NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK & TRUST
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RENDERED:
January 10, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2001-CA-002291-MR
NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CI-00762
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK & TRUST
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON and JOHNSON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Northfield Insurance Company appeals from a
summary judgment granted by Laurel Circuit Court in favor of First
National Bank & Trust, in which the court denied its counter-motion
for
summary
between
the
judgment,
reserving
co-defendants
which,
decision
in
on
relevant
the
cross-claims
part,
included
Paradise Custom Yachts, Inc. and Northfield.
In October 1999, Northfield Insurance Companies, through
Northfield (a self-described surplus lines carrier), issued a
commercial insurance policy to Paradise, a houseboat manufacturer
located in London, Kentucky.
Among other provisions, the policy
provided casualty loss coverage for the building in the amount of
$580,000.00, insured the personal property and inventory up to
$1,500,000.00 and secured the replacement of business income loss
up to $250,000.00.
The policy was effective from October 1, 1999,
to October 1, 2000, originally naming Paradise as the sole insured.
First National was a secured lender to Paradise by virtue of a
series of promissory notes and security agreements between the two
parties pursuant to which First National possessed a security
interest
in
specific
personal
property
belonging
to
Paradise
including a 1999 Paradise houseboat, accounts receivable, inventory
and other items of collateral described in the agreements.
At the
time Paradise procured the commercial insurance policy at issue, it
was leasing its business premises and had been in the business of
manufacturing custom luxury houseboats for approximately one and
one-half years without maintaining fire insurance.
On October 30, 1999, a fire occurred at the business
premises of Paradise, destroying its property and inventory, the
collateral
securing
the
loans
of
First
National.
Paradise
subsequently filed a claim with Northfield under the subject policy
seeking to recover for its losses.
and investigation of the claim.
Northfield initiated a review
Public fire officials and private
fire investigators retained by Northfield independently determined
that the fire was incendiary in nature.
In support of its claim, Paradise provided a sworn
statement in proof loss as required by the policy on December 8,
1999, denying any involvement in the fire and making a claim of
$580,000.00 for the building, $575,202.00 for its contents and
$250,000.00 for lost business income.
-2-
At the conclusion of an
extensive investigation into the circumstances surrounding the fire
and the resulting claim, Northfield determined that Paradise, or
someone acting on its behalf, had both motive and opportunity to
set the fire, ultimately denying coverage based on the conclusion
that
either
intentionally
Paradise,
caused
the
or
someone
fire
in
acting
an
attempt
on
its
to
behalf,
collect
the
insurance proceeds.
In December 1999, more than one month after the subject
fire loss, Paradise allegedly contacted Rob Hoenscheid, its local
insurance agent, at Roeding Lexington Insurance Agency, to request
that Northfield amend its policy to name First National as a
mortgagee/loss payee and the City and County Industrial Development
Authority as an additional insured, further requesting that the
endorsement be retroactive, effective October 1, 1999.
in
turn,
contacted
Mark
Melbostad,
concerning the requested endorsement.
a
Northfield
Hoenscheid,
underwriter,
Melbostad then contacted
Northfield’s general agent, Swett & Crawford, seeking additional
information regarding the request.
In a letter dated December 14, 1999, Donna Jahn of Swett
& Crawford asked Northfield to amend the policy as requested.
Although Melbostad Arequested that an endorsement be prepared on
December 16, [1999,] and forwarded to [Northfield’s] broker at
Swett & Crawford, Swett was instructed to hold [the endorsement]@
while Melbostad investigated the relationship of First National and
CCIDA to Paradise.
Upon obtaining further information concerning
the nature of the relationship between First National and Paradise,
Melbostad
directed
Swett
&
Crawford
-3-
to
return
the
original
endorsement to him along with any copies.
On June 26, 2000, Swett
& Crawford complied with this directive.
In an affidavit of
February 1, 2001, attached to Northfield’s counter-motion for
summary judgment, Melbostad testified as to the foregoing sequence
of events, confirming that A[t]o date, the endorsement has not been
issued to Paradise, First National or CCIDA.@
However, on or
around March 27, 2000, Swett & Crawford, via Hoenscheid, issued a
document entitled AEvidence of Property Insurance@ to Paradise,
allegedly without authorization from Northfield, identifying First
National as an additional insured under the policy at issue.
Northfield later sent a notice of cancellation to First National on
two separate occasions, the first on April 5, 2000, indicating that
the policy would be canceled effective June 24, 2000, due to a
Achange of risk which substantially increases any hazard insured
against, after coverage has been issued,@ and the second on April
26, 2000, indicating that the policy would be canceled effective
May 11, 2000, due to non-payment of premium with the final notice
Asupersed[ing] previous notice sent.@
Both cancellation notices
were signed by Melbostad.
On
June
5,
2000,
Northfield
filed
a
AComplaint
for
Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief@1 against Paradise in the
1
As alleged by First National and conceded by Northfield,
the copy of the policy attached to this pleading as an exhibit
included a copy of the subject endorsement which Paradise
requested but Northfield denies issuing as well as a letter
authored by Northfield’s associate corporate counsel directed to
its local counsel referring to the enclosed copy as Acomplete.@
However, Northfield has consistently maintained that the
endorsement was attached due to clerical error, the endorsement was
never incorporated into the policy and the copy of the policy in
question does not represent a Atrue and accurate@ copy of the policy
(continued...)
-4-
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
London Division, alleging that Paradise breached the provision of
its policy relating to Aconcealment, misrepresentation or fraud@ and
is
therefore
entitled
to
no
compensation
under
the
policy.
Further, Northfield requested the District Court to construe the
policy accordingly, declare the policy void and award Northfield
such other relief as deemed Aequitable and just,@ including costs
and attorneys’ fees.
Paradise filed a counterclaim seeking a
declaration of policy rights in its favor and alleging causes of
action for breach of contract, statutory and common law bad faith,
defamation and fraud.
First National was not named as a party to
the action.
On September 1, 2000, First National initiated an action
against Paradise, its owners and Northfield in Laurel Circuit
Court.
In its complaint, First National sought enforcement of its
rights as a secured lender against Paradise and its owners who had
executed personal guaranties to First National in order Ato induce
[First National] to extend credit to Paradise.@
Relying on the
purported endorsement naming it as a mortgagee/loss payee, First
National alleged that Northfield was obligated to satisfy the
indebtedness of Paradise, claiming entitlement to Aa sum of money
as damages for the value of [First National’s] collateral destroyed
by fire and covered by said insurance policy, less salvage.@
1
(...continued)
in effect on the date of the loss at issue.
First National
counters by arguing that Northfield’s actions should constitute a
Ajudicial admission,@ that this admission operates to preclude
Northfield from denying the issuance of the endorsement and/or that
waiver and equitable estoppel apply leading to the same result.
-5-
In a AMemorandum Opinion and Order@ entered on December
4, 2000, the District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
Northfield’s declaratory judgment action, dismissing the action
without prejudice as the action involving Northfield and Paradise
was
pending
in
circuit
court,
the
proper
forum
in
which
to
determine the rights of both parties under the policy in question,
particularly since the insured’s mortgagee, i. e., First National,
was also a party to that action.
Northfield appealed this dismissal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
At the time briefs were
filed in the instant appeal, oral arguments in the case were
scheduled for July 2002.
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the District Court from the bench.2
With respect to the circuit court action, First National
filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit from
its vice-president, Jerry Dotson, which essentially echoed its
complaint.
In response, Northfield filed its own motion for
summary judgment, disputing First National’s contention that it was
an insured under the subject policy because the endorsement being
relied upon was never issued as revealed by the affidavit of
Melbostad filed in support of its position.
In the alternative,
Northfield argued that the express terms of the endorsement did not
afford any coverage to First National since it was not classified
as a mortgagee.
2
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Civil Action No. 01-5023.
-6-
In the summary judgment entered on August 29, 2000, the
circuit court found that Northfield Aissued a policy covering fire
loss to [Paradise], which policy had an endorsement naming First
National [] as a mortgagee, effective October 1, 1999[,]@ and,
further, that the policy provided coverage for First National Aas
a loss payee by virtue of being designated a creditor whose
interest in Covered Property is established by financing statements
or security agreements@ and that said loans were Acovered by such
lien documents.@
The court found that Northfield sent notices of
cancellation to First National on two separate occasions, AFirst
National
having
cancellations.@
been
named
as
Mortgagee/Loss
Payee
in
such
Based on these findings3 and others regarding the
existence and amounts of the notes due to First National, the court
concluded that the Apolicy issued by [Northfield] covered First
National’s collateral, the subject of the loans mentioned herein by
virtue of the mortgagee/loss payee endorsement and provisions of
such policy@ and that Northfield
canceled its coverage of First
National with the notices of May 11, 2000, and June 24, 2000,
received by First National.
Northfield
Acovered
such
Accordingly, the policy issued by
collateral
when
the
houseboats
and
inventory were destroyed by fire on October 30, 1999.@
3
Although the circuit court purports to make findings of
fact, such findings are inappropriate in the context of a summary
judgment. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must refrain from deciding issues of fact, simply examining the
evidence to determine if a genuine issue as to any material fact
exists. Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 56.03. Here, the court apparently
determined that no genuine issue existed as to these material facts
which it presumably set forth to clarify the basis for its decision
in order to assist with the review process.
-7-
Consistent with the foregoing, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of First National, holding Paradise, its owners
and Northfield jointly and severally liable for the sums due under
the notes plus interest and late charges and awarding First
National
ownership
of
the
receivable and inventory.
1999
Paradise
houseboat,
accounts
Further, the court denied Northfield’s
counter-motion for summary judgment and reserved the remaining
cross-claims
between
the
co-defendants
for
future
decision.
Northfield filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the summary
judgment which the court denied following a hearing on October 5,
2001.
Northfield now appeals from the summary judgment in favor of
First National and the order denying its motion to motion to alter,
amend or vacate said judgment.
On appeal, Northfield’s argument is threefold:
I.
Material issues of fact exist regarding issuance of
a policy endorsement adding First National to the policy
precludes entry of summary judgment in the Bank’s favor.
* * *
II.
The
subject
endorsement
does
not
provide
the
coverage claimed by First National in any event.
* * *
III.
Through proper application of the policy language
in the subject endorsement, Northfield is entitled to
summary judgment on First National’s claim.
In
response,
First
National
follows:
-8-
frames
its
argument
as
I.
First National’s interest in the insurance proceeds
at issue is evidenced by the plain language of the
insurance policy and clearly within the Afour corners@ of
the documentation of record, which cannot subsequently be
refuted by unreliable parole evidence in the face of a
motion
for
summary
judgment.
[In
this
vein,
First
National further claims that the Melbostad affidavit is
irrelevant because Kentucky law provides First National
with a right to recover even in the absence of an
endorsement.]
* * *
II.
Northfield waived any right to refute, and was
estopped from refuting, the loss endorsement.
* * *
III.
Northfield’s
insurance
policy
is
internally
ambiguous, using the words Amortgagee@ and Aloss payee@
interchangeably, and thus the endorsement constitutes a
Astandard mortgagee@ endorsement requiring payment to
First National regardless of any defenses to coverage
available against Paradise, the insured.
* * *
IV.
Northfield’s [a]ppeal must be dismissed due to its
failure
to
include
[d]efendant
Paradise
as
an
[i]ndispensable party [a]ppellee.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03 authorizes
summary
judgment
Aif
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together
-9-
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is not a genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.@
Summary judgment is only proper
Awhere the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail
under any circumstances.@4 However, Aa party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat that motion without
presenting at least some affirmative evidence demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.@5
In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court must
view the record Ain a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved
in his favor.@6
On appeal from a summary judgment, we must determine
Awhether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.@7
findings
required.8
are
at
issue,
deference
to
the
Since no factual
trial
court
is
not
Although Northfield appeals from the summary judgment
granted in favor of First National, it is likewise appealing from
the denial of its own motion for summary judgment.
Under CR 56.03
the general rule is that such a denial is, Afirst, not appealable
4
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991), reaffirming Paintsville Hospital Co. v.
Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
5
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992).
6
Steelvest, supra, n. 4, at 480.
7
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
8
Id.
-10-
because of its interlocutory nature and, second, is not reviewable
on appeal from a final judgment where the question is whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact.@9
However, there is an
exception to the general rule which applies when, as is the case
here, the following criteria are met: A(1) the facts are not in
dispute, (2) the only basis of the ruling is a matter of law, (3)
there is a denial of the motion, and (4) there is an entry of a
final judgment with an appeal therefrom.@10
Applying these governing principles to the instant case,
our analysis must necessarily begin with a review of the pleadings
and proof of record in order to answer the dispositive question of
whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact presented
by the evidence of record.
More specifically, the inquiry becomes
whether Northfield did in fact issue the endorsement at the center
of the present dispute as resolution of the remaining issues hinges
on the answer to this determinative question.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, First
National relied solely upon its complaint, brief and the affidavit
and
deposition
authorized
testimony
representative.
of
Dotson,
its
Similarly,
vice-president
Northfield’s
and
evidence
consists solely of the affidavit and deposition testimony of its
underwriter, Melbostad, submitted in conjunction with its answer
and counterclaim.
Dotson’s testimony essentially serves to confirm
the existence of the debt owed to it by Paradise, providing a time
9
Commonwealth
of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet,
Bureau of Highways v. Leneave, Ky. App., 751 S.W.2d 36, 37 (1988).
10
Id.
-11-
line complete with an itemization of each note and a description of
its terms.
Beyond that, Dotson’s testimony merely highlights the
relevant facts relating to First National’s demand for payment from
Northfield as summarized in its complaint.
Melbostad’s
testimony,
on
the
other
hand,
directly
refutes the effectiveness of the endorsement, acknowledging that he
requested the endorsement and it was subsequently prepared, but
specifically denying that it was ever issued.
Here, First National places much emphasis on the alleged
inconsistencies between the evidence and arguments of Northfield
before the United States District Court and this Court, arguing
that the summary judgment in its favor must be upheld on the basis
of waiver and estoppel as Northfield Adeliberately omitted First
National as a party to that action,@ Aobviously embark[ing] upon a
strategy to separate the adjudication of rights in the policy as
between the insured and the loss payees.@
Northfield’s
actions
in
attaching
the
In its estimation,
version
of
the
policy
encompassing the prepared endorsement to its complaint in the
declaratory judgment action which was then incorporated into its
answer to First National’s complaint and Paradise’s cross-claim in
circuit court, Ahad the effect of waiving or dispensing with the
necessity of the insureds producing evidence of what constitutes
the insurance policy@ and Northfield is now barred from disputing
the validity of the version it previously asserted was correct.
Alternatively, First National contends that judicial
estoppel applies on the current facts since the Aelement of suit
between the same parties@ is met because First National Ashould have
-12-
been a party@ to the U.S. District Court action.
Again relying on
Northfield’s representation to the U.S. District Court which was
allegedly incorporated into the circuit court pleadings and is
therefore properly before this Court, First National asserts that
Northfield’s conduct constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to
AFor
claim that Melbostad did not intend to issue the endorsement.
this Court’s convenience,@ First National attached copies of the
parties’ briefs filed in the Sixth Circuit proceeding to its brief
here, attempting to incorporate the documents by reference.
In short, this argument is based on a faulty premise,
i.e., that the pleadings, orders, etc., from the District Court and
Sixth Circuit actions were authenticated below and can therefore be
properly considered as evidence of record for purposes of review.
In making this assumption, First National has neglected to comply
with Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 901, which, in relevant part,
provides:
A(a)
authentication
General
or
provision.
identification
as
The
a
requirement
condition
of
precedent
to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.@
Subsection (b) of this rule contains an illustrative list of
acceptable methods by which to satisfy this threshold requirement.
First National made no attempt to authenticate any of the
documents relating to either the U.S. District Court action or its
appeal to the Sixth Circuit during the proceedings below, instead
attaching the complaint, etc., upon which it relies so heavily to
its
pleadings
and
labeling
them
as
exhibits
rather
than
authenticating them via affidavit, interrogatory or comparable
-13-
means, just as it attached copies of the parties’ briefs from the
Sixth Circuit action to its brief here.
Although the examples in
KRE 901(b) are A[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation,@ the necessary implication is that some method must be
utilized
to
verify
the
authenticity
of
condition precedent to their admissibility.
such
documents
as
a
Even assuming arguendo
that the documents in question could accurately be described as
self-authenticating,
certification
as
defined
in
KRE
902
is
required and is equally lacking.
Presumably, First National is implicitly arguing that
this Court should take judicial notice of these related proceedings
and the pleadings, etc., generated therefrom pursuant to KRE 201.
This we cannot do.
Because First National failed to take the
necessary steps below to authenticate the purported evidence, i.e.,
the complaint in the U.S. District Court action to which Northfield
attached a copy of the insurance policy containing the endorsement,
etc., it stands to reason that said evidence is not of record on
appeal and, therefore, we are precluded from considering this
extraneous information.
In other words, there is no proof that the
documents in question were attached to the filings in the federal
action and in the present context, our review is limited to the
Apleadings . . . .@
That
being
the
case,
Melbostad’s
affidavit
stands
unrefuted with the necessary conclusion being that no genuine issue
as to any material fact exists regarding whether the endorsement
was issued.
Accordingly, we look to the literal language of the
policy as initially written.
There is no allegation that the
-14-
original policy provided coverage for First National.
In the
absence of the endorsement, then, no credible argument can be made
that First National is entitled to coverage under the express terms
of the policy.
law.
Northfield is entitled to judgment as a matter of
This determination renders moot the issue of whether the
terms of the disputed endorsement encompass the type of loss
sustained by First National.
Allowing for this possibility, First National also claims
that it is entitled to recover even if we accept Melbostad’s
affidavit as true because it had an equitable lien on the insurance
proceeds
by
virtue
of
its
agreement
with
Paradise
requiring
Paradise to procure and maintain property insurance with coverage
for its personal property collateral.
In so arguing, First
National relies on Castle Ins. Co. v. Vanover,11 in which this Court
established that a creditor has an insurable interest and equitable
lien
in
insurance
proceeds
even
in
the
absence
of
express
contractual provisions.
Citing the majority rule as recited in Northwestern Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. of Minneapolis v. New York Life Ins. Co.,12 we
held that A[i]n situations where the mortgagor agrees to insure the
property for the benefit of the mortgagee, but fails to do so, an
equitable lien is created on the insurance proceeds for the benefit
of
the
mortgagee
to
the
extent
of
its
insurable
interest.@13
Clearly, First National is correct in its assertion that this
11
Ky. App., 993 S.W.2d 509, 510 (1999).
12
238 Ky. 229, 37 S.W.2d 67 (1931)
13
Castle, supra, n. 10, at 511.
-15-
reasoning applies on the instant facts which is favorable to its
position
as
far
as
it
goes.
What
First
National
fails
to
recognize, however, is that its right to recover is still dependent
on the success of Paradise’s claim with Northfield, the merits of
which have not yet been addressed and are questionable.
Given our
determination as to the validity of the endorsement, First National
is not a loss payee.
Thus, it has only a derivative right to
recover, a right which can not be assessed until the pending claim
between Paradise and Northfield is fully adjudicated.
First National’s remaining argument is that A[p]roper
interpretation of the parties’ relationships as defined by the
subject
casualty
insurance
policy
show
that
Paradise
is
an
indispensable party to this action and the appeal, because, in
Paradise’s absence, complete relief cannot be afforded to First
National or Northfield . . . .@
Citing CR 19.01, First National
alleges that failure to name Paradise as a party will impair the
ability of Paradise to protect its interests as an insured under
the policy and leave all of the parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring inconsistent obligations.
is
indisputably
an
interested
party
but
We disagree.
cannot
Paradise
properly
be
categorized as indispensable.
As previously mentioned, the circuit court explicitly
reserved the claims between the co-defendants, i.e., Paradise (and
its owners) and Northfield for future decision.
While disposing of
the case in its entirety would have arguably been more efficient,
the fact remains that the court chose a different approach.
Reversal of the summary judgment in favor of First National and
-16-
against Northfield has no direct effect on the outcome of those
claims
under
any
possible
scenario.
If
Paradise
ultimately
prevails on its claim by demonstrating that the subject fire was
not the result of arson, it will receive full coverage pursuant to
its policy with Northfield, irrespective of the disposition here.
Likewise, even if we had reached the issue of whether First
National has a direct right of recovery under the terms of the
endorsement and found in favor of Northfield on the merits, the
rights of Paradise would have been unaffected.
To summarize, given
the nature of the relief sought by Northfield on appeal, we find no
error in the omission of Paradise at this stage of the litigation.14
Because the uncontradicted evidence of record reflects
that the endorsement at the heart of this controversy was prepared
but never issued and First National is not entitled to coverage
under the express terms of the policy, First National Acould not
prevail under any circumstances.@
Thus, the circuit court erred by
granting summary judgment in favor of First National and denying
Northfield’s motion for the same relief.
To the contrary, a review
of the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any
material
fact
in
this
regard,
conclusively
resolving
this
dispositive legal question in favor of Northfield rather than First
National.
Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed and this
case is remanded to Laurel Circuit Court with directions to grant
summary judgment in favor of Northfield.
ALL CONCUR.
14
See Braden v. Republic-Vanguard Life Ins. Co., Ky., 657
S.W.2d 241 (1983).
-17-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Todd. S. Page
STOLL, KEENON & PARK, LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
David R. Schott
London, Kentucky
Kathryn Warnecke
WISE, WARNECKE & WISE
Lexington, Kentucky
-18-
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