STEVE B. BELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 12, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000379-MR
AND
NO. 2002-CA-000381-MR
STEVE B. BELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CR-00816 AND 01-CR-00821
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Steve B. Bell has appealed from a final
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on January 16,
2002, which sentenced him to prison for one year following his
conditional guilty plea to assault in the third degree.1
Having
concluded that the Commonwealth was not barred on double
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.025.
Class D felony.
Assault in the third degree is a
jeopardy grounds from seeking to try Bell a second time
following a mistrial, we affirm.
On June 28, 2000, Officer David Hester and Officer
Mark Long of the Lexington Police Department responded to a
domestic disturbance in Fayette County, Kentucky, involving Bell
and his sister.
According to Officer Hester’s police report, he
was in the process of gathering information from those present
at the scene when Bell approached Bradford McKenzie, the father
of Bell’s sister’s children, in a threatening manner.
Officer
Hester stated in his police report that he attempted to arrest
Bell, but he resisted.
According to the written report, a
struggle ensued between Bell and both officers, which resulted
in Bell striking Officer Hester in the face.
On August 15, 2000, a Fayette County grand jury
indicted Bell on one count of assault in the third degree, one
count of assault in the fourth degree,2 one count of resisting
arrest,3 and one count of criminal mischief in the third degree.4
On August 29, 2000, Bell entered pleas of not guilty to all of
the charges in the indictment, and the case proceeded to trial.
Bell’s jury trial began on December 5, 2000.
After
returning from the lunch recess, the Commonwealth called
2
KRS 508.030.
Assault in the fourth degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
3
KRS 520.090.
Resisting arrest is a Class A misdemeanor.
4
KRS 512.040.
misdemeanor.
Criminal mischief in the third degree is a Class B
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Sergeant Mark Sennett of the Lexington Police Department to
testify.
A few moments before Sgt. Sennett took the witness
stand, he informed the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney that he
had taken a statement from Bell in which Bell purportedly
admitted to striking Officer Hester in the face.
At that time,
neither the Commonwealth nor counsel for Bell was aware that
Bell had allegedly made such a statement to Sgt. Sennett.
During its direct examination of Sgt. Sennett, the
Commonwealth introduced Bell’s alleged admission without first
informing defense counsel about this newly discovered piece of
evidence.
Bell’s defense counsel did not make an immediate
objection to Sgt. Sennett’s testimony.
During cross-
examination, Sgt. Sennett also revealed for the first time that
a “Use of Force Report” had been made following the incident in
question.
Bell’s self-incriminating statement in which he
purportedly admitted to striking Officer Hester in the face was
contained in this report.
Once again, neither the Commonwealth
nor counsel for Bell was aware that such a report had been made.
According to the record, immediately after Sgt. Sennett was
dismissed from the witness stand, both the Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney and Bell’s defense counsel objected to
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Sgt. Sennett’s testimony.5
Following a conference in chambers,6
the trial court granted Bell’s motion for a mistrial.7
Approximately two weeks later, on December 18, 2000,
Bell filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.
Bell argued that
allowing the Commonwealth to retry its case against him would
violate the double jeopardy provisions of the United States
Constitution8 and the Kentucky Constitution.9
On June 21, 2001,
the trial court entered an order denying Bell’s motion to have
the indictment against him dismissed.
Following the denial of his motion to dismiss, Bell
elected to enter a conditional plea of guilty to assault in the
third degree,10 while reserving his right to appeal the double
jeopardy issue.
The trial court accepted Bell’s guilty plea on
5
It is difficult to discern from the recording of the proceedings whether
both parties indeed made an objection to Sgt. Sennett’s testimony. However,
in its order denying Bell’s motion to dismiss, the trial court found that
“[b]oth parties objected.” On appeal, neither party has taken issue with
this finding.
6
Apparently, this conference was not recorded or transcribed and is
consequently not a part of the record before us.
7
Approximately one week after declaring a mistrial, the trial court entered
an order setting the case for a status hearing. In this order, the trial
court stated in part that “[Bell] made a motion for a mistrial and said
[m]otion was granted.” However, in Bell’s motion to dismiss his indictment,
he asserts that the mistrial was granted “on a joint motion by the parties.”
8
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in part that
“[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.”
9
Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution states in part that “[n]o person
shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb
. . . .”
10
The other three counts in Bell’s indictment, assault in the fourth degree,
resisting arrest, and criminal mischief in the third degree, were dismissed.
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December 11, 2001.
On January 16, 2002, after a pre-sentence
investigation had been completed, the trial court sentenced Bell
to one year in prison.11
This appeal followed.
Bell’s sole claim of error is that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss.
Specifically, Bell
argues that the Commonwealth acted in “bad faith” when it
introduced Bell’s purported admission without first disclosing
the newly discovered piece of evidence to Bell’s defense
counsel.
Bell argues that because of this “bad faith” conduct,
the Commonwealth was barred from attempting to try him a second
time on double jeopardy grounds.
We disagree.
In Oregon v. Kennedy,12 the United States Supreme Court
stated:
We do not by this opinion lay down a flat
rule that where a defendant in a criminal
trial successfully moves for a mistrial, he
may not thereafter invoke the bar of double
jeopardy against a second trial. But we do
hold that the circumstances under which such
a defendant may invoke the bar of double
jeopardy in a second effort to try him are
limited to those cases in which the conduct
giving rise to the successful motion for a
mistrial was intended to provoke the
defendant into moving for a mistrial.
11
On August 7, 2001, Bell was indicted for bail jumping in the first degree
pursuant to KRS 520.070, for his failure to appear at a status conference.
Bell eventually pled guilty to an amended charge of bail jumping in the
second degree pursuant to KRS 520.080. On January 16, 2002, the trial court
sentenced Bell to 12 months in jail for this conviction. This sentence was
set to run concurrently with the one-year sentence he received on his
conditional plea of guilty to assault in the third degree.
12
456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).
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In Stamps v. Commonwealth,13 our Supreme Court expressly stated
that the aforementioned standard also applied to the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Kentucky Constitution.14
Hence, absent
proof that the Commonwealth intended to provoke Bell into moving
for a mistrial, he was not entitled to invoke the bar of double
jeopardy to prevent the Commonwealth from trying him a second
time.
Under the facts of the case sub judice, we hold that
the Commonwealth was not barred on double jeopardy grounds from
attempting to try Bell a second time following the mistrial.
In
its order denying Bell’s motion to dismiss, the trial court
specifically found that it was not “the prosecutor’s intention
to provoke a mistrial,” and that the “bad faith exception” did
not apply.15
Since the evidence upon which the trial court based
its findings is not in the record before us, we must assume that
the evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings.16
13
Ky., 648 S.W.2d 868 (1983).
14
Id. at 869 (holding that “[i]t is our opinion that this should also apply
to the double jeopardy clause in the Constitution of Kentucky”).
15
The trial court found that the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney knew she
had a duty to disclose this newly discovered evidence to the defense.
However, the trial court also found that she erroneously believed in good
faith that since Sgt. Sennett’s testimony “mirrored evidence already in the
record,” disclosure to the defense was not necessary.
16
McDaniel v. Garrett, Ky.App., 661 S.W.2d 789, 791 (1983)(holding that
“[w]hen the evidence is not presented for review, this court is confined to a
determination as to whether the pleadings support the judgment and on all
issues of fact in dispute we are required to assume that the evidence
supports the findings of the lower court”). It appears as though the trial
court based its findings on evidence presented during the in camera
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Therefore, since the Commonwealth did not intend to provoke Bell
into moving for a mistrial, double jeopardy did not preclude the
Commonwealth from seeking to try Bell a second time.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Bell’s
motion to dismiss.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
conference following Sgt. Sennett’s testimony. Bell states in his brief that
this conference was “not preserved on tape.” Nonetheless, if Bell had wished
to challenge the factual findings, he could have availed himself of Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 75.13, which allows an appellant to prepare a
“narrative statement” of the proceedings below if no recording was made.
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