AND ROBERT E. BANKS v. CHARLES MARCUM; JAMES GARRISON; OSCAR G. HOUSE; SHERRIE HOUSE; ANNA JACKSON; ED JORDAN; CLAY M. BISHOP, JR.; CLINT HARRIS; CLAY COUNTY FISCAL COURT; AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002269-MR
AND
NO. 2001-CA-002270-MR
ROBERT E. BANKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CI-00221 AND 01-CI-00222
CHARLES MARCUM; JAMES GARRISON;
OSCAR G. HOUSE; SHERRIE HOUSE; ANNA JACKSON;
ED JORDAN; CLAY M. BISHOP, JR.;
CLINT HARRIS; CLAY COUNTY FISCAL COURT;
AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Robert E. Banks has appealed, pro se, from two
separate orders of the Clay Circuit Court entered on October 5,
2001, which dismissed both of Banks’s complaints against the
named defendants.
Having concluded that the trial court did not
err in dismissing either of Banks’s complaints, we affirm.
On May 15, 2001, Banks was arrested and charged with
flagrant nonsupport in violation of KRS1 530.050.2
According to
Anna Jackson, an employee of the Cabinet for Families and
Children, Child Support Division (the Cabinet), Banks had
persistently failed to make his child support payments and his
arrearages had grown to $2,060.00.
Banks spent one night in the
Clay County Jail and was released on May 16, 2001, after he pled
guilty to nonsupport3 and was sentenced to six months in jail by
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Flagrant non-support is a Class D felony.
KRS 530.050 reads in part:
(2) A person is guilty of flagrant nonsupport when he persistently
fails to provide support which he can reasonably provide and which he
knows he has a duty to provide by virtue of a court or administrative
order to a minor or to a child adjudged mentally disabled, indigent
spouse or indigent parent and the failure results in:
(a) An arrearage of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000)[.]
3
Nonsupport is a Class A misdemeanor.
(1)
KRS 530.050 further states:
A person is guilty of nonsupport:
(a) When he persistently fails to provide support
which he can reasonably provide and which he knows he
has a duty to provide to a minor or to a child
adjudged mentally disabled, indigent spouse or
indigent parent; or
(b) Upon a finding that a defendant obligor, subject
to court order to pay any amount for the support of a
minor child, is delinquent in meeting the full
obligation established by such order and has been so
delinquent for a period of at least two (2) months
duration.
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the Clay District Court.4
On June 15, 2001, Banks, once again acting pro se,
filed two separate complaints in the Clay Circuit Court.5
In the
first action, case number 01-CI-00221, Banks claimed that he had
been subjected to “[d]iscrimination, unlawful detainment, cruel
and unusual punishment, false arrest, [and] excessive bail.”
Banks named as defendants Clay County Jailer Charles Marcum,
Clay County Judge-Executive James Garrison, Clay County Sheriff
Ed Jordan, Clay County Attorney Clay Bishop, Jr., Assistant Clay
County Attorney Clinton Harris, Clay District Judge Oscar G.
House, Anna Jackson, the Clay County Fiscal Court, and Sherrie
House, another employee of the Cabinet and the wife of Judge
House.
Banks sought $4.5 million in damages in this complaint.
In the second action, case number 01-CI-00222, Banks
claimed that the “Kentucky Child Support Enforcement Law” was
unconstitutional on two grounds:
(1) that it “was way too
broad”; and (2) that it was a violation of the Contracts Clause
of the United States Constitution.6
The Cabinet was named as the
sole defendant in this second complaint.
4
Banks was also ordered to make continuing payments of $75.00 per month,
$60.00 of which was to go toward child support and $15.00 of which was to go
toward arrearages.
5
Banks has acted without the assistance of counsel throughout the entirety of
these civil proceedings.
6
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl 1.
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On September 14, 2001, the trial court, sua sponte,
scheduled a status conference for both of Banks’s complaints.
All of the named defendants in both complaints moved the trial
court to dismiss Banks’s claims against them.
On October 5,
2001, the trial court entered two separate orders dismissing
each of Bank’s claims against all of the named defendants.
This
appeal followed.
We first address Banks’s claim that the trial court
erred by dismissing his complaint against the Cabinet.
While
Banks’s brief to this Court is very difficult to understand,
from our reading we discern seven arguments in support of his
claim that the trial court erred: (1) that his children should
be eligible for K-CHIP;7 (2) that such eligibility should relieve
him of the obligation to pay $60.00 per month in child support;
(3) that KRS 205.9928 is unconstitutionally vague; (4) that
forcing him to pay $60.00 per month in child support and $15.00
per month in arrearages amounts to double jeopardy; (5) that
placing an unemployed person in jail for nonsupport is
unconstitutional; (6) that his child support payments should
7
K-CHIP is an acronym for Kentucky Children’s Health Insurance Program, which
provides medical coverage and various child care services for the children of
low income families.
8
KRS 205.992 provides penalties for child support recovery offenses:
Any person violating the provisions of KRS 205.785
shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars
($500) or be imprisoned in the county jail for not
more than one (1) year, or both.
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have been held in abeyance until his “questions of
constitutional law [are] answered;” and (7) that a person should
not be jailed for non-payment of child support until a
“financial hearing” can be held.
We first note that Banks has cited no authority
whatsoever in support of any of these propositions.
Moreover,
all of these issues were either not raised before the trial
court or were raised but not decided.
Therefore, we will not
consider these arguments for the first time on appeal.9
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Banks’s
complaint against the Cabinet.
We now turn to Banks’s claim that the trial court
erred by dismissing his complaint against the Clay County Fiscal
Court, and the various Clay County officials and county
employees.
First, as for Banks’s claims against the Clay County
Fiscal Court, it is well-settled that a county government,
absent a waiver, enjoys the same immunity from suit as the
9
See Abuzant v. Shelter Insurance Co., Ky.App., 977 S.W.2d 259, 262 (1998)
(quoting Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Dept. of Highways v. Taub,
Ky., 766 S.W.2d 49 (1988)(holding that an issue not presented to the trial
court would not be considered for the first time on appeal); and Gailor v.
Alsabi, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 597, 602 (1999)(holding that “‘[w]e will not address
issues raised but not decided by the Court below. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that issues raised on appeal but not decided will be treated as
settled against the appellant in that court upon subsequent appeals unless
the issue is preserved by cross-motion for discretionary review’”))).
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state.10
Since there is no evidence of waiver, the dismissal of
Banks’s claims against the Clay County Fiscal Court is affirmed.
Next, Banks testified in his deposition that he was
suing Clay County Judge-Executive James Garrison in his official
capacity.
A suit against a member of the fiscal court in his
official or representative capacity is essentially a suit
against the county, which is barred by sovereign immunity.11
Moreover, Banks has admitted that he knows of nothing that Judge
Garrison may have done to violate any of his rights.
Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of Banks’s claims
against Judge Garrison is affirmed.
Banks also filed suit against Clay County Jailer
Charles Marcum, claiming that Jailer Marcum violated his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Once again, it
appears as though Banks sued Jailer Marcum in his official
capacity.
To the extent this is so, Banks’s claims are barred
since Jailer Marcum is cloaked with the county’s sovereign
immunity.12
Nonetheless, Banks’s assertion that he was subjected
10
Franklin County v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195, 203 (1997), overruled in
part on other grounds, Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 65 S.W.3d 510 (2001).
11
Id. at 201.
12
Commonwealth, Board of Claims v. Harris, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 896, 899
(2001)(holding that “official capacity claims [against jailers] are in
essence claims alleging negligent operation of the jail and are, therefore,
claims against the county. . . . This cloaks the jailer, in his official
capacity, with the county's sovereign immunity” [citations omitted]).
-6-
to cruel and unusual punishment when he was forced to sleep on
the floor of the Clay County Jail for one night is plainly
without merit.
Banks admitted that he was provided with a
mattress and a blanket.
Obviously, this treatment does not rise
to the level of shocking the general conscience or violating
principles of fundamental fairness.13
Therefore, we affirm the
trial court’s dismissal of Banks’s claims against Jailer Marcum.
Banks further named Clay County Sheriff Ed Jordan as a
defendant.
Once again, to the extent Banks has sued Sheriff
Jordan in his official capacity, Banks’s claims are barred by
the doctrine of official and/or sovereign immunity.14
Further,
Banks stated at the status conference that his sole reason for
naming Sheriff Jordan as a defendant in his complaint was the
fact that Sheriff Jordan called to inform him that a warrant had
been issued for his arrest, and that it would be best if Banks
turned himself in.
Hence, Banks has failed to state a claim for
which relief can be granted.15
Accordingly, the trial court’s
dismissal of Banks’s claims against Sheriff Jordan is affirmed.
13
Workman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (1968).
14
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521 (stating that “[o]fficial immunity can be
absolute, as when an officer or employee of the state is sued in his/her
representative capacity, in which event his/her actions are included under
the umbrella of sovereign immunity. . .”).
15
See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.03.
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Banks also brought suit against Clay County Attorney
Clay Bishop, Jr.
Banks stated at the status conference that the
sole basis for his claims against Bishop was the fact that
Bishop made a recommendation to Judge House regarding the
appropriate bond for Banks.
This conduct on Bishop’s part falls
squarely within the scope of his authority as Clay County
Attorney.
suit.16
As such, Bishop is entitled to absolute immunity from
Therefore, the trial court’s dismissal of Banks’s claims
against Bishop is affirmed.
Banks further asserted a claim against Clay County
District Judge Oscar House.
According to Banks, since Sherrie
House, Judge House’s wife, was the complainant against Banks in
his arrest warrant, Judge House exhibited bias toward Banks in
issuing his arrest warrant.
incorrect on the facts.
We first note that Banks is simply
It was Anna Jackson, and not Sherrie
House, who is listed as the affiant on Banks’s arrest warrant.
Nonetheless, Judge House was acting within the scope of his
judicial authority and is therefore protected from suit by
judicial immunity.17
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of Banks’s claims against Judge House.
16
Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 202.
17
Henry v. Wilson, 249 Ky. 589, 61 S.W.2d 305, 307 (1933)(holding that “[i]t
has been repeatedly held by this court in a long line of decisions that a
judicial officer is not subject to civil suit when in the performance of his
judicial duties and within his jurisdiction, although his ruling may be the
result of mistake of law, error of judgment, or malice, or be done
corruptly”).
-8-
Banks also named Anna Jackson as a defendant.
The
crux of Banks’s claims against Jackson was that the sworn
statements she made which led to the issuance of Banks’s arrest
warrant, i.e., that Banks had failed to make his child support
payments, were false.
However, Banks has apparently overlooked
the fact that he pled guilty to persistently failing to provide
child support.
Thus, Banks cannot now assert the falsity of the
charges against him in the arrest warrant.18
Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Banks’s complaint against
Jackson.
Banks further named Sherrie House as a defendant in
his complaint.
According to Banks’s version of the facts,
Sherrie House, because she is married to Judge House, had a
“conflict of interest” in making sworn statements which led to
the issuance of Banks’s arrest warrant.
However, as we
mentioned previously, it was Anna Jackson and not Sherrie House
who is listed as the affiant on Banks’s arrest warrant.
Banks
also alleges that Sherrie House falsely told “people” that in
order to “get [Banks] out of jail,” they would first have to pay
Banks’s back child support.
Banks argues that these alleged
statements denied him due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
18
McGrew v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 838, 215 S.W.2d 996, 997 (1948)(holding
that “a plea of guilty confesses everything charged in the indictment, or
warrant. . .”).
-9-
However, Banks has cited no authority for these propositions,
nor has he offered any explanation as to how these alleged
statements led to the denial of his constitutional rights.
Further, Banks’s due process and equal protection arguments were
not raised below and we will not consider them for the first
time on appeal.19
Therefore, the trial court’s dismissal of
Banks’s claims against Sherrie House is affirmed.
Finally, Banks asserted a “discrimination” claim
against Assistant Clay County Attorney Clint Harris.
The basis
for this claim was that Harris allegedly told some individuals
that “if . . . Banks had a law degree a man would have to send
him to the penitentiary or have [Banks] shot.”
On appeal, Banks
has apparently abandoned his contention that Harris’s alleged
statement constituted discrimination against him.
claims that this statement was somehow defamatory.
Banks now
While it is
unclear whether this defamation issue was ever properly raised
before the trial court, we nonetheless hold that Harris’s
alleged statements, even if they could be proven, are not
defamatory.
In Yancy v. Hamilton,20 our Supreme Court adopted the
approach taken by Section 566 of The Restatement (Second) of
19
See Abuzant, 977 S.W.2d at 262.
20
Ky., 786 S.W.2d 854 (1989).
-10-
Torts with respect to stated opinions that are alleged to be
defamatory.
Comment e to Section 566 reads in part:
There are some statements that are in
form statements of opinion, or even of fact,
which cannot reasonably be understood to be
meant literally and seriously and are
obviously mere vituperation and abuse. . . .
No action for defamation will lie in this
case.21
We believe that Harris’s alleged defamatory
statements, i.e., that Banks would need to be shot or imprisoned
if he obtained a law degree, must be considered as the kind of
statement which “cannot reasonably be understood to be meant
literally and seriously.”
Hence, even if Harris did in fact
make such a statement, it does not rise to the level of an
actionable claim for defamation.
Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s dismissal of Banks’s claims against Harris.
Based on the foregoing, the orders of the Clay Circuit Court
dismissing both of Banks’s complaints are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
21
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566, comment e (1977).
-11-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Robert E. Banks, Pro Se
Manchester, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, CHARLES
MARCUM, SHERRIE HOUSE, ANNA
JACKSON, ED JORDAN, CLAY M.
BISHOP, JR., CLINT HARRIS, AND
CLAY COUNTY FISCAL COURT:
Phillip Lewis
Hyden, Kentucky
Martha L. Brown
London, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, OSCAR G.
HOUSE:
Stuart Cobb
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CABINET
FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN:
Wendell H. Overcash
Frankfort, Kentucky
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