CHARLOTTE HALL, INDIVIDUALLY; CHARLOTTE HALL, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JERRY HALL; LISA HALL; AND BRENT HALL v. CARITAS HEALTH SERVICES, INC., D/B/A CARITAS MEDICAL CENTER
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RENDERED: APRIL 4, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000418-MR
CHARLOTTE HALL, INDIVIDUALLY;
CHARLOTTE HALL, AS EXECUTRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF JERRY HALL;
LISA HALL; AND BRENT HALL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-006492
CARITAS HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,
D/B/A CARITAS MEDICAL CENTER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND COMBS, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellants, Charlotte Hall, in her Individual
Capacity and as Executrix of the Estate of Jerry Hall, and Lisa
Hall and Brent Hall (“Appellants”), seek review of a summary
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of the
Appellee, Caritas Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Caritas Medical
Center (“Caritas”), in this nursing negligence claim.
The trial
court dismissed Appellants’ claim after granting Caritas’ motion
in limine to exclude the testimony of Appellants’ sole expert
nursing witness.
We are asked to decide:
(1) Whether the trial court
erred in excluding the testimony of Margaret (“Peggy”) Schmidt,
Appellants’ expert nursing witness; (2) Whether the trial court
abused its discretion in precluding Appellants from offering
economic expert witnesses’ testimony; and (3) Whether sufficient
facts exist from which a jury could find negligence by Caritas’
nursing staff in the absence of Schmidt’s testimony, thus making
summary judgment inappropriate.
On November 11, 1996, Steven J. Reiss, M.D. removed a
brain tumor from Jerry Hall at Caritas.
developed meningitis and died.
Mr. Hall subsequently
On November 10, 1997, Appellants
filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court against Dr.
Reiss1 and Caritas.
Appellants claim that nursing negligence was
a factor in Mr. Hall’s death.
To prove their case, Appellants
relied upon Schmidt, who had identified herself as a registered
nurse.
According to Appellants’ supplemental expert witness
disclosure, served February 28, 2001, Schmidt was an “R.N.,
B.S.N.”
Further:
1
Appellants’ claims against Dr. Reiss have been settled and he is not
a party to this appeal.
-2-
It is Ms. Schmidt’s opinion that the
Caritas . . . nursing staff was negligent and
their nursing care deviated from the standard of
care and such negligence and deviation was a
substantial factor in causing Jerry Hall’s
death. . . . Specifically, Mr. Hall was a patient
of the Intensive Care Unit but was not
mechanically monitored in any way, . . . The
staff should have made his safety their priority
and mechanically restrained Mr. Hall in some
manner (as per their hospital policy and standard
nursing practice) which would have allowed them
to place him on the appropriate monitoring
devices. Had he been on the oxygen saturation
monitor, . . . the monitor would have alarmed
prior to the Code Blue.
[Further] . . . Critical care nurses should know
that this [Hall’s “sleeping without distress,”
when he was previously confused and attempting to
get out of bed] was a drastic change from
previous behavior and should have been
interpreted as a potentially serious change in
his neurological status. If the nurse had
performed a complete neurological assessment at
this point, . . . the Code Blue may have been
averted.
On September 20, 2001, Caritas filed a motion in
limine to exclude Schmidt’s testimony, on ground that Schmidt
was not a licensed, practicing nurse and on ground that she was
not qualified to express opinion on medical causation.
Caritas
explained that “[n]ot until her deposition on July 25, 2001 did
Ms. Schmidt reveal that she does not have a registered nursing
license. . . .
In addition, when she did have a Kentucky
registered nursing license, it was either suspended or on
probationary status on numerous occasions.”
-3-
Caritas noted
Schmidt’s numerous difficulties.
She was suspended for
practicing without a license from November 1, 1988-January 6,
1989, at Norton Kosair.
She was charged with narcotics
violations in 1991, resulting in a six-month suspension and
fine.
After her license was reinstated, with a one-year
probationary period in 1994, Schmidt’s nursing practice was
limited and closely monitored.
In 1999, Schmidt was again
before the Kentucky Board of Nursing, having resigned from
Baptist East over discrepancies in the documentation of
controlled substances on patient records.
A two-year license
suspension was stayed, and Schmidt was placed on probation for
two years, with restrictions upon her employment.
In October
2000, Schmidt elected not to renew her nursing license at the
end of the probationary period.
Caritas asserted that Schmidt lacked qualification to
express expert opinion – she was not licensed to practice in the
Commonwealth; she had not practiced as an R.N. -- actually
caring for patients -- since 1998, and prior to that had only
sporadically done so; she was never certified by the American
Association of Neuroscience Nurses, and had not been certified
by the American Association of Critical Care Nurses since 1990.
Further, Schmidt had no specialized courses in caring for
neurosurgical patients; had conducted no research and could not
cite authority in support of her opinions; had not reviewed any
-4-
of the hospital’s policies and procedures in forming her
opinions, and admitted her lack of qualification to express
medical opinion.
Following a hearing on October 31, 2001, the trial
court entered an order granting Caritas’ motion in limine,
because “Schmidt’s proffered testimony fails to meet the
threshold requirements articulated in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny.
Ms.
Schmidt is prohibited from testifying at the trial of this
action for the reasons stated on the record at the 10/31/01
hearing.”
The court compared the situation to allowing a
disbarred attorney to testify as an expert in a legal
malpractice case.
The court explained that it would be
abdicating its role as a gatekeeper to put Schmidt before the
jury to testify about standard of care, where she had
shortchanged her own patients of their narcotic medication, had
failed to document records and had failed to meet basic
standards of a nurse.
The court was concerned about Schmidt’s
having practiced without a license while working at Norton
Hospital.
The court also considered that a lot of what Schmidt
had to say was more in the nature of medical opinion, than
nursing opinion.
-5-
“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of
review of a trial court's evidentiary rulings. . . .
A trial
court's ruling on the admission of expert testimony is reviewed
under the same standard as a trial court's ruling on any other
evidentiary matter.”2
On appeal, Appellants acknowledge that
admissibility of expert testimony is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, but argue that rejection of such
testimony is the exception rather than the rule.
Appellants contend that that the circuit court focused
upon Schmidt’s drug addiction and loss of license, but “did not
criticize Schmidt’s reasoning, methodology3, opinions or
expertise.”
Appellants assert that the issue of Schmidt’s
licensing and drug abuse problems went to her credibility and
was for the jury to decide.
We are inclined to agree;
nevertheless, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of
Caritas.
Schmidt’s testimony does not supply the competent
medical causation testimony Appellants need to establish
negligence on the part of Caritas’ nursing staff.
By Opinion
2
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 577-89
(2000).
3
Appellants do not explain what methodology Schmidt may have employed
in formulating her opinion. We are not aware of any. Schmidt
testified that she reviewed Mr. Hall’s medical records and some
depositions. Schmidt’s testimony did not concern any novel scientific
techniques. We question whether her testimony “trigger[ed] the
necessity of applying the Daubert analysis.” Collins v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 951 S.W.2d 569, 575 (1997). We believe the issue is more simply
whether Schmidt was qualified as an expert under KRE 702.
-6-
and Order, entered January 24, 2002, the trial court held, in
pertinent part, that:
Jerry Hall was admitted to Caritas on or about
November 11, 1996 . . . to remove a left
cerebellar . . . tumor. Pursuant to doctor’s
orders, Mr. Hall was to be given a neurologic
assessment (the Glasgow Coma test ) every hour by
the Caritas nursing staff. Mr. Hall was also to
be given one-on-one nursing care. On November
17, Laura Mitchell began caring for Mr. Hall at
7:00 p.m. The outgoing nurse, Nancy Gilpin, had
performed a complete neurologic evaluation at
7:00 p.m. and reported to Ms. Mitchell that while
Mr. Hall had been combative throughout the day,
he had become calmer and was resting.
Ms. Mitchell performed another complete
neurologic evaluation of Mr. Hall at 7:30 p.m.
At that same time, Dr. John Rogers, an infectious
disease physician, also evaluated Mr. Hall and
performed a neurologic examination as well. At
approximately 8:20 p.m., Ms. Mitchell was advised
by Mr. Hall’s wife that Mr. Hall’s breathing had
changed. Ms. Mitchell moved Mr. Hall into an
upright position and began suctioning brown
drainage. Mr. Hall suffered respiratory failure,
was placed on a respirator, and subsequently
died.
Plaintiffs brought this action alleging medical
malpractice. . . . Plaintiffs concede that Mr.
Hall would have eventually died as a result of
meningitis. However, Plaintiffs now argue that
“but for the CARITAS nursing staff’s failure to
assess and chart Mr. Hall’s deteriorating
neurologic condition, Mr. Hall’s aspiration could
have been prevented or corrected, . . .”
* * *
A medical negligence claim in Kentucky must be
grounded in expert testimony “because the nature
of the inquiry is such that jurors are not
competent to draw their own conclusions from the
evidence without the aid of such expert
-7-
testimony.” Baylis v. Lourdes Hospital, Inc.,
Ky., 805 S.W.2d 122 (1991). Expert testimony is
needed unless the injury is so apparent that
laymen with general knowledge would have no
difficulty recognizing that it could not have
occurred if proper care and skill had been used.
Perkins v. Hausladen, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 652
(1992). . . .
* * *
In this case, Plaintiffs have offered two expert
witnesses: Dr. Richard Sokolov and Margaret
Schmidt. . . . [T]his Court entered its Order on
October 31, 2001, excluding the testimony of Ms.
Schmidt in its entirety. Dr. Sokolov,
Plaintiff’s remaining expert, has expressed no
criticism of the Caritas nursing staff.
Plaintiffs argue that they still have expert
testimony with which to prove their case . . . .
[and] that the testimony of Caritas’ own
employees is sufficient to create a question of
material fact precluding summary judgment.
Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Mitchell
acknowledges that a change in consciousness could
be indicative of a change in neurologic status.
According to Plaintiff, Mr. Hall’s transition
from restlessness to sound sleep should have
alerted Ms. Mitchell to the existence of a
neurologic change.
. . . .Kentucky has recognized that a defendant
physician can by his or her own admission provide
the necessary expert testimony. For example, in
Perkins v. Hausladen, supra, . . . the Defendant
admitted initially to the patient’s husband that
he had . . . drilled into the vein, causing
blindness. Even though the Defendant later
retracted the statement, Justice Leibson noted
there was sufficient evidence from the
Defendants’ deposition and the depositions of
subsequent treating physicians “regarding
causation” of the blindness to allow the case to
go to the jury.
-8-
In this case, Plaintiffs suggest that the Caritas
nurses’ own observation of Mr. Hall’s change from
restlessness to sound sleep provides sufficient
expert evidence of the nurses’ breach of the
appropriate standard of care. Ms. Mitchell’s
testimony also shows, however, that she performed
complete neurologic checks on Mr. Hall above and
beyond the hourly evaluations ordered by Mr.
Hall’s physician, and that during those checks
nothing in Mr. Hall’s responses indicated any
respiratory or neurological complication. Rather
the examination . . . revealed nothing unusual.
This case, unlike Perkins, is not one where the
necessary expert testimony can be found in the
statements of those who provided the care.
The court was inclined to agree with Defendants that
Plaintiffs had attempted to mislead the court by providing only
selective portions of Mitchell’s testimony; further, that
Plaintiffs had failed to mention evaluations performed by Gilpin
at 7:00, and by Mitchell and Dr. Rogers at 7:30.
In addition,
the court also noted the opinion of William Kohorst, M.D. that
Mr. Hall’s respiratory failure was due to a catastrophic central
nervous system event – meaning that the respiratory center of
his brain quit functioning because of severe brain injury.
According to Dr. Kohorst, aspiration was the result, not the
cause, of his respiratory arrest, an event that could not be
prevented or anticipated by neurological examination.
Nothing
was offered to contradict Dr. Kohorst.
Appellants maintain that the deposition testimony of
Caritas nurses, Laura Mitchell and Nancy Gilpin, “should have
been considered sufficient expert testimony to show causation.”
-9-
Appellants cite Am.Jur.2d and authority from other states to the
effect that a defendant, or a defendant’s employee, can provide
expert testimony for a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action.
However, Appellants have failed to cite any competent
causation testimony from a defendant, or a defendant’s employee,
in this case to support their argument.
Instead, Appellants proceed to argue that an issue of
fact exits as to whether or not Nurse Mitchell performed a
“proper neurological assessment.”
Appellants base this argument
upon their assertion that a disparity exists between Nurse
Mitchell’s testimony4 and the medical records.5
Assuming,
arguendo, that such a disparity exists, Appellants’ negligence
claim against Caritas still must fail, because they have no
competent expert opinion establishing a causal connection
between any nursing negligence and Mr. Hall’s aspiration/death.
“Proximate causation between negligence and the injury
complained of in a medical malpractice case must be established
by expert testimony.”6 The trial court did not err in granting
summary judgment.
4
Mitchell testified that there were doctor’s orders for a Glasgow coma
check every hour.
5
Appellants assert that the records do not indicate Mitchell
sufficiently woke Mr. Hall to have checked his neurologic signs.
6
Sakler v. Anesthesiology Associates, Ky. App., 50 S.W.2d 210, 214
(2001).
-10-
The remaining issue Appellants raise is whether the
trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of
their economic experts, because they were not timely identified.
In light of our holding herein, we agree with Caritas that the
issue is moot.
We affirm the Opinion and Order granting summary
judgment in favor of Caritas.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bill V. Seiller
Kyle Ann Citrynell
Michael C. Bratcher
Louisville, Kentucky
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Jann B. Logsdon
Tera M. Rehmel
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Bill V. Seiller
Louisville, Kentucky
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Louisville, Kentucky
-11-
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