GLENN SPRADLIN v. ANNA SPRADLIN
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RENDERED:
September 19, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002691-MR
GLENN SPRADLIN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE PAXTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00245
v.
ANNA SPRADLIN
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2001-CA-002698-MR
ANNA SPRADLIN
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE PAXTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00245
GLENN SPRADLIN
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-002691-MR
AND CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-002698-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, COMBS, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE:
Glenn Spradlin (“Glenn”) brings a direct appeal
(No. 2001-CA-002691-MR) and Anna Spradlin (“Anna”) brings a
cross-appeal (No. 2001-CA-002698-MR) from an October 25, 2001,
order of the Floyd Circuit Court.
We affirm.
Glenn and Anna were married for twenty-six years.
They separated on or about January 15, 2000, and Glenn filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage shortly thereafter.
The
parties own a considerable amount of private property, as well
as three corporations:
Big Foot Food and Fuel.
Big Foot Trucking, Big Foot Repair, and
The valuation of these corporations and
the division thereof is disputed by the parties.
On July 16, 2001, the Floyd County Domestic Relations
Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) made findings of fact and
conclusions of law with regards to evidence submitted by Glenn
and Anna.
The Commissioner denied Anna’s request for
maintenance based on the conclusion that Anna’s job was secure,
her income exceeded that of Glenn’s, and she was to receive her
IRA account, her government retirement, and the marital
residence.
The Commissioner awarded Glenn all the stock and
ownership in Big Foot Repair, Big Foot Trucking, and Big Foot
Food and Fuel and directed him to pay all indebtedness on the
corporations.
Glenn was also ordered to pay Anna $50,000 for
her marital interest in the “business real estate.”
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The Floyd Circuit Court entered an order adopting in
part and reversing in part the recommendations of the
Commissioner.
The court determined that fair market value was
the appropriate method for valuing the corporations and awarded
all stock and ownership in the corporations to Glenn.
The court
also awarded permanent maintenance to Anna in the amount of $700
per month until her remarriage or death.
This appeal and cross-
appeal follow.
In order to facilitate our resolution of this matter,
we shall first address Anna’s cross-appeal; discussion of
Glenn’s direct appeal will follow.
Cross-Appeal No. 2001-CA-002698-MR
Anna argues that the circuit court’s decision to award
Glenn all stock and ownership in the three corporations was
improper because the award gave Glenn a disproportionately large
percentage of the marital property.
Specifically, Anna contends
that she should have been awarded a fifty percent interest in
Big Foot Food and Fuel, or that, in the alternative, Glenn
should be required to sell the corporations and split the net
proceeds with her.
We disagree.
In divorce proceedings, it is well established that
the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it
is found to be clearly erroneous or “clearly contrary to the
weight of evidence.”
Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56,
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58 (1990).
When determining the proper division of marital
property, “[t]here is not a presumption or requirement that
marital property be equally divided.”
App., 878 S.W.2d 24, 25 (1994).
Russell v. Russell, Ky.
Rather, the trial court must
divide marital property in conformity with Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 403.190, which requires that the division be in
“just proportions.”1
In making determinations regarding the
value of business property, “there is no single best method.
The task of the appellate court is to determine whether the
trial court’s approach reasonably approximates the net value of
the [corporation].”
Id. at 59.
Based on the record and the circuit court’s findings,
we believe the marital property was justly divided.
The court
properly reviewed the factors set forth by KRS 403.190 in making
its determination of the division.
Likewise, the court properly
determined that the “fair market value” method was suitable for
appraising the value of the corporations.
Under such method,
Big Foot Trucking was valued at $600,000 and Big Foot Repair was
determined to be worth $42,500.
Big Foot Food and Fuel, the
1
Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.190, the following factors
must be taken into consideration when dividing marital property:
contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including
contribution of a spouse as homemaker; value of the property set apart to
each spouse; duration of the marriage; and economic circumstances of each
spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.
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parties’ fledgling business venture, was not assigned a value
because it lacked a history of earnings.
Anna was awarded a fair proportion of the parties’
marital property, including the family residence, money in a
joint checking account, savings bonds, her IRA, her government
retirement pension, one of the parties’ two time-share condos in
Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, and $50,000 for her marital interest in
the business real estate.
Glenn was awarded the stock and
ownership of the parties’ three corporations, a lake house,
various personal effects, and the other time-share condo.
Glenn
was also ordered to pay the debt on the corporations of
approximately $1,500,000.
The personal debt of the parties was
equitably divided between both Glenn and Anna.
Anna notes in her Prehearing Statement that the value
of the marital property awarded to Glenn exceeds the value of
the property awarded to her by $500,000.
We recognize the
disparity in the values; however, we do not believe the circuit
court’s division of the marital property was “clearly contrary
to the weight of evidence.”
Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 58.
Although
Glenn was awarded property worth more than that awarded to Anna,
he was also ordered to pay the outstanding debt on the
corporations of approximately $1,500,000.
Considering the
substantial debt encumbering the marital property awarded to
Glenn, we are of the opinion that the marital property was
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justly divided.
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s
decision regarding the division of marital property.
Appeal No. 2001-CA-002691-MR
Glenn argues that the circuit court’s decision to
award permanent maintenance to Anna was in error.
We disagree.
The standard for determining whether an award of
maintenance is proper is “whether the spouse seeking maintenance
lacks sufficient property to meet her reasonable needs and is
unable to support herself through appropriate employment
according to the standard of living established during the
marriage.”
Weldon v. Weldon, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 283, 285
(1997); KRS 403.200.2
As with determinations regarding the
division of marital property, “maintenance determinations are
within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
S.W.2d at 60.
Clark, 782
The findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed “unless absolute abuse is shown.”
Id.
In granting maintenance to Anna, the circuit court
determined that, although Anna was “awarded property herein and
is able to support herself through appropriate employment,” she
was not able to sufficiently “provide for her reasonable needs
2
KRS 403.200 permits a grant of maintenance if the court finds that “the
spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and is
unable to support himself through appropriate employment. . .” The amount of
maintenance awarded is dependant upon factors such as “the financial
resources of the party seeking maintenance . . . ; the standard of living
established during the marriage; the duration of the marriage; and the
ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.”
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based upon the standard of living which the parties enjoyed
during their marriage.”
The court also determined that Glenn
was “able to meet his needs notwithstanding the award of
maintenance to [Anna].”
We do not believe that this determination was an abuse
of discretion.
The trial court properly weighed the factors
dictated by KRS 403.200.
Anna was awarded a just proportion of
the marital property; however, she was not awarded any incomeproducing property.
Considering the very comfortable standard
of living that Anna and Glenn had established during their
marriage, we are of the opinion that Anna was not awarded
“sufficient property to meet her reasonable needs.”
S.W.2d at 285.
Weldon, 957
As such, Anna would not be able to “support
herself according to the standard of living established during
the marriage.”
Id.
Therefore, the circuit court’s award of
permanent maintenance in the amount of $700 per month until
Anna’s remarriage or death was proper.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Floyd
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Thomas W. Moak
STUMBO, MOAK & NUNNERY, P.S.C.
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
John David Preston
PERRY, PRESTON & MILLER
Paintsville, Kentucky
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