ESTATE OF CARL J. MABRY v. COMMERCIAL BANK OF GRAYSON
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RENDERED:
August 22, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002000-MR
ESTATE OF CARL J. MABRY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00325
v.
COMMERCIAL BANK OF GRAYSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
This is the second time these parties have
been before this court on appeal.
On remand from this court,
the Estate of Carl J. Mabry (the Estate) appeals the Carter
Circuit Court’s order and judgment in favor of the Commercial
Bank of Grayson (Bank) in distributing the proceeds from the
sale of real property owned by Carl J. Mabry which descended to
Billy Jack Mabry, Carl’s son, under Carl’s will.
The estate
argues that the sale of the real property resulted in excess
proceeds after the satisfaction of a mortgage on the property.
Moreover, the excess proceeds belonged to the insolvent estate
to be distributed under KRS 396.095; however, the Bank wrongly
took the excess proceeds in satisfaction of other secured debts
owed by Carl J. Mabry to the Bank.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Carl J. Mabry died on January 12, 1997.
This case
began in September of 1997 when the Bank initiated a lawsuit
against the Estate and Billy Jack Mabry, individually, in an
effort to collect the unpaid balances owed by Carl J. Mabry on
three loan obligations and secured by a perfected security
interest in a motor vehicle.
In addition to the three loan
obligations, Carl Mabry granted the bank a mortgage on his real
property in Carter County, Kentucky
Sometime in September or October of 1997, Billy Jack
Mabry brought the vehicle that served as the collateral for the
three loan obligations to the Bank.
The Bank sold the vehicle
and applied the proceeds to the satisfaction of Carl Mabry’s
various obligations, thereby eliminating one debt, reducing
another debt and leaving one debt in full.
On November 3, 1997, the trial court awarded the Bank
a default judgment on the two debts that remained after the sale
of the vehicle.
default judgment.
The Estate did not appeal the entry of the
Subsequently, the Bank perfected a judgment
lien against the real property.
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Next, in February of 1998, the Bank filed an amended
complaint seeking to recover the balance owed on the mortgage
note.
As relief, the Bank requested that the mortgaged property
be sold and that the net proceeds from the sale be applied
toward the balance due on the mortgage note.
After limited discovery occurrred in the action to
enforce the mortgage, the Bank made a motion for summary
judgment.
The trial court granted the Bank’s motion on December
1, 1998, and directed the master commissioner to sell the real
property.
The proceeds of the sale were to be applied to
satisfy the mortgage note as well as all of the indebtedness set
forth in the default judgment entered in November of 1997 on the
secured loans.
At this point, the total amount necessary to
satisfy the mortgage was in excess of $16,000 and the judgment
lien was $10,830.64 plus costs, interest and attorney’s fees.
Billy Jack Mabry, as the executor of the Estate, sold
the property in a private sale for $25,000.
The Bank applied
this amount to payoff the mortgage and held the remainder to
satisfy the judgment lien.
The Estate appealed asserting, among other claims not
relevant to this appeal, that the Bank wrongfully and without
judicial or statutory authority seized the excess funds to pay
off the two personal debts not secured by the real estate and
refused to turn over the funds to the Estate.
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In setting out
the history of the case below, this court noted that the
judgment lien perfected by the bank as a result of the November
1997 default judgment “secured payment of the default judgment
in derogation of the rights of any other creditors of the
estate, and regardless of whether any such creditors were
entitled to priority.”
396.095.
In support, this court cited KRS
Having said that, later in the opinion when discussing
the issue of the proper distribution of the proceeds from the
sale of the real property, this court held as follows:
At the outset, it is appropriate to analyze the
posture of this litigation as it has been
presented to this court. First, it is clear that
the November 1997 default judgment against Carl
Mabry’s estate and its executor is valid and
enforceable. Although KRS 396.135 clearly
prohibited any levy or execution on that judgment
against Carl Mabry’s property, the parties have
acknowledged that such a levy was effected.
However, the record contains no documentation to
establish this fact. Moreover, the record
neither includes any order regarding the
distribution of the funds, nor otherwise shows
whether the net proceeds derived from the sale of
the mortgaged property were sufficient to satisfy
the balance due on the 1992 mortgage note, the
amount of the judgment lien, and/or the claims of
creditors. Presumably, if the assets were
sufficient to pay all outstanding claims, both of
appellee’s judgments would have been fully
satisfied. On the other hand, if the assets were
not sufficient to pay all outstanding claims, the
available funds should have been distributed to
creditors consistent with the dictates of KRS
396.095(1) and (2), except insofar as appellee,
as a secured creditor, was entitled to priority
in regard to the net proceeds from the judicial
sale of the residence.
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. . .
In summary, we affirm the November 1997 and
December 1998 judgments as to the liability of
Carl Mabry’s estate and Billy Mabry as executor
thereof. Moreover, we also affirm so much of the
December 1998 judgment as directs a sale of Carl
Mabry’s mortgaged property and orders the net
proceeds thereof to be applied in satisfaction of
the balance due thereon. However, any additional
net proceeds derived from that judicial sale must
be distributed consistent with the dictates of
KRS 396.095 and 396.135.
On remand, the Estate made a motion to have the matter
referred to the master commissioner for an accounting of the
funds held by the Bank in conformity with the opinion of this
court.
In response, the Bank submitted a letter from the Bank’s
President which provided the following breakdown of the
application of the proceeds from the sale of the real property:
Payments Received
$23,008.00
from Fisher’s Auto Sales [Buyer]
250.00
from Pearl Crum, Realtor
$23,258.00
total received
Payments Applied
$16,215.57
principal payment on mortgage loan
313.62
interest on mortgage loan from Oct. 1
to Dec. 24, 1998
80.00
late charges on mortgage loan
28.64
forced place insurance on mortgage loan
2,710.79
attorney fees to Jeff Scott
2,033.25
principal payment on Carl Mabry note
#74560
1,876.13
principal payment on Carl Mabry note
#22191
$23,258.00
Total disbursed
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The Bank asserted that its application of the proceeds conformed
with the December 1998 judgment which this court specifically
upheld and affirmed.
The trial court referred the matter to the master
commissioner for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
there were any excess proceeds from the sale of the real
property.
After the hearing, the master commissioner found, in
pertinent part, that the notes on which the November 1997
judgment was based were secured notes.
Moreover, the Estate did
not appeal the November 1997 judgment.
In addition, the
commissioner found that the devisee in Carl Mabry’s will sold
the real estate and further concluded that the real estate was
not a probatable asset, therefore it was not even an asset of
the estate.
The commissioner concluded that attorney’s fees on
both the mortgage and the promissory notes were properly
withheld because the Court of Appeals did not reverse on the
issue of attorney’s fees, and the mortgage and the notes sued
upon specifically provided for an award of attorney’s fees.
In accord with his findings and conclusions, the
commissioner recommended that no money be returned to the Estate
as the sale proceeds of the real property were sale proceeds of
a non-probatable asset and were paid to extinguish the lawful
debts of the decedent which the executor had both the authority
and the duty to pay pursuant to KRS 396.155.
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The estate filed
exceptions to the commissioner’s report; however, the trial
court found that the report was supported by substantial
evidence and that the legal authority cited by the commissioner
was sound and based upon the facts of the case.
As such, the
trial court adopted the commissioner’s report in total,
precipitating this appeal.
The Estate raises five arguments on appeal.
First,
the Estate argues that the trial court was required to enforce
the mandate of this court and not reinterpret it or ignore it.
Second, the Estate argues that the law of the case did not allow
the trial court to relitigate issues already decided by the
initial opinion of the court of appeals.
Third, the Estate
argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it
failed to independently review the commissioner’s report.
Fourth, the Estate argues that the trial court erred in ruling
that the real estate was a non-probatable asset.
Finally, the
Estate argues that KRS 396.095 requires all assets of the estate
to be distributed in order of priority.
The heart of this case is the significance of secured
transactions in the satisfaction of the debts of the decedent’s
estate.
In other words, this is a case about priority.
In
reaching our conclusion on this second appeal, we must bear in
mind that neither party sought review of the first decision of
this court.
In particular, the Estate did not seek review of
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this court’s holding that the Bank was entitled to priority as a
secured creditor in the distribution of the net proceeds from
the sale of the residence.
We first address the Estate’s arguments regarding the
trial court’s task upon remand by this court.
The Estate
correctly asserts that the law of the case doctrine is
applicable here.
“The law of the case doctrine essentially
holds that a final decision of an appellate court is
determinative of an issue, whether that decision is right or
wrong, and a lower court is bound by the higher court's
decision.”
Ranier v. Kiger Ins., Inc., Ky. App., 998 S.W.2d
515, 518 (1999).
The doctrine applies to the determination of
questions of law and not questions of fact.
Inman v. Inman,
Ky., 648 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1982).
As the term ‘law of the case’ is most
commonly used, . . . it designates the
principle that if an appellate court has
passed on a legal question and remanded the
cause to the court below for further
proceedings, the legal questions thus
determined by the appellate court will not
be differently determined on a subsequent
appeal in the same case. Thus, if, on a
retrial after remand, there was no change in
the issues or evidence, on a new appeal the
questions are limited to whether the trial
court properly construed and applied the
mandate. The term ‘law of the case’ is also
sometimes used more broadly to indicate the
principle that a decision of the appellate
court, unless properly set aside, is
controlling at all subsequent stages of the
litigation, which includes the rule that on
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remand the trial court must strictly follow
the mandate of the appellate court.
Inman v. Inman, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1982) (citing
Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 744).
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In this case, since the
issues have not changed and the evidence has merely been
developed by the parties pursuant to this court’s mandate, under
the law of the case doctrine, our review is limited to whether
the trial court properly construed and applied the mandate of
this court from the first appeal.
The mandate to the trial court was to determine
whether there were any excess proceeds from the sale of the real
property after the estate satisfied Carl Mabry’s secured debts.
Specifically, this court remanded the case and instructed the
trial court as follows:
“if the assets were not sufficient to
pay all outstanding claims, the available funds should have been
distributed to creditors consistent with the dictates of KRS
396.095(1) and (2), except insofar as appellee, as a secured
creditor, was entitled to priority in regard to the net proceeds
from the judicial sale of the residence.” (emphasis added).
Upon hearing the evidence, the trial court determined
that no monies remained from the sale of the real property after
the satisfaction of Carl Mabry’s secured liabilities.
The Bank
applied the proceeds from the sale of the real property to
satisfy the mortgage in full.
Once the mortgage was satisfied,
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the Bank applied the remainder in partial satisfaction of the
secured promissory notes.
After making these disbursements, no
funds were left over to be distributed under KRS 396.095.
The Estate’s position throughout this case has been
that Carl Mabry’s secured debts are on equal footing with Carl
Mabry’s unsecured debts.
However, since 1897, Kentucky courts
have consistently held otherwise, recognizing the priority of
secured transactions in doing so.
See Milward v. Shields, Ky.,
43 S.W. 184, 185 (1897); International Harvester Co. v. Dyer’s
Adm’r, Ky., 178 S.W.2d 966, 968 (1944) (holding former KRS
396.090 applies to assets in the hands of a personal
representative and does not take precedence over a mortgage lien
on mining equipment that was recorded prior to the equipment’s
placement in the mine); Graham v. Graham’s Adm’x, Ky., 306
S.W.2d 831 (1957) (holding an unrecorded chattel mortgage lien
has preference and priority over the preferred claim for burial
expenses provided under former KRS 396.090).
In Milward, the
court held that a mortgage lien is superior to the lien of an
undertaker for funeral expenses.
Id.
More important for the
purposes of this appeal is the court’s reasoning in reaching
that conclusion:
The statute [which provides that: "If the
personal estate of a decedent be not
sufficient to pay his liabilities, then the
burial expenses of such decedent . . . shall
be paid in full before any pro rata
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distribution shall be made”] has no reference
to, nor any effect upon, bona fide liens
secured to creditors of the decedent under
the general law, such as liens by mortgage,
or liens acquired-like attachment liens-by
operation of law, but regulates priorities
in reference only to unsecured liabilities,
gives certain liabilities and expenses
priority, and then puts all other debts and
liabilities on equal footing. It leaves
valid liens acquired on the decedent's
estate where the rules of the general law
leave them. Such liens have no validity by
virtue of the statute in question, but exist
independent of it. They overrule burial
expenses, claims due the estate of a dead
person, or of a ward, or of a person of
unsound mind committed by a court of record
to and remaining in the hands of a decedent,
and the costs and charges of administration,
except so far as the latter may necessarily
be incurred in ascertaining the lien, and
pursuing it to judgment, with a view to
determine whether any assets, personal or
real, may be left, after the incumbrance is
satisfied, for distribution under the terms
of the statute. Every lien may be considered
exposed to this peril, but no more. If
burial expenses are allowed to overreach a
valid lien, acquired in good faith before
the death of the decedent, so may what he
owes as fiduciary to the estate of a dead
person, of a ward, or of a lunatic, and the
lien might be totally destroyed, if such
claims had priority; and, no matter how
acquired in the lifetime of the decedent,
they might be as worthless as the paper by
which they are evidenced. The burial
expenses and the other statutory priorities
are placed on the same footing, and are of
the same dignity, and are superior only to
the general unsecured liabilities of the
decedent. They cannot prevail against and
consume liens created voluntarily by the
decedent before he dies, or by the equally
binding operation of law, but stand secure
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in their inherent force, by virtue of the
general law governing them.
Milward, at 185.
In obtaining a default judgment on the secured
promissory notes, the Bank, as a secured creditor, exercised
those rights to which it was entitled pursuant to the default
and enforcement of security interest provisions of Article 9 of
Kentucky’s Uniform Commercial Code.
See KRS 355.9-601, et. seq.
Although not relevant to the issues on appeal, we note that KRS
396.135 provides for such enforcement when it states “but this
section shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of
mortgages, pledges or liens upon real or personal property in an
appropriate proceeding.”
Taking the Estate’s arguments out of order, we address
the argument that the trial court erred in ruling that the real
estate was a non-probatable asset.
We believe the law-of-the-
case doctrine is applicable here and hold that this finding is
superfluous and irrelevant to the mandate of this court.
This
court upheld the Bank’s action to foreclose on the mortgaged
real property.
The mandate of this court was to hear evidence
on the application of the proceeds of the sale of the real
property to the secured debts of Carl Mabry, those secured debts
being the mortgage and the promissory notes which had been
reduced to a judgment lien.
If any proceeds remained, they were
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to be distributed as assets of the estate under KRS 396.095.
The court followed this mandate, and to the extent that the
trial court made any additional findings, we hold that it is
harmless error.
We move to the Estate’s argument that the trial court
committed reversible error when it failed to independently
review the master commissioner’s report of July 25, 2001.
The
Estate contends that the trial court’s failure to conduct an
independent review is evident in the fact that it adopted the
commissioner’s report, for had the court conducted an
independent review, it would have found numerous errors of law.
In support, the Estate lists the following errors:
the
commissioner’s failure to follow the dictates of the law of the
case; and the commissioner’s consideration of the status of Carl
Mabry’s other debts with the Bank, whether the real estate was a
probatable asset or not and whether the Bank could retain funds
that belonged to the Estate.
As discussed above, we affirm the
order and judgment of the trial court, therefore we believe this
argument has no merit.
Having concluded that there were no excess proceeds
after the complete satisfaction of the mortgage and partial
satisfaction of the secured promissory notes, we need not
address the Estate’s final argument that KRS 396.095 requires
all assets of the estate to be distributed in order of priority.
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On remand, the Bank demonstrated that after the satisfaction of
Carl Mabry’s secured liabilities, no assets remained.
For the foregoing reasons, the order and judgment of
the Carter Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christophe G. Stewart
Louisville, Kentucky
W. Jeffrey Scott
Grayson, Kentucky
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