DANNY GOFF v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 7, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002196-MR
DANNY GOFF
v.
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
NO. 2002-SC-00950-DG
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES E. LOWE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00280
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Danny Goff (“Goff”) appealed from a criminal
judgment and sentence of the Pike Circuit Court reflecting a
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
jury verdict of guilty on two counts of incest.
On October 25,
2002, a panel of this Court rendered an opinion affirming the
conviction.
On discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court
rendered an opinion on August 13, 2003, vacating the opinion of
this Court and remanding it for review in light of Norton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 175 and Fraser v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448 (2001).
For the reasons addressed below, we
affirm the conviction of the Pike Circuit Court.
Goff was indicted by the Pike Country grand jury on
October 26, 1995, with two counts of incest.
The indictment
alleged in relevant part that Goff engaged in sexual intercourse
with his minor step-daughter, A.B.
Goff entered a plea of not
guilty, and the matter proceeded to trial on August 19, 1996.
After taking proof, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
both counts.
Goff was later sentenced to ten years in prison on
each count, to be served consecutively. The conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court.
On April 30, 1999, Goff filed a pro se motion seeking
RCr 11.42 relief.
He later received appointed counsel, who
filed a supplemental motion seeking RCr 11.42 relief.
On July
2, 2001, the trial court rendered an order denying the
supplemental motion.
Goff's subsequent motion to reconsider was
denied, and this appeal followed.
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Goff argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial.
Specifically, he maintains that counsel
improperly failed to cross examine A.B.'s mother, Judy Lewis
("Lewis"), concerning A.B.'s alleged motive to lie; that counsel
improperly failed to object to hearsay testimony and other
improper evidence; that counsel improperly failed to interview
and call witnesses who stated that they had never observed
Goff's alleged wrongful conduct; and, that counsel improperly
failed to obtain copies of videotaped interviews of
A.B. and failed to request a "taint hearing" prior to trial.
Goff also argues that the trial court improperly denied his
motion for an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
He seeks to
have the judgment reversed and the matter remanded for a new
trial.
We have closely examined the record, the law, and the
arguments of counsel, and find no error in the trial court's
denial of Goff's motion for RCr 11.42 relief.
As the parties
are well aware, the standard for addressing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
In order to be found ineffective, counsel's performance
must be below the objective standard of reasonableness and must
be so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial
and a reasonable result.
Id.
In considering ineffective
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assistance, the reviewing court must focus on the totality of
evidence before the lower court and assess the overall
performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine
whether the identified acts or omissions overcome the
presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional
assistance. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct.
2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986).
On Goff's first claim of error, i.e., that counsel was
ineffective for failing to examine Lewis concerning a motive for
A.B. to lie, we find no error.
Goff maintains that both A.B.
and Lewis were motivated to fabricate a story that Goff had
engaged in sexual contact with A.B.
This motivation, according
to Goff, came about when it was disclosed to A.B. that Goff was
not her biological father.
Goff further maintains that Lewis
was motivated to lie as a result of a dispute between Goff and
Lewis over $3,000, and that counsel improperly agreed with the
Commonwealth that this issue was beyond the scope of the
questions asked on direct examination.
The record reveals that trial counsel's primary
defense strategy was to attack the veracity of the
Commonwealth's witness statements.
Goff would have us conclude
that counsel failed to provide him the defense to which he was
entitled by failing to cross-examine Lewis as to A.B.'s (and
Lewis's) motivation to lie.
We cannot reach this conclusion.
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While it will always be the case that a trial counsel could have
pursued a different defense strategy at trial, or pursued a
particular strategy in a different manner, the dispositive
question is whether counsel's performance fell within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, supra.
A related issue is whether Goff was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the question of whether counsel should have crossexamined Lewis and raised with her the question of whether A.B.
was motivated to lie.
In Norton, supra, the Kentucky Supreme
Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Norton had been convicted on
numerous charges including assault and resisting arrest, but had
been found not guilty of public intoxication.
At trial, his
sole defense to the assault and other charges was voluntary
intoxication.
In his post-judgment motion for relief, he
maintained that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
call witnesses who allegedly would have given exculpatory
testimony, i.e., that he was intoxicated at the time of the
offenses.
The trial court in Norton did not grant an evidentiary
hearing on the issue.
On appeal from an opinion of this Court,
the Kentucky Supreme Court opined that Norton was entitled to
the hearing as there remained material issues of fact which
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could not be determined on the face of the record, apparently
relating to three witnesses who were prepared to testify that
Norton was intoxicated.
Norton is distinguishable from the matter at bar.
In
Norton, the appellant’s sole defense at trial was voluntary
intoxication.
Given that the Commonwealth both charged him with
alcohol intoxication and offered proof of the intoxication and
as the record indicated that three witnesses were prepared to
testify as to his intoxication, there existed material issues of
fact as to whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
call the witnesses who would bolster his defense of public
intoxication.
Norton does not alter or expand upon the general
rule that a RCr 11.42 movant is not entitled to a hearing where
the issues raised are justiciable by reference to the record.
See generally, Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311
(1998).
The record in Norton contained a substantial amount of
credible evidence relating to Norton’s alleged alcohol
intoxication (evidence presented by both the Commonwealth and
Norton’s counsel), and voluntary intoxication was the sole
defense raised to the assault, resisting arrest, and other
charges.
Under these circumstances, the Kentucky Supreme Court
was compelled to conclude that Norton was entitled to a hearing
on his claim of ineffective assistance on this issue.
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Conversely in the matter at bar, Goff’s claim that
A.B. may have been motivated to lie, and that counsel should
have cross-examined Lewis on this issue, is more akin to the
proverbial “fishing expedition” than it is to Norton.
Whereas
the evidence in Norton compelled further investigation via a
hearing, the facts of the matter at bar do not.
The bald
assertion that A.B. and/or Lewis may have been motivated to lie
did not, by itself, compel the trial court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on Goff’s claim of ineffective assistance,
and the trial court properly so found.2
Similarly, we are not persuaded by Goff’s argument
that he was entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether
counsel improperly failed to interview and call witnesses who
stated that they had never observed Goff's alleged wrongful
conduct.
Again, the record does not give rise to the genuine
issues of fact of the type found in Norton, and we are not
persuaded that there existed a reasonable probability that but
for counsel’s alleged errors the jury would have reached a
different conclusion.
Id., citing Strickland.
2
In its August 13, 2003 opinion and order vacating and remanding the prior
opinion of this Court, the Kentucky Supreme Court also cited Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (2001). Fraser is similar to Norton (and
dissimilar to the matter at bar) to the extent that it contained strong and
compelling evidence giving rise to issues of fact requiring an evidentiary
hearing. In Fraser, the defendant received the maximum sentence for the
crime to which he pled guilty. The Kentucky Supreme Court opined that this
fact, taken alone, satisfied the Strickland element that counsel’s alleged
deficient performance may have prejudiced the proceedings against the
defendant. As such, it remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue.
-7-
We find no error in the trial court's conclusion that
the performance of Goff's counsel fell within this wide range of
professionally competent assistance on either the issue of
A.B.’s alleged motivation to lie, or the issue of whether
counsel should have interviewed and call witnesses who stated
that they had never observed Goff's alleged wrongful conduct.
There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was
effective, Id., and Goff has not overcome that presumption.
We
find no basis for concluding that the trial court erred on these
issues.
Goff next argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to hearsay testimony, evidence of other
crimes, and improper bolstering.
For example, he maintains that
counsel should have objected to A.B.'s statements as to what
Lewis was thinking, and a social worker's testimony concerning
how upset A.B. was while being interviewed.
He cites other
examples of alleged improper testimony upon which counsel failed
to object, and argues that these failings entitled him to the
relief sought below.
We find no error on this issue.
As noted above,
counsel could have undertaken a different defense strategy at
trial, called different witnesses, or made different objections
to the proffered testimony.
The mere fact that counsel could
have done these things, however, does not by itself require a
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trial court to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance.
Arguendo, if the examples cited by Goff were in fact
objectionable (i.e., not in conformity with the KRE), trial
counsel was not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise the
objection if the decision was part of counsel's overall trial
strategy.
We have closely studied these claims of error, and
cannot conclude that the trial court erred declining to rely
upon them as a basis for sustaining Goff's motion for relief
from judgment.
For the same reasons, we are not persuaded by
Goff's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to call
witnesses who lived with Goff and A.B.
Goff's fourth argument is that counsel was ineffective
for failing to obtain copies of A.B.'s videotaped interviews and
for failing to request a "taint hearing" prior to trial.
He
maintains that the only way to fully ascertain A.B.'s
credibility was to view and examine the videotaped interviews
and to seek a hearing on the issue of whether A.B.'s statements
were improperly influenced by the police, social workers, and
mental health counselors.
He directs our attention to other
cases in which a child was found to be susceptible to suggestive
questioning, and seeks to have the matter remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.
We are persuaded by the Commonwealth's argument on
this issue that Goff has not articulated any factual basis upon
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which we must conclude that A.B.'s testimony was improperly
influenced.
Goff seeks to have the tapes examined to determine
if trial counsel was ineffective.
This inquiry does not support
a Strickland finding that counsel's performance fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness and was so prejudicial as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable
result.
Again, while counsel arguably could have used these
tapes to impeach A.B.'s testimony or to show that her statements
were tainted, there is no factual or legal basis for concluding
that he acted ineffectively in failing to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Pike Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Karen Schuff Maurer
Frankfort, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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