JA-RON S. TEAGUE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 23, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-000462-MR
AND
NO. 2001-CA-000688-MR
JA-RON S. TEAGUE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-002453
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING BOTH APPEALS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Ja-ron Shawn Teague (hereinafter “Teague”) has
appealed from two sets of rulings by the Jefferson Circuit
Court:
1) the February 1, 2001, order denying his motion for
recalculation of time served and the order denying his motion
for reconsideration of that order,1 and 2) the February 8, 2001,
order denying his motion to interpret KRS 439.179(1)(2) and
declaration of rights, and from the order denying his motion for
1
Appeal No. 2001-CA-000462-MR.
reconsideration of that order.2
This Court consolidated the
matters for purposes of appeal.
Having reviewed Teague’s two
briefs and supplemental brief, the Commonwealth’s consolidated
brief, and the record, we find no error in any of the circuit
court’s rulings.
Thus, we affirm.
On September 30, 1998, the Jefferson County Grand Jury
returned indictments against Teague on charges of Escape II3 and
for being a First Degree Persistent Felony Offender.4
The
charges arose from Teague’s July 9, 1998, escape from the River
City Corrections detention facility while on work release.
At
the time he escaped, Teague was serving a 365-day sentence for a
misdemeanor charge, which had been imposed on September 19,
1997.
Throughout the course of the escape proceedings, Teague
argued that he was improperly allowed to participate in work
release as his commitment order had a “no release” notation on
it.
Because he never should have been permitted to leave on
work release, he asserted, he could not be punished for
escaping.
Nevertheless, during an August 20, 1999, pre-trial
conference, Teague decided to accept the Commonwealth’s offer on
a plea of guilty.
The Commonwealth recommended a five-year
sentence on the Escape II charge, enhanced to ten years due to
2
3
4
Appeal No. 2001-CA-000688-MR.
KRS 520.030.
KRS 532.080.
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the PFO I charge, and also recommended probation on the strict
condition of compliance with the circuit court’s orders and
admission to the Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center.5
If
the circuit court decided not to grant probation, the
Commonwealth reserved the right to amend the PFO I charge to a
PFO II charge, and recommend a five-year sentence to serve.
The
circuit court accepted Teague’s guilty plea,6 and after he agreed
to waive separate sentencing, continued with the sentencing
hearing.
The circuit court chose to accept the Commonwealth’s
recommendation to grant probation, and sentenced Teague to an
enhanced sentence of ten years, but withheld rendition of the
sentence and placed him on intensive probation with Probation
and Parole for five years on the condition that he strictly
comply with several requirements.
These requirements included
that he commit no other offenses; that he have no alcohol or
drugs; that he enroll in, stay in, and complete the Salvation
Army treatment program; that he continue counseling and
treatment after completion of the program during his
probationary period; that he abide by the court’s orders; and
that he keep all of his appointments with his probation officer.
5
Teague vehemently asserted throughout the proceedings that he needed
substance abuse treatment due to his admitted drug addiction problem, and had
himself contacted the Salvation Army regarding entrance to the rehabilitation
program.
6
Teague provided the circuit court with his address during the guilty plea
portion of the hearing.
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Furthermore, the circuit court directed him to report
immediately to the Salvation Army upon his release.
The circuit
court placed a telephone call to the Salvation Army office to
ensure that a bed was still available and to inform the office
that Teague was being sent there that day.
The Salvation Army
indicated that they would wait for him to arrive, and that if he
had not arrived by 6:00 p.m., the sheriff would be contacted.
The written judgment was not entered until the following Monday,
August 23, 1999.
Teague was released by corrections officials shortly
after 6:00 p.m. on the evening of Friday, August 20, 1999, but
he unfortunately failed to report to the Salvation Army.
Instead, he was arrested at 11:30 p.m. that night by the
Jefferson County Police Department for shoplifting, possession
of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of drug
paraphernalia, and resisting arrest.7
The probation office
reported the arrest to the circuit court, and the Salvation Army
also reported that Teague failed to report as directed.
Teague
was apparently released shortly after his August 20, 1999,
arrest, because the circuit court issued a bench warrant on
August 26, 1999.
He was again arrested on August 29, 1999, on
the bench warrant and for shoplifting at J.C. Penny.
7
The
Teague claimed that he was released too late for him to arrive at the
Salvation Army before it closed at 6:00 p.m. and that he had nowhere else to
go as he was homeless. We note, however, that Teague provided the circuit
court with an address earlier that day in open court.
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Commonwealth immediately moved to revoke Teague’s probation on
the grounds that he failed to report as directed, failed to
follow the court ordered conditions of probation, and failed to
report a new arrest.
However, the revocation hearing was
continued several times to allow for resolution of his new
district court charges, including a competency evaluation by
KCPC.
On January 21, 2000, the parties appeared regarding the
motion to revoke.
By that time, Teague had been found competent
by the district court on the basis of the KCPC evaluation, and
the district court charges had been disposed of by agreement
with the Commonwealth.
As a part of the district court
agreement, Teague agreed to stipulate to the allegations in the
motion to revoke, to not object to revocation of his probation,
and to not request shock probation.
The circuit court revoked
Teague’s probation and remanded him for service of the ten-year
sentence imposed on August 20, 1999.
A written order
memorializing the bench ruling was entered the same day.
Following his incarceration, Teague filed several pro
se motions with the circuit court, all of which were denied.
On
January 12, 2001, he filed a motion for other credit time
pursuant to KRS 532.120, requesting credit for time served from
August 28, 1997, through August 20, 1999.
The circuit court
requested a recalculation of jail time credit from Probation and
Parole, and received a response by letter dated January 19,
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2001.
Probation and Parole Officer Debbie Flach indicated that
Teague had been accurately credited with 527 days.
Therefore,
the circuit court denied the motion by order entered February 1,
2001, and denied Teague’s motion for reconsideration on February
9, 2001.
It is from these two orders that Teague took the
appeal docketed as appeal No. 2001-CA-000462-MR.
On February 2, 2001, Teague filed a pro se motion to
interpret KRS 439.179(1)(2)/declaration of rights.
In this
motion, Teague was apparently seeking a dismissal or
modification of his Escape II sentence because he was released
for work in contravention to an order directing that he not be
released while serving the sentence for his misdemeanor
conviction.
Additionally, he was requesting that the circuit
court interpret a statute dealing with the release of
misdemeanants.
The circuit court denied the motion on February
8, 2001, and denied the motion to reconsider that ruling on
February 22, 2001.
It is from these rulings that Teague filed
the appeal docketed as appeal No. 2001-CA-000688-MR.
APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-000462-MR
At the outset, we note that the circuit court record
contains a pleading from Teague styled “Motion to Withdraw Jail
Credit Time Appeal,” filed on March 14, 2001, after the notice
of appeal was filed in this case.
In the motion, Teague
indicated that he no longer wanted to address the issue of jail
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time credit.
The circuit court, properly, did not rule on this
motion, but the motion was not forwarded to the Court of
Appeals.
Although we could dismiss the appeal based upon this
motion, we note that Teague perfected his appeal by filing a
brief in this matter.
Therefore, we shall address the merits of
the appeal.
In appears that Teague’s argument is that he is
entitled to a credit from August 28, 1997, when he began serving
his sentence on the misdemeanor conviction, until August 20,
1999, when the circuit court entered the Escape II conviction.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth argues that the circuit
court properly denied Teague’s motion in that he was correctly
credited with 527 days following the revocation of his probation
on January 21, 2000.
We agree with the Commonwealth that Teague was not
entitled to any more credit than the circuit court had already
allowed him.
He clearly is not entitled to credit back to
August 28, 1997, on the escape charge because he did not commit
that offense until July 9, 1998.
Furthermore, the 527 days of
credit to which Teague was entitled on January 21, 2000, covers
the time during which he was in custody (after serving out his
misdemeanor sentence) for the escape charge and upon his rearrest for probation violations and subsequent revocation,
adjusted for the time he was not in custody for whatever reason.
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The circuit court did not commit any error or abuse
its discretion in denying Teague’s motion for additional jail
time credit or his motion for reconsideration.
APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-000688-MR
In this appeal, Teague continues with his longstanding argument that his Escape II conviction should be
dismissed because he never should have been placed on work
release, based upon the “no release” notation on his misdemeanor
commitment order, and because he was entrapped by this action.
He also requests that this Court “settle the existing
controversy over who grants misdemeanor work, etc, releases,
pursuant to KRS 439.179 and RCr 3.18 and interpret and certify
the law on KRS 439.179(1)(2)(3)(4) and RCr 3.18.”
The
Commonwealth, again, argues that the circuit court properly
denied this motion, and that Teague cannot legitimately shift
the blame for his actions to corrections officials.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth asserts that in making his
arguments, Teague ignores the fact that he entered a guilty plea
to the Escape II charge, and therefore waived his right to
present any defense.
We agree with the Commonwealth’s argument that Teague
is precluded from raising any defenses regarding the
circumstances of the escape charge due to his decision to enter
a guilty plea.
As set out in the Commonwealth’s brief, it is
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well established that “the effect of a guilty plea is to waive
all defenses except that the indictment charged no offense.”
Porter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 166, 167 (1992).
Likewise, we need not address Teague’s request that we
interpret and certify the law regarding KRS 439.179.
The
statute has no relations to this felony case, and any issue
should have been raised, if at all, in the district court
presiding over the misdemeanor conviction.
Furthermore, only
the Kentucky Supreme Court has the authority to certify the law.
CR 76.37.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying either Teague’s motion for interpretation/declaration of
rights or his motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the
Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, PRO SE
IN BOTH APPEALS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE IN BOTH
APPEALS:
Ja-Ron S. Teague
Burgin, KY
A. B. Chandler
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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