JOHN A. HUMPHRESS v. PATRICIA ANN HUMPHRESS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 3, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001630-MR
JOHN A. HUMPHRESS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00384
v.
PATRICIA ANN HUMPHRESS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND DYCHE, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant John A. Humphress appeals from alleged
errors in a decree of dissolution.
John Humphress, (hereinafter John), was the owner of
several corporations at the time of the dissolution.
corporations were formed during the marriage.
These
In addition to
these Corporations, John and Appellee Patricia Humphress,
(hereinafter Patricia), had several joint bank accounts and
there were CDs and savings accounts in the names of the
corporations.
At the inception of the action, counsel for John
notified the trial court that he did not know the exact value of
the corporations and that a CPA would be needed to value the
corporations.
Patricia provided the trial court with a document
entitled “Petitioner’s List of Property” which included real
estate, horses, the corporations and corporate property.
value of the property was provided on that list.
No
During the
final hearing on the matter Patricia provided a verified list of
assets and liabilities.
John provided a “Notice of Compliance”
in response to the Court’s request that he provide a similar
listing of all property, individual and marital.
John provided
values for the property where same were known to him.
He also
provided balances for accounts owned by the corporations and
expressly disputed the valuation for these accounts previously
provided by Patricia.
In July, 1999, at the request of the parties, the trial
court appointed two appraisers and a CPA to value the property.
The court directed counsel to work with these experts in valuing
the property.
John’s lawyer withdrew from the case in December,
1999, prior to the court-requested evaluation being performed.
The hearing on the case was set for January 11, 2000.
retained new counsel on January 7, 2000.
John
John requested a
continuance of the hearing date to allow his new counsel time to
become familiar with the complexity of the case.
was continued until February 15, 2000.
-2-
The hearing
Conflicts developed between John and his new lawyer.
These conflicts escalated during the hearing and included name
calling by John’s lawyer.
John’s counsel provided the trial
court with an inventory listing a value for each asset.
John
denies that he provided the information contained in the report
and disputed any finding that the values were correct.
During
the hearing, John’s lawyer abruptly withdrew from
representation.
John moved for a continuance and informed the
trial court that there was a need for appraisals and valuation
of the real estate and corporations.
John’s motion.
The trial court denied
Following the hearing, but a year prior to the
entry of the decree of dissolution, John filed a trial brief
giving values for real estate, automobiles, personal property
and corporate stock.
nonmarital debt.
The trial brief also listed marital and
Similarly, Patricia provided a verified
listing of assets and liabilities.
John objects to the trial court’s refusal to continue
the February 15, 2000 hearing.
John asserts that he did not
receive adequate representation during that hearing and this
lack of representation harmed his case.
John also argues that
the failure of the court to continue the hearing until a full
appraisal was done of the real estate and corporations was in
error.
John appealed the denial of his request for continuance.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his request for intervention.
-3-
Almost a year passed between the date of the hearing and the
entry of the decree of dissolution.
counsel during that time.
John did not obtain new
He provided his “trial brief” and
list of assets and liabilities during that time period.
The
record shows that ample evidence was provided by both parties
with regard to value of the assets and liabilities and that John
had time in which to supplement his responses had he chosen to
do so.
Where there is no abuse of discretion shown, this court
cannot reverse the trial court’s determination.
Drake v. Drake,
Ky. App., 809 S.W.2d 710, 714 (1991).
The trial court’s judgment stated that both parties had
filed disclosures of assets.
John objects to this finding
claiming that no full and fair disclosure had been made by
either party.
The record contains Patricia’s verified listing
of assets and liabilities and John’s trial brief containing a
similar listing.
In addition, John’s counsel provided the court
with an amended listing of properties at the February 11, 2000
hearing.
The trial court assigned values to the personal
property based on the documentation in the record which had been
provided by the parties over a three year period.
The trial
court repeatedly warned the parties during the almost four years
before entry of the final decree of dissolution that each party
had a duty to provide a correct valuation.
The trial court even
went so far as to appoint individuals to work with the parties
-4-
in creating such a valuation.
Neither party worked with the
court appointed assessors and CPA, choosing instead to create
their own valuations.
The trial court also found marital debt in the sum of
$58,500.00.
John notes discrepancies between his “Notice of
Compliance” and Patricia’s list of assets, and the findings of
the trial court.
John does not address the fact that many of
the values used by the trial court came from the list of assets
provided by his former counsel at the February 11, 2000 hearing.
John continues to assert that because he did not agree to
counsel’s provision of this information to the trial court or
Patricia, the court could not properly review that information.
The trial court awarded Patricia in excess of
$400,000.00, household furniture and belongings, her new
vehicle, and her IRA account.
The court granted John the
marital residence, an additional $125,000.00 piece of real
estate, and the balance of funds in various corporate accounts.
The trial court required John to pay all marital debt.
John
objects to the trial court’s findings, but does not show that he
provided evidence upon which the trial court could have based a
different ruling.
John does not show reversible error in the
trial court’s division of assets and liabilities.
reason, the judgment must be affirmed.
App., 878 S.W.2d 24, 25 (1994).
-5-
For this
Russell v. Russell, Ky.
The Decree states that the values for the various
properties were based on the documentation submitted early on in
the hearing by John’s counsel, who withdrew.
John asserts that
he did not authorize that valuation; he did not agree to those
valuations; he did not verify that they were correct, and the
values are incorrect.
However, the record shows that John
worked with his counsel in preparing those valuations and also
provided counsel with evidence supporting the listing.
John
argues that this documentation should not have been considered
part of the record in this action, and was improperly relied
upon by the trial court.
The record shows that the parties were
given ample time to provide the trial court with dispositive
evidence and the record supports the trial court’s findings.
John asserts that the trial court’s ruling should be
reversed due to the trial court’s determination that the law
required a 50/50 division of all marital property, regardless of
contribution.
John argues that KRS 403.190 holds otherwise.
The record does not reveal that the trial court required a 50/50
division of assets.
The trial court accomplished what appears
to be a fairly equal division of assets but did not indicate
that it was required to make a completely even distribution.
There was no abuse of discretion in the division.
John asserts that his retirement IRA, valued at
$61,390.00, was improperly found by the trial court to be
-6-
marital property and was improperly divided with Patricia.
John
asserts that as Patricia was entitled by law to the entirety of
her teacher’s retirement IRA, his retirement fund should be
considered solely his own.
The record does not contain evidence
showing that the account at issue was John’s IRA account rather
than a marital IRA account.
In the absence of such
documentation, the account must be treated as marital property.
Further, John’s contention that the trial court should take the
value of Patricia’s teacher retirement funds into account when
dividing property is in error.
action by the trial court.
KRS 161.700(2) prohibits such
The trial court’s refusal to make
the consideration demanded by John was in accordance with law.
This Court cannot disturb the findings of a trial
court in a case involving dissolution of marriage unless those
findings are clearly erroneous.
746 S.W.2d 568, 569 (1988).
Cochran v.Cochran, Ky. App.,
in the trial court’s rulings.
Appellant has not shown clear error
For this reason, the judgment of
the Taylor circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth C. Woodford
Lexington, Kentucky
William E. Hudson
Greensburg, Kentucky
Michael D. Meuser
Lexington, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.