
the
broadest
possible
In sum,
discretion
respect to the use it makes of reports of [DRCs].”21
court
is
entitled
to
reevaluate
different conclusion than the DRC.
the
evidence
with
A trial
and
reach
a
As an appellate court, we
are not authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the
trial
court
on
the
weight
of
the
evidence,
where
the
trial
court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.22
In applying KRS 403.200, we have said that
the trial court has dual responsibilities:
one, to
make relevant findings of fact; and two, to exercise
19
Id. at 472-473.
20
Id. at 473.
21
Eiland v. Ferrell, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 713, 716 (1997).
22
Leveridge v. Leveridge, Ky., 997 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1999).
also Clark, supra, n. 11.
19
See
its
discretion
maintenance
in
in
light
making
of
a
those
determination
facts.
In
on
order
to
reverse the trial court’s decision, a reviewing court
must find either that the findings of fact are clearly
erroneous
or
that
the
trial
court
has
abused
its
discretion.23
Thus, our function is limited to ascertaining whether
there is substantial evidence to support the factual findings of
the
circuit
court
and
determining
whether
the
circuit
court
abused its discretion in awarding maintenance of $400.00 per
month to Christina in light of those findings.
It
determine
is
the
whether
responsibility
the
spouse
of
the
seeking
circuit
court
maintenance
to
lacks
sufficient property to meet her reasonable needs and is unable
to support herself through appropriate employment according to
the standard of living established during the marriage.24
When a
spouse is unable to support herself in accord with the same
standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage and the
property
awarded
to
her
is
insufficient
23
to
provide
for
her
Weldon v. Weldon, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 283, 285 (1997),
citing Perrine v. Christine, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 825 (1992);
Russell, supra, n. 8, at 26.
24
Id.
20
reasonable
needs,
an
award
of
maintenance
is
appropriate.25
However, the court must also consider “the ability of the spouse
from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting
those of the spouse seeking maintenance.”26
Here, the circuit
court did exactly that.
With respect to marital property, the court found that
the only item “of significant value” Christina received as a
result of the settlement was a pickup truck with a blown engine
currently
valued
at
$3,000.00.
Lloyd
does
not
contest
this
finding, arguing instead that Christina “inflated” her expenses
and has sufficient income to meet her needs whereas he does not
as a consequence of the maintenance obligation imposed by the
court.
As observed by the court, Christina’s contribution to
the parties’ annual income was comparable to Lloyd’s prior to
the onset of her disability.
is totally disabled.
seeking
health
maintenance
problems,
Lloyd now concedes that Christina
When, as is the case here, the spouse
is
KRS
unable
to
be
403.200
is
appropriately
25
self-supporting
due
to
utilized
to
McGowan v. McGowan, Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1983).
See also Russell, supra, n. 8; Robbins v. Robbins, Ky. App., 849
S.W.2d 571 (1993); Calloway v. Calloway, Ky. App., 832 S.W.2d
890 (1992); Clark, supra, n. 11; Roberts, supra, n. 13; and
Newman, supra, n. 12.
26
McGowan, id.
21
prevent a drastic change in the standard of living experienced.27
Contrary
to
eligible
for
Lloyd’s
and
assertion,
receives
SSI
the
fact
that
disability
Christina
benefits
does
is
not
automatically preclude her from receiving maintenance.28
During
testimony
from
the
proceedings
Christina
which,
below,
the
standing
court
alone,
heard
constitutes
substantial evidence to support its findings if believed.
Upon
reviewing both the medical evidence29 and the parties’ respective
financial data and hearing the testimony of both parties on two
separate
occasions,
the
court
concluded
that
Christina
lacks
sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to
her,
to
meet
her
reasonable
needs
and
herself through appropriate employment.
is
unable
to
support
In other words, she
satisfied both prongs of KRS 403.200(1), a prerequisite for an
award of maintenance.
Although
the
evidence
regarding
the
parties’
respective monthly incomes and expenses and the implications of
Christina’s
conflicting,
disability
the
court
on
her
evaluated
employment
the
potential
credibility
27
the
Russell, supra, n. 8, at 27 (citation omitted).
28
of
was
Calloway, supra, n. 24, at 894.
29
As the findings summarized previously are supported by the
record and Lloyd is no longer challenging the extent of
Christina’s disability, further detail is unnecessary at this
juncture.
22
witnesses and weighed all of the information in reaching its
conclusion.
Such functions are uniquely within the province of
the circuit court in its role as the fact-finder and, absent an
abuse
of
discretion,
we
“must
maintain
confidence
in
the
decision” of the circuit court.30
Having
maintenance,
concluded
the
court
that
then
Christina
properly
was
considered
entitled
each
of
to
the
enumerated factors contained in KRS 403.200(2) in determining
the amount and duration of the award including the length of the
parties’ marriage (12 years), the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage as previously described and the parties’
respective
contributions
approximately
conclusion,
to
the
marital
estate
$50,000.00-$60,000.00).
the
court
also
considered
In
the
(each
earned
reaching
parties’
its
current
financial resources (Lloyd still earns approximately $60,000.00
and has minimal debt while Christina’s income consists of SSI
benefits in the amount of $1,566.00 per month, UNUM disability
payments of $606.12 per month and child support of $902.00 per
month)
and
the
parties’
respective
monthly
expenses
(approximately $1,711.00 and $2,900.00 for Lloyd and Christina,
respectively).
30
Calloway, supra, n.24, at 894.
23
In addition, the court considered the related factors
of
Christina’s
physical
condition
and
resulting
inability
to
support herself and, contrary to his assertion, Lloyd’s ability
to
meet
his
needs
in
light
of
the
maintenance
obligation.
Although Lloyd argues that the court placed undue emphasis on
Christina’s disability, no single factor was determinative in
its analysis.
Based on the disparity in the lifestyles of Lloyd
and Christina, the court awarded Christina the reasonable sum of
$400.00 per month in maintenance until she marries, turns 65 or
dies, subject to the court’s continuing supervision consistent
with both James and KRS 403.250.
result
was
not
only
On the facts presented, this
permissible
but
equitable.
Should
Christina’s ability to provide for her reasonable needs improve,
“KRS 403.250 and the civil rules provide for mechanisms by which
the maintenance award can be reduced or eliminated.”31
Because
the
factual
findings
upon
which
the
court
based its conclusion that Christina is entitled to maintenance
are supported by substantial evidence and the court properly
considered
the
relevant
statutory
factors
in
determining
amount and duration of the award, the decree is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
31
Calloway, supra, n. 24, at 894.
24
the
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby G. Wombles
Lexington, Kentucky
Clay McKnight
Scott County Attorney
Georgetown, Kentucky
25
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