H. DENNIS HALFHILL v. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, BOARD OF TRUSTEES
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RENDERED: June 20, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000564-MR
H. DENNIS HALFHILL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00746
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS,
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DYCHE AND McANULTY, JUDGES; AND POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE1
POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
H. Dennis Halfhill appeals from an
opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court holding that 105
KAR2 1:205 does not intentionally discriminate against
individuals 55 years of age or older; does not violate the
prohibitions against age discrimination as contained in KRS3
1
Senior Status Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution.
2
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Chapter 344; and that Halfhill is not eligible for disability
retirement benefits because he is qualified for an unreduced
retirement benefit.
For the reasons stated below, we reverse.
On December 23, 1991, Halfhill began work as a deputy
sheriff for the Kenton County Sheriff’s Department.
On December
23, 1992, Halfhill suffered a work-related injury when a
motorist ran a red light and hit his cruiser.
His injuries were
severe, and, as a result, on September 30, 1999, he was
terminated because of his disability.
At the time of his
termination Halfhill had 94 months of service in the County
Employees Retirement System.
On September 22, 1999, Halfhill applied to Kentucky
Retirement Systems for disability benefits.
At the time he
filed his application Halfhill was 57 years old.
On September
29, 1999, Kentucky Retirement Systems notified Halfhill that it
was denying his application for disability retirement benefits
because he was over 55 and entitled to an unreduced normal
retirement allowance.4
Halfhill was specifically ineligible for
disability benefits under 105 KAR 1:205, the regulation Halfhill
challenges in this proceeding as in violation of KRS Chapter
344.
Halfhill qualified for the unreduced allowance solely
4
In addition, as a member of the Kenton County Sheriff’s Department Halfhill
was employed in a hazardous position. Consequently, he was eligible for
hazardous disability benefits. Under this benefit, if the injury is
sustained in the line of duty, as Halfhill’s was, retirement benefits are
enhanced regardless of length of service. KRS 16.582; KRS 78.545(40).
2
because he was over 55; had he been younger than 55 years old, he
would have been entitled to disability benefits.
According to
Halfhill, his unreduced normal retirement allowance is
substantially less than the benefits he would have been entitled
to under the disability benefits formula, and application of the
disability benefit procedures would have resulted in a permanent
enhancement of his retirement benefits.5
After the initial denial Halfhill sought an
administrative hearing on his application for disability
benefits.
On April 18, 2000, the Hearing Officer entered a
report and recommended order upholding the denial of Halfhill’s
disability retirement benefits.
On May 24, 2000, the
Administrative Appeals Committee of the Board of Trustees of the
Kentucky Retirement Systems adopted the Hearing Officer’s report
and recommended order denying Halfhill retirement disability
benefits.
Halfhill subsequently appealed to the Franklin Circuit
Court.
On February 28, 2002, the Circuit Court entered an
opinion and order holding that 105 KAR 1:205 does not
intentionally discriminate against individuals 55 years of age
and older; does not violate the age discrimination provisions of
KRS Chapter 344; and that, consequently, Halfhill is not
5
Kentucky Retirement Systems does not dispute this allegation. See KRS
16.582(5) for the determination of the disability retirement allowance.
3
entitled to disability retirement benefits.
This appeal
followed.
The parties have presented this case here, as they did
in the lower court and before the Retirement Board, to be one
that turns upon a single legal issue.
This Court will accept
their characterization and decide the case accordingly.
As
phrased by the parties, this case turns upon whether 105 KAR
1:205, a regulation establishing qualifications for disability
benefits, violates KRS 344.040, the Kentucky statute prohibiting
age discrimination.
Since the issue is a legal one this court
may review it de novo.
Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan,
Ky. App., 785 S.W.2d 263 (1990).
Halfhill is a member of the County Employees
Retirement System, the terms of which are generally covered by
KRS Chapter 78.
However, KRS 78.545(40) provides that members
of the County Employees Retirement System in hazardous duty
positions, such as Halfhill, are subject to the disability
procedures of KRS 16.582.6
Prior to being amended effective July
14, 2000, KRS 16.582(2)(b) had provided that to be eligible to
receive disability benefits the applicant “shall be less than
6
KRS 16.505 et seq. codifies the State Police Retirement System. KRS 61.150,
et seq. codifies the Kentucky Employees Retirement System and contains
provisions for disability retirement analogous to those discussed herein.
See KRS 61.600; KRS 61.605; and KRS 61.607.
4
normal retirement age.”7
KRS 16.505(15) defines the normal
retirement age as 55 years.
As a result, disabled workers in
Halfhill’s situation who were over the age of 55 were ineligible
for disability benefits.
Classifying this exclusion as one “based solely on the
basis of age,” thereby making it void under the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),8 the Board of Trustees
of the Kentucky Retirement System enacted a corrective
regulation, 105 KAR 1:205.9
That regulation, which became
7
As amended the statute provides that in order to qualify to retire on
disability “the person shall not be eligible for an unreduced retirement
allowance.”
8
We note that in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct.
631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the United States
Congress could not validly impose the ADEA upon the states pursuant to the
sovereign immunity provisions of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution; therefore, the Board’s concern about the Federal Act was,
ultimately, misplaced.
9
The regulation was promulgated pursuant to KRS 61.645(9)(e) in response to a
challenge raised by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the
state statutory scheme. The introductory annotations to the regulation
stated as follows:
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 16.582 and
61.600 provide for long-term disability benefits for
members of the Kentucky Employees Retirement System,
County Employees Retirement System and the State
Police Retirement System. 29 USC 623(i)(1)(A) and 29
CFR 1625.10(f)(ii) prohibit a pension system from
limiting long-term disability benefits solely on the
basis of age. KRS 61.645(9)(f) provides that the
provisions governing the Kentucky Employees
Retirement System, County Employees Retirement System
and the State Police Retirement System shall conform
to federal law. Because the enhanced benefits
provided under disability retirement are intended to
bridge the gap between the date the member becomes
disabled and the date the member would have been
eligible for a benefit without reduction, this
administrative regulation establishes that members
who are eligible for retirement without a reduction,
5
effective May 19, 1999, did two things.
First, those who had in
the past been denied disability retirement benefits under the
statute could reapply for benefits without application of the
offensive age restriction.
105 KAR 1:205 § 1.
Second, in the
future, those who were eligible “for a retirement allowance not
subject to the reduction specified in KRS 16.57710 or
61.595(2)(a)”11 were to be denied disability benefits.
105 KAR
1:205 § 2.
Under the new regulation there were two ways a
retiring employee in Halfhill’s situation was not subject to
reduced retirement benefits.
First, if he retired after the
normal retirement age of 55, or second, if he retired after
twenty years of service.
In other words, under the new
regulation the pool of ineligible retirees was enlarged; not
reduced.
No one over age 55 was eligible for disability
retirement benefits, and, in addition, those who had 20 years of
service were likewise barred.
regardless of age, shall not be entitled to
disability retirement. This administrative
regulation also establishes a procedure for
individuals previously denied the right to apply for
disability retirement because of age to submit an
application for disability retirement.
The regulation was withdrawn after the 2000 revisions by the
General Assembly incorporating the provisions of the regulation
into the retirement statutes.
10
Reduction for early retirement under Kentucky State Police Retirement
System.
11
Reduction for early retirement under Kentucky Employees Retirement System.
6
As the Retirement Board had previously acknowledged
the discriminatory effect of disqualifying only retirees over
age 55 from disability benefits, the question becomes whether
expanding the pool of excluded claimants from only those over
normal retirement age to include those who have served 20 years
transforms the exclusion from one “based solely on . . . age”
into something more acceptable.
We hold that it does not.
Kentucky’s principal Civil Rights statute, KRS
344.040, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
It is an unlawful practice for an employer:
(1) To fail or refuse to hire, or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against an individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of the
individual's . . . age forty (40) and over
. . . [.]
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify
employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive an individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
status as an employee, because of . . . age
forty (40) and over . . . [.]
As previously noted, Halfhill was disqualified for
disability retirement benefits merely because he was over 55 at
the time he filed his application for disability benefits.
Had
he not yet turned 55 and all other aspects of his employment
were otherwise the same, including years of service, he would
have qualified for disability benefits resulting in retirement
7
earnings substantially greater than his normal retirement
allowance.
Moreover, the increased earnings would have been
permanent, not just for a “gap filler” period as argued by the
appellee and stated in the regulation itself.12
KRS 344.040, among other things, makes it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate with respect to compensation, terms,
or conditions of employment or to limit, segregate, or classify
employees in any way which would deprive the individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his or
her status as an employee on the basis of the age of the
employee if the employee is over 40.
Because of the substantial
and permanent detriment which would be incurred by Halfhill,
under the circumstances of this case, we are persuaded that 105
KAR 1:205 does not comply with the standards as set forth in the
statute.
See Betts v. Hamilton Co., 897 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir.
1990); Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S.Ct.
613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); and EEOC v. Chrysler, 733 F.2d 1183
(6th Cir. 1984).
The Board and the Franklin Circuit Court deferred to
the regulation over KRS 344.040.
However, an administrative
regulation cannot supercede a statute.
12
Whenever there is a
While for some reason Halfhill failed to provide the calculations of the
amounts at issue, Kentucky Retirement Systems does not specifically deny the
appellant’s allegation that application of the disability formula would
result in a substantially greater retirement allowance and that the greater
benefit would be permanent.
8
conflict between a statute and an administrative regulation, it
is elementary that the statute controls.
Franklin v. Natural
Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 1,
3 (1990); see also KRS 13A.120(2).
As such, the anti-
discrimination provisions of KRS 344.040 must prevail over 105
KAR 1:205.
We note, however, that the retirement statutes were
amended in 2000 to incorporate the language previously found in
the regulation.
Consequently, KRS 344.040 will not impact this
issue in the future.
If two statutes are in conflict, the more
recent and more specific controls.
Troxell v. Trammell, Ky.,
730 S.W.2d 525, 528 (1987).
In summary, the rationale, as set out in the
regulation itself, for denying those over 55 enhanced benefits
is that disability benefits are meant to be “gap fillers” to
cover an employee from the time of his disability until the time
when he could retire without penalty.
However, the enhanced
disability benefits, in fact, extend beyond the time full
retirement accrues and result in a permanent advantage to those
able to qualify for disability retirement benefits.
Under these
circumstances we believe that the anti-discrimination provisions
of KRS 344.040 were violated.
Halfhill was denied a substantial
and permanent benefit solely because of his age.
Further,
adding another category to those excluded by the age exclusion
does not make it less discriminatory.
9
Therefore, to answer the
issue as posed by the parties, 105 KAR 1:205 does violate the
age discrimination prohibitions of KRS 344.040, and Halfhill is
entitled to disability benefits.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is reversed and the case is remanded with
directions to grant Halfhill’s application for disability
retirement benefits.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen D. Wolnitzek
Donna M. Bloemer
Wolnitzek & Rowekamp, P.S.C.
Covington, Kentucky
James D. Allen
Lizbeth Ann Tully
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Stephen D. Wolnitzek
Wolnitzek & Rowekamp, P.S.C.
Covington, Kentucky
J. Eric Wampler
Kentucky Retirement Systems
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
James D. Allen
Lexington, Kentucky
10
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