JEFFREY S. CROWLEY v. ANGELA LILLY
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RENDERED: MAY 9, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002425-DG
JEFFREY S. CROWLEY
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-XX-00003
ANGELA LILLY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of
the Kentucky Domestic Violence Act, Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 403.710, et. seq., both facially and as applied.
This
court granted discretionary review of a Henderson Circuit Court
memorandum opinion that affirmed a Domestic Violence Order of
the Henderson District Court entered against Jeffrey S. Crowley.
We vacate and remand for additional findings of fact.
On January 17, 2001, Angela Lilly filed a Domestic
Violence Petition/Motion against her ex-husband, Jeffrey S.
Crowley.
The District Court entered an Emergency Protective
Order on January 17, 2001, which required that Crowley remain at
least 500 feet away from Lilly and members of her family and
household at all times and places.
The order also granted
temporary custody of the couple’s two children to Lilly.
A hearing on the petition was held on January 26,
2001, in Henderson District Court, after which the Court entered
a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) against Crowley.
ordered to:
Crowley was
1) remain at all times and places at least 500 feet
away from Lilly and members of Lilly’s family or household
except for visitation exchanges and telephone calls to the
children; 2) not commit further acts of domestic violence and
abuse; and 3) not dispose of or damage any property of the
parties.
The DVO was ordered in effect until January 25, 2003.
On February 6, 2001, Crowley filed a “Motion to Vacate
and Set Aside Judgment or in the Alternative to Make Additional
Findings of Fact.”
The motion requested that the order be set
aside on two grounds:
1) the order violated the mandates of KRS
403.720, in that the evidence did not support a finding of
“physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,
assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury,
serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault.”
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KRS 403.720
(1); 2) the domestic violence statutes violated the Kentucky and
U.S. Constitutions, both as written and as applied to Crowley.
The motion requested, in the alternative, that the trial court
make additional findings of fact as to what facts gave rise to
1) acts of domestic violence, or 2) the fear of imminent
physical injury, including date, place, and location of each
act; and 3) facts upon which the court relied to find that
domestic violence may occur in the future.
The motion was to be heard on February 16, 2001.
On
that date, Crowley filed a “Memorandum in Support of the Motion”
and filed a “Notice to Attorney General of Constitutional
Challenge.”1
The record shows that the hearing on the motion was
continued to March 2, 2001.2
motion on March 2, 2001.
The District Court denied the
However, the court docket sheet shows
that this order was either lost or misfiled and on March 28,
2001, the court again denied the motion.
The trial court did
not enter specific findings of fact as requested by Crowley.
Crowley appealed to the Henderson Circuit Court.
In
the appeal he argued that there were “no facts supporting
domestic violence” and that the domestic violence statutes were
1
The Certificate of
served by mail. The
what appears to be a
motion and notice in
Service noticing the Attorney General states that it was
Certificate of Service is dated February 5, 2001, with
hand-altered date of February 15, 2001. Entry of the
the record was February 16, 2001.
2
Crowley contends that the continuance was to allow the Attorney General’s
office time to intervene. However, there is nothing in the record to
support.
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unconstitutional both facially and as applied.
The Circuit
Court entered a Memorandum Opinion affirming on October 3, 2001,
which determined that the Act was not overbroad, that it was not
vague, and that it did not violate due process.
This Court granted Crowley’s motion for discretionary
review on February 25, 2002.
On August 7, 2002, Lilly filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that:
1) Crowley’s
constitutional challenge was untimely filed in that the
constitutional challenge was first raised in a post-judgment
motion; and 2) the Attorney General was never given the proper
opportunity to respond to the challenge as a result of the
untimely challenge.
On September 26, 2000, this Court entered
an order passing the Motion to Dismiss to a three-judge panel.
On the same date, this Court entered an order denying a motion
for attorney fees and costs and granting a motion for additional
time to file briefs.
The Governor’s Office of Child Abuse and
the Kentucky Domestic Violence Association were also granted
leave to file amicus briefs.
On March 26, 2003, we entered an
order denying Lilly’s motion to dismiss.
The first issue to be addressed on appeal is whether
Crowley complied with the mandatory requirements of Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 418.075(1), which states:
In any proceeding which involves the
validity of a statute, the Attorney General
of the state shall, before judgment is
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entered, be served with a copy of the
petition, and shall be entitled to be heard,
and if the ordinance or franchise is alleged
to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General
of the state shall also be served with a
copy of the petition and be entitled to be
heard.
Lilly relies on the cases of Maney v. Mary Chiles
Hosp., Ky., 785 S.W.2d 480 (1990), and Allard v. Kentucky Real
Estate Comm’n, Ky. App., 824 S.W.2d 884 (1992), in support of
her argument that Crowley failed to comply with the notice
requirements of the statute.
In Maney, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that KRS 418.075 is mandatory and that strict
enforcement of the statute is necessary to eliminate procedural
uncertainty.
Maney, 785 S.W.2d at 482.
In Allard, this Court
applied Maney and determined that a constitutional challenge was
untimely when it was raised for the first time in a motion to
alter, amend or vacate.
Allard, 824 S.W.2d at 886.
Crowley attempts to distinguish Allard on its facts.
He emphasizes the following language from Allard:
“Appellant’s
initiating document before the circuit court (designated ‘Appeal
Pursuant to KRS 324.210’) makes no reference to the
constitutionality of the statutes.”
Id. at 887.
Crowley argues
that the first document he filed was the motion to vacate and
set aside the judgment and that when he filed the motion the
document was accompanied by a written notice to the Attorney
General.
Crowley argues that the rationale behind this court’s
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opinion that Allard’s constitutional challenge was untimely was
that Allard had a lengthy trial and the case had been before the
circuit court for months before the issue was raised.
However,
this interpretation fails to consider the language that follows
the Allard cite Crowley offers to support his argument.
This
Court stated, “The proceedings before the commission, copies of
which were filed with the trial court, reflect no issue being
raised regarding the constitutionality of the statutes.”
Id.
Clearly, the length of time the case was before the circuit
court was not the determining factor.
Crowley also argues that, because he only knew of the
charges against him for nineteen days before he raised the
challenge, Allard should not apply.
The record establishes that
the first time Crowley considered raising the issue of
constitutionality was in a letter written to the Commonwealth
Attorney on February 2, 2001, after the DVO was entered.
As
excuse for this procedural failure, Crowley states that he
expected the charge to be dismissed at the hearing and that the
motion to vacate was the first document he filed.
While it is
true that Crowley’s motion to vacate was the first document he
filed, we do not see how this relieved him from the procedural
mandates of the notice requirement.
The reason for the rule
requiring notice to the Attorney General prior to judgment is to
prevent procedural uncertainty.
Crowley’s failure to follow the
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procedural mandate is fatal to his attack on the facial
constitutionality of the statute.
However, this does not
preclude our review of whether the statute was
unconstitutionally applied to Crowley.
See Sherfey v. Sherfey,
Ky. App., 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (2002).
Crowley’s “as applied” arguments are that his due
process rights were violated by:
1) the summary procedures
without trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 2)
the trial court considering evidence outside the scope of the
complaint; 3) the trial court’s failure to make specific
findings of fact that domestic violence occurred -- including
the date, place, and location of the acts that gave rise to a
finding of domestic violence -- and that domestic violence was
likely to occur again in the future.
Crowley’s argument regarding a trial by jury and the
standard of proof, while styled “unconstitutional as applied,”
in fact goes to the facial constitutionality of the statute.
The statute specifically allows for the court, without a jury,
to make its findings from a preponderance of the evidence.
403.750(1).
KRS
As previously stated, Crowley is precluded from
making this argument for failure to timely notice the Attorney
General.
Crowley’s argument regarding the trial court
considering evidence outside of the complaint is unpreserved.
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Our review of the record establishes that Crowley made no
objection to this evidence at the hearing.
KRE 103(1).
Crowley’s final argument is that his due process
rights were violated when the trial court failed to make
specific findings of fact.
The process for obtaining a domestic
violence protective order is outlined in KRS 403.700 et. seq.
KRS 403.750(1) allows the trial court to enter a Domestic
Violence Order following a hearing, “if it finds from a
preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of domestic
violence and abuse have occurred and may again occur[.]”
KRS 403.720(1) defines domestic violence and abuse as
follows:
“Domestic violence and abuse" means physical
injury, serious physical injury, sexual
abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of
imminent physical injury, serious physical
injury, sexual abuse, or assault between
family members or members of an unmarried
couple.
“Imminent physical injury,” as it applies to the
domestic violence statutes is defined as follows:
"Imminent" means impending danger, and, in
the context of domestic violence and abuse
as defined by KRS 403.720, belief that
danger is imminent can be inferred from a
past pattern of repeated serious abuse.
KRS 503.010(3).
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We have thoroughly reviewed the Domestic Violence
Order and the transcript of the hearing held on January 26,
2001, in the Henderson District Court and must vacate and remand
for further findings of fact.3
Based on the record before us,
the trial court failed to make findings of fact sufficient to
allow for meaningful appellate review.
In her petition, Lilly stated that on January 16,
2001,
. . . he [Crowley] is threatening violence
against my spouse and me (to beat us up).
His wife is also making threats against me.
Both are using abusive obscene language. On
numerous occassions [sic] he has used this
language and screamed and yelled at me in
front of the children. “He has threatened
“to whip your ass until you wouldn’t know
which end is up.” (to Cooper) His wife has
said “Your ass is going to burn.” (to me),
etc.
At the hearing, the trial court questioned Lilly about
what threat Crowley had made specifically to her.
Lilly
proceeded to testify as to previous encounters with Crowley as
opposed to the phone call upon which the petition was based.
She testified about previous encounters where Crowley had yelled
at her and pointed his finger at her.
Lilly also testified that
Crowley had pushed her once, seven years earlier while they were
getting divorced.
She also testified that on a previous
3
While the record establishes that the DVO was to expire on January 25, 2003,
which could render this issue moot, KRS 403.750(2) provides that an order may
be reissued upon expiration and the number of times it may be reissued is
unlimited.
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occasion he had pulled his car in behind her at the daycare
center where they exchanged the children for visitation.
She
testified that when Crowley was informed that his son had
forgotten his coat Crowley was thrown “into a fit of rage” and
in response she “just walked off in the Busy Bee.”
When questioned by counsel for Crowley, Lilly
testified that she had never had to call the police for
protection from Crowley.
Lilly also testified as follows:
“When he started the yelling, the screaming,
the calling me names, and the cussing, I
refused to talk, and I would have – warned
him numerous times that when he begins to
talk to me that way, I will hang up, because
I am not – I just cannot keep living like
this, and if we – you know, the
conversations aren’t about what’s best for
the boys, they’re about how horrible I am,
and he makes many mentions of that, and it’s
over and over, it’s screaming and yelling.
It’s not a civil conversation of how to work
things out, it’s a conversation of, “You’re
going to pay,” you know, and, “your life’s
going to fall down around you when you least
expect it.”
Lilly testified that most of conversations to which she was
referring took place over the phone.
After Lilly testified, counsel for Crowley moved to
dismiss the petition.4
The trial court overruled the motion as
follows:
4
The transcript of the hearing indicates that the tape was inaudible when
counsel stated the basis for the motion to dismiss. However, based on the
ruling of the court, we believe the basis was lack of evidence to support the
petition.
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Pointing fingers, elevating voices, “Going
to get you; going to make you pay,” keeping
a person from leaving when they choose to
are all situations which somebody, I
believe, could objectively and reasonably be
placed in eminent [sic] fear of misthought.
Those are acts of domestic violence.
After denying the Motion to Dismiss the trial court
requested the parties come to bench.
The following exchange
then took place:
THE COURT: I want to bring you all up here.
I’m not – number one, I don’t want you to
leave today feeling like I’ve lectured at
you. But inevitably that’s probably what
I’m going to do anyway.
The – the very least I can say, I know
nothing about your particular situation.
I’ve not been there the last seven years. I
have no idea what transpires between you. I
can tell you based on what I’ve heard and
the interaction and the evidence that I’ve
seen that you, all four of you, and I bring
the two – other two of you up because you
play an important dynamic in the
relationship, that this is a highly
unhealthy situation, and if not for the two
– not for the four of you, these two kids,
because the statistics show that kids who
see people yelling, and screaming, and doing
irrational type things, and I’m not
suggesting that all of this necessarily
happened, but that the kids are going to
learn from this, and they’re much more
likely to perpetuate this kind of behavior.
MR MCCOLLOM5: Your Honor, if I could
interject, these dynamics have been terrible
and I’ve talked to them. They were going to
counseling [sic], and Mr. Crowley has
ordered the children to call his current
5
County Attorney.
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wife mom, and that was causing the children
concern, and the counselor called Mr.
Crowley to try to talk to him about how the
problems could affect the children –
THE COURT:
I’m not –
MR. MCCOLLOM:
The mother then told –
MS. ZACHARY6:
Did you talk to the counselor?
THE COURT: Hold on; hold on. I’m not going
– I’m not going to point fingers today, and
I’m not going to blame anybody. I’m just
asking you please to start to heal. And
today’s not the day to do it. You’ve come
in, [sic] you’ve had an emotional hearing.
You know, you’re not going to heal today.
But you can’t afford for these kids to
continue to see this kind of conduct, if it
occurred, if it happened, okay? Please try
– I mean, I’m not worried about the four of
you. I mean, I just don’t want these kids
to show up down here in front of me in ten
years because they’re not getting along with
their sixteen-year old girlfriend in high
school and they take a swipe at her. Okay?
(Emphases ours.)
The trial court then discussed pending criminal
charges with Mr. McCollom.
These criminal charges related
specifically to the phone call made by Crowley to Lilly’s home
on January 16, 2001, which was the basis of the complaint and
request for a DVO.
The County Attorney made the following
statement:
We’ve talked and the criminal cases have
been filed, and I think from the evidence
that I’ve heard, probably the criminal
6
Counsel for Crowley.
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terroristic threatening is probably – wasn’t
just, “I’m going to do something if you
don’t” – make threats. It’s not, “I’m going
to come over and do it.” So probably that’s
not a good charge.
Based on the record we cannot tell, for purposes of
appellate review, whether the trial court found that the act
alleged in the complaint was an act of domestic violence,
whether it put Lilly in fear of imminent physical injury, and
whether it was likely to occur again in the future – all
findings required by the statutes.
Therefore, we must vacate
the order of the Henderson District Court and remand for
additional findings of fact consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Amealia R. Zachary
Hanson, Kentucky
Curtis J. Hamilton III
Morton & Bach
Henderson, Kentucky
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FILED ON
BEHALF OF THE GOVERNOR’S
OFFICE OF CHILD ABUSE &
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SERVICES:
Mary Joe Gleason
Frankfort, Kentucky
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FILED ON
BEHALF OF THE KENTUCKY
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASSOCIATION:
Lisa A. Beran
Frankfort, Kentucky
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