NANCY DICKSON v. COMAIR, INC.; LINDA NOBLE; AND RALPH LEE
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RENDERED: JUNE 27, 2003; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002354-MR
NANCY DICKSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00664
v.
COMAIR, INC.; LINDA NOBLE;
AND RALPH LEE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDNG IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The Appellant, Nancy Dickson (“Dickson”), seeks
review of a summary judgment of the Boone Circuit Court
dismissing her claims against her former employer, Comair, Inc.
and two Comair employees, Linda E. Noble, and Ralph Lee,
Appellees herein.
In her complaint, Dickson alleged, inter
alia, age discrimination in violation of KRS 344.040,
wrongful/constructive discharge, and promissory estoppel.
As
outlined below, we conclude that summary judgment was improperly
granted on the promissory estoppel claim and reverse in part.
In all other respects, we affirm.
By order entered October 4, 2001, the trial court
granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
The order, in
its entirety, states:
This matter came before the Court on the motion
for summary judgment filed by Defendants Comair,
Inc., Linda E. Noble and Ralph O. Lee
(“Defendants”) on all claims asserted against
them by Plaintiff Nancy Dickson (“Plaintiff”) in
this action. Based on the pleadings, the
evidence, arguments of counsel and the entire
record, this Court is fully advised in the
premises and finds Defendants’ motion well taken.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT summary judgment is
GRANTED in favor of Defendants on all claims
asserted against them by Plaintiff. The claims
against Defendants shall and hereby are
dismissed, with prejudice. Each party to bear
their own costs, if any.
On October 19, 2001, Dickson filed a notice of appeal
to this Court.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary
judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
is no requirement that we defer to the trial court because
factual findings are not at issue.1
1
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
-2-
There
Dickson first argues that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on her promissory estoppel claim.
In
1997, Comair advised that it was considering a policy change to
require employees to relinquish seniority earned as flight
attendants upon taking positions as in-flight supervisors.
If
an in-flight supervisor chose to return to a flight attendant
position, all seniority would be lost.
Current in-flight
supervisors, as was Dickson at the time, were told they would
have to agree to the new policy to remain supervisors.
Dickson was concerned about forfeiting her 12 years of
seniority.
In response to her concerns, she claims she was told
that she would not lose her seniority if she returned to a
flight attendant position, in the event Comair effectively
eliminated her position as a supervisor.
In 1999, Comair reorganized its in-flight department.
Dickson alleges that after the reorganization, her
responsibilities were reduced to essentially “menial” tasks and
her workspace was moved upstairs, away from the mainstream of
flight attendant activity.
Dickson claims that these drastic
changes effectively eliminated her job as a supervisor.
Unhappy, Dickson explains that she applied for a position
as a flight attendant instructor in late 1999, believing that
her seniority would be reinstated under these circumstances,
based upon earlier assurances from Linda Noble and Lorain
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DeLotell.
However, after she accepted the new position, she was
informed there might be a problem reinstating her seniority.
Dickson claims that she took the position “under protest,” with
the understanding that the seniority issue remained under
consideration.
Ultimately, Comair decided that Dickson would
lose all of her seniority for bidding purposes, but her salary
would be that of a flight attendant with half Dickson’s actual
seniority.
Dickson says that “she could no longer bear to work
under those circumstances and was forced to leave.”
In response, Appellees argue that Dickson cannot
prevail on her promissory estoppel claim because she has failed
to establish (1) a sufficiently clear and definite promise and
(2) detrimental reliance upon that promise.
Further, “even
accepting” her version of events, Dickson’s job did not so
dramatically change that it was effectively eliminated.
Appellees characterize the changes in Dickson’s supervisory
position as “missing two meetings, the computerization of some
paperwork, a new office location, and other minor adjustments.”
In reviewing a summary judgment, our function is to
determine whether there are genuine issues to be tried, not to
resolve them, viewing the record in a light most favorable to
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Dickson and resolving all doubts in her favor.2
A promissory
estoppel, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 90 (1965), is:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise.
. . . .
The whole theory of a promissory estoppel action
is that detrimental reliance becomes a substitute
for consideration under the facts of a given
case. Calamari and Perillo, The Law of
Contracts, Hornbook Series § 105 (1970).
Numerous oral and gratuitous promises have been
enforced on this basis. Id. at Chapter 6, § 99105. Promises by employers to provide certain
fringe benefits are generally found to be
supported by consideration but will, at least,
give rise to the elements of a promissory
estoppel. Weesner v. Elec. Power Bd. of
Chattanooga, 48 Tenn.App. 178, 344 S.W.2d 766
(1961); The Law of Contracts, supra, at § 109.
The employer can reasonably foresee that
continuation in employment has been induced and
injustice can be avoided only by giving effect to
the promise.3
Lorain DeLotell, vice president of in-flight service
for Comair from June 1- December 20, 1997, testified by
deposition.
She read from a document she had prepared for
2
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991)
3
McCarthy v. Louisville Cartage Co., Inc., Ky.App. 796 S.W.2d
10, 11-12 (1990)
-5-
flight attendant personnel meetings in November and December
1997:
We removed supervisors from the in-flight service
seniority list to ensure their commitment to the
position. There is, however, one exception and
that is should we ever reduce the number of
supervisors or eliminate a particular position,
they will be returned to their original position
on the list in order that they may maintain their
employment with Comair as a flight attendant.
DeLotell did not tell everyone this was a “proposed
policy,” but that this was the policy.
DeLotell explained that
“we were going to implement the policy, okay, and whether it was
that particular group of supervisors or whomever replaced them,
there would be a policy about seniority.”
At the time DeLotell
met with the individual supervisors, a policy had not yet been
adopted; however, “[I]t was our intent to put this policy in
place in writing to the supervisors, and most probably to the
flight attendant group as well.
forward, to put it in place.
That was the intent going
This is what we were going to do.”
When questioned about when this policy went beyond the
“proposal” stage, DeLotell responded, “Well, I think we’re
getting into a semantics thing here versus proposed versus
policy.
When I presented this to the supervisors, it wasn’t a
question of whether or not we were going to do it, we were going
to do it.
The question was whether they were going to stay.”
-6-
DeLotell recalled meeting with Dickson, who “had great
concerns that it [seniority] was something that was going to be
hard for her to give up.”
DeLotell recalled that Dickson voiced
concerns about what would happen to her if they were not happy
with her job performance or if they changed her job.
At the
time, Dickson was moving into a new job – a “meet and greet”
supervisor on the concourse, a troubleshooter.
According to
DeLotell, Dickson “was the perfect candidate for that position
because that’s what she loved doing and she was very good at
that.”
DeLotell recalled having discussions “using examples
of talking about eliminating positions or changing jobs or
things like that.”
DeLotell testified:
I said things like, Hey, you know, what if we
told you you had to go out there and fly as a
supervisor five days a week and as a flight line
attendant you’d only have to work two or three,
that’s a significant enough job change, it’s not
– it does not reflect what you’re doing today.
Then you would have the right to go back to
flying.
If I told you from now on you’ve got to . . .
scrub the toilets in the ladies’ rest room, that
is a significant enough job change that you
should be able to go back to flight status.
What I’m saying to you is that you are giving up
your seniority to maintain the job that we have
described to you now and what your duties are as
a supervisor. If we change that so dramatically
that it’s not even recognizable anymore, then
that is eliminating your job.
-7-
DeLotell was asked whether she gave that speech in the
“one-on-one” meetings with the supervisors.
Although she could
not identify the particular meeting, DeLotell explained that
she gave that speech to certain individuals who had concerns
about giving up their seniority.
“I can tell you that I know
that I had those kinds of discussions with at least one or more
supervisors.”
concerns.”
DeLotell testified, “I know Nancy Dickson had
DeLotell “would say” that she had two meetings with
Dickson about the seniority issue and other discussions with her
as well.
I only know it came up. I only know she
[Dickson] was reluctant, because I could see some
of her facial expressions . . . asking me, again,
what will happen, you know, if you all don’t want
me any longer, and I have to really think about
this, and I just need to make sure I’m doing the
right thing. I can’t tell you any more than that
about the discussion.
DeLotell testified that she called Dickson after
hearing she had left Comair.
DeLotell was “very surprised” by
what had happened, because “the intent would never have been, at
least if I had been the one writing the policy, to change the
supervisors’ jobs so dramatically and then not allow them to
return to flight status.”
The Appellee, Linda Noble, senior vice president of
human resources for Comair, testified by deposition.
According
to Noble’s recollection, she attended a meeting with Dickson and
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DeLotell in August 1997, in which Dickson “said that she would
relinquish her seniority number.”
else Dickson said at that meeting.
Noble did not recall anything
Noble only recalled “that
the conversation about if a job were eliminated, you know, as a
result of downsizing, that a supervisor would be able to
recapture her seniority in that regard.”
Noble confirmed that
the policy verbalized to the supervisors in 1997 had not been
written down anyplace before December 1999.
When asked why,
Noble responded, “It’s always appropriate to have written
policies, for every company, I believe.
However, the pace which
some companies, such as Comair, operate, there are times when
there is a lag in getting policies in writing.”
Noble was asked about a meeting she had with Dickson:
Q. Do you remember learning from Nancy, in the
December 1999 meeting, why she had left her
management position and gone to the part-time
instructor position?
A. I recall that Nancy expressed a tremendous
amount of frustration. I recall that she didn’t
feel valued as a member of the management team.
Q. Do you recall that she complained that her
job functions had changed?
A. She did say that.
Q. Do you recall her giving any examples to you
of how her job functions have changed?
A. She mentioned to me a meeting that was held
with the ATS. And I believe that Nancy normally
chaired that meeting. And there was a meeting
held that she did not participate in. However,
apparently, her manager, Anna Marie Stucker, had
– had chaired the meeting. And I recall Nancy
saying to me, frustration [sic], that she didn’t
know there was a meeting and she wasn’t included.
And also I believe Nancy said that members of the
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ATS group had approached her before the meeting,
and maybe after the meeting, as well.
Q. And asked why she wasn’t there?
A. Something like that.
Q. Do you remember Nancy bringing up her prior
participation at the nine o’clock conference call
that she was no longer participating in?
A. I don’t recall that.
Q. Do you recall any specifics that she told you
as examples of her job change, other than the ATS
meeting that you just mentioned?
A. There may have been other things. I don’t
recall what they are.
Anne Marie Stucker also testified by deposition.
In
August 1999, she was promoted to in-flight manager of operations
support.
Stucker testified about her understanding of Dickson’s
various responsibilities before she [Stucker] became manager.
Stucker agreed that Dickson, as an in-flight supervisor, had
been a support person for the flight attendant group.
According
to Stucker, Dickson had been a liaison with the commissary
department, met with them regularly, and tried to resolve
issues.
Dickson had also worked with the uniform sales rep,
setting up fittings, and had supervised the liquor sales clerk.
Stucker acknowledged that in the summer of 1999, Dickson was the
only person qualified to train ATS trainers.
Dickson had also
participated in a mentoring program for the new flight
attendants.
Stucker also testified about changes in Dickson’s
responsibilities.
She explained that Dickson’s involvement in
the mentoring program ended after the manager of the employee
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services department, Joel Kuplack, decided the program should be
moved to his department.
Stucker was not aware that anyone had
informed Dickson that she would no longer be involved in the
mentoring program.
Stucker believed that Ralph Lee had made the decision
that Dickson no longer be involved in the morning conference
calls; according to Stucker, “It really didn’t fall under her
job responsibilities as a – it was an operational call.”
According to Stucker, Ralph Lee knew that Dickson had been
involved in the morning conference call up to that point.
Stucker did not know “how she [Dickson] was told she was not
doing it [anymore].”
However, Dickson stopped participating in
those calls.
Stucker was questioned about Dickson’s office being
moved upstairs.
Stucker testified that Dickson “said she just
felt uncomfortable being up on the second floor and she would
rather be downstairs by the flight attendant lounge.”
Stucker
“understood how she felt as far as not being downstairs.
When I
first moved upstairs, it was much more quiet than the
environment was downstairs. . . .”
Having reviewed the record, we believe that genuine
issues of fact exist, and conclude that the trial court’s entry
of summary judgment on Dickson’s promissory estoppel claim was
-11-
improper.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings in that regard.
Next, Dickson maintains that the trial court erred in
entering summary judgment for Appellees on her age
discrimination claim, for violation of KRS 344.040.4
In Turner
v. Pendennis Club,5 this Court held:
There are three critical sequences of occurrences
in an employment discrimination action. First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing: (1) that she is a
member of a protected class; (2) that she was
qualified for and applied for an available
position; (3) that she did not receive the job;
and (4) that the position remained open and the
employer sought other applicants. McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Next, if
plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating those four
criteria and thus establishing a prima facie case
of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a "legitimate
nondiscriminatory" reason for its action. Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
Finally, should the employer be able to provide a
"legitimate nondiscriminatory" reason for not
hiring the plaintiff, the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the "legitimate reason" propounded
4
KRS 344.040 provides:
It is an unlawful practice for an employer:
1) To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an
individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
the individual's race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age forty (40) and over, . . . .
5
19 S.W.3d 117, 119-20 (2000).
-12-
by the employer is merely a pretext to camouflage
the true discriminatory reason underlying its
actions.
In Harker v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, the
Kentucky Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Federal law has a
different standard for a summary judgment in age discrimination
cases. . . .the special rule for age discrimination summary
judgments is whether the plaintiff has proof of ‘cold hard facts
creating an inference showing age discrimination was a
determining factor’ in the discharge.”6
The Court was
“persuaded that the approach used by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals which incorporates McDonnell Douglas is applicable here.
The Sixth Circuit makes a but/for test or the equivalent of a
third stage pretext analysis without regard to whether the
initial two stages of the McDonnell Douglas test have been met.
In the absence of specific evidence of age discrimination, a
summary judgment is proper.”7
Dickson complains that Comair did not explain its
adverse employment action in its memorandum in support of
summary judgment, but waited until its reply to justify its
decision to promote Stucker.
Dickson asserts this was “patently
unfair,” depriving her of the opportunity to present rebuttal
6
Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226, 229 (1984)
7
Id., at 230.
-13-
evidence of pretext.
Dickson does not state whether she brought
the matter to the attention of the trial court.
76.12(4)(c)(v).
CR
Our review of the record does not indicate that
she moved to strike portions of Comair’s reply, or requested any
other relief, after it was filed.
Moreover, in its memorandum in support of summary
judgment, Comair mentions its decision to promote Stucker, as
well as Dickson’s testimony that she did not believe the
decision had anything to do with age at the time it was made.
As Comair notes, Ken Marshall had testified about the reason for
promoting Stucker, ten months before the motion for summary
judgment was filed.
Marshall, vice president of in-flight and
corporate safety, chose Stucker based upon her overall
performance.
Our review of the record does not show any “cold hard
facts” that age was a determining factor in Comair’s decision to
promote Stucker.
We conclude no genuine issue exists as to any
material fact and that Comair was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Dickson’s age discrimination claim.
Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of individual liability
under KRS Chapter 344.
The remaining issue is whether Dickson should have
been permitted to present her constructive discharge claim to a
jury.
According to the complaint, Dickson alleged age
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discrimination as the underpinning of her wrongful/constructive
discharge claim.
In her memorandum filed in the trial court,
Dickson states that “[t]he constructive discharge was the result
of age discrimination . . . .”
In Kentucky, an employer may discharge an at-will
employee for good cause, no cause, or one that some might view
as morally indefensible.8
The limitations to the wrongful
discharge exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine are:
1) The discharge must be contrary to a
fundamental and well-defined public policy as
evidenced by existing law.
2) That policy must be evidenced by a
constitutional or statutory provision.
3) The decision of whether the public policy
asserted meets these criteria is a question of
law for the court to decide, not a question of
fact.9
Kentucky law holds that:
[A] claim of sex discrimination would not qualify
as providing the necessary underpinning for a
wrongful discharge suit because the same statute
that enunciates the public policy prohibiting
employment discrimination because of "sex" also
provides the structure for pursuing a claim for
discriminatory acts in contravention of its
terms. See KRS Chapter 344, Civil Rights.
KRS 344.040 provides that it is "unlawful
practice for an employer ... to discharge any
individual ... because of such individual's race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, or age
between forty (40) and seventy (70)." The
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights is structured
8
9
Grzyb v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399 (1985)
Id., at 401.
-15-
in KRS Chapter 344 to adjudicate complaints of
discrimination on these grounds. Thus, the same
statute which would provide the necessary
underpinning for a wrongful discharge suit where
there is sufficient evidence to prove sex
discrimination in employment practices also
structures the remedy. The statute not only
creates the public policy but preempts the field
of its application.
We conclude that Comair was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Dickson’s constructive discharge claim.
The summary judgment of the Boone Circuit Court,
entered October 9, 2001, is reversed in part, as it relates to
Dickson’s promissory estoppel claim.
proceedings in that regard.
We remand for further
In all other respects, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert A. Klingler
Michael J. Trapp
Cincinnati, Ohio
W. Keith Noel
Paul D. Dorger
Cincinnati, Ohio
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