GARR KEITH HARDIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 16, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001782-MR
GARR KEITH HARDIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CR-00042
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS AND DYCHE, JUDGES; AND POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE.1
POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
This is an appeal by Garr Keith Hardin
from an order of the Meade Circuit Court denying his motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On April 5, 1999, Rhonda Walford’s body was discovered
in a rural area of Meade County.
times.
1
She had been stabbed numerous
Following a police investigation, Hardin and his co-
Senior Status Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution.
defendant, Jeffrey Clark, were indicted on charges of murdering
Walford.
In March 1995, following a seven-day jury trial,
Hardin and Clark were each found guilty of murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment.
On August 9, 1996, the Kentucky Supreme
Court rendered an unpublished opinion affirming Hardin’s
conviction.
On August 30, 1999, Hardin filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
The motion alleged
that, for various reasons, Hardin had received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial.
On June 14, 2001, the Circuit
Court entered an opinion and order denying the motion without a
hearing.
This appeal followed.
Appellant contends that his trial counsel was
deficient in three respects.
First, that trial counsel failed
to properly investigate the background of a jailhouse informant
who was called to testify that co-defendant Clark confessed to
murdering Walford.
Second, that trial counsel failed to hire an
independent medical expert to establish the time of death with
precision.
And lastly, that trial counsel failed to properly
object to the introduction of evidence that Hardin had on
occasions engaged in satanic practices.
Further, Hardin alleges
that, at minimum, the Circuit Court should have given him a
hearing on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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In order to prevail in an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the
movant must first allege in the motion specific facts that if
true would entitle him to relief.
RCr 11.42(2).
In order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must
satisfy a two-part test showing: (1) that counsel's performance
was deficient and (2) that the deficiency resulted in actual
prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1986).
movant makes both showings, he cannot prevail.
U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
Unless the
Strickland, 466
The specific facts alleged in
the motion must show that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient and that absent the errors by trial counsel there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a
different result.
177 (2001).
Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky. 63 S.W. 3d 175,
The burden of proof is upon the movant to show that
he was not adequately represented by trial counsel.
Jordan v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878, 879 (1969).
In determining whether counsel was ineffective, a
reviewing court must be highly deferential in scrutinizing
counsel's performance, and the tendency and temptation to
second-guess must be avoided.
S.W.2d 311 (1998).
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978
We must look to the particular facts of each
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case and determine whether the acts or omissions were outside
the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Id.
For a motion to be denied without a hearing the record must
conclusively disprove the movant’s allegations or otherwise
prove that he is not entitled to relief.
Fraser v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W. 3d 448, 452 (2001).
Hardin’s first allegation of ineffective assistance is
that trial counsel failed to properly investigate Commonwealth
witness Clifford Capps.
Capps, a former cellmate of Hardin’s
co-defendant Clark, testified at trial that Clark had confessed
to the crime while they were in jail together.
After the trial,
but before the case was appealed, Hardin discovered that Capps
had written a letter which could have been used to impeach
Capps’ trial testimony.
The Commonwealth had not produced the
letter during pretrial discovery, and Hardin made an
unsuccessful motion for a new trial based upon the failure of
the Commonwealth to produce the letter.
The denial of this
motion was appealed along with the trial verdict.
In its opinion affirming Hardin’s conviction, the
Supreme Court specifically addressed whether the production of
the letter and the perjury it may have implied “could in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury”
and held that it would have not:
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In his appeal to this Court, Appellant takes
great liberties in his description of Capps’
testimony. A review of the trial
proceedings indicates that while Capps did
acknowledge that Clark, on two occasions,
confessed to the murder, he did not so
directly state that Appellant also
participated in the crime. Appellant makes
much of the fact that Clark’s admission, as
related by Capps, “by innuendo referred to
[Appellant].” Appellant’s Brief, at 21.
However, such intimation does not convince
us “that the perjury, if such it be, ‘could
in any reasonable likelihood have affected
the judgment of the jury.’” Cope v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 645 S.W.2d 703, 705
(1983). Moreover, while the trial court, in
denying the defense’s motion for a directed
verdict, specifically relied upon the
testimony of Capps, it characterized this
evidence with respect to Appellant as “more
marginal in nature.” In addition, defense
counsel, on cross-examination of Capps, was
able to bring out that the informant, who
had first been jailed in April of 1992 to
serve an eventual fourteen year sentence,
gave his statement of Clark’s confession to
police on December 2, 1992 and was then
paroled later that month. As Capps’ parole
was later revoked, defense counsel also
questioned the informant’s motives in
testifying at trial, as he was again up for
parole in a couple of months. As such, we
cannot conclude that any such newly
discovered evidence relied upon here by
Appellant “would with reasonable certainty
have changed the verdict if a new trial was
granted.” Gibbs v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
723 S.W.2d 871, 876 (1987). (Emphasis
added).
Hardin v. Commonwealth, 95-SC-461-MR, Slip Op. at 14 – 15.
Pursuant to Strickland, in order to show ineffective
assistance of counsel, the movant must show that there is a
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"reasonable probability" that the jury would have reached a
different result.
Norton, supra, at 177.
This “reasonable
probability” standard corresponds to the “reasonable likelihood”
standard applied by the Supreme Court on direct appeal.
Since
the Supreme Court has already ruled on the issue, Hardin cannot
relitigate it here, see Commonwealth v. Tamme, Ky., 83 S.W.3d
465, 468 (2002), and his claim that he received ineffective
assistance because trial counsel failed to uncover the letter
must fail because the deficient performance, if any there was,
did not affect the outcome of his trial. Strickland, supra.
We
would further note that an issue raised and rejected on direct
appeal may not be relitigated in an RCr 11.42 proceeding by
claiming it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel,
Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (2002), which
is precisely what Hardin is attempting to do with respect to the
Capps issue.
Hardin’s second allegation of ineffective assistance
is that trial counsel failed to hire an independent medical
expert to establish the time of Walford’s death.
At trial the
state medical examiner testified that the victim had died in the
“early morning hours” of April 2, 1992.
It appears to be
Hardin’s theory that an independent medical examiner could have
established the time of death with more precision, which
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presumably would have placed the death at a time for which
Hardin had an alibi.
The movant in an 11.42 motion must allege the grounds
for relief with particularity.
He must “state specifically the
grounds on which his sentence is being challenged and the facts
on which [he] relies.”
RCr 11.42(2); Stanford v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742, 748 (1993).
Here, Hardin has made no
attempt to show that an expert even exists who could establish
the precise time of death - - perhaps because he has not been
able to locate a witness who would provide such testimony.
Hardin has thereby failed to demonstrate a specific factual
basis for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to produce such a witness.
Conclusory allegations which
are not supported by specific facts do not justify postconviction relief under RCr 11.42; moreover, RCr 11.42 is not
intended to serve the function of a discovery deposition.
Sanders at 385.
Hardin may not rely on trial counsel’s failure
to hire an expert witness to challenge his sentence.
Hardin’s last argument concerning ineffective
assistance is that trial counsel was deficient because he did
not join in his codefendant’s unsuccessful motion in limine
objecting to the introduction of evidence of satanic practices.
However, trial counsel did object to the introduction of this
evidence at trial, and the propriety of admitting the evidence
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was an issue on appeal.
The Supreme Court ruled that the
evidence was properly admitted:
It was the prosecution’s theory that this
killing was part of a satanic ritual;
therefore, at trial, the Commonwealth
introduced into evidence a satanic bible and
other occult-related objects found at
Appellant’s residence, as well as other
items, such as writings and drawings done by
Appellant. Appellant makes much of the fact
that the prosecution was allowed to
introduce this evidence even though two
expert witnesses called by the Commonwealth
indicated that the victim was not killed in
a ritualistic murder or satanic sacrifice.
Appellant adds that he had admitted to
police to having previously been involved in
satanic practices. Appellant also objects
to the introduction, by the Commonwealth, of
a number of photographs of pocket and
hunting knives which were taken from
Appellant’s residence pursuant to the
execution of the search warrant, as none of
the knives were ever alleged to have been
associated with the murder. Appellant
argues that the probative value of all of
this evidence was outweighed by the
potential for prejudice. Chumbler v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 905 S.W.2d 488 (1995).
Disposing of this latter issue first, we
conclude that the items at issue amounted to
more than, as Appellant would describe,
“character type evidence of [Appellant]
which lacks a legitimate connection to the
crime charged . . . . ” Appellant’s Brief,
at 8. While Appellant is accurate to note
that in Chumbler we determined that the
admission of certain evidence unrelated to
the crime charged was improper, such a
holding does not apply to the case at bar.
As it was the Commonwealth’s theory that the
victim’s stabbing death occurred pursuant to
a satanic ceremony, certainly proof as
related to Appellant’s involvement in this
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“religious” practice was relevant to the
crime for which he stood accused. Relevancy
determinations rest heavily in the
discretion of the trial judge and will not
be overturned absent a showing of abuse of
such discretion. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v.
Ogden, Ky., 310 S.W.2d 547 (1958); Green
River Electric Corp. v. Nantz, Ky. App., 894
S.W.2d 643 (1995). We find that no such
abuse of discretion occurred here in the
introduction of either the satanic items or,
although in a closer situation, in that of
the photographs of the knives.
Hardin v. Commonwealth, 95-SC-461-MR, Slip Op. at 2 – 4.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court determined in the direct
appeal that the satanic worship evidence was admissible at
trial, this allegation of ineffective assistance fails under
both prongs of Strickland.
Further, we again note that an issue
raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated in
an RCr 11.42 proceeding by claiming that the issue amounts to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Sanders, supra.
Finally, because the record conclusively disproves
Hardin’s allegations of ineffective assistance or otherwise
proves that he is not entitled to relief, the Circuit Court
properly denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Fraser, supra, at 452.
For the foregoing reasons the order of the Meade
Circuit Court denying the appellant’s motion for RCr 11.42
relief is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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