NICOLE K. RAGOZINE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 8, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000613-MR
NICOLE K. RAGOZINE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00116
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Nicole K. Ragozine appeals from a judgment of
the Meade Circuit Court convicting her of first-degree criminal
abuse and sentencing her to seven-years imprisonment.
Nicole
contends that she was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal and that the trial court made various erroneous
evidentiary rulings.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Ruby Rose Grammer was born on March 3, 2001.
parents are Nicole Ragozine (now Grammer) and Nicole’s
Her
codefendant, Christopher M. Grammer.1
In June 2001 the family
was living in a trailer owned by Nicole’s mother, Kathy Allen.
Christopher was 20 and Nicole was 18.
The night of June 10 –
11, 2001, Ruby was baby-sat by neighbors Debbie Gorney and Erik
Kraus until approximately 2:45 a.m.
11, 2001, Ruby would not quit crying.
On the afternoon of June
Ms. Allen was first
called to the home, but the baby continued to cry.
Emergency
personnel were then called to the trailer.
Officer Charlie Ashbaugh from the Meade County Police
was the first to respond.
Ashbaugh observed that Ruby had a
bruise on her arm, a circular bruise on her abdomen, a knot on
the back of her head, and suffered from severe cradle cap.
He
also noted that Ruby’s diaper was soiled and that she “smelled
nasty.”
Ruby was transported to Kosair Children’s Hospital in
Louisville, where additional, more severe, injuries were noted,
including four rib fractures, a compression fracture of the
second lumbar vertebra, and trauma associated elevated liver
enzymes.
On November 5, 2001, Nicole and Christopher were
indicted on charges of first-degree criminal abuse (KRS2
508.100).
Following a joint trial, Christopher and Nicole were
each convicted of first-degree criminal abuse.
1
Each was
Nicole and Christopher were not married on June 11, 2001, but married
sometime prior to the trial in the case.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
sentenced to the recommended jury sentence of seven years.
This
appeal followed.3
First, the appellant contends that the trial court
erred in overruling her motion for a directed verdict when the
evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to have found
guilt on the charge of first-degree criminal abuse.
In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from
the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.
Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
Commonwealth v.
If the evidence is
sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given.
Id.
For the purpose of ruling on
the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for
the Commonwealth is true, reserving to the jury questions as to
the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
Id.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under
the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a
jury to find guilt; only then is the defendant entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.
Id.
KRS 508.100(1) defines first-degree criminal abuse as
follows:
3
Christopher also appealed his conviction and sentence. We address
Christopher’s appeal in an Opinion rendered this day in Case No. 2002-CA000530-MR.
3
A person is guilty of criminal abuse in the
first degree when he intentionally abuses
another person or permits another person of
whom he has actual custody to be abused and
thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause
him serious physical injury; or
(c) Causes torture, cruel confinement or
cruel punishment; to a person twelve (12)
years of age or less, or who is physically
helpless or mentally helpless.
KRS 508.090(1) defines “abuse” as follows:
"Abuse" means the infliction of physical
pain, injury, or mental injury, or the
deprivation of services by a person which
are necessary to maintain the health and
welfare of a person, or a situation in which
an adult, living alone, is unable to provide
or obtain for himself the services which are
necessary to maintain his health or welfare.
KRS 500.080(15) defines serious physical injury as follows:
“Serious physical injury” means physical
injury which creates a substantial risk of
death, or which causes serious and prolonged
disfigurement, prolonged impairment of
health, or prolonged loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily organ;
A reasonable juror could have concluded that Ruby
suffered serious physical injuries.
The initial intake
examination disclosed that Ruby had dark purple contusions on
her right and left cheeks, a light purple contusion on her left
forearm, an abrasion or scrape on one of her nostrils, and a
4
bruise on her abdomen.
Dr. Betty Spivack, a forensic
pediatrician working at Kosair Children’s Hospital, testified
that Ruby had four rib fractures of three different ages ranging
from one- to two-months old to ten-days old, a compression
fracture of the second lumbar vertebra, and that Ruby had
elevated levels of enzymes in her liver, which Dr. Spivack
identified as usually a sign of trauma.
Dr. Spivack testified that the bruising on Ruby’s
abdomen were “pattern contusions,” reflecting that an object of
some circular shape came into contact with her.
She further
testified that the injury to the vertebra was of the type which
usually only occurs with infants if the child is either slammed
down on a hard surface or by holding and squeezing the child by
the chest so that as the child’s legs go up, the lower part of
the spine is compressed.
Dr. Spivack stated that a substantial
risk of death was present based upon significant abdominal
trauma and rib fractures, the latter most commonly caused by
squeezing a child too hard.
In addition, Dr. Spivack testified
that the compressed vertebra could result in a life-long injury.
In light of the medical testimony, a reasonable juror
could conclude that Ruby suffered serious physical injuries as
defined under KRS 500.080(15).
Based upon the medical evidence, abuse occurred, and
it is only a question of who inflicted the abuse.
5
Drawing all
fair and reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, the
evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Nicole either
intentionally inflicted the abuse herself, or intentionally
permitted the abuse to occur.
It is unnecessary for a conviction of first-degree
criminal abuse that a person who eye-witnessed the abuse testify
at trial and identify the defendant as the perpetrator.
Conviction can be premised on circumstantial evidence of such
nature that, based on the whole case, it would not be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Graves v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 858, 862 (2000).
As the parents, Nicole and Christopher were Ruby’s
principal caretakers.
Ruby was substantially under their
exclusive supervision and control.
The injuries occurred at
various occasions over a period of time.
A compelling
alternative perpetrator was not identified who could have
inflicted injuries on various occasions over a period of time.
Applying the basic principles of circumstantial evidence, it was
not clearly unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Nicole or
Christopher perpetrated the abuse.
Further, the jury could
reasonably have concluded that the one permitted the other to
carry out the abuse.
With regard to whether the abuse was intentional, it
has long been held that intent can be inferred from the act
6
itself and the surrounding circumstances.
Suttles, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 424, 426 (2002).
Commonwealth v.
Because a person is
presumed to intend the logical and probable consequences of his
conduct, a person's state of mind may be inferred from his
actions preceding and following the charged offense.
Id.
Here,
the evidence was that the abuse occurred on various occasions
over a period of time.
Moreover, on the occasions of the
previous injuries, the defendants did not seek medical treatment
for Ruby.
Under these circumstances the jury could reasonably
infer that the infliction of the abuse was intentional.
While it is suggested that perhaps neighbors Debbie
Gorney and Erik Kraus perpetrated the abuse, the jury was not
required to accept this theory.
Gorney and Kraus were not
called as witnesses, and the identification of these two as the
perpetrators is supported by little more than innuendo.
In addition, other than the night before the injuries, we are
not cited to any other occasion upon which Gorney and Kraus
baby-sat the child.
Thus the theory fails to explain the
multiple injuries at various times.
Since the medical evidence
was that some of the injuries occurred on various occasions over
a period of time, it would have been reasonable for the jury to
reject the theory that Gorney and Kraus were the perpetrators.
Next, the appellant contends that the trial court
erred when it permitted evidence to be introduced by the
7
Commonwealth regarding the conditions of the defendants’
residence when such evidence had no relevancy and was unduly
prejudicial.
In the course of the investigation following the
events of June 11, 2001, it was determined that the defendants’
mobile home was maintained in a deplorable condition.
Garbage
and clothes, including dirty diapers, were strewn throughout the
home.
Animal feces was in the living area.
numerous small items were all over the floor.
Broken glass and
piled up and the floor was filthy.
Dirty dishes were
Photographs were taken
depicting the residence in this appalling condition.
Prior to trial the defendants filed a motion in limine
to prevent the Commonwealth from introducing evidence, including
the photographs, regarding the condition of the mobile home.
The trial court initially ruled in favor of the defendants, but
left open the possibility that if the evidence showed that the
condition of the trailer had a nexus to the crime, then the
ruling was subject to change.
During the course of the trial
the prosecutor on several occasions sought to delve into the
condition of the trailer; however, the trial court continued to
rule that the evidence was not admissible.
Then, during the defense case in chief, Christopher’s
father, Ronnie Grammer, was called as a witness.
In the course
of direct examination, Ronnie was asked about his opinion
8
regarding Christopher and Nicole as parents.
Ronnie responded
that the parents showed love to their baby and were “concerned
about her care and always took care of her.”
At the close of the defense case the prosecution,
referring to Ronnie Grammer’s testimony, again sought to present
evidence regarding the condition of the trailer, including the
pictures depicting the filthy condition of the residence.
The
trial court ruled that Grammer’s testimony had opened the door
to rebuttal evidence concerning the condition of the trailer.
This issue presents the doctrine of curative
admissibility, commonly known as "opening the door."
Norris v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 89 S.W.3d 411, 414-415 (2002) (citing R.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 1.10, 30-33 (3d
ed. Michie 1993).
Wigmore distilled the issue to this question:
"If the one party offers an inadmissible fact that is received,
may the opponent afterwards offer similar facts whose only claim
to admission is that they negative or explain or counterbalance
the prior inadmissible fact?"
Id. (citing 1 Wigmore, Evidence
in Trials at Common Law, 731 (Tillers' rev. 1983)).
In a
typical case, a witness will make an inadmissible assertion and
the opposing party is then permitted to introduce evidence to
the contrary.4
Id. (citing United States v. Jansen, 475 F.2d 312
4
We are not suggesting that Ronnie Grammer’s testimony regarding Nicole and
Christopher’s parenting was per se inadmissible under the rules of evidence;
9
(7th Cir.1973) (Defendant improperly asserted that he had never
been convicted of a crime; prosecutor then permitted to
introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence that defendant had
earlier been convicted of a misdemeanor) and Dewey v. Funk, 211
Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722 (1973) (In a paternity action the mother
improperly testified that she had been a virgin prior to
intercourse with the alleged father.
Kansas Supreme Court ruled
that the defense should have been permitted to introduce
otherwise inadmissible evidence that the mother had admitted to
intercourse with other men)).
The admission of rebuttal evidence is largely a matter
of judicial discretion.
Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d
787, 799 (2001); RCr5 9.42. The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Commonwealth
v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
In this case, the defendants opened the door to the
issue of Nicole and Christopher’s parenting by eliciting the
statements of Ronnie Grammer on the matter.
The trial court
exercised restraint in permitting the Commonwealth to present
evidence rebutting Ronnie Grammer’s statements in praise of
their parenting.
Only six of twenty-five pictures of the
however, it stands to reason that the same rationale would apply to an
admissible assertion of opinion on an issue under dispute.
5
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
10
residence were permitted to be presented to the jury.
Under the
circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to present evidence
directly rebutting the testimony of Ronnie Grammer on the issue
of Nicole and Christopher’s parenting.
“In short, the
appellants, having opened the book on the subject, were not in a
position to complain when their adversaries sought to read other
verses from the same chapter and page.”
Harris v. Thompson,
Ky., 497 S.W.2d 422, 430 (1973).
Next, the appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it excluded pictures of Ruby at
various stages of her 13-week life prior to June 11, 2001.
The
defense sought to introduce the photographs to demonstrate her
condition at various intervals from the time of her birth.
Defense counsel first produced the photographs and
sought their introduction the morning of the trial.
Following
an objection by the Commonwealth, the trial court ruled that the
pictures were inadmissible on the basis that defense counsel had
failed to timely provide the pictures to the Commonwealth in
compliance with the case discovery order.
On November 8, 2001, the trial court entered a
discovery order which, among other things, required the
defendants to “provide[] a list of, and an opportunity to
inspect, copy, or photograph all . . . tangible objects which
11
the Defendant intends to produce at the trial and are in his
possession, custody or control, within fifteen (15) days after
receiving discovery.”
7.24.
Such an order is authorized under RCr
RCr 7.24(9) provides as follows:
If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to
comply with this rule or an order issued
pursuant thereto, the court may direct such
party to permit the discovery or inspection
of materials not previously disclosed, grant
a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing in evidence the material not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order
as may be just under the circumstances.
In matters dealing with discovery, it is within the
discretion of the trial court to permit the discovery or
inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing into
evidence the material not disclosed, or to enter such other
orders as may be just under the circumstances.
RCr 7.24(9);
Neal v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 843, 848 (2003).
It is undisputed that the defendants did not disclose
the photographs proposed to be introduced until the morning the
trial was scheduled to begin.
Consequently, the Commonwealth
would have had minimal, if any, opportunity to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the taking of the photographs.
RCr
9.24 specifically authorizes the trial court, at its discretion,
12
to prohibit the defendants from introducing the material into
evidence.
As noted by the trial court during argument of the
issue, the defendants were free to introduce witnesses who could
testify concerning the condition of the child during the time
periods covered by the photographs.
Under these circumstances,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
photographs could not be admitted.
Finally, the appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying an instruction on third-degree
criminal abuse.
Defense counsel sought an instruction on third-degree
criminal abuse; however, the trial court denied the instruction
and instructed only on first-degree criminal abuse and seconddegree criminal abuse.
KRS 508.120, the statute which defines
third-degree criminal abuse, provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal abuse in
the third degree when he recklessly abuses
another person or permits another person of
whom he has actual custody to be abused and
thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause
him serious physical injury; or
(c) Causes torture, cruel confinement or
cruel punishment; to a person twelve (12)
years of age or less, or who is physically
helpless or mentally helpless.
13
KRS 508.100, the statute which defines first-degree
criminal abuse, is substantially identical except that the
required mental state is intentional, and KRS 508.110, the
statute which defines second-degree criminal abuse, is
substantially the same except that the required mental state is
wantonly.
The trial court has a duty to prepare and give
instructions on the whole law of the case, including any lesserincluded offenses which are supported by the evidence.
Commonwealth, Ky. 95 S.W.3d 843, 850 (2003).
Neal v.
However, that duty
does not require an instruction on a theory with no evidentiary
foundation.
Id.
An instruction on a lesser included offense is
required only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the
jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense.
Id.
KRS 501.020(4) provides that
A person acts recklessly with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense when he fails to
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of
such nature and degree that failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation.
14
The medical evidence suggested that Ruby’s injuries
were caused by the shaking, squeezing, and/or striking of the
child.
As previously discussed, the injuries inflected upon the
child were very severe.
Among other things, Ruby had four rib
fractures that were of three different ages; a compression
fracture on the second lumbar vertebra; elevated levels of
enzymes in her liver which were suspected to be as a result of
trauma; dark purple contusions on her right and left cheeks; a
light purple contusion on her left forearm; an abrasion or
scrape on one of her nostrils; and a bruise on her abdomen.
Given the severity of the injuries, the force of
shaking, squeezing, and/or striking was necessarily excessive.
The evidence does not support the theory that Nicole failed to
perceive the substantial and unjustifiable risk that excessive
physical abuse could produce severe injuries to a 13-week-old
child.
The risk was too obvious.
There was no evidence that
Nicole was so naive so as not to appreciate that a child, in the
early weeks of her life, requires gentle handling or that she
did not perceive the risk that severe handling could result in
serious injuries.
Absent this failure to perceive the risk,
there was no evidentiary foundation for the instruction.
In her brief, the appellant fails to articulate a
rational theory in support of the instruction.
She refers to
the placing of the child in the care of Debbie Gorney and Erik
15
Kraus, apparently suggesting that they were the perpetrators and
that her reckless conduct was placing Ruby in their care.
However, as previously noted, the evidence does not support the
theory that the abuse occurred solely during the night prior to
the police being called when Ruby was with Gorney and Kraus.
On
the contrary, the medical evidence suggested that the abuse was
continual and ongoing.
In summary, we are persuaded that the trial court did
not commit error when it denied the appellant’s request for a
third-degree criminal abuse instruction.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Meade
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General Of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
16
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