PATRICIA MORRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 15, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-000711-MR
PATRICIA MORRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLINTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CR-00045 & 00-CR-00045-1
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Patricia Morris appeals from a judgment and
sentence entered March 5, 2001, by the Clinton Circuit Court.
Morris was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled
substance first-degree.1
She received a sentence of one year on
each count, ordered to run concurrently.
We affirm.
On June 8, 2000 police executed a search warrant for
the home Morris shared with her husband David Morris.
The
search warrant affidavit was based on information from a
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415.
confidential informant that David Morris was selling oxycontin
from the residence.
The warrant was executed by Albany Police
Officers Johnny Garner, Mark Bell, and Chris Asberry; Clinton
County Sheriff Kay Riddle and Clinton County Deputy Sheriff Rick
Riddle.
Officer Garner headed the investigation.
The search resulted in the seizure of numerous items,
including several glass and plastic vials, other drug
paraphernalia and two hand-rolled cigarette butts.
Based on the
evidence discovered in the home, Morris and her husband were
arrested.
On June 15, 2000, Officer Garner personally delivered
the items to the Kentucky State Police Crime Lab.
Forensic
testing showed one of the plastic tubes to contain cocaine and
one of the glass tubes to contain methamphetamine.
cigarette butts were found to contain marijuana.
The
On August 21,
2000, Morris was indicted for one count of first-degree
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and one
count of first degree possession of a controlled substance,
cocaine.
A trial was held on January 12, 2001.
The jury found
Morris guilty of both counts and recommended a sentence of one
year on each count.
The jury recommended the sentences run
concurrently for a total of one year imprisonment.
On March 5,
2001, the trial court imposed the jury-recommended sentence.
On appeal, Morris argues that: 1) the trial court
erred in failing to grant a directed verdict; 2) improper chain
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of custody; and 3) reversible error resulted from prosecutorial
misconduct.
Morris argues that she was entitled to a directed
verdict because the prosecution failed to prove that she
knowingly possessed a controlled substance and because the
Commonwealth failed to establish a chain of custody.
The standard for directed verdict is as follows:
On a motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given.2
KRS 218A.1432 states in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of manufacturing
methamphetamine when he knowingly and
unlawfully:
(a) Manufactures methamphetamine; or
(b) Possesses the chemicals or equipment for
the manufacture of methamphetamine with the
intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
In order to prove its case the Commonwealth was
required to show that Morris knowingly possessed the chemicals
or equipment with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
Lewis testified that the box contained the equipment
constituting a two-stage gas generator for the red phosphorous
2
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
-3-
method of methamphetamine production.
Constructive possession
may be established by a showing that the drugs were subject to a
defendant’s dominion or control.3
Officer Garner testified that
Sheriff Riddle and Deputy Sheriff Riddle discovered the drug
paraphernalia in the master bedroom of the residence.
Riddle then called Officer Garner into the room.
Sheriff
Sheriff Riddle
testified that he personally seized the vials, which later
tested positive for the drugs.
He also testified that women’s
clothing and other items in the room indicated to him that an
adult female occupied the bedroom where the search was
conducted.
Sheriff Riddle testified that he found the
paraphernalia at the head of the bed and that to the best of his
recollection there were shelves on the bed.
He stated that he
picked the items up, laid them on a dresser and then called
Officer Garner into the bedroom.
When cross-examined, Sheriff
Riddle stated that, “most of it was on the top of the dresser
and the head of the bed.”
He also testified that he didn’t
recall finding anything in the dresser but that it was all on
top.
In conflict with Sheriff Riddle’s testimony was that of
Morris’ sister, Tammy Butler.
She testified that the headboard
in the master bedroom of Morris’ home did not have shelves and
that there was not a flat surface on top capable of holding the
vials.
The defense introduced the picture of a rounded, and
3
Hargrave v. Commonwealth, Ky., 724 S.W.2d 202, 203 (1986) citing Rupard v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 475 S.W.2d 473, 475 (1972).
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what appears to be flat, headboard.
Butler also testified that
there was a dresser to the right side of the bed in close
proximity to the bed.
testify.
The prosecutor showed him the picture of the
headboard.
house.
He stated, “That’s the bed I thought was in Lisa’s
I got them mixed up, I guess.
Patricia’s house.
other.”
Sheriff Riddle was then called back to
That’s the bed in
I searched them both, one right beside the
When asked if there was a possibility the items could
have been on the dresser sitting next to the bed, the Sheriff
replied, “It was dark in there.
It could have been something
sitting on the side of it, but it was at the head of the bed.”
When questioned further, the Sheriff stated that he was certain
that the items were in plain view.
He admitted that he could
have gotten the trailers mixed up because they were “set out the
same” but that he was sure of the items he retrieved in Patricia
Morris’ home.
Sheriff Riddle further testified that the search
warrant at Morris’ sister’s home was a separate search warrant
executed on a different day and that the evidence in question
came from the search of Morris’ home.
Whether the evidence was found on a shelf on the
headboard or the dresser next to the bed, the Sheriff insisted
that they were found in Morris’ bedroom in plain view.
A
reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence that the
vials were found in plain view in Morris’ bedroom and she
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therefore had constructive possession of them.
As such, it was
not error for the trial court to submit the case to the jury.
“Credibility and weight of the evidence are matters within the
exclusive province of the jury.”4
The defense vigorously
attacked the credibility of Sheriff Riddle and Officer Garner as
to exactly where the items were found.
It was for the jury to
believe or disbelieve their testimony.
Morris also argues that she was entitled to a directed
verdict because the Commonwealth failed to establish a complete
chain of custody of the evidence.
Our review of the record
shows that the chain of custody was established.
Sheriff Riddle
testified that he found the items in the bedroom and called
Officer Garner to the room.
As chief investigator, Officer
Garner took immediate control of all the items.
items in a bag and tied the bag closed.
in the trunk of his car.
He placed the
He then placed the bag
Officer Garner testified that he took
the bag to the police station and checked it into the locked
evidence room, to which only two other individuals had keys.
Officer Garner further testified that to his knowledge no other
drugs were being stored in the evidence room at the time.
Officer Garner testified that he personally took the bag from
the room a week later, placed the items in an envelope, sealed
4
Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 126, 129 (1999) citing Estep v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1997) and Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186
(1991).
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the envelope and initialed the tape.
Officer Garner further
testified that at the time of trial the items were in the same
condition as when he first seized them at Appellant’s home and
when he retrieved them from the evidence room.
The forensic
chemist from the Kentucky State Police Crime Lab testified that
he received the sealed envelope from Officer Garner and that he
tested three of the items.
The chemist testified that there was
no indication that the items had been tampered with or that any
of the materials had been mixed.
Appellant claims that the items “had mysteriously been
placed in another bag and been sealed and marked by some unknown
person.”
The record refutes this claim.
Officer Garner
testified that he took the items from the bag and placed them in
the envelope, sealed the envelope, marked the envelope, and
hand-delivered it to the lab.
Appellant also claims that, “the
judge and jury never knew who found what.”
Again, the record
refutes this claim, in that Sheriff Riddle testified that he
found the vials and turned them over to Officer Garner.
Appellant speculates that because of the method of storage prior
to delivery of the items to the lab, tampering could have
resulted.
In ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, the
trial court correctly stated that, even with respect to
substances which are not clearly identifiable or
distinguishable, “it is unnecessary to establish a perfect chain
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of custody or to eliminate all possibility of tampering or
misidentification, so long as there is persuasive evidence that
"the reasonable probability is that the evidence has not been
altered in any material respect."5
If persuasive evidence is
presented, then any gaps are a question of weight and
credibility for the jury.6
The record contains persuasive
evidence that the evidence was tamper free.
It was for the jury
to decide the weight to be given the evidence and therefore,
Morris was not entitled to a directed verdict.
Morris next argues that reversible error occurred when
the prosecutor made improper comments inferring that Morris
would sell drugs to the high school students next door.
Morris
states that this issue is preserved for appeal by counsel’s
contemporaneous objection.
The Commonwealth submits that the
argument is not properly preserved for appellate review.
agree with the Commonwealth.
We
A thorough review of the record
establishes that the first reference to the proximity of Morris’
residence to the high school was in the Commonwealth’s opening
statement.
The reference was made three times, to which defense
counsel made no objection.
Finally, during closing argument,
the prosecutor stated that, “this drug activity was taking place
a stone’s throw from Clinton County High School.”
5
Robovsky v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998).
6
Id.
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Again defense
counsel failed to object.
While defense counsel did finally
object, it was in response to the following argument:
When we have methamphetamines in our home
with our children, it is time to say enough
is enough. The Community is going to be
watchings [sic] what happens here. Everyone
is wanting to know, if our community now
safe? [sic] Is enough enough? Are we going
to try to stand up for our children our
grandchildren. I have cases...
The transcript of the trial establishes that this objection came
some two pages after the prosecutor stated the location of
Morris’ home in relation to the high school.7
As such, we agree
with the Commonwealth that this issue is unpreserved.
However,
we may consider an unpreserved error pursuant to RCr8 10.26, if
we deem it to be “palpable”.
Palpable error is error that
affects the substantial rights of the defendant and results in
manifest injustice.
In determining whether an error is
palpable, "an appellate court must consider whether on the whole
case there is a substantial possibility that the result would
have been any different."9
In Young v. Commonwealth10 the
Kentucky Supreme Court outlined appellate review of whether an
error resulted in manifest injustice:
7
The record on appeal contains of a transcript of the proceedings.
the content of the bench conferences was not recorded.
8
However,
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
9
Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (2002) citing Commonwealth v.
McIntosh, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1983).
10
Ky., 25 S.W.3d 66, 74-75 (2000).
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An appellate court's review of alleged error
to determine whether it resulted in
"manifest injustice" necessarily must begin
with an examination of both the amount of
punishment fixed by the verdict and the
weight of evidence supporting that
punishment. Other relevant factors,
however, include whether the Commonwealth's
statements are supported by facts in the
record and whether the allegedly improper
statements appeared to rebut arguments
raised by defense counsel. Finally, we must
always consider these closing arguments "as
a whole" and keep in mind the wide latitude
we allow parties during closing arguments.
As stated previously, the evidence against Morris, while not
overwhelming, was sufficient for the jury to conclude she was in
possession of the controlled substances.
minimum sentence on both charges.
Morris received the
The statements were supported
by the testimony of Officer Garner as to the location of the
residence.
The trial court instructed the jury two separate
times that arguments of counsel were not evidence.
As a whole,
we cannot say the comments by the prosecutor resulted in
manifest injustice, warranting the setting aside of the jury
verdict.
Morris’ final argument is that the prosecution
violated Morris’ constitutional right to remain silent.
closing argument the prosecutor stated:
We see a mother who with a serious drug
problem and a husband who comes in here and
takes the Fifth Amendment. I assume she
will be taking the Fifth at his trial. It’s
a sad day.
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During
Even if we were we to conclude that the comment by the
prosecutor was an indirect comment on Morris’ right to remain
silent, “not every reference to a defendant's failure to testify
constitutes reversible error.”11
harmless error analysis.
In Dillard the Court applied a
The court focused on whether the
reference was brief and isolated, whether the jury was properly
instructed as to the defendant’s right to remain silent and
whether the focus of the improper comment was to draw attention
to the fact that the defendant did not testify.
Id.
In the
case sub judice, the reference was brief and isolated.
The jury
was instructed as follows:
Every citizen charged with a crime has a
right to remain silent at trial. This is
because it is not the citizen’s
responsibility to prove herself innocent of
any crime. Patricia Morris has not
testified in this trial as was her right.
You shall not draw any inference of guilt
from her choice. You shall not allow her
choice to prejudice her in any way. If you
use her choice not to testify in any manner,
you will have violated your oath that you
have taken as jurors.
The focus of the statement by the prosecutor was not to comment
on Morris’ right to remain silent but rather to respond to
comments made by the defense in closing arguments.
Defense
counsel stated during closing argument that, “They know who the
outlaw is.
11
The outlaw took the stand, took the Fifth and they
Dillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 366, 374 (1999).
-11-
have not enough proof to take this woman from her child.”
The
prosecutor’s comment was an attempt to show that David Morris’
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights did not absolve
Patricia Morris of guilt, as suggested by the defense.
If in
error at all, the comment was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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