JOSEPH HUTSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001426-MR
JOSEPH HUTSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00270
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
CONSOLIDATED WITH:
APPELLEE
2002-CA-001603-MR
JOSEPH HUTSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00429
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE:
Judge.1
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** ** ** ** **
BAKER AND SCHRODER, Judges; and HUDDLESTON, Senior
Senior Status Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
BAKER, JUDGE:
Joseph Hutson brings Appeal No. 2001-CA-001426-MR
from a June 21, 2001, order and brings Appeal No. 2002-CA001603-MR from a February 9, 1999, judgment of the Campbell
Circuit Court.
We affirm both appeals.
Appeal No. 2002-CA-001603-MR is a belated appeal taken
from a judgment adjudicating appellant to be a persistent felony
offender (PFO) in the second degree and sentencing him to ten
years’ imprisonment.2
Appeal No. 2001-CA-001426-MR is taken from
an order denying appellant’s Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion.
As Appeal No. 2002-CA-001603-MR is a direct appeal, we shall
first address it and then address the collateral appeal (Appeal
No. 2001-CA-001462-MR).
Appeal No. 2002-CA-001603-MR
In his direct appeal, appellant raises three
allegations of error:
1) the trial court erroneously failed to
arraign appellant on the PFO charge, 2) the Commonwealth failed
to prove the PFO charge by competent evidence, and 3) the trial
court improperly took judicial notice of appellant’s prior
convictions.
Appellant failed to designate any of the videotape
proceedings in this appeal, appellant only designated the
circuit court record which consists of one volume.
The
Commonwealth argues that “[t]here is nothing in the record on
2
Appellant was granted a belated appeal by an October 21, 2002, order entered
by this Court.
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appeal to support appellant’s claims of error.
Therefore, this
Court must presume that the omitted record supports the decision
of the trial court.”
Brief for Commonwealth at 2.
The relevant videotape proceedings were included in
the appellate record in collateral Appeal No. 2001-CA-001426-MR.
Appellant maintains that he “successfully consolidated the two
cases [appeals], thus the transcript of evidence is now before
this Court in the present appeal.”
1.
Appellant is incorrect.
Reply Brief for Appellant at
The video tape proceedings at issue
were designated in Appeal No. 2001-CA-001426-MR and, thus, are
properly before this Court in that appeal solely.
Appellant bears the burden of designating that portion
of the record necessary for our review.
Commonwealth, Ky., 423 S.W.2d 255 (1968).
Fannelli v.
We simply do not
believe that the Court of Appeals is at liberty to utilize a
record designated in one appeal when considering another appeal.
As appellant failed to designate the necessary videotape
proceedings in Appeal No. 2002-CA-001603-MR, we must presume
that those proceedings support the trial court’s decision.
Gillum v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 925 S.W.2d 189 (1995).
See
We
thus summarily reject appellant’s contentions of error.
Appeal No. 2001-CA-001426-MR
Appellant maintains that the circuit court concluded
erroneously that he could not bring his argument concerning the
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violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).
Appellant’s allegation in his RCr 11.42 motion stated that
“there was a serious issue of violation of the IAD and that Mr.
Knoebber did not take the necessary steps to obtain documents
from the penitentiary which would have bolstered the Affiant’s
claim that the IAD had been violated.”
In an RCr 11.42 motion,
a circuit court is correct in refusing to address an issue that
has been raised on direct appeal or which should have been
raised in a direct appeal.
S.W.2d 500, 501 (1990).
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788
Thus, the Campbell Circuit Court was
correct in refusing to address an argument concerning the
violation of the IAD since appellant should have brought this
issue on direct appeal.
However, the circuit court was
incorrect in refusing to address the issue of whether
appellant’s counsel was ineffective by failing to acquire
documents that might have demonstrated a violation of the IAD.
During the RCr 11.42 hearing, the circuit court
allowed appellant to testify concerning his counsel’s
ineffectiveness on this issue.
Appellant also was allowed to
call his trial counsel and question him as to this matter.
Thus, we believe that a sufficient record was established to
allow us to review appellant’s ineffective counsel contention on
this issue.
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To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel,
appellant must show that his counsel’s representation was
deficient and that these deficiencies prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 37, 39 (1984).
First, appellant asserts
that his counsel was ineffective for not introducing into
evidence a May 6, 1998, letter that appellant wrote to the
Campbell County Commonwealth attorney, in which appellant
allegedly requested a disposition on detainer and a speedy trial
as required by the IAD of which Kentucky is a party state.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 440.450.
Appellant argues that
this letter would show that IAD procedures should have begun on
May 6, 1998.
Therefore, appellant’s trial, held on December 10,
1998, would have been outside the 180 day period required by the
IAD, denying him of his statutory right for a speedy trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove that he was deprived
of some substantial right that would justify the extraordinary
relief afforded by the RCr 11.42 hearing.
Dorton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (1968).
The appellate
record contains no evidence that a May 6, 1998, letter was
written, except that in a July 1, 1998, letter from appellant to
the Campbell County Commonwealth attorney, appellant alludes to
a letter of this date.
The record is devoid of any further
evidence of the letter or that if the letter did exist appellant
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followed the proper procedures outlined in the IAD in submitting
the letter to the Commonwealth’s Attorney.
In the RCr 11.42 hearing, appellant had ample
opportunity to produce this letter and evidence of correct
compliance with the IAD on May 6, 1998.
He failed to do this.
What the record does indicate is that proper IAD procedure was
instigated on July 1, 1998.
Thus, appellant’s trial, held on
December 10, 1998, fell within the 180 days required by the IAD.
Appellant’s counsel was not ineffective.
Second, appellant argues that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to locate an alleged alibi witness,
Bobbie Lawson.
Appellant’s counsel testified that he personally
tried to serve Lawson on three different occasions at two
different addresses.
Counsel was told that a Bobbie Lawson did
not live at the locations.
subpoena the witness.
Counsel made a liberal effort to
Thus, no deficiency on the part of
counsel existed.
For the foregoing reasons, the order in Appeal No.
2001-CA-001426-MR and the judgment in Appeal No. 2002-CA-001603MR of the Campbell Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Elizabeth R. Stovall
Dept. of Public Advocacy
LaGrange, Kentucky 40031
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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