ROBERT HAYDEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 16, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002287-MR
ROBERT HAYDEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00371
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS AND DYCHE, JUDGES; AND POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE.1
POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Robert Hayden appeals from an order of
the Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (RCr)
11.42.
Hayden contends that he is entitled to have his
convictions for murder and second-degree assault vacated because
he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
For the
reasons stated below we affirm.
1
Senior Status Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution.
On August 7, 1998, Hayden was indicted for murder,
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 507.020, and attempted murder,
KRS 507.020 and KRS 506.010.
The charges resulted from the
allegation that on May 30, 1998, Hayden caused the death of
Girard Crosby by stabbing him to death, and that he attempted to
cause the death of Jamie Crosby, Hayden’s girlfriend and Girard
Crosby’s ex-wife, by attempting to stab her to death.
Following a jury trial Hayden was found guilty of
Murder and second-degree assault.
The jury recommended
sentences of 30 years and 10 years, respectively, to run
consecutively.
denied.
Hayden filed a motion for a new trial, which was
On May 7, 1999, the trial court entered final judgment
and sentence consistent with the jury verdict and sentencing
recommendation.
On August 24, 2000, the Kentucky Supreme Court
rendered an opinion affirming Hayden’s conviction and sentence.
On August 21, 2001, Hayden filed a pro se motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On October 8,
2001, the trial court entered an order denying the motion.
This
appeal followed.
Hayden contends that, for various reasons, he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In order to prevail in an
RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant must first allege in the motion
specific facts that if true would entitle him to relief.
11.42(2).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
RCr
-2-
counsel, the movant must satisfy a two-part test showing: (1)
that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the
deficiency resulted in actual prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
(1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed.
2d 724 (1986).
Unless the movant makes both showings, he cannot
prevail. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
The
specific facts alleged in the motion must show that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient and that absent the errors
by trial counsel there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have reached a different result.
Ky. 63 S.W. 3d 175, 177 (2001).
Norton v. Commonwealth,
The burden of proof is upon the
movant to show that he was not adequately represented by trial
counsel. Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878, 879
(1969).
In determining whether counsel was ineffective, a
reviewing court must be highly deferential in scrutinizing
counsel's performance, and the tendency and temptation to
second-guess must be avoided.
S.W.2d 311, 315 (1998).
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978
We must look to the particular facts of
each case and determine whether the acts or omissions were
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Id.
For a motion to be denied without a hearing the record must
-3-
conclusively disprove the movant’s allegations or otherwise
prove that he is not entitled to relief.
Fraser v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W. 3d 448, 452 (2001).
Hayden’s first allegation of ineffective assistance is
that trial counsel, after securing an instruction for extreme
emotional disturbance (EED), conceded in closing arguments that
EED was not applicable under the facts of this case.
During
closing arguments, trial counsel referred to the EED instruction
and then made the statement, “I don’t believe that that was what
happened.
I don’t think anyone here is to argue that.”
While an EED jury instruction to the murder charge was
given, a review of the trial discloses that Hayden’s principal,
if not only, defense was self-protection.
Hayden took the
stand, admitted that he stabbed Girard Crosby to death, but
alleged that he did so because he felt he was in a lifethreatening situation.
As noted by the Supreme Court in its
opinion in the direct appeal “neither the Commonwealth nor
Appellant argued extreme emotional disturbance at trial.
Appellant relied on a self-defense justification.”
Hayden v.
Commonwealth, 1999-SC-0472-MR, Slip Op. at 2 – 3.
It is not the function of this Court to usurp or
second-guess counsel’s trial strategy.
Ky. 23 S.W.3d 619, 624 (2000).
Baze v. Commonwealth,
Further, it is well settled that
judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
-4-
deferential.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Because of the difficulties inherent in making a fair assessment
of attorney performance, "a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ "
Strickland, 466 U .S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v.
Pelfrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
Based upon the evidence as developed through the trial
testimony, including Hayden’s testimony, it was a legitimate
trial strategy for trial counsel to emphasize self-protection as
Hayden’s principal defense.
As part of this strategy, it was
proper for trial counsel to de-emphasize the EED instruction for
the purpose of directing the jury’s attention to the selfprotection evidence.
Because trial counsel’s statements in
closing arguments amounted to legitimate trial strategy, there
was not ineffective assistance of counsel.
Next, Hayden contends that he received ineffective
assistance because trial counsel nullified the EED defense in
closing arguments without his consent.
This argument is merely a rehash of the preceding
argument, and we will not provide additional discussion of trial
counsel’s comments concerning EED during his closing argument
-5-
except to clarify that it was not necessary under the Strickland
standards for trial counsel to consult with Hayden prior to
pursuing this trial strategy.
Next, Hayden contends that he received ineffective
assistance because trial counsel failed to secure an expert
witness to review the blood evidence, the collection of the
blood evidence, and the testing of the blood evidence.
The movant in an 11.42 motion must allege the grounds
for relief with particularity.
He must “state specifically the
grounds on which his sentence is being challenged and the facts
on which [he] relies.”
RCr 11.42(2); Stanford v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742, 748 (1993).
Here, Hayden has made no
attempt to show that an expert even exists who could establish
factors relative to the blood evidence favorable to his defense.
Conclusory allegations which are not supported by specific facts
do not justify post-conviction relief under RCr 11.42.
at 385.
Sanders
Further, RCr 11.42 is not intended to serve the
function of a discovery deposition.
Id.
Hayden’s allegation
that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to hire a
blood evidence expert is without merit.
Next, Hayden contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move for dismissal of the charges at
the conclusion of the evidence.
-6-
We construe this argument to allege that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict at
the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case and the defense case.
Neither party provides us with the proper citations to the
videotape trial; however, Hayden was not entitled to a directed
verdict at the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence of
either the Commonwealth’s case or the defense case; so, even if
this allegation is true, he was not prejudiced by the deficient
performance.
Next, Hayden contends that trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to object to the presentation of
additional proof by the Commonwealth after it had announced
closed.
A review of the videotape citations supplied by Hayden
discloses that the questions about which Hayden makes complaint
were not asked after the Commonwealth announced closed.
The
record does reflect that at the conclusion of the proceedings on
March 23, 1999, the Commonwealth passed a witness to the defense
for questioning, but questioning by the defense did not commence
that day.
The following morning, at the commencement of the
proceedings, the Commonwealth was permitted to ask a few
additional questions concerning whether Hayden was right-handed
or left-handed.
Similarly, the Commonwealth passed a witness to
the defense for questioning just prior to the lunch break on
-7-
March 24, 1999, but defense counsel did not commence questioning
of the witness prior to lunch.
When proceedings resumed after
lunch, the Commonwealth was permitted to ask a few additional
questions of the witness concerning whether anyone other than
Hayden and the two victims had been at the residence and whether
the kitchen door worked properly.
Trial counsel’s acquiescence in permitting the
Commonwealth to wind-up its direct examination of the witnesses
was, in our estimation, a courtesy rather than deficient
performance.
Moreover, there is not a reasonable likelihood the
result of the trial would have been different if trial counsel
had objected, and Hayden was not prejudiced by the additional
questioning.
Next, Hayden contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to call the lead detective as a witness.
Hayden has failed to allege facts regarding how he was
prejudiced by the failure to call the lead detective.
He
identifies no exculpatory evidence the detective may have
testified to, or any other advantage associated with calling the
detective.
"Decisions relating to witness selection are
normally left to counsel's judgment and this judgment will not
be second-guessed by hindsight."
S.W.3d 878, 885 (2000) (quoting
Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17
Fretwell v. Norris, 133 F.3d
621, 627 (8th Cir. 1998))
-8-
In the absence of specific allegations regarding the
prejudice Hayden suffered by trial counsel’s failure to call the
lead detective, this allegation of ineffective assistance is
without merit.
Next, Hayden contends that if the individual
allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient for postconviction relief then the cumulative effect of the errors in
performance entitles him to relief.
Defense counsel was not ineffective as a result of
cumulative error.
In view of the fact that the individual
allegations have no merit, they can have no cumulative value.
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (1986).
Next, Hayden contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motion in the absence of a response to his motion by
the Commonwealth.
In reviewing an RCr 11.42 motion, first, the trial
judge must examine the motion to see if it is properly signed
and verified and whether it specifies grounds and supporting
facts that, if true, would warrant relief.
may be summarily dismissed.
If not, the motion
Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59
S.W.3d 448, 452 (2001) (citing Odewahn v. Ropke, Ky., 385 S.W.2d
163, 164 (1964)).
As disclosed by our discussion of the
individual issues in this case, above, Hayden’s motion did not
specify grounds and supporting facts that would warrant relief,
-9-
and it was proper for the trial court to summarily dismiss the
motion without a response from the Commonwealth.
Finally, Hayden contends that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his motion.
A hearing is required only if there is a material
issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e.,
conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the
record.
Id. (citing
Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d
742, 743-44 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S.Ct. 703,
126 L.Ed.2d 669 (1994) and Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411
S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967)).
In this case there were no material issues of fact
which could not be conclusively resolved by the record, and an
evidentiary hearing was not required.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert Hayden, pro se
Eastern Kentucky Correctional
Complex
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.