SL HOTEL DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE GOLDEN RANCH DEVELOPMENT, LLC; RAY DESLOOVER; JOHN REVEL; BRUCE MCINTOSH
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000493-MR
SL HOTEL DEVELOPMENT, LLC
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-04005
GOLDEN RANCH DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
RAY DESLOOVER; JOHN REVEL;
BRUCE MCINTOSH
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: SL Hotel Development, LLC (SL) appeals from an
order of the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
Golden Ranch Development, LLC (Golden Ranch).
On appeal SL
raises two issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in finding
that SL breached the terms of the contract with Golden Ranch;
and 2) whether Golden Ranch anticipatorily breached the contract
with SL, thus suspending performance by SL.
remand.
We reverse and
Pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
56.03, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The standard of review of a trial court's granting of summary
judgment is "whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
Where
the relevant facts are undisputed and the dispositive issue
becomes the legal effect of those facts, our review is de novo.
Western Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, Ky.
In the case sub judice, both
App., 80 S.W.3d 787, 790 (2001).
parties admit that there is no material fact to be resolved.
Both assert that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 1, 1999
SL entered into a Purchase Agreement with Select Properties,
Inc. and Stanford Realty, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Stanford) for the purchase of real property located on New
Circle Road in Lexington, Kentucky (Stanford contract).
purchase price was $2,225,000.
The
There were four tenants on the
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property with leases and at least one of the leases required 24month’s notice to the tenant before cancellation of the lease.
Closing was to take place no later than 90 days after execution
of the contract.
However, a series of addendums extending the
closing date were executed.
On January 24, 2000 an addendum to
extend closing to February 15, 2000 was signed by the owner of
Stanford, Timothy Diachun.
John Owen, the owner of SL.
The addendum was never signed by
Closing on the property never took
place.
On December 24, 1999, SL entered into a Purchase and
Sale Agreement with Golden Ranch, whereby Golden Ranch agreed to
purchase a smaller tract of the Stanford property (Golden Ranch
contract).
The purchase price was $900,000.
As required by the
contract, Golden Ranch deposited $5,000 and a non-interest
bearing note for $195,000 with Gibson Realty.
The note was
guaranteed jointly and severally, personally and unconditionally
by Ray DeSloover, John Revel, and Bruce McIntosh.
Closing was
to take place on or before February 15, 2000.
The following letter, dated February 11, 2000 was sent
from Michael R. Eaves, counsel for Golden Ranch to Bill Arvin,
Senior, counsel for SL:
Speaking for my clients, we still wish to
buy the property but have become convinced
that Mr. Owen will not be able to deliver
possession of it, free of the claims of the
existing tenant. Based upon the lease I have
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seen, the tenant has a continued right to
occupancy of the premises for three or four
more years, absent being bought out of its
lease. Quite obviously, my clients want the
property for the construction of a
restaurant and are not interested in paying
a million dollars simply in order to collect
rent from the existing tenant.
My clients have spent several months
negotiating with Mr. Owen, only now to
discover that a deal with him may not be
possible. As I said, they remain interested
in purchasing the property. The terms under
which they are interested in purchasing the
property are reflected in the last contract
I proposed, a copy of which I believe I sent
you. If Mr. Owen wishes to sell the
property, we need to meet here in Richmond,
face to face, and discuss it. Absent that,
I see nothing more than a continuing stream
of negotiations and delays, while still
having no assurance that we would ever have
a deal. My clients are tired of negotiating
and are only interested in an agreement.
Please advise.
On February 17, 2000, SL noticed Golden Ranch that it
was in default for its failure to close on February 15, 2000.
The letter stated, as a remedy for this default, SL would accept
the earnest money as liquidated damages and requested that
Golden Ranch direct Gibson to deliver the $200,000 earnest money
to SL.
When Golden Ranch failed to do so, SL filed the suit,
which is the subject of this appeal, asking for judgment against
Golden Ranch, Ray DeSloover, John Ravel, and Bruce McIntosh in
the amount of $195,000, together with post-judgment interest at
the rate of 12%.
SL also requested judgment against Golden
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Ranch, requiring that Golden Ranch direct Gibson to release the
$5,000 earnest money.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
SL
argued that Golden Ranch was required to close on or before
February 15, 2000, that it had 30 days before closing to notify
SL of any failures of contingencies in the contract and that
Golden Ranch failed to provide said notice.
SL also argued that
its agreement to deliver possession was not absolute, and, more
specifically, that, under the contract terms, SL had thirty days
after closing to get the tenant to vacate the premises.
SL
pointed out that the contract provided for a penalty of $5,000
per month rent if SL failed to do so.
Golden Ranch argued that SL’s contract to purchase the
property from Stanford expired on January 14, 2000 and, as a
result, SL had no rights to the property and could not perform
under their agreement.
Golden Ranch asserted that they did give
notice of failed contingencies in a letter dated January 10,
2000, as required by the agreement.
Golden Ranch also argued
that they were not obligated to perform until SL could convey
marketable title.
The trial court granted the Golden Ranch motion for
summary judgment and denied SL’s motion, finding that the
purchase and sale agreement between SL and Stanford expired on
January 14, 2000, and that as a result, SL was unable to perform
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as of that date.
The trial court concluded that the closing of
the sale and purchase agreement between SL and Stanford was a
prerequisite to the agreement entered into between SL and Golden
Ranch.
The trial court further concluded that Golden Ranch was
not obligated to give the thirty-day notice requirement under
the agreement because any such notice would have been
irrelevant.
The trial court, relying on Jackson v. Lamb’s Ex’r,
299 Ky. 505, 186 S.W.2d 9 (1945), determined that Golden Ranch
was not required to perform until SL could convey a good and
marketable title.
Based on the facts in this case, we believe the trial
court erred in its determination that Golden Ranch was entitled
to summary judgment as a result of SL’s failure to obtain title
as of January 14, 2000.
“It is not essential that the vendor of land be able
at the time he enters into the contract for its sale to convey a
perfect title in order to make the contract valid, since it is
competent for him to acquire the title afterwards, or clear
encumbrances thereon and render himself able to convey a perfect
title at the time he is called upon by his contract or by the
law to do so.”
(1949).
Guill v. Pugh, 311 Ky. 90, 223 S.W.2d 574
Golden Ranch does not refute SL’s claim that Golden
Ranch was aware that SL did not actually own the property it
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contracted to sell.
The contractual requirement, in pertinent
part is as follows:
4.1 Title at Closing. At closing an
unencumbered, marketable title to the
Property shall be conveyed to Purchaser by
deed of general warranty with the usual
covenants . . .
This contract clearly called for SL to deliver title
at closing, not before.
Obviously, since Golden Ranch knew that
SL had not yet acquired the property when it entered into the
contract to purchase, it could have negotiated a contract
whereby SL was required to provide proof of title at some date
prior to closing.
Its failure to do so is fatal to its claim.
By the express terms of the contract, SL was not required to
convey title until closing.
Golden Ranch relies upon the testimony of Timothy
Diachun, the owner of Stanford, that SL’s last contract
extension to purchase the property expired on January 14, when
SL did not execute the extension offer of January 24, and failed
to cause the transfer of the earnest money deposit by January
26, a condition precedent to that last extension.
Be that as it
may, we are not called upon to determine whether SL breached its
contract with Stanford.
The continued extensions, and Diachun’s
testimony establish that Diachun was hopeful that a deal with SL
might still be worked out.
The letter notifying SL that it was
in default on the Stanford contract was dated February 9, 2000.
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This letter still gave SL five days to cure the default and
close on the property.
Whether SL would or could have done so
is not established, in that on February 11 Golden Ranch sent the
letter which SL believed was an anticipatory breach of the
contract by Golden Ranch.
Because this letter was an
anticipatory breach, as discussed later in this opinion, SL was
relieved of its obligation to purchase property for which it
believed it no longer had a buyer.
The trial court’s reliance on Jackson is misplaced.
It is true that “a vendee cannot be required to perform his part
of a contract unless the vendor can convey a good and marketable
title.”
Jackson, 299 Ky. at 509, 186 S.W.2d at 11.
However,
the vendor is not required to perform until the contract or law
requires it.
Guill, 311 Ky. at 92, 223 S.W.2d at 575.
Under
the terms of the contract, SL had until closing to convey title,
and therefore could not have breached the contract with Golden
Ranch when it failed to obtain title on January 14.
Because the trial court concluded that SL had breached
the Golden Ranch contract by failing to obtain title, it never
addressed the issue of whether Golden Ranch anticipatorily
breached the contract, relieving SL from its duty to purchase
the property.
Golden Ranch claims that sometime after the execution
of the contract, it became aware of the leases.
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However, the
contract provides for the removal of the tenants and Golden
Ranch does not refute the claim that it was aware of the tenants
on the property.
John Owen, owner of SL, testified that Golden
Ranch had been provided with copies of the leases and that it
inspected the leases prior to signing the contract.
Golden
Ranch does not specifically refute that claim, but rather
asserts that the February 11 letter was notification to SL of a
title defect, represented by the leases.
The basis of Golden
Ranch’s claim is that, while they were aware of the tenant, at
closing they were entitled to title free of the leases, per
section 4.1 of the contract.
We first note, that the February
11 letter states that Golden Ranch was concerned about SL’s
ability to deliver possession, not title free of the leases.
Golden Ranch takes the position it was merely attempting to
settle a dispute over conflicting portions of the contract, and
that the parties were free to “reach an agreement regarding
their differing opinions as to what their Contract required.”
SL argues that the contract language is clear and that Golden
Ranch had negotiated its protection as to possession into the
contract.
We agree.
The two provisions Golden Ranch contends were in
dispute are as follows:
4.1 Title at Closing. At closing an
unencumbered, marketable title to the
Property shall be conveyed to Purchaser by
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deed of general warranty with the usual
covenants such as any national title company
will insure, free and clear of any and all
liens, leases, tenancies and encumbrances
except (a) such liens and encumbrances as
Purchaser may specifically approve . . .
4.2
Other Terms and Conditions.
a. Present tenant to be vacated from
property no later than 30 days after
closing; however, all contingencies are to
be removed before notification to tenant.
Notification to and vacating of tenant shall
be only by the Seller. If tenant is still
occupying the property after closing,
Purchaser shall grant Seller a limited
power-of-attorney, for the purpose of
vacating present tenant from the property.
Seller and Purchaser agree that if present
tenant has not vacated the property by 30
days after closing, Seller will pay to
Purchaser a $5,000 (Five Thousand Dollar)
monthly penalty for each full month, after
30 days past closing, that tenant continues
to occupy the property. Any partial month
occupied by tenant shall be prorated daily.
Seller also agrees that purchaser shall be
entitled to any and all rents from tenant,
starting at closing.
In construing a contract, the court will give effect,
if possible to the intention of the parties.
Black Star Coal
Corp. v. Napier, 303 Ky. 778, 199 S.W.2d 449 (1947).
If the
contract contains inconsistent clauses, they should be
reconciled if possible.
Id.
However, we have no right to make
a contract for the parties or revise the agreement while
professing to construe it.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Hobbs, Ky., 268 S.W.2d 420 (1954).
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It is clear that Golden Ranch was, at the very least,
aware that there was a tenant on the property.
Even if it was
not given copies of the leases before signing the contract, in
performing its due diligence, it would have become aware of the
existence of the leases.
Golden Ranch makes no claim of fraud
or misrepresentation as to the leases.
Ranch is one of timing.
The problem for Golden
Section 4.2 (d) of the contract
specifically required that Golden Corral approve the property as
an acceptable restaurant location by January 15, 2000.
Further,
Section 10.4 of the contract required that all communication,
including notices, be in writing.
While there is nothing in the
record to establish the date that Golden Corral first objected
to the leases, the first written communication in the record as
to the leases is the February 11 letter, nearly a month after
the January 15 deadline for approval by Golden Ranch.
Golden Ranch argues that a letter dated January 10,
2000 was notice that it was not approving the property.
While
this is factually true, the letter of January 10 did not mention
the leases but raised issues of parking spaces, signage and rear
access.
Golden Ranch never asserted that it was entitled to
cancel the contract based on the issues raised in the January 10
letter, but rather relied only on the issue of the leases.
We
believe that this is a clear indication that Golden Corral was
either aware of the leases and had second thoughts about them or
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failed to perform its due diligence before the January 15, 2000
deadline.
In either case, Golden Ranch was not entitled to
insist that SL renegotiate the contract.
The February 11 letter
establishes that this is what Golden Ranch was attempting to do.
The letter states, in pertinent part, “The terms under which
they are interested in purchasing the property are reflected in
the last contract I proposed, a copy of which I believe I sent
you.”
For all its claims to the contrary, Golden Ranch was not
attempting to clarify the terms of their existing contract, but
rather was attempting to substitute a new contract in its place.
The contract clearly provided for a remedy in the
event the tenant could not be removed within 30 days of closing.
Golden Ranch agreed under the terms of the contract, to a $5,000
a month penalty to be paid by SL and any and all rents from the
tenant, starting at closing.
Golden Ranch had no right to
insist that SL renegotiate these terms.
Golden Ranch also argues that the February 11 letter
is not an anticipatory breach, because the letter states that it
was still interested in purchasing the property.
An
anticipatory breach requires unequivocal words or conduct
evidencing an intent to repudiate the contract.
Brownsboro Road
Restaurant, Inc. v. Jericco, Inc., Ky. App., 674 S.W.2d 40, 42
(1984).
The letter of February 11 was an unequivocal statement
by Golden Ranch of its intent to repudiate the contract unless
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SL agreed to a new contract, on Golden Ranch’s terms.
Since
Golden Ranch refused to perform the contract as written, SL had
the right to suspend its performance.
Dalton v. Mullins, Ky.,
293 S.W.2d 470, 476 (1956).
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees is
reversed and the matter is remanded to the circuit court for an
order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant, SL Hotel
Development, LLC.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
John P. Brice
Fleming, Ward & Brice, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael R. Eaves
Valerie J. Himes
Sword, Floyd & Moody, PLLC
Richmond, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Michael R. Eaves
Richmond, Kentucky
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