PHILLIP WESLEY MANN, AN INCOMPETENT BY HIS GUARDIAN, CHARLOTTE HOOTS v. NORTON HOSPITALS, INC., DBA KOSAIR CHILDRENS HOSPITAL; GREGORY B. NAZAR, M.D.; NEUROSURGICAL INSTITUTE OF KENTUCKY, P.S.C.; AND VICKIE LEE MONTGOMERY, M.D.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 9, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000476-MR
PHILLIP WESLEY MANN, AN INCOMPETENT
BY HIS GUARDIAN, CHARLOTTE HOOTS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-002362
NORTON HOSPITALS, INC.,
DBA KOSAIR CHILDRENS HOSPITAL;
GREGORY B. NAZAR, M.D.;
NEUROSURGICAL INSTITUTE OF KENTUCKY, P.S.C.;
AND VICKIE LEE MONTGOMERY, M.D.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND COMBS, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The Appellant, Phillip Wesley Mann, an
incompetent, by his Guardian, Charlotte Hoots, seeks review of
orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment
in favor of the Appellees, Norton Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Kosair
Children’s Hospital (“Kosair Children’s”), Gregory B. Nazar,
M.D. and Neurosurgical Institute of Kentucky (“Dr. Nazar”), and
Vickie Lee Montgomery, M.D. (“Dr. Montgomery”), and denying
Appellant’s motion to vacate.
The relevant facts in this medical negligence case are
well summarized in the parties’ briefs and in the Opinion and
Order of the trial court.
We refer to the record as necessary
to resolve the issues before us, namely:
I. PLAINTIFF HAVING ESTABLISHED TO A REASONABLE
MEDICAL CERTAINTY THAT DEFENDANTS’ FAILURE TO PERFORM
AN ANGIOGRAM OR TO TIMELY TRANSFER HIM TO A FACILITY
CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THAT VITAL DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE
WAS A DEVIATION FROM ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE, THAT THE DEVIATION INCREASED THE RISK OF
HARM FROM A PREEXISTING CONDITION, AND THAT THE
INCREASED RISK WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN CAUSING THE
HARM THAT HE ULTIMATELY SUSTAINED, THERE EXIST GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
and
II. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING OSTENSIBLE AGENCY,
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY
ESTABLISHED BY THE COURTS OF KENTUCKY, KOSAIR SHOULD
BE HELD LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF FOR INJURIES THAT HE
SUSTAINED BECAUSE OF THE MALPRACTICE OF DEFENDANT
PHYSICIANS.
(I)
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Dr. Nazar and Dr. Montgomery, because:
Dr. Stellar [Appellant’s expert] cannot supply
the medical causation testimony required by
Kentucky law. Even if his testimony criticizing
the delay in obtaining an angiogram or
-2-
transferring Phillip is deemed sufficient to
establish a breach of the applicable standard of
care (a matter on which this Court has grave
doubts), there is no question that his testimony
is devoid of any credible opinion regarding a
treatment which would have given Phillip Mann a
reasonable probability of a better outcome. In
short, Dr. Stellar criticized what he perceived
as delay in obtaining the angiogram and
emphasized repeatedly the necessity of
transferring the patient to a medical facility
where this extremely rare condition could be
treated, but he gave no viable testimony
regarding where that facility was located or what
would have awaited Phillip Mann at that facility.
Asked repeatedly by different defense attorneys
to identify the course of treatment that would
have been offered, he repeatedly refused to do
so. Opining that a proper diagnostic procedure
should have been done sooner to enable a prompter
transfer to a different facility where an unknown
surgical intervention may or have not been
attempted is patently deficient expert testimony.
The trial court noted that Dr. Chyatte, the
neurosurgeon who treated Phillip at Northwestern, provided
testimony that “underscored the fatal flaw in Plaintiff’s loss
of chance theory.”
Dr. Chyatte explained that the treatment he
performed after rupture of Phillip’s aneurysm (coil embolism)
would not have been performed before the rupture, because it
carried a significant risk of death.
According to Dr. Chyatte,
giant basilar fusiform aneurysms are considered untreatable by a
large number of experts, because the available treatments have
very high morbidity and mortality rates, and lesser treatments
may not cure the problem.
The trial court noted Dr. Chyatte’s
testimony regarding his own experience treating this rare type
-3-
of aneurysm, and that he thought it “fair to say that no one has
the answer on how to treat these lesions [giant basilar fusiform
aneurysms]”.
The trial court further explained the basis for
granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment:
Dr. Stellar had no opinion as to a specific
surgical treatment which Phillip Mann could have
had but was denied as a result of Dr. Nazar’s
alleged failure to promptly perform an angiogram
and/or transfer the patient. Coupled with Dr.
Stellar’s inability to offer such testimony is
Dr. Chyatte’s considerable real life experience
with this extremely rare form of aneurysm.
Simply put, Dr. Stellar fails to offer the
medical proof necessary to establish Plaintiff’s
claim and Dr. Chyatte’s experience clearly
illustrates why such testimony would not be
forthcoming from Dr. Stellar or any other
neurosurgeon. In 1993 and even today medical
science simply does not have “the answer” to a
giant basilar fusiform aneurysm. . . .
We review summary judgments de novo.1
In essence,
Appellant asserts that the physicians should be estopped from
relying upon any failure of proof as a defense, where their
negligent delay in getting an angiogram precluded Appellant from
obtaining proof of proximate cause.
Appellant states that
“because the angiogram had not been performed before the
aneurysm ruptured and altered the architecture of Phillip’s
brain, Dr. Stellar could not opine to which [sic], if any, of
the treatments that were available for such conditions in 1993,
1
Deaton v. Connecticut General Life Insurance, Ky. App., 17
S.W.3d 896 (2000).
-4-
. . . could have been employed, and with what success.”
The
logic of this argument is illusory.
Appellant does not dispute the diagnosis of a giant
fusiform aneurysm of the basilar artery.
2
Dr. Stellar’s
inability to give an opinion about appropriate treatment options
for that condition was not “caused” by any failure to timely
obtain an angiogram.
Expert medical testimony established that
in 1993, there was no surgery, intravascular intervention, or
medical intervention that would have prevented the aneurysm from
rupturing and that would have provided Phillip with a reasonable
clinical outcome.3
Dr. Stellar conceded as much:
Q. If you block off the blood supply to the
proliferating arteries but maintained the blood
supply up through the neck through the basilar
artery in to the Circle of Willis would the loss
of those proliferating arteries still cause a
morbid or perhaps mortality affect [sic] on a
healthy patient.
A.
They would.
2
Kosair Children’s expert, Rafael Tamargo, M.D., explained that
a fusiform aneurysm is a dilation and weakness involving the
entire circumference of the artery itself, as contrasted to a
saccular aneurysm which is a bubble arising from the parent
vessel. The type of aneurysm determines the treatment options
which may be available. The basilar artery supplies the brain
stem, the cerebellum and the back portion of the cerebrum, as
well as the deep thalamic structures. The brain stem is
probably the most important part of the brain in terms of
survival and provides direction for all basic functions, such as
blood pressure control, heart rate, and respiration. Transcript,
Dr. Tamargo (video) deposition, 1/11/2002, pp. 25-26, 28-29.
3
According to Dr. Tamargo.
-5-
Q. If you were to block off the blood supply of
the entire basilar artery I assume it would have
the same affect [sic]?
A.
Yes, or even more.
Q. Do you know what procedure was done at
Northwestern Hospital on this patient?
A. No. I didn’t get to read that in the
operative report. I think you remember when I
looked for it.
Q. Are you aware of a procedure that was being
done and I will represent to you that it was
experimental but it was being done in 1993 called
platinum coil embolization?
A.
Yes, there were coils of various kinds.
Q. Those are actually placed within an artery;
is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q. If I were to represent to you that Philip had
28 of these platinum coils placed within his
basilar artery at Northwestern, first would you
have any information to contradict that?
A.
No, I wouldn’t have such information.
Q. Second question, would this be the sort of
procedure that would be performed upon a healthy
patient?
A.
A healthy patient?
Q.
Let me strike that?
A.
Do you mean an otherwise healthy patient?
Q. Would this be the sort of procedure that
could be performed on Phillip Mann in his
preruptured condition?
A.
It could well be.
-6-
Q. Would you still expect a morbid result from
the blocking of Phillip Mann’s proliferating
arteries?
A. You wouldn’t do the coil operation to block
off those arteries. You would be doing it to
block off the aneurysm.
Q. Okay. If the aneurysm itself involved the
entire basilar artery would that not have the
same affect [sic] of blocking off the blood flow
through the proliferating arteries?
A.
It might well.
Q. Are you aware of any other procedure other
than embolization that may have been available
for Phillip Mann in 1993?
A. No. Assuming that he had a fusiform aneurysm
no, I don’t think there was anything else.
Q.
This was not a clippable aneurysm, was it?
A.
No, as far as I know it wasn’t.
Q. Similarly, I believe there was a procedure
involving a detachable balloon that was filled
with silicone.
A.
Yes.
MR. RHATICAN: That was not a question.
That was your statement.
Q. Was there a procedure in which there was a
detachable balloon that could be filled with
silicone for the blocking of certain arteries?
A. Yes, I am not sure if that would be
appropriate here though.
Q.
Why would that not be appropriate here?
A. I am not sure. Because you wouldn’t want to
block off the artery completely. You would want
-7-
to block off only what you could really call the
aneurysm and it might not be possible. If it’s
in continuity you might not have no choice [sic].
Q. I assume in all of your testimony today you
are leaving open the possibility that this
aneurysm may have been inoperable?
A.
Yes.4
Kentucky law requires that the plaintiff in a
malpractice suit present evidence “reflecting medical reasonable
probability of proximate cause for the claimed adverse result as
related to the charge of negligence.” 5 We agree with the trial
court that “Dr. Stellar cannot supply the medical causation
testimony required by Kentucky law. . . .[because] his testimony
is devoid of any credible opinion regarding a treatment which
would have given Phillip Mann a reasonable probability of a
better outcome.”
Accordingly, we affirm the Opinion and Order granting
summary judgment in favor of the physicians.
(II)
The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor
of Kosair Children’s, having determined that the disclaimer in
the “Conditions of Admission and Authorization for Treatment”
Form, signed by Appellant, was sufficient to alert the public
that the physicians were not hospital employees.
4
5
We agree with
Transcript Dr. Stellar deposition, 9/26/2001, pp. 189-92.
Walden v. Jones, Ky. 439 S.W.2d 571, 576 (1969).
-8-
Kosair Children’s that summary judgment in favor of Dr. Nazar
and Dr. Montgomery operates in favor of the Hospital, as a
matter of law.
We affirm the Opinion and Order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court entered January 16, 2002, granting motions for
summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, Norton Hospital,
Inc., d/b/a Kosair Children’s Hospital, Gregory B. Nazar, M.D.,
Neurosurgical Institute of Kentucky, P.S.C. and Vicki Lee
Montgomery, M.D. and dismissing the complaint against them with
prejudice; and the Order denying the motion to vacate entered
February 5, 2002.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Z. Lance Samay
Morristown, New Jersey
Peter E. Rhatican
Mendham, New Jersey
Edward F. Harrington, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, NORTON
HOPSITALS, INC. DBA KOSAIR
CHILDRENS HOSPITAL:
Frank P. Hilliard
Ed Monarch
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, GREGORY B.
NAZAR, M.D. AND NEUROSURGICAL
INSTITUTE OF KENTUCKY, P.S.C.:
Gerald R. Toner
Cathleen C. Palmer
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, VICKIE LEE
MONTGOMERY, M.D.:
Richard P. Schiller
Kimberley S. Naber
Louisville, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.