GLOBE AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY v. GEORGE B. BOWMAN, CAROLYN BOWMAN, and CAROLYN BOWMAN as Administratrix of the Estates of DANIEL BOWMAN, COURTNEY BOWMAN, and ASHLEY BOWMAN
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RENDERED: May 30, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001420-MR
AND
NO. 2001-CA-001508-MR
GLOBE AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00259
GEORGE B. BOWMAN, CAROLYN BOWMAN, and
CAROLYN BOWMAN as Administratrix of the
Estates of DANIEL BOWMAN,
COURTNEY BOWMAN,
and ASHLEY BOWMAN
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM and McANULTY, Judges; and JOHN D. MILLER,
Special Judge.1
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
George and Carolyn Bowman were seriously
injured and their three children were killed in a head-on
collision in Whitley County, Kentucky, on June 24, 1996.
Their
claims against the other driver and their claims for
1
Senior Status Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the
Kentucky Constitution.
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits against their insurer,
Globe American Casualty Company, were eventually settled.
After a jury trial, the circuit court awarded the Bowmans
$349,935.02 on their claims against Globe for bad faith and
unfair claims practices.
This appeal by Globe followed.
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on June 24, 1996, the
Bowman vehicle collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Randy
Mills.
George Bowman was driving the Bowman vehicle, and his
passengers were his wife, Carolyn; his son, Daniel Bowman, age
17; his daughter, Courtney Bowman, age 13; and his daughter,
Ashley Bowman, age 8.
George and Carolyn were seriously
injured, and the three children were killed.
Mills survived.
The Kentucky State Police investigated the accident,
and a three-part report by Trooper William Baker was completed
in late October 1996 and was received by a Globe representative
on November 1, 1996.
Mills’ fault.
The report indicated that the accident was
Criminal charges were not filed.
Globe insured both vehicles involved in the accident.
Mills had liability coverage of $25,000 per person/$50,000 per
accident.
The Bowmans had policies from Globe covering two
vehicles, both having $50,000 UIM coverage.
were stacked for a total of $100,000.
The UIM coverages
Thus, there was $150,000
in total insurance proceeds from the Globe policies available to
compensate the Bowmans.
2
Globe assigned separate claims representatives to
handle the Mills policy and the Bowman policy.
Karen Talmadge
was assigned responsibility for the Mills policy, and Leighann
Patterson was assigned responsibility for the Bowman policy.
The two claims representatives reported to a single supervisor,
Ken Leiner.
Globe hired Art Longnaker, an independent adjuster, to
assist in processing the claims against the Mills policy.
Talmadge, who handled the Mills policy, left Globe before
Trooper Baker issued his final report.
As a result of
Talmadge’s departure, Pattylyn Taueg was assigned responsibility
for the Mills policy in late December 1996.
Patterson, who had
responsibility for the Bowman policy, hired Frank McElroy, an
independent adjuster, to assist in handling the claims against
the Bowman policy.
The Bowmans initially were not represented by an
attorney.
Instead, Mrs. Bowman dealt directly with Globe.
She
was assisted by her brother-in-law, Dr. Bruce Broudy, who sought
the assistance of his neighbor, Guy Colson, an attorney.
Dr.
Broudy asked Colson for advice on how to help the Bowmans obtain
the maximum amount of insurance proceeds available to them.
Colson advised Mrs. Bowman that it was not likely she would need
an attorney to recover the available insurance proceeds.
3
On July 9, 1996, Brad Freeman, an attorney retained by
George Bowman to represent him due to Bowman’s concern that
criminal charges might be filed against him, sent a letter to
Globe seeking a copy of the declaration sheet of the Mills
policy.
Globe never responded to the letter.
On September 11,
1996, McElroy reported to Globe that Dr. Broudy was interested
in resolving the claims on behalf of his sister-in-law and her
family.2
Further, with Colson’s assistance, Dr. Broudy drafted
and sent a letter to McElroy on October 26, 1996, demanding
payment of the limits of the Mills and Bowman policies.
Although McElroy forwarded this letter to Globe with a report
dated October 30, 1996, Globe never responded to Dr. Broudy’s
letter.
In early January 1997, Patterson denied Mills’ claims
against the Bowmans based on the Kentucky State Police report.
On February 12, 1997, the Bowmans retained Colson to
represent them in connection with their claims.
On February 20,
1997, Carolyn was appointed as administratrix of the estates of
the children.
On May 7, 1997, the Bowmans filed a civil
complaint in the Whitley Circuit Court against Mills and Globe.
The complaint included allegations of bad faith and violations
of the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (KRS3
304.12-230 et seq.) against Globe.
2
In its answer to the
The record indicates that McElroy, on behalf of Globe, made initial
contact with the Bowmans through Dr. Broudy.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
Bowmans’ complaint, Globe denied owing the limits of the Mills
policy “since the question of fault in this accident is severely
disputed.”
Globe finally offered the full $150,000 in October
1998, nearly a year and one-half after litigation had been
commenced.
The Bowmans’ claims for bad faith and violations of
the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act went to
trial in April 2001.
The court first instructed the jury that
in order to find for the Bowmans, it must first find that Globe
was obligated to pay each claim under the terms of the policies,
that Globe lacked a reasonable basis in law or in fact for
denying the Bowmans’ claims, and that Globe either knew there
was no reasonable basis to deny the claims or acted with
reckless disregard for whether such a basis existed.
Further,
the court instructed the jury that mere delay in payment does
not constitute bad faith, that for Globe to have acted in bad
faith it must have acted with an evil motive or with a reckless
disregard for the Bowmans’ rights, and that Globe’s conduct must
have been so bad as to be considered outrageous.
The court also
defined “evil motive,” “reckless disregard,” and “outrageous.”
Following the preliminary instructions, the court
posed ten separate interrogatories for the jury’s consideration.
Each of these interrogatories related to an allegation of bad
faith or unfair claims settlement practice against Globe.
5
Further, each interrogatory was answered by the jury in a manner
adverse to Globe.
The jury then awarded the Bowmans $24,967.51
for reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in having
to hire an attorney to file suit for the payment of their
claims.
The jury further awarded the Bowmans $250,000 for
mental anguish suffered as a direct result of Globe’s bad faith
failure to pay their claims and $50,000 for punitive damages.
The court also awarded the Bowmans $23,776.37 in interest.
This
appeal by Globe followed.
Globe does not quarrel with the jury instructions
which led to the verdict.
Further, Globe does not assert that
the court made any errors in connection with the admissibility
of evidence or in connection with other trial procedure.
Rather, Globe argues that the court erred in not awarding it
summary judgment prior to trial or in not awarding it a directed
verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Citing Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wireman, Ky. App., 54
S.W.3d 177 (2001), the Bowmans respond that the failure to grant
summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal.
They assert that
Globe may only appeal from the trial court’s denial of Globe’s
motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
Globe agrees that orders denying summary judgment
motions are generally not reviewable on appeal, but it notes
6
that there is an exception to the rule which it claims exists in
this case.
See Midwest Mut., 54 S.W.3d at 179.
In reviewing Globe’s motion for summary judgment, the
trial court was required to view the record in a light most
favorable to Globe.
See Dossett v. New York Mining and Mfg.
Co., Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1970).
Similarly, “[a] motion
for directed verdict admits the truth of all evidence which is
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.”
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d
855, 860 (1988).
For reasons which we will state later in this
opinion, we conclude that the trial court properly denied
Globe’s motions for summary judgment, for a directed verdict,
and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
In Wittmer v. Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885 (1993), the
Kentucky Supreme Court, quoting from Justice Leibson’s
dissenting opinion in Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, Ky.,
711 S.W.2d 844 (1986), described the elements of a bad faith
claim:
[A]n insured must prove three elements in
order to prevail against an insurance
company for alleged refusal in bad faith to
pay the insured’s claim: (1) the insurer
must be obligated to pay the claim under the
terms of the policy; (2) the insurer must
lack a reasonable basis in law or fact for
denying the claim; and (3) it must be shown
that the insurer either knew there was no
reasonable basis for denying the claim or
acted with reckless disregard for whether
7
such a basis existed . . . . [A]n insurer is
. . . entitled to challenge a claim and
litigate it if the claim is debatable on the
law or the facts.
Wittmer, 864 S.W.2d at 890.
“[M]ere delay in payment does not
amount to outrageous conduct absent some affirmative act of
harassment or deception.”
996 S.W.2d 437, 452 (1997).
Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, Ky.
Further, “there must be proof or
evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the purpose of
the delay was to extort a more favorable settlement or to
deceive the insured with respect to the applicable coverage.”
Id. at 452-53.
Also, in order to prevail in an action for bad
faith, a party must show more than mere negligence.
Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Kentucky v. Whitaker, Ky. App., 687 S.W.2d 557,
559 (1985).
Neither mere errors in judgment nor mere breakdowns
in communications are sufficient to establish bad faith.
Id.
Although Globe initially asserted a defense to the bad
faith claims that the issue of fault was “severely disputed,” it
has apparently abandoned that defense.
Trooper Baker’s November
1996 report indicated that Mills was at fault in the accident.
After receiving Trooper Baker’s report, McElroy, the independent
adjuster Globe had hired to assist in processing the claims
under the Bowman policy, immediately forwarded it to Globe with
his report.
Although Patterson, the Globe adjuster responsible
for the Bowman policy did not read McElroy’s report until
8
December 2, 1996, she immediately determined that Mills was at
fault.
Also, Art Longnaker, the independent adjuster Globe had
hired to assist in processing the claims against Mills, noted in
his November 12, 1996, report to Supervisor Leiner that the
evidence indicated the Bowmans were in their lane when the
accident occurred.
Further, Supervisor Leiner considered
Globe’s investigation to be complete as of early December 1996
and considered George Bowman to be without fault in the
accident.
In short, in light of the clear indication that Mills
was totally at fault and in light of the obvious extent of
damages to which the Bowmans and the children’s’ estates would
be entitled, it was apparent to Globe by no later than early
December 1996 that the Bowmans would be entitled to all proceeds
under both policies for the full amounts of coverage therein.
Therefore, rather than continuing to rely on the issue of fault
as the reason for not paying the Bowmans the maximum amounts
under the policies, Globe relies on other arguments which we
will address below.
Globe’s first argument is that the trial court erred
in not granting it a directed verdict or a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because no proceeds could be paid
for damages due to the wrongful death of the children until
February 20, 1997, when the children’s’ estates were opened by
the appointment of Carolyn Bowman as administratrix.
9
Globe
argues that “if the estates could not present a cause of action;
there cannot be a claim of bad faith for failure to settle such
claims.”
Globe asserts that it had “already made overtures to
plaintiffs to settle claims consistent with recognized liability
and UIM procedures” and that “[t]he failure to have a personal
representative is fatal to plaintiffs’ claims of bad faith.”
We
believe this argument is without merit.
Globe obviously knew that the Bowmans would be acting
on behalf of their deceased children’s’ estates.
Had Globe
agreed to pay the proceeds from the policies when it determined
that Mills was solely at fault and that the damages would exceed
the amount of the policies, it should have offered to do so.
The appointment of an administrator or administratrix for the
estates to receive the proceeds would have been shortly
forthcoming,4 and the failure to have an administratrix in place
at that time was not a hindrance to Globe offering a full
settlement of the matter.
In fact, the estates were set up in
February 1997, and Globe did not offer to pay the full amounts
under the policies until October 1998.
Globe’s second argument is that the trial court erred
in not granting a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding
4
In fact, Dr. Broudy stated in his October 26, 1996, letter to McElroy
that “[i]t is my understanding that it may be necessary, in order to
achieve a release, for Mr. and Mrs. Bowman (or either of them) to be
appointed administrator/administratrix of the estates of the children
for purposes of settlement which can be accomplished when a settlement
is reached.”
10
the verdict because the Bowmans failed to exhaust or accept the
limits of the Mills policy before demanding UIM benefits under
their policy.
Globe asserts that the Bowmans’ claim for UIM
benefits was “moot as being unripe at the time of presentation”
since they had not accepted the limits under the Mills policy.
In support of its argument, Globe cites Coots v. Allstate Ins.
Co., Ky., 853 S.W.2d 895 (1993).
It argues that “it cannot be
bad faith to wait until after the tortfeasor tenders his policy
limit or the insured wishes to settle for a full release before
attempting to settle the underinsured claim to be raised by the
insured.”
Globe maintains that the Bowmans are attempting to
impose liability on it for failing to settle both claims at one
time “despite the contrary practice being specifically approved
in Kentucky since Coots.”
Globe maintains that it acted in good
faith when it offered the policy limit under the Mills policy
and advised the Bowmans that it stood ready to resolve the UIM
claim under the Bowman policy once the liability portion was
resolved.
Further, Globe notes that the Bowman policy had
language which stated that it would pay damages under the policy
“only after the limits of liability under any other applicable
bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements.”
11
The Bowmans argue in response that this situation was
not the typical Coots scenario because Globe insured both
vehicles involved in the accident.
Thus, they maintain Globe
was not in the normal position of an underinsured carrier as
contemplated by either Coots or the language of the Bowman
policy.
We agree.
Furthermore, Supervisor Leiner testified that as of
December 3, 1996, he could have offered the Bowmans the maximum
limits under both policies ($150,000) provided the Bowmans
released Mills from liability and set up the children’s’ estates
to receive the proceeds.
In fact, Globe eventually offered the
full amounts under both policies in October 1998 without
requiring the Bowmans to first exhaust or accept the limits of
the Mills policy.
Finally, Globe argues that the trial court erred in
not granting it a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict because it was at least a “debatable issue” whether
Globe was acting in bad faith for failing to offer a full
settlement under both policies rather than first requiring a
settlement under the Mills policy.
Globe cites the portion of
the Wittmer case which holds that an insurer is entitled to
challenge a claim that is “debatable on the law or the facts.”
Wittmer, 864 S.W.2d at 890.
Globe also notes that the Bowmans
introduced expert testimony that the Mills’ policy limits and
12
the Bowmans’ policy limits should have been offered
simultaneously but that the testimony also revealed that
reasonable minds could differ on the issue.
Globe’s argument in this regard is related to its
previous argument.
The Bowmans respond in much the same way
they did to that argument.
Further, citing the Coots case, the
Bowmans argue that a UIM carrier “cannot refuse to negotiate a
one million dollar claim until the UIM insured can process a
claim against the tortfeasor covered by a $25,000 limit
liability policy to judgment.”
Coots, 853 S.W.2d at 902.
The
Bowmans assert that this is particularly true where Globe was
the insurer under both policies.
We agree.
In addition to the three arguments raised above, Globe
maintains that there was simply a lack of evil motive or bad
faith on its part in the settlement of the claims.
They contend
that “[t]here was at best a lack of communication between Globe
and the Bowmans after Karen Talmadge left Globe some time after
October 23, 1996, and the reassignment of the file to Pattylyn
Taueg in late December.”
Without again reviewing the evidence
presented at trial, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict on each of the ten interrogatories
decided in favor of the Bowmans on their bad faith claims.
13
The judgment of the Whitley Circuit Court is affirmed.5
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
William A. Watson
Middlesboro, Kentucky
Barry Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
Lawrence M. Hansen
Indianapolis, Indiana
5
The cross-appeal by the Bowmans is moot.
14
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