KEVIN W. REYNOLDS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
August 15, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
August 29, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001467-MR
KEVIN W. REYNOLDS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00010
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, McANULTY, AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Kevin W. Reynolds appeals from a judgment of
the Carroll Circuit Court sentencing him to ten years in prison1
after a jury found him guilty of escape in the second degree and
being a persistent felony offender in the first degree.
Reynolds contends the trial court erred by denying his request
1
The judgment also imposed a fine of $1,000.
for a directed verdict.
We disagree, and thus affirm the
judgment.
On November 15, 2000, in Gallatin County, Reynolds
pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of possession of a
controlled substance in the second degree (cocaine), first
offense (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1416).
He was
sentenced to twelve months in the county jail with service of
the sentence to begin on December 27, 2000.
Under an agreement
with Gallatin County, Reynolds was to be placed in the Carroll
County Detention Center for service of his sentence.2
On
December 18, 2000, the trial court granted Reynolds’s request
for work-release by entering an order allowing him to be
released for work Monday through Saturday at 7:15 a.m. until
5:00 p.m. the same day.
orders.
Reynolds reviewed and signed the
Shortly after beginning service of his sentence,
Reynolds properly arranged to switch employers under his workrelease and began working for Ralph Asher, who owned a small
construction business.
Under an affidavit signed by Asher, he
agreed to be responsible for supervising Reynolds and notifying
jail personnel if he wanted Reynolds to work beyond or outside
2
The Carroll County Detention Center is a regional detention facility that
houses prisoners for several counties, including Gallatin County, under
separate compensation contracts. See KRS 441.050(7).
2
the authorized hours in the work-release order.
With the
permission of the judge, the work-release order was modified to
a sign-out time of 7:00 a.m. to allow Reynolds to get to the job
site.
From the first day of entering the Carroll County
Detention Center, Reynolds was allowed work-release without any
problem pursuant to the trial court’s order.
On January 19,
2001, however, Reynolds signed out of the jail shortly before
7:00 a.m. but failed to return by the designated return time.
Jail personnel contacted Asher’s wife, who told them Reynolds
had last been seen at approximately 4:30 p.m.
Jail personnel
notified the county sheriff, who was unable to locate Reynolds.
At approximately 8:15 a.m. the next morning, January 20, 2001,
Reynolds returned to the Carroll County Detention Center.
He
was given a preliminary breathalyzer test, which was negative,
but he refused to take a urinalysis drug test.
On February 12, 2001, the Carroll County grand jury
indicted Reynolds on one felony count of escape in the second
degree (KRS 520.030) and for being a persistent felony offender
in the first degree (PFO I)(KRS 532.080).
During a trial held
on April 27, 2001, the Commonwealth called seven witnesses
including jail personnel, Ralph Asher, two of Reynolds’s coworkers, Billy Wright and Martin Gills, and the Gallatin County
Commonwealth’s Attorney.
Reynolds testified on his behalf for
3
the defense.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case and the
close of all the evidence, Reynolds’s attorney moved for a
directed verdict, which the trial court denied.
The jury found
Reynolds guilty on both counts and recommended sentences of two
years on the escape charge enhanced to ten years on the PFO I
charge.
On May 21, 2001, the trial court sentenced Reynolds to
ten years’ imprisonment for escape in the second degree and
being a PFO I consistent with the jury’s recommendation.3
This
appeal followed.
Reynolds challenges the trial court’s denial of his
motions for a directed verdict of acquittal.
In Commonwealth v.
Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court
delineated the standard for handling a criminal defendant’s
motion for directed verdict as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
3
See infra note 1.
4
Id. at 187 (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3
(1983)).
See also Norris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 89 S.W.3d 411,
416 (2002).
A court must be mindful of the rule that
“[c]redibility and weight of the evidence are matters within the
exclusive province of the jury.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 5
S.W.3d 126, 129 (1999)(citations omitted).
Jurors are free to
believe parts and disbelieve other parts of the evidence
including the testimony of each witness.
Id.
The standard for
appellate review of a denial of a motion for directed verdict
alleging insufficient evidence dictates that if under the
evidence as a whole it would not be clearly unreasonable for a
jury to find the defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187;
Holbrooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 563, 569 (2002).
Reynolds contends that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of escape in the second degree.
More
specifically, he argues that while the evidence may establish
that he violated the terms of his work-release, it was
insufficient to prove the culpable mens rea or intent not to
return to the Carroll County Detention Center.
KRS 520.030 provides in part that “[a] person is
guilty of escape in the second degree when he escapes from a
detention facility . . . .”
KRS 520.010(5) defines “escape” in
relevant part as “failure to return to . . . detention following
5
a temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or for a
limited period[.]”
Finally, a “detention facility” includes any
building used for confinement of a person convicted of an
offense.
KRS 520.010(4).
A defendant in jail on a misdemeanor
conviction who fails to return to jail at the designated time
while out on work-release may be convicted of the felony offense
of escape in the second degree.
See Commonwealth v. Johnson,
Ky. App., 615 S.W.2d 1 (1981).
The Penal Code4 statutes creating the offense of felony
escape do not indicate that the accused’s mental state is a
material element of the offense, but neither do they dispense
with the requirement.
Generally, a culpable mental state is
required for offenses under the Penal Code.
See KRS 501.030(2).
Moreover, even though no culpable mental state is expressly
designated in a criminal statute, it may be required if the
proscribed conduct necessarily involves a culpable mental state.
See KRS 501.040.
The Penal Code provides for and defines four
types of mental states:
intentional, knowing, wanton and
reckless.
Reynolds’s position assumes that an
KRS 501.020.
intentional mental state is an element of escape in the second
4
Various miscellaneous criminal statutes were revised and collected in KRS
Chapters 500 to 534, known as the Penal Code, which became effective on
January 1, 1975. KRS 500.010.
6
degree.
Specific intent generally is not required for a
conviction for escape.
See 27A Am. Jur.2d Escape § 3 (1996);
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S. Ct. 624, 62 L. Ed.
2d 575 (1980).
While other mental states arguably would be
sufficient to support an escape conviction under the Penal Code,
Bailey, supra (holding knowing state of mind sufficient for
escape under federal statute); see also Phipps v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 933 S.W.2d 825 (1996)(indicating knowing conduct
sufficient for escape in the second degree), the trial court’s
instructions required the jury to find that Reynolds had
“intentionally escaped from the Carroll County Regional
Detention Facility by failing to return” from the court ordered
work-release by the designated time.5
Even though the
intentional mens rea is a higher standard of culpability and
more burdensome than the other three mental states, we will
consider the sufficiency of the evidence for the jury verdict
5
The instructions also defined escape as “the departure from custody or the
detention facility in which a person is held or detained with knowledge that
the departure is unpermitted, or failure to return to custody or detention
following a temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or for a limited
period. The willful failure of a prisoner to return within the time
prescribed to a detention facility to which he was committed constitutes an
escape.”
7
and the trial court’s denial of the directed verdict motions
consistent with the court’s instructions.6
The evidence shows that Reynolds signed out of the
Carroll County Detention Center on January 19, 2001, at 6:48
a.m.
He was driving his stepfather’s truck that Friday morning.
Billy Wright, to whom Reynolds gave a ride to work, brought
along a cooler containing approximately 15 cans of beer.
Despite bad weather consisting of snow and sleet, they worked at
an undisclosed location but went to Ralph Asher’s home/office
around noon in order to pick up their paychecks.
Upon
distributing the paychecks, Asher told his employees they did
not have to continue working because of the inclement weather.
6
The mens rea aspect of the trial court’s instructions appears to be
predicated in large part on KRS 439.610, which was cited in the indictment in
addition to KRS 520.030. KRS 439.610 states: “The willful failure of a
prisoner to remain within the extended limits of his confinement, or to
return within the time prescribed to an institution or facility to which he
was committed or transferred to after commitment, constitutes an escape from
custody punishable as provided in KRS 520.030.” The precise interplay
between this statute, which appears in the chapter dealing with probation and
parole, and the escape provisions of the Penal Code is unclear. KRS 439.610
was originally enacted in 1972 as part of several statutory provisions
dealing with the temporary release of state prisoners under the auspices of
the Department of Corrections for purposes such as educational training,
medical treatment, and paid employment. See Ky. Acts Ch. 293 (encompassing
KRS 439.580 to KRS 439.630). “Institution” generally refers to a state penal
entity, see KRS 186.010(4), and “facility” for purposes of KRS 439.610 is
defined as a community correctional center as established by the Department
of Corrections, see KRS 439.580(4). Consequently, KRS 439.610 arguably does
not apply to Reynolds, who was serving a misdemeanor sentence and was not
under the authority of the Department of Corrections. Furthermore, we note
that our research indicates that KRS 439.610 has not been cited in any case.
Nevertheless, this apparent anomaly does not affect the outcome of our
decision.
8
Reynolds and Wright then drove to the bank, to a gasoline
station, and allegedly back to the job site in case the weather
improved.
During that time, Wright drank several beers and
Reynolds drank 3-4 beers.
The pair returned to Asher’s
home/office at approximately 4:00-4:30 p.m. to return tools that
Reynolds remembered were in his truck.
After leaving Asher’s
residence a short time later, Reynolds and Wright went to the
Bun Boy Motel, where another co-worker, Danny Gills, was
residing.
All three continued to drink beer.
Approximately two
hours later, Reynolds left the motel but he testified that he
had difficulty controlling his truck on the wet highway, so he
pulled off onto the shoulder.
Reynolds said he fell asleep and
when he awoke early the next morning his truck was covered with
snow.
He stated that it took him several hours to extricate the
truck from the sloped shoulder of the highway and then drive
back to the jail on the icy roadway.
Reynolds arrived back at
the detention center at 8:15 a.m. on January 20, 2001.
A
breathalyzer test taken at that time registered zero for alcohol
but Reynolds refused to take a urinalysis drug test.
Reynolds asserts that he was entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal on the escape charge.
He does not dispute
that the Carroll County Detention Center was a “detention
facility” and that he failed to return to detention at the
designated time following a temporary leave granted for a
9
specific purpose, work-release, or for a limited period.
His
only quarrel is with the sufficiency of the evidence of the
requisite mental state, which for purposes of this case we will
assume is intentional conduct.
In support of his position,
Reynolds relies on State v. Rocque, 104 Idaho 445, 660 P.2d 57
(1983), which held that Rocque could not be convicted of escape
for failing to return to jail while out on work-release granted
as part of his probationary sentence.
KRS 501.020(2) states that “[a] person acts
intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described
by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is
to cause that result or to engage in that conduct.”
It is well
established that mens rea and intent may be established by or
inferred from circumstantial evidence.
See, e.g., Stopher v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 802 (2001)(“intent may be
inferred from actions because a person is presumed to intend the
logical and probable consequences of his conduct, and a person’s
state of mind may be inferred from actions preceding and
following the charged offense.”); Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
43 S.W.3d 261, 265 (2001).
Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to support a criminal conviction.
See Baker v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 760, 761 (1993); Bussell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111, 114 (1994).
Finally,
intoxication is a defense to an offense only if it prevents a
10
person from forming the requisite intent, and mere drunkenness
will not raise this defense.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 86 S.W.3d 29, 44 (2002).
Reynolds did not assert or
request instructions on an intoxication defense at trial and the
evidence did not support an instruction on this defense.
See
generally Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 362
(1999)(challenge to absence of instruction on intoxication
unpreserved where defendant did not request or tender
intoxication instruction).
Captain Snow testified that he told Reynolds that if
he did not work because of bad weather, he had to report back to
the jail.
Asher, Wright, and Gills all stated that at various
times, they discussed with Reynolds his obligation to return to
the jail by approximately 5:30.
Rather than return to the jail
after Asher told his employees at noon that they did not need to
return to work, Reynolds and Wright continued to drive around
drinking beer.
Even after leaving Asher’s home/office at
approximately 4:30, Reynolds went to Gills’ motel room and
proceeded to stay for several hours drinking beer.
Despite the
obvious potential problems associated with driving back to the
jail, Reynolds continued to drink alcohol and did not even
attempt to return to the jail until very near or after his
designated time to return of which he does not dispute he was
fully aware.
Reynolds was approximately 14 hours late in
11
returning to the jail and never attempted to obtain permission
for or notify the jail that he would be late.
Reynolds’s
testimony was the only evidence concerning his whereabouts after
leaving Gills’ motel room and his alleged problems with the
weather conditions.
Reynolds’s reliance on State v. Rocque, supra is
misplaced.
First, that case from the Idaho Supreme Court is not
binding on this Court.
Second, it is distinguishable because
Rocque was participating in the work-release program as a
condition of probation and not while serving a term of
incarceration.
The court held that Rocque’s confinement in the
jail during evening hours was a result of a “voluntary probation
agreement” and his failure to return to jail was a break of the
terms of probation and not an escape.
The court specifically
noted the unusual circumstances of the case with respect to the
requirement for “confinement” under the Idaho statute.
Idaho at 446, 660 P.2d at 58.
104
In our situation, Reynolds’s
status as a person serving a misdemeanor conviction granted
work-release clearly made him subject to the Kentucky escape
statutes.
On a directed verdict motion, the trial court must
draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth and the jury is free to determine the
credibility of the witnesses.
We believe there was sufficient
12
evidence to infer that Reynolds did not intend to return to the
Carroll County Detention Center at the time designated for his
return authorized under his work-release.
The fact that
Reynolds eventually returned to the jail voluntarily does not
preclude a conviction but is merely one fact to be considered.
Viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to believe that Reynolds was guilty of escape
in the second degree.
Consequently, the trial court did not err
in denying Reynolds’s motions for directed verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Carroll Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler
Attorney General
J. Gary Bale
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
13
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.