HUNTER BYRD, III v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 6, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002640-MR
HUNTER BYRD, III
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CR-00827; 01-CR-01007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DYCHE AND McANULTY, JUDGES; AND POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE.1
POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
This is an appeal by Hunter Byrd, III,
from a jury verdict convicting him of three counts of drug
trafficking and one count of drug possession.
For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
In May 2001, Victoria Taylor was working as a
confidential informant in cooperation with Lexington Police
Officer Shane Ensminger.
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Taylor eventually identified Byrd as a
Senior Status Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution.
drug trafficker.
On May 15, 16, and 17, 2001, Taylor arranged
to meet and purchase crack cocaine from Byrd.
In each case
Taylor was wired, the transaction was tape recorded, and police
surreptitiously monitored the transaction.
Byrd was not
arrested after these “buy and rides” because the police wanted
to protect Taylor’s identity.
The transactions instead were
presented to the Grand Jury.
On August 13, 2001, in Indictment No. 01-CR-827, Byrd
was indicted on three counts of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance.
On August 15, 2001, Byrd was arrested.
During a search incident to the arrest, Detective Ensminger
found a wadded up dollar bill in Byrd’s left front pocket which
appeared to have cocaine residue on it.
As a result, on October
1, 2001, Byrd was indicted for first-degree possession of a
controlled substance.
A jury trial covering the four charges was held on
October 16, 2001.
Byrd was found guilty on all charges, and the
jury recommended a total sentence of sixteen years to serve.
On
November 19, 2001, the trial court entered final judgment and
sentencing.
The trial court reduced Byrd’s sentence to a total
of ten years to serve.
This appeal followed.
First, Byrd contends that the trial court erred in
permitting Detective Ensminger to state to the jury that he knew
Byrd prior to Taylor identifying him as a drug trafficker, and
2
that the error was compounded when Ensminger, after being asked
by the Commonwealth how he knew Byrd, stated that he knew the
appellant because he had heard reports that Byrd had in the past
sold drugs in a Lexington public park.
Prior to trial Byrd moved in limine to exclude any
prior “encounters” or “dealings” Ensminger had had with Byrd
prior to the May 2001 transactions.
Although the relevant in
limine proceedings are barely audible, it is apparent that the
trial court ruled that Ensminger would be permitted to testify
to the limited effect that he knew Byrd prior to the controlled
buys.
Accordingly, the prosecutor elicited from Ensminger that
he knew Byrd prior to the May 2001 transactions.
While it was within the trial court’s discretion to
permit into evidence that Ensminger knew Byrd prior to May 2001,
we are troubled by the prosecutor’s follow-up question to this
general background question.
Presumably having some idea of
what the response would be, the prosecutor asked Ensminger how
he knew Byrd.
Ensminger responded that he knew of Byrd because
he had received numerous complaints that Byrd was selling drugs
in Douglas Park.
We agree with Byrd that this question and response was
an inexcusable violation of KRE2 404(b).
Moreover, the response
repeated hearsay statements in violation of KRE 802.
2
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
3
The
Commonwealth’s attempt, on appeal, to justify the violation as
admissible “to show why the police . . . targeted Byrd” is
likewise inexcusable.
See KRE 404(b).
Moreover, the Commonwealth’s brief misstates the
relevant hearsay law by claiming that Ensminger’s reference to
the complaints was “not being introduced to prove that Byrd had
sold drugs in Douglas Park[, but rather] was offered simply to
show the jury that the police was [sic] familiar with Byrd.” In
light of Hughes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 934 (1987), the
Commonwealth’s position that Ensminger’s statement was
nonhearsay under KRE 801(c) is untenable.
Despite our dissatisfaction with the manner in which
both the prosecuting attorney and the appellate attorney have
practiced this issue; nevertheless, we have carefully reviewed
the trial testimony and are compelled to conclude that in light
of the overwhelming evidence of Byrd’s guilt, the evidence was
harmless error.
An error is harmless if there is no reasonable
possibility that, absent the error, the verdict would have been
different.
RCr 9.24; Harman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 898 S.W.2d
486, 489 (1995); Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 848
(2000).
The harmless error doctrine "recognizes the principle
that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the
factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence ... and
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promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on
the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the
virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error." Hodge at 848
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct.
1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).)
In this case, absent the improper testimony, there is
not a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been
different.
The controlled drug buys were implemented so as to
develop evidence demonstrating well beyond a reasonable doubt
that Byrd was responsible for selling cocaine to Taylor on the
three occasions charged in the indictment.
Taylor set up the sales by contacting Byrd on his cell
phone; the recordings of these calls as well as Byrd’s cell
phone records listing the calls were introduced into evidence.
Prior to sending Taylor out for the buys, Taylor and her vehicle
were searched to make sure she did not have cocaine on her prior
to going on the buys.
Following the buys, after meeting with
Byrd, Taylor was in possession of cocaine, and the cocaine could
only have been a product of the meetings with Byrd.
Further, Taylor was wired for each of the drug
transactions, and the resulting audio recordings implicating
Byrd as the seller of the cocaine were introduced into the
record.
Similarly, the first two buys were videotaped and
Byrd’s distinctive vehicle places him at the scene.
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Moreover,
Taylor testified that Byrd sold her the cocaine; Ensminger
surveilled the buys, and his testimony corroborates Taylor’s
testimony that Byrd was the seller.
As his defense, Byrd asserts that it was a passenger
in the vehicle, rather than him, who sold the cocaine to Taylor.
However, on the occasion of the last buy, Byrd delivered the
cocaine by bringing it out of a residence to her vehicle.
In
addition, Taylor testified that the passengers had nothing to do
with the drug transactions.
Further, while it is true that on
the occasion of the first two buys there was a passenger in
Byrd’s vehicle and Taylor approached the Byrd vehicle from the
passenger side, the testimony disclosed that on these occasions
Byrd parked his vehicle with the passenger side faced toward
Taylor.
The lone factor that the transactions were completed on
the passenger side of Byrd’s vehicle is not enough to offset the
overwhelming evidence described above which implicates Byrd as
the seller.
In summary, while we are disturbed by both trial
counsel and appellate counsel’s practice of this issue, we
nevertheless are convinced that there is not a reasonable
possibility that, absent the error, the result would have been
different and that the error was harmless.
Next, Byrd contends that the trial court erred by not
granting a mistrial following the introduction of evidence
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concerning prior drug use Byrd and Taylor had engaged in
together.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved in limine to
present testimony regarding prior drug use Byrd and Taylor had
engaged in together.
The trial court denied the motion.
Nevertheless, Ensminger testified that Taylor brought
Appellant’s name to the police as someone she had bought drugs
from in the past.
Further, Taylor testified that if Byrd “would
sell to her he would sell to her kids.”
Following each of these
incidents defense counsel moved for a mistrial.
"A mistrial is appropriate only where the record
reveals 'a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or
real necessity.'"
(2002).
Bray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 375, 383
For the purpose of appellate review, the trial judge is
always recognized as the person best situated to properly
evaluate the circumstances as to when a mistrial is required.
Kirkland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 53 S.W.3d 71, 76 (2001).
Therefore, the trial court has broad discretion in determining
when a mistrial is necessary.
"Where, for reasons deemed
compelling by the trial judge, who is best situated
intelligently to make such a decision, the ends of substantial
justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a
mistrial may be declared...." Wiley v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
575 S.W.2d 166, 169 (1979) (quoting Gori v. United States, 367
7
U.S. 364, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901 (1961)); Gosser v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 897, 906 (2000).
Here, again, the prosecution crossed the line and
violated a pre-trial in limine order of the trial court.
Ensminger’s testimony that Byrd had, prior to May 2001, sold
drugs to Taylor should not have been presented to the jury.
The
testimony was not admissible under KRE 404(b) and, further,
violated the trial court’s pre-trial order.
While we express disapproval of this disregard of the
trial court’s pretrial order, nevertheless, we cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a
mistrial.
While the testimony may have had a damaging effect,
in light of the overwhelming evidence of Byrd’s guilt, as
previously discussed, Ensminger’s testimony of the pre-May 2001
transactions between Byrd and Taylor did not create a manifest
necessity for a mistrial.
Similarly, though Taylor’s unfounded conjecture to the
effect that if Byrd “would sell to her he would sell to her
kids” was incompetent testimony, the comment did not create a
manifest necessity for a mistrial.
In all likelihood the jury
recognized the unsolicited commentary for what it was – a
speculative assertion by a witness hostile to the defendant’s
interests.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Byrd’s motion for a mistrial regarding Taylor’s comment.
8
Next, Byrd contends that a mistrial should have been
granted as a result of various comments the prosecutor made
during her closing arguments.
Specifically, Byrd contends that the prosecutor
improperly compared the facts in Byrd’s trial to a previous drug
trafficking trial in which the defendant was found guilty, and
did so with the knowledge that one of the jurors on the Byrd
panel was also on the panel in the previous case.
Byrd also
claims that it was improper for the prosecutor to argue to the
effect that if the jury believed that Byrd was guilty of one of
the charges then it was only logical that he was guilty of all
of the charges.
The comments made by the prosecutor concerning a prior
trial were as follows:
I believe in a trial a couple of weeks ago I
said something about a crack fairy. Do you
think they [the drugs] just magically
appeared from the crack fairy? No. They
came from Hunter Byrd. They were sold by
him to Victoria Taylor. He was the only one
involved and we have proved that to you
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The prosecutor’s comments to the effect that if Byrd was guilty
of one of the charges then it was only logical that he was
guilty of the third charge were as follows:
[Defense Counsel] also wanted to point out
to you that he thought that it was maybe the
other person involved in the second or third
9
transaction. That’s fine and dandy if he
wants to grasp at straws. But how is he
going to explain the third transaction when
Byrd was by himself. Not much of an
explanation there. And if you believe
Hunter Byrd is going to sell once. Why not
believe that he is going to sell two or
three times or even more. We just happen to
monitor these transactions. There is no
explanation on how the third deal took place
if Hunter Byrd is the only person there.
Attorneys are granted wide latitude during closing
argument. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 39 (1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1153, 119 S.Ct. 1056, 143 L.Ed.2d 61
(1999).
To warrant reversal, misconduct of the prosecutor must
be so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally
unfair.
Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 805
(2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1059, 122 S.Ct. 1921, 152 L.Ed.2d
829 (2002).
When reviewing allegations of error in closing
argument, "[t]he required analysis, by an appellate court, must
focus on the overall fairness of the trial, and not the
culpability of the prosecutor....
A prosecutor may comment on
tactics, may comment on evidence, and may comment as to the
falsity of a defense position."
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
744 S.W.2d 407, 411-12 (1987)(internal citation omitted).
Reversal is only justified when the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct is so egregious as to render the trial fundamentally
unfair.
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224
10
(1996); Berry v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 84 S.W.3d 82, 90
(2001).
The reference to the previous trial may be interpreted
as merely an introductory comment to the “crack fairy”
illustration as opposed to a deliberate attempt to signal to an
individual juror that Byrd’s case should be somehow associated
with the previous trial.
Further, the mere use of the term
“crack fairy” would probably have reminded the juror of the
previous trial even without the specific reference to the trial.
We believe the comment was within the wide range of latitude
permitted in closing arguments, and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Byrd’s motion for a mistrial.
Similarly, the prosecutor’s comments to the effect
that if the jury believed Byrd committed some of the crimes then
he committed all of the crimes was proper commentary.
The
comments were made in direct response to defense counsel’s
comments in closing arguments to the effect that a passenger in
Byrd’s car was actually the person who sold the crack cocaine to
Taylor.
Clearly the prosecutor’s comments were intended to
remind the jury that while there was a passenger present during
the first two transactions, Byrd was alone during the third
transaction.
The prosecutor’s statements were proper commentary
on the evidence and were within the wide-range of permissible
argument.
The comments did not require a mistrial.
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Finally, Byrd contends that if the foregoing arguments
are not individually cause for reversible error, then the errors
cumulatively resulted in reversible error.
There is no basis to claim cumulative error in this
case.
Appellant received a fundamentally fair trial and we find
that the isolated instances of harmless error are insufficient
to create a cumulative effect which would warrant reversal of
his convictions for a new trial.
Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
973 S.W.2d 13, 40 (1998); compare Funk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 842
S.W.2d 476 (1992).
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alicia A. Sneed
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
12
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