JAMES G. GRZYWACZ v. DEBORAH A. GRZYWACZ
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 12, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002377-MR
AND
NO. 2002-CA-001121-MR
AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-002462-MR
JAMES G. GRZYWACZ
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEALS/CROSS-APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARGARET RYAN HUDDLESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-01002
v.
DEBORAH A. GRZYWACZ
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AS TO THE APPEALS
AND
VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING AS TO THE CROSS-APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
James Grzywacz appeals from an order of the
Warren Circuit Court awarding child support and work-related
child care costs to his former spouse, Deborah Grzywacz, and
establishing a visitation schedule based on Deborah’s work
schedule.
Deborah cross-appeals from an order changing the
designation of their child custody arrangement.
We affirm as to
the appeals, vacate as to the cross-appeal, and remand for
further findings in accordance with this opinion.
James and Deborah were divorced on August 13, 1997, by
a decree of dissolution entered in Logan Circuit Court.
By
agreement, they were awarded joint custody of their minor child
and neither party was obligated to pay child support.
James had
the child at least three nights a week while Deborah worked as a
nurse.
However, after James remarried, the parties began
experiencing difficulties maintaining a regular visitation
schedule.
James filed a motion in Logan Circuit Court on July
12, 2000, to enforce the child custody agreement and establish a
specific visitation schedule.
Since both parties were now
living in Bowling Green, venue was transferred to the Warren
Circuit Court.
Deborah filed a motion in response requesting a
custody modification and child support.
After hearings on September 6 and September 21, 2000,
the trial court ordered the parties to either submit an
agreement or proposed findings.
James and Deborah were unable
to reach an agreement; therefore, each of them submitted
proposed findings in October 2000.
Additional hearings were
held after which the trial court issued a draft order and the
parties filed written responses.
On June 4, 2001, the trial
court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
decree modifying custody and establishing visitation.
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James was
ordered to pay child support to Deborah and the parties were
granted joint custody of their child with Deborah to provide the
primary residence.
Both parties filed motions to alter, amend or vacate
the trial court’s judgment and the trial court responded, in an
order dated October 1, 2001, by modifying custody to joint
custody with a co-parenting arrangement with no primary
residence named for the child.
The visitation schedule was also
amended, but the trial court refused to amend its order
requiring James to pay child support.
James appealed the issues
of child support and the visitation schedule and Deborah
appealed the issue of custody modification.
Subsequently, James
filed a motion to reduce his child support.
The trial court
denied the motion, and James also appealed that order.
James’
two appeals were consolidated and are decided here along with
Deborah’s cross-appeal.
James first argues that the trial court erred as to
both the entitlement and the amount of child support awarded to
Deborah.
The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law stated two reasons for modifying the parties’ agreement not
to pay child support.
The first reason given was that the trial
court’s order also modified the custody arrangement between the
parties by naming Deborah as the primary residential custodian.
However, in response to James’ motion to alter, amend or vacate,
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the trial court modified its custody award to joint custody with
a co-parenting arrangement.
Consequently, James contends that
the trial court’s initial reason for awarding Deborah child
support is moot.
This argument serves to ignore the trial court’s
strongest reason for awarding support.
In its findings of fact,
the trial court stated as follows:
[T]he agreement of the parties allowed no
child support to be paid to either party;
however, [Kentucky Revised Statute] 403.211
requires any deviation from the child
support guidelines to be accompanied by a
written finding or specific finding on the
record by the court, specifying the reason
for the deviation. The Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of
Dissolution of Marriage did not include a
written finding specifying a reason for a
deviation from the child support guidelines.
Child support is the right and benefit of
the child and not the parent. Therefore, a
written finding or verbal finding on the
record giving a firm and sound reason for a
deviation from child support is a necessary
predicate for an abrogation of child
support.
Further, in light of this we have previously declined to find
that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding child
support where the parties have joint custody and share equal or
almost equal physical possession of their child.
Downey v.
Rogers, Ky. App., 847 S.W.2d 63 (1993); Brown v. Brown, Ky.
App., 952 S.W.2d 707 (1997).
James simply has failed to show
that the trial court’s order for him to pay child support to
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Deborah was clearly erroneous and, thus, cannot prevail on
appeal.
James next claims that the trial court erred in
awarding work-related childcare costs to Deborah alone.
The
trial court ordered Deborah to submit written documentation of
her work-related childcare costs to James’ attorney on a
quarterly basis.
James is only required to reimburse her for
55% of those costs which is in proportion to the amount of the
parties’ income which he earns.
Moreover, since the child would
normally be with James when Deborah is at work (in accordance
with the trial court’s visitation order), she would only accrue
childcare expenses when James is unavailable to exercise his
scheduled visitation.
James has failed to demonstrate how the
trial court’s decision abuses its discretion in this matter.
With regard to the parties’ visitation schedule, James
contends that the trial court erred in tailoring it to fit
Deborah’s work schedule.
In fact, the trial court granted James
standard visitation with his child and in addition allowed him
to have the five year-old child in his home overnight the nights
Deborah works.
On the one hand, James does not wish to pay
childcare costs associated with Deborah’s schedule working as a
nurse; however, he also complains about the visitation schedule
which allows him to have the child at his home when Deborah is
working, thus alleviating the need to pay for such childcare.
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Further, to facilitate matters, the trial court’s order requires
Deborah to furnish her work schedule, in six-week increments, to
James within two days of receiving it.
This arrangement negates
his argument that the trial court’s order improperly allows
Deborah to manipulate James’ scheduled visitation with the child
by providing him with her schedule in an untimely manner.
Lastly, James appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his motion to modify his child support obligation.
Prior to the trial court’s June 1, 2001 order modifying custody
and awarding Deborah child support, James testified that he
earned approximately $1,000.00 per week from his employment at
Don Tequila’s Mexican Food Distributors, Inc.
He testified that
his duties included flying the corporate plane and assisting
with translating and contracts.
While he did not have a
specific job title, James testified that he ran the business and
described a position similar to that of an operations manager.
Moreover, James had a small ownership interest in the company.
Consequently, because of the disparity between James’ income and
Deborah’s, the trial court ordered him to pay approximately
$500.00 per month in support for their child.
After the trial court denied James’ motion to alter,
amend, or vacate its original findings and order regarding child
support, James filed a motion to reduce his support obligation
in October of 2001.
In this motion, James stated that he no
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longer accepted commercial piloting jobs outside his company and
that he in fact only made $400.00 per week from his job at Don
Tequila’s.
The trial court conducted a hearing and entered
extensive findings of fact related to James’ ability to
substantiate his diminished income.
Specifically, the trial
court addressed his mortgage, his vehicle loan payments and his
lack of credit card debt in concluding that his standard of
living required a higher income than what James now claimed to
have.
The trial court also found it dubious that James’ salary
from his job was allegedly no larger than the salary earned by
his current wife who worked for the same company in a
secretarial capacity.
We are unable to substitute our judgment
or conclude that the trial court, which had the advantage of
hearing the testimony and evaluating all of the evidence
presented, erred in determining that James was not entitled to a
reduction in his child support obligation.
For her part, Deborah cross-appeals from the trial
court’s order which amended the original June 1, 2001 order
awarding the parties joint custody, and designating Deborah as
the primary residential custodian.
She argues that the trial
court erroneously failed to make any findings supporting its
decision to withdraw the designation of a primary residential
custodian in favor of joint custody with a co-parenting
arrangement.
In its original order, the trial court thoroughly
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analyzed the parties’ agreed custody arrangement prior to
ordering a modification.
The trial court stated, in part, as
follows:
. . . The testimony of the parties
presented to this Court reveals the parties
have intermingled the separate concepts of
joint custody and split custody. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals has defined joint
custody as an arrangement in which both
parents share decision-making authority
concerning major areas of their child’s
upbringing. Aton v. Aton, Ky. App., 911
S.W.2d 612 (1995). However, joint custody
does not require an equal division of
physical residence between the parents. Id.
at 615. Joint custody recognizes that,
although one parent may have primary
physical possession of the child, both
parents share the decision making in major
areas concerning the child’s upbringing,
such as which school to attend, etc., a role
traditionally enjoyed by both parents during
the marriage. Burchell v. Burchell, Ky.
App., 684 S.W.2d 296 (1984). Conversely,
split custody means a situation where each
parent is the residential custodian for one
(1) or more children for whom the parents
share a joint legal responsibility. KRS
403.212(2)(h). Split custody does not allow
a child to have a fixed or permanent home
which becomes especially important when a
child reaches school age which has occurred
in this matter.
Although the parties have intermingled
the split custody and joint custody concepts
in their testimony, the fact remains that
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage of the
parties specifically granted joint custody
to the parties. Although the parties agreed
that the child would live with the parties
an equal amount of time, joint custody does
not require an equal division of the
physical possession of the child. The equal
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time provision of the agreement of the
parties closely resembles split custody
which is disfavored by the courts. Most
importantly, the parties failed to designate
who would maintain the primary residence for
the child. Additionally, the Court finds
that the child has now reached school age
which will only exacerbate the problems
evident in the child living with each party
an equal amount of time.
Although there was disagreement
concerning whether a naming of a primary
residential custodian would be a
modification of custody, the Court finds a
naming of a specific party as the primary
residential custodian would be a
modification of custody. Hence, the Court
will now consider whether a modification of
custody is warranted under the applicable
statute. . . .
The trial court went on to conduct an analysis, under KRS
402.340, of the factors governing modification of child custody
arrangements.
Specifically, the trial court focused on subsections
(c), which requires it to determine the child’s best interest
according to the factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2), and (e)
which requires an analysis of whether the advantages of a change
in environment outweigh the harms caused by modification.
The
trial court conducted an in-depth analysis of the statutory
factors and determined that, while the child had a healthy
relationship with both parents, it was in his best interests for
Deborah to be named as primary residential custodian.
Among the
facts which influenced the court were the child’s relationship
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with his maternal grandmother and half-sister, the fact that
Deborah had physical possession of the child a majority of the
time, and that a split custody arrangement would adversely
affect the child when he began school.
Consequently, the trial
court ordered Deborah and James to share joint custody of their
child, with Deborah as the primary residential custodian, and
awarded James liberal visitation.
Moreover, the parties were
still expected to share in the major decisions of their child’s
life, such as school, daycare, religion, and medical care.
In response to the parties’ motions to alter, amend,
or vacate its previous order, the trial court’s October 1, 2001
order amended the designation of child custody to joint custody
with a co-parenting arrangement.
Deborah argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in amending its original order,
which designated her as primary residential custodian, without
making additional findings of fact.
Our prior decision in
Scheer v. Zeigler, Ky. App., 21 S.W.3d 807 (2000), established
that modification of joint custody is subject to the applicable
statutory requirements.
KRS 403,340(3), which the trial court
complied with in its June 1, 2001, order states as follows:
(3) If a court of this state has
jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, the court shall
not modify a prior custody decree unless
after hearing it finds, upon the basis of
facts that have arisen since the prior
decree or that were unknown to the court at
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the time of entry of the prior decree, that
a change has occurred in the circumstances
of the child or his custodian, and that the
modification is necessary to serve the best
interests of the child. . . .
The trial court’s failure to hold a hearing prior to ordering a
second modification in the parties’ custody arrangements,
requires that we vacate this portion of its October 1, 2001
order for further proceedings consistent with the statutory
requirements.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order is
affirmed with regard to the issues of child support and
visitation and vacated with regard to the modification
substituting joint custody, with a co-parenting arrangement, for
joint custody, with Deborah as the primary residential
custodian.
This case is remanded with directions for the trial
court to hold a hearing, as required by KRS 403.340(3), prior to
modifying its June 1, 2001 order concerning child custody.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING
IN PART:
I concur with the majority’s opinion in part, but I
respectfully dissent in part.
I agree with the majority in the
disposition of James’s appeals.
However, I respectfully
disagree with the majority in the disposition of Deborah’s
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appeal.
In short, I would totally affirm the circuit court’s
judgment.
As the majority noted, the trial court entered a
judgment on June 4, 2001, modifying child custody.
Pursuant to
James’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate, the court amended its
judgment.
The majority holds that the failure of the circuit
court to hold a hearing prior to changing its custody
modification decision requires that a portion of the October 1,
2001 order be vacated.
I disagree.
In granting James’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate,
the court was not rendering a new custody modification decision.
Rather, it was merely changing the decision it had made when it
initially modified custody and made Deborah the primary
residential custodian.
Therefore, since the judgment merely
returned the parties to their prior status where they had joint
custody with no primary residential custodian, I see no reason
why additional findings of fact should have been made.
Further,
I see no need why another hearing had to be held since this was
not a modification of a custody decree but was only an amending
of a custody modification that had been rendered.
Deborah did not request another hearing.
In short, I would affirm.
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In fact,
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE JAMES G. GRZYWACZ:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT DEBORAH A. GRZYWACZ:
B. Alan Simpson
Julie F. Shadoan
Pierce, Simpson & Shadoan
Bowling Green, Kentucky
D. Bailey Walton
Safford & Lanphear
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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