COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL, ALBERT B. CHANDLER, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. GREG CRUTCHFIELD
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RENDERED: May 30, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002514-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL,
ALBERT B. CHANDLER, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00062
v.
GREG CRUTCHFIELD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER, and JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, ex rel, Albert B.
Chandler, III, Attorney General, (the Commonwealth) brings this
appeal from an October 26, 2001, summary judgment of the Garrard
Circuit Court.
We affirm.
In November 2000, Greg Crutchfield was elected a
member of the Garrard County Board of Education and assumed the
office of school board member in January 2001.
On March 21, 2001, the Commonwealth filed a complaint
seeking the ouster of Crutchfield from office.
Statute (KRS) 415.060.
Kentucky Revised
Therein, the Commonwealth sought to
remove Crutchfield for violation of KRS 160.180(2)(i) which
prohibits membership on the board if a “relative” is employed by
the school district.
The Commonwealth pointed out that
Crutchfield’s uncle is a bus driver employed by the Garrard
County School District.
Crutchfield admitted to the factual allegations
contained in the complaint but counter-claimed alleging that KRS
160.180(1) and (2)(i) violated Ky. Const. § 2 and U.S. Const.
amends. I and XIV.
The circuit court entered summary judgment
in favor of Crutchfield.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 56.
The circuit court
concluded that KRS 160.180(1) and (2)(i) were unconstitutional,
thus precipitating this appeal.
The Commonwealth contends the circuit court erred by
concluding that KRS 160.180(1) and (2)(i) violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
Summary judgment
is proper where there exists no material issue of fact and
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
1
Steelvest,
The Commonwealth argues that Chapman v. Gorman, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 232 (1992)
upheld the constitutionality of KRS 160.180(1) and (2)(i) upon equal
protection grounds and that we are bound to follow Chapman. We, however, do
not view Chapman as dispositive. The Chapman court was not presented with
the issue of whether KRS 160.180(1)’s differential treatment of aunt/uncle
and niece/nephew offended the equal protection clause. Instead, the Court
was presented with and resolved other issues surrounding the equal protection
clause and KRS 160.180.
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Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Resolution of this appeal centers upon a question of law-–the
constitutionality of KRS 160.180(1) and (2)(i).
KRS 160.180 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)
(2)
As used in this section, “relative”
means father, mother, brother, sister,
husband, wife, son, daughter, aunt,
uncle, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law.
No person shall be eligible to
membership on a board of education:
. . . .
(i)
Who has a relative as defined in
subsection (1) of this section
employed by the school district
and is elected after July 13,
1990. (emphases added).
The Constitutional attack upon KRS 160.180 centers
upon its definition of “relative” found in subsection (1).
Therein, “relative” is defined as including aunt/uncle, but not
as including niece/nephew.
Crutchfield argues that KRS 160.180(1) offended
traditional notions of equality by including aunt/uncle in the
definition of relative while excluding niece/nephew.
Crutchfield believes, as did the circuit court, the legislative
distinction between aunt/uncle and niece/nephew contravenes the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conversely, the Commonwealth argues that KRS
160.180(1) and (2)(i) were enacted to abolish nepotism in the
-3-
public school system; thus, the inclusion of aunt/uncle in the
definition of “relative” undoubtedly furthers this governmental
goal.
Moreover, “[t]hat the statute does not include nephews or
nieces in the definition does not make it invalid, nor does it
make the inclusion of uncles/aunts any less rationally related
to eliminating nepotism in the school system. . . .
Here,
because the General Assembly could have done more to stamp out
nepotism by including ‘nephews’ and ‘nieces’ does not render the
classification unconstitutional.”
Brief for Commonwealth at 11.
To pass constitutional scrutiny upon equal protection
grounds, the classification between aunt/uncle and niece/nephew
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.
In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10-11, 112 S. Ct.
2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d. 1 (1992), the United States Supreme Court
articulately enunciated the “rational basis test” as follows:
The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, commands that no
State shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” Of course, most laws differentiate
in some fashion between classes of persons.
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid
classifications. It simply keeps
governmental decisionmakers from treating
differently persons who are in all relevant
respects alike.
. . . .
The appropriate standard of review is
whether the difference in treatment . . .
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rationally furthers a legitimate state
interest. (Citation omitted).
In the case at hand, there must exist a legitimate
governmental interest rationally related to the differential
treatment or the classification of aunt/uncle and niece/nephew
under KRS 160.180(1).
If a legitimate governmental interest
exists, the classification of aunt/uncle and niece/nephew is
constitutional; if such interest does not exist, the
classification of aunt/uncle and niece/nephew is
unconstitutional.
The legitimate governmental interest offered by the
Commonwealth is that of eliminating nepotism and the appearance
of nepotism in the public school system.
Obviously, the goal of
eliminating nepotism and the appearance thereof is furthered by
prohibiting an individual from serving on a board of education
if an aunt/uncle is employed by that public school system.
query, however, cannot end there.
Our
As stated in Commonwealth v.
Meyers, Ky. App., 8 S.W.3d. 58, 61 (1999), “[t]he relevant
inquiry under the equal protection analysis is whether the
classification (that is, the difference in treatment) is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”
Thus, the classification of aunt/uncle and niece/nephew must
rationally further the government’s goal of eliminating nepotism
and the appearance thereof.
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We are unable to discern the rational basis for the
difference in treatment or classification of aunt/uncle and
niece/nephew in KRS 160.180(1).
We observe that an aunt/uncle
and a niece/nephew are within the same degree of kinship and,
thus, are “similarly situated” for equal protection purposes.
Further, the goal of ending nepotism and the appearance thereof
certainly could be promoted by including both aunt/uncle and
niece/nephew in the definition of relative in KRS 160.180(1).
As such, we are of the opinion that the goal of ending nepotism
does not provide a rational basis for the classification of
aunt/uncle and niece/nephew.
Simply stated, we view the
classification as lacking a rational basis and as violative of
the equal protection clause.
We shall now consider the effect of the
unconstitutional classification upon KRS 160.180(1) and (2)(i).
We, of course, view the unconstitutional language of KRS
160.180(1) to be “aunt, uncle”; we think the proper remedy is to
“sever” the aforementioned unconstitutional language from the
statute.
In so doing, we rely upon our severability statute,
KRS 446.090, which reads:
It shall be considered that it is the intent
of the General Assembly, in enacting any
statute, that if any part of the statute be
held unconstitutional the remaining parts
shall remain in force, unless the statute
provides otherwise, or unless the remaining
parts are so essentially and inseparably
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connected with and dependent upon the
unconstitutional part that it is apparent
that the General Assembly would not have
enacted the remaining parts without the
unconstitutional part, or unless the
remaining parts, standing alone, are
incomplete and incapable of being executed
in accordance with the intent of the General
Assembly.
We observe that the terms “aunt, uncle” are not inseparable from
the remainder of KRS 160.180(1) and that the remainder of KRS
160.180(1) is entirely capable of “standing alone.”
Accordingly, we hold that the language of “aunt, uncle” should
be severed from KRS 160.180(1), thus preserving the
constitutionality of KRS 160.180(1) and (2)(i).
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
Garrard Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
James W. Williams, III
Stanford, KY
Scott White
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Jeffrey S. Walther
Lexington, KY
Winter R. Huff
Somerset, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Stuart Cobb
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Jeffrey S. Walther
Lexington, KY
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