GEORGE ROBERTS; AND CHESTER MAE ROBERTS v. LINDA M. NELSON
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 10, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000247-MR
GEORGE ROBERTS; AND
CHESTER MAE ROBERTS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-006381
LINDA M. NELSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The Appellant, George Roberts, seeks review of a
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court directing a verdict for
the Appellee, Linda M. Nelson.
Appellant asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion by not allowing the treating
physician’s deposition to be introduced into evidence.
We
agree, and reverse and remand for new trial.
Appellant deposed Dr. Christopher Wohltmann, who had
treated him at University Hospital in Louisville for injuries
sustained in the subject April 20, 1998 motor vehicle accident.
Dr. Wohltmann’s deposition was taken on November 7, 2001, via a
three-way conference call with the witness in Texas.
The case
proceeded to trial.
Our review of the video log indicates that on December
18, 2001, after voir dire and jury selection, court was recessed
for the day at 12:31.
On the morning of December 19, 2001,
pretrial issues were discussed.
Thereafter, a directed verdict
was entered for the Appellee.
Appellant explains that during the discussion of
pretrial issues, Appellee requested exclusion of Dr. Wohltmann’s
deposition in its entirety, because the deposition was not
signed.
Although not apparent of record, because no videotape
was included with the record on appeal, Appellee states:
However, in our case, as soon as the Trial Court
stated that the deposition had not been signed and
placed in the Court’s record, undersigned counsel
moved immediately, objecting to the introduction
of the deposition testimony because he had not
signed the deposition and it appeared based on the
record that he had requested signing.
Appellee maintains that an avowal was necessary to
preserve the issue for appeal.
We disagree.
In Underhill v.
Stephenson,1 the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he purpose of
an avowal is to permit a reviewing court to have the information
1
Ky., 756 S.W.2d 459, 461 (1988).
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needed to consider the ruling of the trial court.”
The
substance of Dr. Wohltmann’s testimony is not at issue;
therefore, an avowal was unnecessary.
At issue is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding the deposition for errors or
irregularities in its signing and filing, and whether the record
is sufficient for us to make that determination.
CR 32.04(4)
governs errors and irregularities as to the completion and
return of depositions:
Errors and irregularities in the manner in which
the testimony is transcribed or the deposition is
prepared, signed, certified, sealed, indorsed,
transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the
officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived unless a
motion to suppress the deposition or some part
thereof is made with reasonable promptness after
such defect is, or with due diligence might have
been, ascertained. (Emphasis added)
Our review of the record reflects that on July 5, 2001,
an order was entered reassigning the case for jury trial on
December 18, 2001.
The order directed counsel to follow the
same guidelines noticed in the previous trial order for pretrial
compliance documents.
The previous “Civil Jury Trial Order,”
entered March 27, 2000, requires that “objections to portions of
any depositions shall be in writing and filed with the Court no
later than fifteen (15) days before trial. . . .”
Further, that
“[a]ll motions in limine shall be submitted no later than ten
(10) days before trial.”
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On September 4, 2001, Appellant filed a “Notice of
Filing” that he intended to introduce the testimony of Dr.
Christopher Wohltmann as an expert witness, and that it was
expected the doctor’s deposition would be taken via telephone.
As noted, Dr. Wohltmann’s deposition was taken on November 7,
2001.
On November 30, 2001, the Appellee filed written
objections to certain portions of Dr. Wohltmann’s deposition,
referencing the page numbers and lines of the transcript;
moreover, Appellee sought to “remove objections” to other
portions of the deposition.
No defect in the signing or filing
of the deposition was raised.
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that
any error under CR 32.04(4) was waived, and that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Wholtmann’s deposition.
Appellee had a copy of the deposition transcript no later than
November 30, 2001, when she filed her written objections.
Any
defect could have been ascertained with due diligence at that
time, and certainly should have been discovered prior to the
second morning of trial.
In disallowing the deposition, the
trial court failed to follow its own rules regarding the cut-off
date for objections to depositions.
Disallowing the deposition
substantially prejudiced the Appellant, for without Dr.
Wohltmann’s testimony, he could not prove his case.
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Had Appellee
filed a motion to suppress with “reasonable promptness,”
Appellant would have had the opportunity to cure any defect prior
to trial.
We cannot discern how allowing the deposition would
have prejudiced the Appellee in any way.
Unquestionably,
Appellee was on notice that Appellant intended to rely upon Dr.
Wohltmann as his expert, and Appellee had an opportunity to
cross-examine the doctor.
Insofar as the sufficiency of the record, CR 61.02
allows us to consider a palpable error which effects the
substantial rights of a party, “even though insufficiently
raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has
resulted from the error.”
In Louisville Rent-A-Space v. Akai,2 the wrong party
had been named as a defendant.
At a hearing, the court
dismissed the defendant, but declined to impose sanctions under
Rule 11, having employed an incorrect standard.
The Court of
Appeals held that:
Unfortunately, no transcript of the November 6,
1986 hearing appears in the record. In fact, the
entire record can be termed meager at best. In
general, an appellant has the duty to make a
sufficient record to enable a review of alleged
errors. Burberry v. Bridges, Ky., 427 S.W.2d 583
(1968). Further, an appellant has the duty to
show that alleged errors were properly preserved.
CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv). However, in the case at bar,
2
Ky. App., 746 S.W.2d 85 (1988).
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the trial court clearly erred in employing the
good faith standard. Had the correct standard
been followed by the trial court, there is a
substantial probability that appellant would have
prevailed. Under these circumstances, we view
the error as a substantial one, CR 61.02, and the
failure to properly preserve it is not fatal.
Therefore, the trial court should again examine
the facts of this case in light of the correct
standard.3
In this case, had Dr. Wohltmann’s deposition been
allowed, there is a substantial probability that Appellant’s
case would have been decided by the jury on its merits.
The
civil “rules should be applied to provide for a just
determination on the merits, rather than to use a technicality
to work a forfeiture.”4
We view the trial court’s error as a
substantial one, resulting in a manifest injustice.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jude A. Hagan
Lebanon, Kentucky
Donald Killian Brown
Jeri D. Barclay
Louisville, Kentucky
3
4
Id., at 87.
West v. Goldstein, Ky, 830 S.W.2d 379, 384 (1992).
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