DERRIC M. SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 28, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NOS. 2001-CA-001201-MR
AND
2001-CA-001202-MR
DERRIC M. SMITH
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00413
AND
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00370
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
PAISLEY, JUDGE.
These are consolidated appeals from orders
entered in two different cases involving appellant, Derric
Smith, which were presided over by separate divisions of the
Daviess Circuit Court.
In both divisions, appellant filed
identical motions pursuant to CR 60.02 and CR 60.03 requesting
each to modify its respective sentence in accordance with KRS
532.110, so as to allow appellant to serve his sentences
concurrently rather than consecutively.
circuit court denied appellant’s motion.
Both divisions of the
We affirm.
In 1996, appellant was sentenced to five years in
prison as a result of his guilty pleas in Daviess Circuit Court,
Division II, to the charges of robbery in the second degree,
burglary in the second degree, and four counts of unlawful
transaction with a minor in the second degree.
Appellant served
part of his sentence, but was paroled in May 1997.
While still on parole, appellant committed three
burglaries to which he pled guilty in Daviess Circuit Court,
Division I, in March 1999.
Although he was sentenced to six
years in prison, appellant was placed on probation for three
years as part of an alternative sentencing plan.
Appellant subsequently engaged in further criminal
conduct which resulted in the revocation of both his probation
and his parole for his 1999 and 1996 convictions, respectively.
Thereafter, appellant began serving consecutive sentences for
these convictions.
In both divisions of the court, appellant filed
identical CR 60.02 and CR 60.03 motions requesting that each
court modify its sentence to run concurrently with the other
division’s sentence, rather than consecutively.
were denied, and these appeals followed.
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Both motions
Initially, we note as a matter of procedure that
[a] defendant who is in custody under
sentence or on probation, parole or
conditional discharge, is required to avail
himself of RCr 11.42 as to any ground of
which he is aware, or should be aware,
during the period when the remedy is
available to him. Civil Rule 60.02 is not
intended merely as an additional opportunity
to relitigate the same issues which could
“reasonably have been presented” by direct
appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings. (Citations
omitted.)
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1997). The
purpose of CR 60.02 is such that appellant should have initially
requested relief in the form of a direct appeal or an RCr 11.42
motion.
He did neither.
However, for the sake of judicial
economy, we shall address the merits of his claims on appeal.
In addition, although appellant requested relief pursuant to
both CR 60.02 and CR 60.03, we shall address these claims
simultaneously as appellant failed to state separate grounds for
each.
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that service
of his sentences should be concurrent rather than consecutive.
Appeal No. 2001-CA-001202, involving appellant’s 1996 conviction
in Division II of the Daviess Circuit Court, can be disposed of
summarily because final sentencing for this conviction occurred
at a time when there was no other sentence to consider. As a
result, that court was without authority to determine whether
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the sentence would run concurrently or consecutively with the
later sentence imposed in 1999 by Division I.
Clearly, denial
of this motion was correct.
Moreover, we are not persuaded by appellant’s
contention that KRS 532.110 required the circuit court to run
his 1999 sentence concurrent with his earlier sentence imposed
in 1996.
KRS 532.110 specifies that multiple sentences shall
run concurrently unless otherwise specified by the trial court.
Appellant claims that because the court failed to specify how
his 1999 sentence was to be served with his earlier 1996 term,
he is entitled to serve his sentences concurrently.
However,
KRS 533.060(2) states:
When a person has been convicted of a felony
and is committed to a correctional detention
facility and released on parole or has been
released by the court on probation, shock
probation, or conditional discharge, and is
convicted or enters a plea of guilty to a
felony committed while on parole, probation,
shock probation, or conditional discharge,
the person shall not be eligible for
probation, shock probation, or conditional
discharge and the period of confinement for
that felony shall not run concurrently with
any other sentence. (Emphasis added.)
Since it is undisputed that appellant was on parole when he
committed the burglaries which led to his 1999 conviction, KRS
533.060(2) requires consecutive service of appellant’s
sentences, and the trial judge was left without discretion over
this matter.
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Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the rules of
statutory construction do not mandate that KRS 532.110 should
take precedence over KRS 533.060(2) simply because 532.110 was
amended and reenacted in 1998 and is now the more recent of the
two statutes.
It is true that “[w]here a conflict exists
between two statutes, the later statute enacted is generally
controlling.”
Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d
942, 944 (1992), citing Commonwealth v. Hunt, Ky. App., 619
S.W.2d 733 (1981).
However, our courts have consistently found
that KRS 533.060 takes precedence because it was originally
enacted after KRS 532.110, suggesting that the legislature
intended its application notwithstanding the inconsistency.
Devore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 829 (1984), Riley v.
Parke, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 934 (1987), Commonwealth v. Hunt, Ky.
App., 619 S.W.2d 733 (1981), and Handley v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 653 S.W.2d 165 (1983).
Moreover, White v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 32 S.W.3d 83 (2000), recently addressed this same
argument by pointing out that the amendment to KRS 532.110 dealt
with a portion of the statute which is irrelevant to its
potential inconsistency with KRS 533.060(2).
Reenactment of the
entire statute was simply a procedural requirement mandated by
the Kentucky Constitution, but it had no effect on the portion
of the statute which is pertinent to this situation.
as stated in White, 32 S.W.3d at 86,
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Further,
[i]n substantially reenacting a statute, the
legislature is well aware of the
interpretation of the existing statute and
has adopted that interpretation unless the
new law contains language to the contrary.
If the legislators intended to depart from
the existing statutory interpretation, it is
incumbent that they use “plain and
unmistakable language” which leaves no doubt
that a departure from the prior
interpretation is intended.
Longexisting case law interpreting KRS 532.110
and KRS 533.060(2) has clearly established
the primacy of the latter statute. The
General Assembly has not amended either
statute with clear language evidencing an
intent to change or overrule the courts’
interpretation of these statutes on that
issue. White’s argument that the
reenactment of KRS 532.110 in 1998 allows
the trial court discretion to impose a
concurrent sentence. . . in contravention of
KRS 533.060(2) is without merit. (Citations
omitted.)
We agree with this reasoning and find no basis to
alter the current interpretation of these statutes.
The orders of the Daviess Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT – Pro Se:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Derrick M. Smith
St. Mary, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney
General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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