AND NEIL SPILLMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
2002-CA-000619-MR
AND
2002-CA-000648-MR
NEIL SPILLMAN
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE K. MERSHON AND
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGES
ACTION NOS. 99-CR-002618 & 00-CR-002703
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Neil Spillman appeals from two judgments of the
Jefferson Circuit Court, each convicting him of being a felon in
possession of a firearm.
The court entered the first judgment
February 26, 2002, confirming a jury verdict against Spillman on
charges that he had been convicted of a felony in 1997 and had
possessed a handgun in September 2000.
A different division of
the Jefferson Circuit Court entered the second judgment February
27, 2002, following Spillman’s guilty plea to charges that while
a convicted felon he had possessed firearms in July 1999.
For
the first conviction Spillman was sentenced to five years in
prison and for the second to two additional years.
consolidated his appeals.
This Court
Spillman contends that in both cases
the police illegally obtained evidence.
He also contends that
one of the cases, the case that went to trial, was tainted by a
police officer’s false testimony before the grand jury and by
the prosecutor’s closing argument.
We affirm.
In July 1999, a Louisville police officer stopped
Spillman for speeding and driving recklessly.
The officer
recognized Spillman as a former police-department property-room
employee and knew that he had been convicted in 1997 of wanton
endangerment, a felony.
Having obtained Spillman’s
identification and registration, the officer asked him if his
car contained guns or drugs.
rifle in the trunk.
Spillman admitted that he had a
Immediately the officer arrested him and
searched the trunk, where he found an assault rifle.
He then
searched the car’s passenger compartment and found a handgun
beneath the driver’s seat.
2
In October 1999, the grand jury indicted Spillman for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, a class-D felony.1
While trial in that case was pending, in September 2000,
Spillman was again arrested and this time was accused of fleeing
from officers who had attempted to stop him for a traffic
violation,2 of wantonly endangering two of the officers by
pointing a handgun at them,3 and of illegally possessing the
handgun.4
He was indicted for these offenses in December 2000.
In both cases Spillman moved to suppress evidence on
the ground that the officers had come by it illegally.
With
respect to the July 1999 incident, Spillman argued that the
officer had illegally searched the car.
The court ruled,
however, that the officer, who recognized Spillman as a
convicted felon, had probable cause to arrest when Spillman
admitted possessing the rifle.
The search of the trunk was
thereupon permissible as there was probable cause to believe the
trunk contained evidence of a crime.5
And the search of the
car’s passenger compartment was permissible as an incident of
1
KRS 527.040.
2
KRS 520.095.
3
KRS 508.060.
4
KRS 527.040.
5
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442, 119 S. Ct.
2013 (1999); Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 663 S.W.2d 213 (1983).
3
Spillman’s arrest.6
We believe both of these rulings were
correct.
Noting that the officer did not verify Spillman’s
status as a convicted felon, Spillman contends that the officer
could not have been sure that his possession of the rifle was
illegal, and thus did not have probable cause for the arrest.
Probable cause, however, does not require certainty.
An officer
has probable cause for an arrest if he is aware of such facts
and circumstances as would persuade a person of reasonable
caution that there is a fair probability that the suspect has
committed a felony.7
The officer’s recollection of Spillman’s
felony conviction and Spillman’s admitted possession of the
rifle satisfied this standard.
The trial court did not err,
therefore, by denying Spillman’s suppression motion.
With respect to the incident of September 2000,
Spillman’s suppression motion raised factual issues rather than
legal ones.
At the suppression hearing two officers testified
that they had witnessed Spillman make an illegal turn into an
old-Louisville alley.
They had attempted to stop him and he had
6
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct.
2860 (1981); Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 418 (1987).
7
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983); Beemer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d 912 (1984).
4
fled.
They apprehended him several blocks later, after he had
abandoned his vehicle and brandished a loaded handgun.
Spillman described a very different sequence of
events.
He denied having turned illegally into the alley as
claimed by the police.
He admitted having been in the alley on
the day in question, but denied having entered it the way the
police described.
He claimed that after he exited the alley the
police followed him for several blocks without signaling him to
pull over, but that he had finally pulled over because he felt
the officers were harassing him.
Without provocation, he
asserted, the officers had knocked him to the ground and
searched his car.
He denied having possessed the handgun and
asserted that the police had planted it.
In support of his allegation that the police had
fabricated their version of events, Spillman sought to show that
the officers had initially accused him, as reflected in the
police report, of driving the wrong way in a one-way alley, but
then had changed their stories at the suppression hearing when
they learned that the alley was in fact two-way.
The arrest
report said that the officer observed Spillman “go wrong way in
S[outh]. alley.”
The officers testified that this referred to
Spillman’s illegal turn into the alley from the wrong end,
although the reporting officer admitted that at the time his
impression had been that the alley was one-way.
5
The trial court
credited the officers’ account of Spillman’s illegal turn and
ruled that their seizure of the handgun had been lawful.
Spillman later learned that one of the officers had
told the grand jury that Spillman’s prior felony was for a drug
offense when in fact it was for wanton endangerment.
At trial,
he confronted the officer with his misstatement and the officer
conceded the mistake, although he denied Spillman’s charge that
he had lied to the grand jury.
At the close of the
Commonwealth’s evidence Spillman renewed his suppression motion
on the ground that the allegedly perjurious grand-jury testimony
was new evidence that the police had fabricated the entire
incident.
Again the trial court rejected this contention and
allowed the case to go to the jury.
On appeal, Spillman’s contention is apparently
twofold.
He asserts that the trial court should have granted
his motion to suppress, implying that the trial court erred by
accepting the police version of the traffic infraction, the
chase, and Spillman’s possession of the gun.
RCr 9.78 provides,
however, that “[i]f supported by substantial evidence the
factual findings of the trial court [at a suppression hearing]
shall be conclusive.”
The officers’ testimony in this case was
substantial evidence upon which the trial court was entitled to
rely.
This Court may not second-guess that reliance.
6
Spillman also seems to contend that the officer’s
admittedly inaccurate grand-jury testimony, in and of itself,
entitles him to relief.
to the trial court.
He did not, however, present this claim
He did not move for a mistrial or to have
the indictment quashed.
The issue, therefore, is not preserved.
The claim, furthermore, is without merit.
Courts are
reluctant to intrude upon the grand jury process, which is meant
to be independent.8
Kentucky courts are authorized to remedy
abuses of the grand-jury system,9 but only if it appears that the
alleged abuse prejudiced the accused.10
Even were we to agree with Spillman that the officer’s
mistaken grand-jury testimony amounted to an abuse of the
system, we would not agree that the mistake prejudiced Spillman.
The officer was not mistaken about the fact that Spillman was a
convicted felon, and that was the fact that criminalized his
possession of the handgun.
The grand jury would have issued the
indictment, we believe, even had there been no mistake.
Finally, during his closing argument, Spillman’s
counsel reiterated his theory that the police had stopped
8
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 118 L. Ed. 2d 352, 112
S. Ct. 1735 (1992); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 100
L. Ed. 2d 397, 76 S. Ct. 406 (1956).
9
10
Commonwealth v. Baker, Ky. App., 11 S.W.3d 585 (2000).
Id.
7
Spillman without reason, had beaten him, and had falsely accused
him of possessing a handgun.
In response, the prosecutor asked
the jurors if they thought it likely that several police
officers would jeopardize their jobs by fabricating a routine
case such as this one.
Spillman objected on the ground that
this argument unfairly appealed to the jury’s sentiment.
The
trial court ruled, however, that it was a fair response to
Spillman’s accusations.
We agree.
Both sides are allowed great
leeway during closing argument to comment on tactics, evidence,
and the falsity of the other side’s position.11
The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to ask
the jury to consider Spillman’s accusations within the context
of the officers’ careers.
In sum, we are persuaded that Spillman’s suppression
motions were properly denied and that his trial was fair.
Accordingly, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s February
27, 2002, judgment in case number 99-CR- 02618 and its February
26, 2002, judgment in case number 00-CR-02703.
ALL CONCUR.
11
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407 (1987).
8
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
9
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