SHANNON LUMPKINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 9, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-000574-MR
SHANNON LUMPKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL REID SPARKS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 00-CR-00018
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Shannon Lumpkins appeals from a final judgment
and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Johnson Circuit
Court following a jury trial in which he was convicted of
assault in the first degree.
to twelve years’ imprisonment.
The trial court sentenced Lumpkins
Finding no error, we affirm.
Lumpkins was arrested on September 13, 1999, and
charged with assault in the first degree.
At the time of his
arrest, Lumpkins was seventeen (17) years old.
This arrest
stemmed from events occurring while Lumpkins was being held in
the juvenile wing of the Johnson County Detention Center.1
During the evening of September 12, 1999, Charlotte
Parsons was working as the juvenile supervisor at the detention
center.
Lumpkins and Steven Davidson were, at this time,
juvenile inmates of the detention center and shared a cell with
three other juvenile males.
As cellmates, Lumpkins and Davidson
formulated a plan to escape from the detention center by
assaulting a guard and taking the keys to the jail.
As was normal custom, Parsons allowed Lumpkins to exit
his cell so that he could retrieve sleeping mats from the
hallway.
While moving the mats into the cell, Lumpkins turned
around and struck Parsons’ face with his fists.
Lumpkins then
jumped on top of Parsons and struck her repeatedly until she
lost consciousness.
Davidson joined this assault by kicking
Parsons in the hips.
While Lumpkins was striking Parsons,
Davidson grabbed her keys and ran to unlock a door.
At this point, Corrections Officer Frank Jude heard
Parsons scream and rushed over to the juvenile wing.
Upon
entering the juvenile wing, Jude witnessed Lumpkins strike
Parsons on her head with his bare fists.
1
Corrections Officer
The record does not disclose the reason why Lumpkins was
being detained in the Johnson County Detention Center.
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Robert Salyer arrived at the scene and assisted Jude in
detaining Lumpkins and Davidson.
he hit Parsons.
Lumpkins informed Salyer that
Officials from the detention center immediately
contacted the local ambulance service.
Emergency Medical
Technician Mike Conley transported Parsons to Paul B. Hall
Regional Medical Center with major trauma around her face.
Conley noted that the trauma was located around Parsons’ eyes.
A hearing was held on September 16, 1999, in the
juvenile division of the Johnson District Court.
At this
hearing, the Commonwealth stated that it would seek
certification of Lumpkins as an adult.
During this hearing,
Lumpkins’ counsel admitted that his client was on probation
because of a recent felony conviction in Tennessee.
On February 4, 2000, the juvenile court, as required
by KRS 635.020(3), held a hearing to determine whether Lumpkins
should be transferred to the Johnson Circuit Court for trial as
a youthful offender pursuant to KRS 640.010.
At this hearing,
the Commonwealth moved to amend the charge from assault in the
first degree to assault in the second degree.
The Commonwealth
introduced evidence that Lumpkins executed a plea agreement in
Tennessee concerning a felony charge.
The Commonwealth,
however, provided no final judgment for this Tennessee felony
charge.
After hearing extensive testimony from Parsons
concerning her injuries, the juvenile court found probable cause
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that Lumpkins committed assault in the second degree and ordered
him transferred to circuit court.
Following his transfer to circuit court, Lumpkins
filed a motion requesting release from custody pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 5.22 because he had
been detained for over sixty (60) days without being indicted.
The Commonwealth asserted that it had not been able to present
its case to the grand jury due to the illnesses of the
investigating officer’s father and the investigating officer.
On April 6, 2000, the trial judge signed an order releasing
Lumpkins from custody and dismissing this matter without
prejudice.
Fourteen (14) days later, the grand jury indicted
Lumpkins for assault in the first degree and first-degree
attempted escape in complicity with others.2
Lumpkins’ jury trial was held in January 2001.
At
trial, the major issue in dispute was the extent of Parsons’
injuries.
Dr. Loey Kousa testified that Parsons suffered no
serious injuries as a result of this incident.
According to Dr.
Kousa, Parsons sustained no fractures, blurred vision, double
vision or had any unilateral sensory complaints.
Dr. Douglas
Lamppin, an ear, nose and throat specialist, testified that
there were no nasal blockages and he detected no serious
2
The attempted escape in complicity with others charge was
eventually dismissed by the trial court.
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injuries resulting from this assault.
Dr. Gregory Baker,
however, testified that Parsons suffered from headaches,
numbness in her cheeks and nasal obstruction.
Dr. Baker also
noted that Parsons suffered a fractured cheekbone, emphysema,
and hypertension as a result of this attack.
Parsons also testified concerning the injuries she
sustained during Lumpkins’ attack.
Parsons testified that she
has difficulty breathing during cold weather.
Further, Parsons
stated that, after being assaulted, she is extremely nervous
around people, has nightmares, and suffers from headaches and
numbness in her face.
Lumpkins was convicted of first-degree assault.
The
jury recommended a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment.
On
March 13, 2001, the trial court sentenced Lumpkins in accordance
with the jury’s recommendations.
The trial court denied
Lumpkins’ motion for shock probation.
This appeal follows.
On appeal, Lumpkins presents eight arguments for our
review.
First, Lumpkins argues that the Johnson District Court
erred when it based the decision to transfer him to circuit
court on a pending adjudication that was not final.
this argument to be totally without merit.
We find
During his first
appearance in juvenile court, Lumpkins’ trial counsel admitted
that he was convicted of a felony in Tennessee and was on
probation for that crime.
Moreover, at trial, Lumpkins’ trial
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attorneys stipulated that the conviction from Tennessee was
properly certified, showing that Lumpkins was convicted of a
class C felony in Claiborne County, Tennessee.
The law is clear
that admissions made to a court by counsel relative to issues
are binding on the client.
Bell County Board Of Education v.
Howard, 248 Ky. 766, 59 S.W.2d 982, (1933).
Since trial counsel
openly admitted that Lumpkins had, in fact, been convicted of a
felony in Tennessee and was on probation for such crime,
Lumpkins is bound by that action.
243 S.W.2d 890 (1951).
See Jones v. Phillips, Ky.,
Accordingly, we find no error concerning
the district court’s consideration of the conviction Lumpkins
accepted from our sister state.
Next, Lumpkins argues that the trial court erred by
transferring him to the circuit court without properly finding
that the Commonwealth failed to sufficiently demonstrate all
elements necessary for such transfer to occur.
We disagree.
KRS 640.010(2)(c) clearly states that, if the court,
after a preliminary hearing, finds “that two (2) or more of the
factors specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection are
determined to favor transfer, the child may be transferred to
Circuit Court.”
as follows:
The factors enumerated in KRS 640.010(2)(b) are
the seriousness of the alleged offense; whether the
offense was against persons or property; the maturity of the
child as determined by his environment; the child’s prior
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record; the best interest of the child and community; the
prospects of adequate protection of the public; the likelihood
of reasonable rehabilitation of the child through the resources
of the juvenile justice system; and evidence of a child’s
participation in a gang.
Here, the videotape of the February 4, 2000, hearing
shows that the district court considered all of the factors
listed in KRS 640.010(2)(b).
The district court found that the
assault charge against Lumpkins was a serious offense against a
person.
Additionally, the district court found that Lumpkins
possessed an extensive criminal record in both Kentucky and
Tennessee.
Further, the court determined that both Lumpkins and
the community were best served with Lumpkins being tried as an
adult because of the seriousness of the incident at issue.
Finally, the trial court openly doubted that Lumpkins could be
rehabilitated through the juvenile justice system.
All of these
findings are clearly supported by the evidence received at the
preliminary hearing.
With at least six of the required factors
sufficiently proven at the February 4, 2000, hearing, the trial
court properly entered an order transferring Lumpkins to the
Johnson Circuit Court as a youthful offender.
Lumpkins further argues that the district court should
have made its findings pursuant to KRS 640.010(2)(b) in writing.
The district court’s docket notation, rather than making
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specific findings of reasonable cause, merely orders Lumpkins
transferred to circuit court for trial as an adult.
The docket
notation also states, “Court has stated reasons why Juv. is a
youthful Defender [sic] on a taped record.”
While we believe
that the district court's written order, standing alone, is not
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the circuit court, the
videotape of this hearing reveals that the district court
provided a detailed analysis of its findings.
We note that this
Court has recognized that a district court may orally provide
rulings supporting its findings to transfer jurisdiction.
Harden v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 885 S.W.2d 323, 324-25 (1994).
Thus, since the district court, via the videotaped record,
provided a detailed analysis of its findings, we find no error
concerning the district court’s lack of written findings.
Third, Lumpkins asserts that the circuit court erred
by making him stand trial for first-degree assault even though
the district court did not find probable cause for that offense.
We reject this argument.
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently addressed this
issue in Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 234 (2001).
In
Osborne, the defendant was transferred to circuit court and
charged with two murders, first-degree arson, and first-degree
robbery.
Id., at 238.
Following this transfer, the grand jury
indicted Osborne on the transferred charges, as well as first-
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degree burglary.
Id.
Osborne argued that the circuit court
possessed no jurisdiction to hear the burglary charge since the
district court did not transfer that offense to circuit court.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that “under
the statutory scheme for youthful offenders, it is the offender
that is transferred to circuit court, not the offense.”
Id.
Thus, it appears the grand jury may indict a juvenile defendant
for additional or different offenses as long as the new charges
involve the same victim and arise from the same conduct.
In this matter herein, Lumpkins was transferred after
the district court found probable cause to believe that he
committed second-degree assault.
The grand jury, however, chose
to indict Lumpkins for first-degree assault using evidence
predicated on his actions against Parsons.
Thus, under Osborne,
Lumpkins was properly transferred to circuit court, leaving the
grand jury free to indict him for first-degree assault since
that charge arose from the same facts and involved the same
victim as the transferred charges.
For his fourth assertion of error, Lumpkins argues
that the circuit court erred when it did not return jurisdiction
of him to the district court after the grand jury failed to
indict him in March 2000.
In support of this argument, Lumpkins
asserts that the trial court entered an order dismissing this
charge without prejudice on April 6, 2000.
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By entering an order
of dismissal, Lumpkins believes the circuit court terminated all
proceedings against him.
Accordingly, Lumpkins argues that the
Commonwealth is required to recertify its case before the
district court prior to obtaining another indictment.
While
Lumpkins has presented an interesting argument, it is clear from
the record that he raises this argument for the first time on
appeal.
By failing to raise this issue in the circuit court,
Lumpkins waived this argument.
Hence, this issue is not
properly before us for review.3
Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 80
S.W.3d 759, 760 (2002), citing Commonwealth v. Thompson, Ky.,
697 S.W.2d 143 (1985).
Lumpkins next argues that the cumulative effect of the
errors raised thus far constitutes a denial of due process and
requires a reversal of his conviction.
We disagree.
Based on
our conclusions to this point, we need not address this
argument.
See McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694, 701
3
Even if Lumpkins had properly objected, we cannot accept his
argument. KRS 635.020(3) limits the jurisdiction of the
district court to act any further following its determination of
probable cause. This line of reasoning is supported by
Commonwealth v. Halsell, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 552 (1996). In
Halsell, the Supreme Court found that, following a determination
of reasonable cause to believe a child over age 14 has been
charged with a felony wherein a firearm was used to commit the
offense, KRS 635.020(4) operates to limit the jurisdiction of
the district court to act any further. The Supreme Court also
noted that Section 112(5) of the Kentucky Constitution vested
the circuit court with jurisdiction as to that particular class
of offenders. Thus, nothing in KRS Chapter 635 or KRS Chapter
640 requires the Commonwealth to recertify its case against
Lumpkins in district court before seeking another indictment.
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(1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 2203, 95 L. Ed.
2d 858 (1987).
Sixth, Lumpkins argues that the circuit court erred by
denying his motion for a mistrial after inadmissible evidence
was placed before the jury.
Again, we disagree.
During cross-examination, Corrections Officer Robert
Salyer testified that Lumpkins admitted to assaulting Parsons
during his attempt to escape from the Johnson County Detention
Center.
Lumpkins immediately objected to this testimony
pursuant to KRS 610.200 because this admission was made outside
of the presence of his parents or counsel.4
for a mistrial.
Lumpkins also moved
The trial court sustained the objection to
Salyer’s testimony concerning this admission, but overruled the
motion for a mistrial.
At this point, the trial court
admonished the jury as follows:
[T]he statement given by the Defendant in the
absence of counsel at some later point in time
is not to be considered by you as evidence in
this case, because it is an admission made,
allegedly, without proper admonitions being
given to this young man. . .
A mistrial is appropriate only where the record
reveals "a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or
4
KRS 610.200(1) requires an officer who takes a juvenile
into custody to “immediately inform the child of his
constitutional rights and afford him the protections required
thereunder.” The Commonwealth does not dispute that Lumpkins
was not advised of his constitutional rights prior to admitting
his guilt to Salyer.
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real necessity."
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672,
678 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130, 106 S. Ct. 1998, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 678 (1986) (quoting Wiley v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 575
S.W.2d 166 (1979)).
When an admonition is given, it is
ordinarily presumed that the admonition controls the jury and
removes the prejudice that brought about the admonition.
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 200, 204 (1993).
Clay
The
trial court immediately admonished the jury not to consider
Salyer’s testimony concerning any admission of guilt Lumpkins
may have provided.
With an immediate admonition, we do not
believe that the trial court had an urgent or real necessity to
declare a mistrial.
Lumpkins has not overcome the presumption
that the admonition cured any resulting prejudice.
In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the
admonition achieved the desired effect.
Id.
A trial court has
discretion in deciding whether to declare a mistrial, with that
decision not being disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 662 S.W.2d 483 (1983).
We find
no abuse of discretion.
Lumpkins next argues that the trial court erred by
permitting the introduction of hearsay evidence concerning his
culpability.
Specifically, Lumpkins complains that a portion of
the testimony of the investigating officer, Paintsville Police
Officer Paul Witten, was improperly admitted into evidence.
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Officer Witten testified that Lumpkins and Davidson were both
charged with assault in connection with the attack on Parsons.
However, Witten noted that the Johnson County Attorney sought to
have Lumpkins, but not Davidson, transferred to circuit court
because of Lumpkins’ age5 and the severity of the victim’s
injuries.
Officer Witten also testified as follows:
Q 24: Well, let me ask you this. After
taking the statements, the involvement between
the two Defendants in the commission of the
offense, was that a factor in any way?
A:
That has something to do with it. I
based my investigation on what evidence I had
and what statements I had and what I saw. . .
the injuries of the victim.
Q 25:
And the defendant’s involvement?
A:
Yes.
Q 26:
Between the two Defendants involved?
A:
Yes.
Lumpkins asserts on appeal that this line of
questioning was improper investigative hearsay or improperly
bolstered the Commonwealth’s case.
Unfortunately, Lumpkins
failed to enter a contemporaneous objection to this questioning
during his trial.6
Thus, this issue was not properly preserved
5
The assault on Parsons occurred approximately three (3)
months prior to Lumpkins turning eighteen (18) years of age.
6
In his brief, Lumpkins states that this issue was preserved
by an objection. However, in reviewing the trial transcript,
Lumpkins’ objection was based upon whether Officer Witten could
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for our review.
796 (1995).
Renfro v. Commonwealth, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 795,
See also RCr 9.22.
Moreover, even if we addressed this argument under the
palpable error rule as set out in RCr 10.26, we find no error.
A palpable error is an error affecting the substantial rights of
a party and relief may be granted only upon a determination that
a manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996).
Partin v.
In other words,
this Court, upon consideration of the whole case, must conclude
that a substantial possibility exists that the result would have
been different in order to grant relief.
Id.
Here, a review of
the record clearly refutes any contention that the outcome of
this trial would have been different absent the allegedly
improper questioning by the Commonwealth.
In light of the
overwhelming evidence of Lumpkins’ guilt contained in the
record, we are convinced that any error occasioned by the
allegedly improper questions was at best harmless.
Thus, any
possibility of a different outcome was, at best, remote.
Finally, Lumpkins argues that the trial court erred by
not granting his motion for a directed verdict.
Lumpkins
believes that he was entitled to a directed verdict since the
testify that the Johnson County Attorney elected to transfer
Lumpkins, but not Davidson, to circuit court. Lumpkins failed
to object to any testimony by Officer Witten concerning his
investigation of the September 1999, assault on Parsons.
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Commonwealth produced no evidence that Lumpkins used his hands
or feet as dangerous instruments resulting in serious physical
injury to Parsons.
We disagree.
A directed verdict is warranted only where the
Commonwealth’s evidence fails to establish guilt.
Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 326 (1974).
Butler v.
On review, the test
of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only
then is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991);
Trowel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 530 (1977).
A defendant
is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal if it would
not be unreasonable for a jury to find him guilty.
Yarnell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 834 (1992); Commonwealth v.
Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983).
KRS 500.080(3) defines a “dangerous instrument” as:
[A]ny instrument, including parts of the human
body when a serious physical injury is a
direct result of the use of that part of the
human body, article, or substance which, under
the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used, or threatened to be
used, is readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury.
We acknowledge that the Kentucky Supreme Court, in
Roney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 863 (1985), declared that
a human fist is not a “dangerous instrument” within the meaning
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of the first-degree assault statute.
However, in Johnson v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 926 S.W.2d 463 (1996), a panel of this
Court held that the inclusion of parts of the human body as
“dangerous instruments” depends upon the facts of the case as
well as the capability of the particular body part at issue to
cause death or serious injury.
Applying this holding, the panel
in Johnson determined that a defendant was properly charged with
assault in the first degree after he admitted striking a twomonth-old infant in the forehead with his hand, causing the
infant to sustain a life threatening skull fracture.
In this matter herein, we believe the facts presented
at trial, as well as Lumpkins’ apparent attempt to use his fists
to cause injury, require his fists to be included as “dangerous
instruments.”
It is undisputed from the trial record that
Lumpkins intended to repeatedly strike any corrections official
with his fists in order to escape from custody.
Lumpkins found
an opportunity to orchestrate his escape plans by striking
Parsons with his fists while retrieving sleeping mats for the
cell.
By intentionally using his fists to physically
incapacitate Parsons and facilitate his escape, we believe that
the trial court, in this case, correctly included fists as
“dangerous instruments.”
“Serious physical injury” is defined in KRS
500.080(15) as follows:
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[P]hysical injury which creates a substantial
risk of death, or which causes serious and
prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment
of health, or prolonged loss of impairment of
the function of any bodily organ.
In this matter, the record contains evidence that
Parsons sustained serious physical injuries as a result of
Lumpkins striking her face with his fists.
Specifically,
Parsons testified that, as a result of Lumpkins’ strikes to her
head, a portion of her face still experiences numbness.
Moreover, Parsons stated that her headaches and recurring
nightmares about this incident have persisted and that she
continues to have difficulty breathing in cold weather.
We
believe that, through Parsons’ testimony, the Commonwealth
submitted proof that Lumpkins caused prolonged impairment of
Parsons’ health by hindering her ability to breathe.
Accordingly, the question of whether Parsons sustained a
“serious physical injury” was a proper question of fact for the
jury.
In making his argument, Lumpkins points out that the
medical evidence submitted to the jury fails to prove that any
prolonged impairment occurred.
In fact, medical evidence
submitted at trial from Dr. Kousa and Dr. Lamppin suggests that
Parsons did not sustain any permanent impairment from the
September 1999, incident.
Lumpkins also reminds us that this
Court has previously held that medical testimony is the
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preferred method of proving “serious physical injury.”
Johnson
926 S.W.2d at 465.
While Lumpkins does present a strong argument that the
medical testimony refutes Parsons’ testimony concerning the
seriousness of her injuries, Parsons’ testimony was properly
presented to the jury.
Even though medical testimony is the
preferred method of proving serious physical injury, medical
proof is not an absolute requisite to prove serious physical
injury.
Key v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 840 S.W.2d 827, 829
(1992).
A victim is competent to testify about her own
injuries.
(1965).
Ewing v. Commonwealth, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 651, 653
Thus, a victim’s testimony concerning her physical
injuries may be considered by the jury.
465.
Johnson, 926 S.W.2d at
In addition, some medical evidence supported Parsons’
testimony concerning her injuries.
Dr. Baker testified that he
treated Parsons for headaches, numbness in her cheeks, and nasal
obstruction.
Additionally, Dr. Baker stated that Parsons
sustained a fractured cheekbone, emphysema, and hypertension as
a result of this attack.
Dr. Baker also noted that he performed
surgery on Parsons to fix a deviated septum.7
Finally, Dr. Baker
testified that, while Parsons did not sustain a life-threatening
injury or prolonged disfigurement as a result of the injuries
7
Dr. Baker described a deviated septum as a sign of
significant nasal trauma.
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she suffered during the September 1999, incident, she did
sustain a prolonged impairment of her health.
It appears that
the jury considered all of the evidence, both medical and lay
testimony, brought before it.
The jury obviously gave the
testimony of Parsons and Dr. Baker more attention, as it was
entitled to do.
793 (1968).
See Matherly v. Commonwealth, Ky., 436 S.W.2d
Since the entire record reveals that it was not
clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Lumpkins guilty under
these facts, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of
Lumpkins’ motion for a directed verdict.
We are also aware that whether the victim’s injury is
a “serious physical injury” is often a matter of the application
of a jury’s common sense.
S.W.2d 323 (1993).
Commonwealth v. Hocker, Ky., 865
Here, we believe that Parsons’ testimony
provided sufficient evidence to induce a reasonable juror to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Parsons’ injuries
constituted “serious physical injury” in the statutory sense.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Johnson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Suzanne A. Hopf
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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