K.M., BY HIS NEXT FRIEND B.M., HIS MOTHER v. FAYETTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, HARVIE WILKERSON, CATHY LOUSIGNOTT, ANGIE TEDDER, LARRY MOORE AND DR. ROBIN FANKHAUSER
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RENDERED: August 1, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000304-MR
K.M., BY HIS NEXT FRIEND B.M., HIS MOTHER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-03414
v.
FAYETTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
HARVIE WILKERSON, CATHY LOUSIGNOTT,
ANGIE TEDDER, LARRY MOORE AND
DR. ROBIN FANKHAUSER
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BAKER AND HUDDLESTON,1 JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE:
K.M., by his next friend B.M., his mother,
(referred to as K.M.) brings this appeal from a January 23,
1
Judge Huddleston voted in this matter prior to his retirement
effective June 15, 2003.
2002, summary judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
We reverse
and remand.
On December 6, 2000, K.M. was involved in a physical
altercation with a teacher at Henry Clay High School, and
as a result, was charged with assault.2
K.M. was also suspended
by the principal, and the matter ultimately went before the
Fayette County Board of Education (the Board of Education).
Pending the Board’s decision, K.M. was enrolled in the Fayette
County program called “Project Bound.”
The Board of Education
eventually conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the
incident at issue, and, on August 22, 2001, the Board of
Education expelled K.M. from school and denied him educational
services for the remainder of the 2001-2002 school year.
K.M. thereupon filed a complaint in the Fayette
Circuit Court.
Therein, K.M. alleged, inter alia, that the
Board of Education’s decision to expel him was racially
motivated and in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
Chapter 344 (Kentucky Civil Rights Act) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1996).
He sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief.
On January 23, 2002, the circuit court entered summary judgment
dismissing K.M.’s claims.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 56.
This appeal
follows.
2
K.M. eventually pled guilty to disorderly conduct in order to resolve the
charge against him.
-2-
K.M. contends that the circuit court erred by entering
summary judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 19833 claim.
Specifically, K.M. maintains the circuit court erroneously
concluded that the Board of Education is clothed with Eleventh
Amendment immunity and, thus, not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no material
issues of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991).
We think that resolution of this issue
centers upon a question of law; specifically, is the Board of
Education entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity?
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any “person” who violates the
federally protected rights of another may be enjoined and held
liable for damages.
See 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 88 (2000);
see generally, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
3
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
-3-
58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d. 45 (1989); Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990).
It is
well established that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override the
traditional sovereign immunity of a state and arms of the state
as guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment4; consequently, whether a
governmental entity is a “person” subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is directly correlated to whether the entity
enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See Will, 491 U.S. 58;
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S. Ct 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d
471 (1977); see also Gary Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court’s
Views As To Who Is “Person” Under Civil Rights Statute (42 USCS
§ 1983) Providing Private Right Of Action For Violation Of
Federal Rights, 105 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1999).
Stated differently,
any governmental entity imbued with Eleventh Amendment immunity
is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Will, 491 U.S. 58.
See
As the state and arms of the state possess
Eleventh Amendment immunity, these governmental entities are not
“persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4
U.S. Const. amend. XI reads: “The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
-4-
In concluding the Board of Education was clothed with
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the circuit court relied upon
Clevinger v. Board of Education of Pike County, Ky., 789 S.W.2d
5 (1990):
The Plaintiff student also alleges a
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation
claiming not to have received notice that an
expulsion could be without any educational
services and also claiming racial
discrimination as a result of being expelled
purportedly arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Based upon the decision of the Supreme Court
of Kentucky in Clevinger v. Board of
Education of Pike County, Ky., 789 S.W.2d 5
(1990), wherein it was concluded a local
school board is an agency of the State and
not a “person” for purposes of a suit for
monetary damages under §1983, this Court
agrees with the Defendants and finds no
action for monetary damages is available in
state court under §1983 against these
Defendants. Consequently, the Plaintiff
student’s §1983 claim must be dismissed.
Circuit Court’s Final Order and Judgment at 2-3.
The Board of Education argues that we must affirm the
circuit court’s judgment as Clevinger is dispositive.
Conversely, K.M. argues that Clevinger directly conflicts with
the United States Supreme Court decision in Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990)5 and urges
this court to “overrule” Clevinger.
5
While there appears to be a
In Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990),
the Court held, in part, that whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity was a federal question to be decided by application of
federal law.
-5-
conflict between Howlett and Clevinger6, we are of the opinion
that Clevinger is no longer controlling in light of Yanero v.
Davis, Ky., 65 S.W.3d 510 (2001).7
In Clevinger, the Kentucky Supreme Court was faced
squarely with “[t]he question . . . [of] whether the state
sovereign immunity doctrine which protects the School Board is
preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”
Id. at 11.
The Court
answered the question in the negative.
The Court held that the
local school board of education was vested with state sovereign
immunity and, as a result, was vested also with Eleventh
Amendment immunity:
Thus, because in this Commonwealth a
School Board is protected by state sovereign
immunity from a suit for money damages for
an injury wrongfully inflicted, whether the
cause of action is common law or statutory,
and because the United States Supreme Court
has decided that where such is the case the
state sovereign immunity defense will
prevail against a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and affirm the decision of the trial court
dismissing the claim for money damages in
this case. In all other respects, the
decision is affirmed.
Id. at 12.
6
Tolliver v. Harlan County Board of Education, 887 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Ky.
1995), Creager v. Board of Education of Whitley County, 914 F. Supp. 1457
(E.D. Ky. 1996), and Blackburn v. Floyd County Board of Education, 749 F.
Supp. 159 (E.D. Ky. 1990) provide further elucidation of this apparent
conflict.
7
We observe that Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 65 S.W.3d 510 (2001) expressly
overruled Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407 (1967) which was
relied upon, in part, by Clevinger v. Board of Education of Pike County, Ky.,
789 S.W.2d 5 (1990).
-6-
Since Clevinger, our Supreme Court rendered Yanero.
In pertinent part, Yanero held that a local board of education
“is entitled to governmental immunity, but not sovereign
immunity.”8
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 527.
as pivotal.
Clevinger clearly premised its decision to
We perceive such holding
recognize the Eleventh Amendment immunity of a local board of
education upon the board’s possession of sovereign immunity; per
Yanero, however, a local board of education is no longer said to
possess sovereign immunity.
As the board no longer possesses
sovereign immunity but only governmental immunity, we think
Clevinger is no longer controlling upon whether the Board of
Education has Eleventh Amendment immunity and is, therefore, a
person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Although we are not bound by the decisions of federal
district courts, we view as persuasive the reasoning and
holdings of Tolliver v. Harlan County Board of Education, 887 F.
Supp. 144 (E.D. Ky. 1995) and Blackburn v. Floyd County Board of
Education, 749 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ky. 1990).
In those cases,
the court recognized that whether a Kentucky local board of
education was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity was to be decided by application of federal law.
8
It is said that “sovereign immunity refers to the immunity of the state from
suit and from liability, while governmental immunity refers to the similar
immunities enjoyed by the state’s political subdivisions.” 57 Am. Jur. 2d
Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 10 (2001). See also
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d 510.
-7-
Ultimately, the court determined that a Kentucky local board of
education was not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity and, as a result, was a “person” under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
In so concluding, the court utilized the
following factors for determining whether a governmental entity
was an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes:
Local law and decisions defining the status
and nature of the agency involved in its
relation to the sovereign are factors to be
considered, but only one of a number that
are of significance. Among the other
factors, no one of which is conclusive,
perhaps the most important is whether, in
the event plaintiff prevails, the payment of
the judgment will have to be made out of the
state treasury; significant here also is
whether the agency has the funds or the
power to satisfy the judgment. Other
relevant factors are whether the agency is
performing a governmental or proprietary
function; whether it has been separately
incorporated; the degree of autonomy over
its operations; whether it has the power to
sue and be sued and to enter into contracts;
whether its property is immune from state
taxation, and whether the sovereign has
immunized itself from responsibility for the
agency’s operations.
Blackburn, 749 F. Supp. at 161-162 (quoting Hall v. Med. Coll.
of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299, 302 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Essential to the decision that a Kentucky local board of
education was not an arm of the state under the Eleventh
Amendment were the following factors: (1) the board was not the
state or its “alter ego”; (2) the board was a body politic and
-8-
corporate with perpetual succession; (3) the board “may sue and
be sued, contract, purchase, receive, hold and sell property,
and issue bonds, establish curriculum and employment standards”;
(4) the board exercised control and management over the school
district and addressed primarily “local concerns”; (5) the board
possessed “substantial decision-making authority” when
addressing local concerns; and (6) the board possessed and
utilized the power to levy taxes.
Blackburn, 749 F. Supp. at
162–163.
We, similarly, recognize that the issue of whether an
entity possesses Eleventh Amendment immunity is to be decided by
application of federal law and, thus, hold that a Kentucky local
board of education is not an entity protected under the Eleventh
Amendment and is a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Accordingly, we are of the opinion the circuit court
erred as a matter of law by concluding that the Board of
Education was not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Additionally, K.M. maintains the circuit court erred
by concluding that the Board of Education was not a “place of
public accommodation” under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KRS
Chapter 344).
We, however, are not persuaded that our inquiry
should focus upon the Board of Education as the place of public
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accommodation; however, we view the place of public
accommodation as the high school.
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d
487 (1995), the Court’s discussion of “public accommodation”
focused on the place from which respondents were excluded (the
City of Boston’s St. Patrick Day Parade) rather than the group
(South Boston Allied War Veterans Council) responsible for
excluding respondents.
Similarly, we believe the focus should
be on the place from which K.M. was excluded (Henry Clay High
School) rather than on the group (the Board of Education)
responsible for excluding him.
Indeed, K.M. was not denied
access to the Board of Education.
We shall therefore determine whether the high school,
as opposed to the Board of Education, was a place of public
accommodation under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
In the
interest of thoroughness, we shall also address alternatively
whether the Board of Education is a “place of public
accommodation.”
Discrimination in a place of public accommodation is
prohibited by KRS 344.120:
Except as otherwise provided in KRS 344.140
and 344.145, it is an unlawful practice for
a person to deny an individual the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and
-10-
accommodations of a place of public
accommodation, resort, or amusement, as
defined in KRS 344.130, on the ground of
disability, race, color, religion, or
national origin.(emphases added).
A place of public accommodation is defined, in pertinent part,
by KRS 344.130:
As used in this chapter, unless the context
requires otherwise, “place of public
accommodation, resort, or amusement”
includes any place, store, or other
establishment, either licensed or
unlicensed, which supplies goods or services
to the general public or which solicits or
accepts the patronage or trade of the
general public or which is supported
directly or indirectly by government funds,
. . . .(emphases added).
We interpret KRS 344.130 as creating a two-prong test
for determining what constitutes a place of public
accommodation.
Thereunder, a place of public accommodation is:
[1] any place, store, or other establishment; that [2] either
(a) supplies goods or services to the general public; (b)
solicits or accepts patronage or trade of the general public; or
(c) is supported directly or indirectly by government funds.
Utilizing the above two-prong test, we shall now
determine whether the high school constitutes a place of public
accommodation under KRS 344.130.
Under the first prong, we must
resolve whether the high school is a “place, store, or other
establishment” within the meaning of KRS 344.130.
-11-
The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law for
the court, and our review is, of course, de novo.
Floyd County
Bd. of Educ. v. Ratliff, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 921 (1997); Halls
Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, Ky. App., 16 S.W.3d 327 (2000).
When interpreting a statute, we are bound to afford words their
common meaning unless there appears a contrary intention.
Hoy
v. Kentucky Indus. Revitalization Auth., Ky., 907 S.W.2d 766
(1995).
The term “place” is commonly understood to mean:
1. An area with definite or indefinite
boundaries. 2. An area occupied by or set
aside for a specific person or purpose. 3. A
definite location, . . . .
Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 897 (1st ed.
1994).
We recognize that the Kentucky Civil Rights Act is
remedial legislation and should be interpreted broadly to
achieve its goals.
See Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Jeffers,
Ky., 13 S.W.3d 606 (2000).
Here, we think the term “place”
should be given its common meaning and interpreted broadly to
include “an area with definite. . .boundaries,” “an area. . .
set aside for a specific . . . purpose,” and “a definite
location,” such as a high school.
We believe our interpretation
of the term “place” not only comports with but, more
importantly, promotes the Kentucky Civil Rights Act’s goal of
“safeguard[ing] all individuals within the state from
discrimination because of . . . race.”
-12-
KRS 344.020(1)(b).
Hence, we are of the opinion that the high school is a “place”
under the first prong of KRS 344.130.
Having determined that the high school meets the first
prong of the test, we shall now turn to the second prong of KRS
344.130 - whether the high school: (a) supplies goods or
services to the general public, (b) solicits or accepts
patronage or trade of the general public, or (c) is supported
directly or indirectly by government funds.
We interpret the
above sub-prongs, (a), (b), and (c), as separate and discrete.
It is undisputed that the high school is supported
directly and indirectly by government funds.
Additionally, we
think the high school can be said to supply educational
“services to the general public,” thereby satisfying the
requirement of sub-prong (a).
As such, we are of the opinion
that the second prong of KRS 344.130 has been satisfied by
government funding and by the supplying of services to the
general public by the high school.
Alternatively, we address whether the Board of
Education constitutes a place of public accommodation under the
two-prong test of KRS 344.130.
Under the first prong, we must
resolve whether the Board of Education is a “place, store, or
other establishment” within the meaning of KRS 344.130.
The term “establishment” is commonly understood to
mean:
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2.a. A business firm, club, institution, or
residence, . . . . b. A place of business,
. . . . c. An organized group, as a
government, political party, or military
force.
Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 444 (1st ed.
1994) (emphasis added); see Hoy, 907 S.W.2d 766.
As we are
bound to give words their common meaning and to broadly
interpret the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, we hold that the word
“establishment” should be interpreted as including “any
organized group,” such as a local board of education.9
Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 13 S.W.3d 606.
See
Hence, we are of the
opinion that the Board of Education is an establishment under
the first prong of KRS 344.130.
Having determined that the Board of Education is an
“establishment,” we address the second prong of KRS 344.130 whether the Board of Education: (a) supplies goods or services
to the general public, (b) solicits or accepts patronage or
trade of the general public, or (c) is supported directly or
indirectly by government funds.
It is undisputed that the Board
of Education is supported directly and indirectly by government
9
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1987), the Court held the Unruh
Civil Rights Act did not violate the First Amendment rights of the California
Rotary Club by requiring the organization to admit women. In its discussion,
the Court observed that the California Court of Appeals held the Rotary Club
constituted a “business establishment” under the Act and interpreted the term
“establishment” to include “‘not only a fixed location but also a permanent
commercial force or organization or a permanent settled position. . .’”
(citations omitted). Id. at 542.
-14-
funds.10
As such, we are of the opinion that the second prong of
KRS 344.130 has been satisfied by government funding of the
Board of Education.
In sum, we hold that the high school and the Board of
Education constitute places of public accommodation under KRS
344.130. Our ratiocination for this conclusion is that the high
school qualifies as a “place. . . which supplies. . . services
to the general public. . . or which is supported directly or
indirectly by government funds,” and that the Board qualifies as
an “establishment . . . supported directly [and] indirectly by
government funds.”11
K.M. further argues that the decision of the Board of
Education to expel him was arbitrary.
Specifically, K.M.
maintains the Board of Education’s decision was unsupported by
the evidence.
The circuit court concluded:
KRS 158.150(2) requires a local board of
education to provide an expelled student
with educational services in an alternative
program or setting “unless the board has
made a determination, on the record,
supported by clear and convincing evidence,
that the expelled student poses a threat to
the safety of other students or school staff
and cannot be placed into a state-funded
agency program.” The nature of this
allegation by the student Plaintiff amounts
10
Additionally, we think it could be said that the Board of Education
“supplies . . . services to the general public.”
11
We point out that the Kentucky legislature effectively waived any immunity
enjoyed by a local board of education upon claims arising under the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act (KRS Chapter 344). Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ., Ky., 30 S.W.3d
793 (2000).
-15-
to an appeal to this Court of the expulsion
decision. Nevertheless, this Court has
reviewed the expulsion hearing video tape
and record and finds, based upon such
review, there was sufficient evidence to
support a determination of the Plaintiff
student posing a threat to the safety of
school staff and of the unavailability of a
state-funded agency program so as to have
met the clear and convincing standard.
Circuit Court’s Judgment and Order at 3-4.
As an appellate court, we step into the shoes of the
circuit court and review the Board of Education’s decision for
arbitrariness.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm’n, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450
(1964).
Arbitrariness has many facets; relevant to this issue
is whether the Board of Education’s decision was supported by a
sufficient quantum of evidence.
Id.
We think compelling evidence exists that K.M. did, in
fact, assault a teacher.
Further, it reasonably appears that
expulsion from a public school is one of several permitted and
appropriate remedies to be imposed upon such a finding.
K.M.,
however, alleges that he possesses statistical and/or other
evidence proving his expulsion from school was made in a
discriminatory manner or under racially motivated circumstances.
There having been no discovery in this regard prior to the entry
of judgment, neither K.M. nor the Board of Education have had
the opportunity to either prove or refute this assertion.
-16-
Therefore, we deem it premature to consider whether the Board of
Education’s decision to expel K.M. was arbitrary.
K.M. also asserts that the circuit court’s dismissal
of his complaint “without opportunity for discovery” was
erroneous.
Based upon our disposition of the appeal, we deem
this assignment of error as moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court is reversed and this cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove
Lexington, KY
Robert L. Chenoweth
Frankfort, KY
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