CURTIS FITCH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 20, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2000-CA-002700-MR
CURTIS FITCH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN ROBERT MORGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DYCHE AND McANULTY, JUDGES; AND POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE1
POTTER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Curtis Fitch appeals from a jury verdict
convicting him of first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree
persistent felony offender.
Fitch contends that the trial court
erred by permitting three witnesses to testify regarding hearsay
statements bolstering the testimony of the complaining witness;
erred in admitting a report prepared by the examining physician;
1
Senior Status Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution.
erred by permitting the prosecutor to impeach Fitch’s wife by
showing the particular felonies of which the appellant had been
convicted; erred by denying the appellant the opportunity to
cross-examine the examining physician regarding the healing
time-frame for a hymenal tear; that the prosecutor exceeded the
permissible limits in cross-examining Fitch and in his closing
arguments; and that the trial court violated ex post facto when
it required a sex offender presentence evaluation pursuant to
KRS 17.554 when there was no proof that the crime occurred after
the effective date of the statute.
Because the trial court erred by permitting
inadmissible hearsay statements bolstering the testimony of the
complaining witness, and because the error was not harmless, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.
We also address those
allegations of error which may recur upon retrial.
On February 15, 1999, Ernistine Wakeland, the paternal
grandmother of the child, was returning the child, K. W., to the
Fitch residence following a visitation with her father.
Upon
arriving at the residence K. W. expressed reluctance to be left
alone with Fitch, and stated that Fitch had previously made her
disrobe for him.
The grandmother left the child with Fitch but
reported the incident to the police the next day.
On February
16, 1999, Detective Glenn Caudill of the Kentucky State Police
interviewed the child at school, had her removed from the home,
2
and asked Dr. Elizabeth Spencer Allen to examine her.
On
February 26, 1999, Dr. Spencer-Allen examined the child and
determined that she had been sexually abused.
In the course of
the examination K. W. identified Fitch as the perpetrator of the
abuse.
On August 26, 1999, Fitch was indicted for firstdegree sexual abuse (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.110)
and first-degree persistent felony offender (KRS 532.080).
The trial was held on October 9 and 10, 2000.
witnesses were called to testify.
Six
In addition to the child and
Fitch, the witnesses at trial were Detective Caudill, the
investigating officer; Ernestine Wakeland, the child’s paternal
grandmother; Dr. Spencer-Allen, the doctor who examined the
child at Detective Caudill’s request; and the child’s mother,
Wanda Sue Wakeland Fitch.
According to the trial testimony, at the time of the
alleged abuse, in July 1998, Fitch was married to, and living
with, the child’s mother Wanda Sue.
The child occasionally
visited with her natural father, who resided with his mother,
Ernestine Wakeland.
Fitch did not contest the Commonwealth’s
assertion that the child had been sexually abused.
Rather Fitch
asserted that, as his lawyer put it in opening, “at the end of
the day we are going to ask you to find Mr. Fitch not guilty
because this didn’t happen on his watch.”
3
The defense theory
was that the perpetrator was a neighbor who babysat the child at
her father’s home.
In support of this defense, Wanda Sue testified that
in 1997, prompted by K. W.’s problems at school, she had asked
her if anything was wrong.
The child responded that a
babysitter at her father’s house had sexually abused her.
The
mother did not believe the accusation and took no action.
When
interviewed by Detective Caudill in relation to the charges
against Fitch, the child acknowledged having made this previous
accusation against the sitter.
At trial, however, the child
denied having previously made the allegations against the
sitter.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Fitch
guilty of first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree persistent
felony offender.
He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
HEARSAY ISSUES
Fitch contends that the trial court erred by failing
to exclude hearsay statements of K. W. offered by the examining
physician, the grandmother, and the investigating detective.
appeal the Commonwealth acknowledges that the out-of-court
statements identified by Fitch are hearsay and that Fitch’s
4
On
objections would be well taken unless Fitch failed to timely
object, the statements were admitted under an exception to the
hearsay rule, or the statements were introduced by Fitch
himself.
DISCUSSION
We first address whether the hearsay issues are
properly preserved.
Fitch made few, if any, contemporaneous
objections to the hearsay statements he now cites were
erroneously admitted.
However, in written pretrial motions,
oral argument before trial, and objections during the trial,
Fitch objected to the examining physician, the paternal
grandmother, and the lead detective testifying regarding the
child’s prior out-of-court statements implicating Fitch as her
abuser.
Though not raised on appeal, at trial Fitch even
objected to the child herself testifying as to her prior out-ofcourt statements implicating Fitch.
Particular effort was
directed against the examining physician testifying to such
statements.
Fitch maintained that K. W.’s out-of-court
statements were hearsay not subject to any exception.
Further, prior to trial Fitch filed a memorandum that
raised the issue and cited Miller v. Commonwealth, Ky., 925
S.W.2d 449 (1996), Sharp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 849 S.W.2d 542
(1993), Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990), and
5
Souder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 730 (1986).
Both before
trial and during an in-chambers discussion during trial the
hearsay issues were argued and these cases produced, read and
argued over.
In addition it appears that the argument in this
case duplicated similar arguments between defense counsel and
prosecutors that had been made in related cases.
Therefore,
despite the absence of contemporaneous objections, it cannot be
said that Fitch waived any objection to the admission of the
hearsay statements.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
9.22; Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 103(a)(1); O’Bryan v.
Hedgespeth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 571 (1995).
The Commonwealth’s primary argument in response to
Fitch’s allegations of error is that the hearsay statements were
admissible under KRE 801A(a)(2), which provides that prior
consistent statements are admissible to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication.
In this case, however, there was simply no charge
of recent fabrication and no facts to support such an inference.
K. W. first raised the allegations against Fitch with her
grandmother on February 15, 1998, and, subsequently, her
allegation that Fitch was the perpetrator remained consistent.
For KRE 801A(a)(2) to apply, the prior consistent statement
would have had to have predated her original round of
allegations to show that her initial reports were not a recent
fabrication.
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S.Ct.
6
696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995); Noel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 76
S.W.3d 923, 928 (2002).
The Commonwealth also contends that Fitch elicited the
hearsay statements himself.
While it is true that Fitch himself
elicited testimony from the Detective regarding the child’s
earlier allegation against the alternative suspect, the former
babysitter, and in so doing may have opened the door to related
testimony, the door was not opened to other hearsay statements
repeated by the Detective.
Further, no such claim can be made
regarding the hearsay statements repeated by the child’s
paternal grandmother or the examining Doctor.
HEARSAY TESTIMONY BY EXAMINING PHYSICIAN
Turning first to the examining physician’s recitation
of hearsay statements made by K. W., after testifying as to her
physical finding indicating digital penetration, the following
questioning of the physician transpired:
Q.
Doctor, did [K. W.] tell you what
caused this?
A.
Yes, she did.
Q.
What did she tell you?
A.
She told me that on three,
approximately three occasions her stepfather
had stuck his finger up in her and that it
hurt--- it felt really bad. And when she
said the word “bad,” she emphasized it
greatly.
7
In Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990),
the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that the modern approach
to the issue (as represented by Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence) “blurs the distinction between treating and
testifying physicians. . . . " but made it clear that the
distinction had not been abolished.
Drumm recognized the
desirability of a more flexible approach to the determination of
whether such evidence should be admitted or excluded but
acknowledged that statements made to a physician who is
consulted for a purpose other than treatment have less inherent
reliability than such statements made to a treating physician.
As such, Drumm directed application of a prejudicial
effect versus probative value analysis.
The rule required a
trial court to begin with the view that statements made to a
physician who lacks treatment responsibility have less inherent
reliability than traditional patient history.
With this view in
mind, the trial court was required to then decide whether from
the totality of the circumstances the probative value of the
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.
This approach was
reiterated in Sharp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 849 S.W. 2d 542
(1993); Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 882 (1994); and
Miller v. Commonwealth, Ky., 925 S.W.2d 449 (1995).
8
The Drumm rule was the rule in effect at the time of
the trial in this case.
Based upon the application of the Drumm
rule, we are persuaded that the hearsay statements related by K.
W. to Dr. Spencer-Allen, who was clearly a non-treating
physician, were not admissible as the prejudicial effect of the
hearsay statement outweighed its probative value.
2
In Garrett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 48 S.W.3d 6 (2001), a
case decided by the Supreme Court after the trial in this case,
the Supreme Court held that the Drumm rule did not survive the
adoption of KRE 803(4), which was effective July 1, 1992.
Garrett held that the adoption of KRE 803(4) abolished the
distinction between treating and examining physicians and that
inquiry for admissibility following the adoption of the rule was
threefold.
First, whether the hearsay statement fits within KRE
803(4) in that the statement “was made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”
Second, whether the statement is admissible as relevant evidence
2
In an in limine ruling the trial court held “It seems that Dr. Spencer-Allen
would be an evaluating, rather than a treating, physician . . . . Therefore
she would not be permitted to testify as to the history.” We note two
things. The trial court did not apply the probative value versus prejudice
prong of the Drumm test and, second, the testimony by the Doctor’s repeating
of K. W.’s hearsay statements violated the in limine ruling.
9
under KRE 402.
And thirdly, whether, pursuant to KRE 403, the
statement’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice [not if its prejudicial effect merely
outweighs its probative value per Drumm], confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Garrett at 13 – 14.
We are persuaded that the doctor’s testimony that “She
told me that on three, approximately three occasions her
stepfather had stuck his finger up in her and that it hurt--- it
felt really bad.
And when she said the word “bad,” she
emphasized it greatly” does not meet the new test as set-forth
in Garrett.
Dr. Spencer-Allen’s function in this case is
unmistakable.
The record reflects that Dr. Spencer-Allen is a
member of a “Multi-Disciplinary Team” which consists of a
Commonwealth Attorney, a police officer, a social worker, a
victim’s advocate, and a physician.
Dr. Spencer-Allen was the
physician on this team; her report in this case is captioned
“Child Advocacy Clinic”; and the report begins with the
statement “[K. W.] is brought to me for evaluation of purported
sexual abuse.”
Our conclusion is further supported by the
following factors: K. W. was referred to Dr. Spencer-Allen for
the specific purpose of determining whether she had been
sexually abused, not for treatment; the suspected abuse had
10
occurred some seven months prior to the examination; the
injuries were described by Dr. Spencer-Allen as “well-healed;
and, in fact, Dr. Spencer-Allen did not provide medical
treatment with regard to the injuries.
In summary, the statements made by K. W. during the
examination were not given for the purpose of medical diagnosis
and treatment and do not satisfy the hearsay exception
prescribed by KRE 803(4).
Since the hearsay statements directly
implicated Fitch as the perpetrator of the abuse, the statements
were highly prejudicial.
HEARSAY TESTIMONY BY GRANDMOTHER
Turning next to the grandmother, Ernestine Wakeland,
on the Commonwealth’s direct-examination of the witness, the
only substantive testimony contributed by the grandmother was
the child’s hearsay accusation made when she returned the child
after the February 1999 visitation with her father when K. W.
objected to being left alone with Fitch.
The exchange between
the prosecutor and the grandmother took place as follows:
Q.
Would you describe to the jury what
took place.
A.
Well, she - - Curt was standing at the
window talking to us and [K. W.] kept asking
where her mommy was. Curt didn’t answer
her. Then he told us that she went to the
doctor to get some medicine. Then she
wanted to know where Shana was. And he said
that she went with some girls or something.
11
He said that Sue had took her with them and
took some girls back that had stayed all
night with them. And [K.W.] just started
crying and asking me not to leave her with
Curt. And I told her, I said “well, baby,
you’ll be all right.” I said “he didn’t
whip you or nothing the other time, did he,
when I left you here.” And she said no, but
he wanted her to take her clothes off and
show him - - show herself to him in the
living room. And I promised her - - she
cried and held onto me and told me not to
leave her. And we stayed with her for a
long time. And I promised her I would help
her. And I stayed awake all night that
night and I cried. The next morning I
called the social workers and asked them to
go to the school and talk with her because
there was something wrong. That’s all I
did. (Emphasis added).
While K. W.’s statement to the effect that she did not
want to be left alone with Fitch was admissible as a nonhearsay
utterance reflecting the state of mind of the declarant, see
Stringer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 883, 887 (1997), cert.
denied 523 U.S. 1052, 118 S.Ct. 1374, 140 L.Ed.2d 522, (citing
L.K.M. v. Department for Human Resources, Ky. App., 621 S.W.2d
38 (1981) and R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook §
8.05, pp. 364-65 (3rd ed., Michie, 1993)), it was error for the
Commonwealth to introduce through the grandmother K. W.’s
hearsay statement to the effect that Fitch “wanted her to take
her clothes off and show him - - show herself to him in the
living room.”
(1986).
See Souder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 730
The grandmother’s repetition of K. W.’s out-of-court
12
statement was unadulterated hearsay not subject to any
exception.
HEARSAY TESTIMONY BY DETECTIVE
Turning next to the testimony of the investigating
Detective, Glenn Caudill, the Commonwealth’s first witness, it
is apparent that the hearsay line, albeit indirect hearsay,3 may
have been crossed from the outset.
With its first substantive
question to the Detective the Commonwealth elicited the
following answer:
Yes, I was notified by Social Services to
meet them at the school and conduct an
interview at the school with this child. As
a result of that investigation, based on my
findings and conclusions, I removed this
child from the residence that same day. This
day was on February the 16th of 1999.
(Emphasis added).
The implied hearsay contained in this response is that
K. W. stated to the Detective that Fitch sexually abused her.
“The rule is that a police officer may testify about information
furnished to him only where it tends to explain the action that
was taken by the police officer as a result of this information
3
If the apparent purpose of offered testimony is to use an out-ofcourt statement to evidence the truth of facts stated therein, the hearsay
objection cannot be obviated by eliciting the purport of the statements in
indirect form. Thus evidence as to the purport of 'information received' by
the witness, or a statement as the result of investigation made by other
persons, offered as evidence of the facts asserted out of court, have been
held to be hearsay. Sherley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 889 S.W.2d 794, 802 (1994)
(citing McCormick on Evidence, Sec. 249, p. 593 (Cleary ed. 1972)).
13
and the taking of that action is an issue in the case.”
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 541 (1988).
Sanborn
“Such
information is then admissible, not to prove the facts told to
the police officer, but only to prove why the police officer
then acted as he did.”
Id.
“It is admissible only if there is
an issue about the police officer's action.”
Id.
The
information that the Detective had recommended that K. W. be
removed from the Fitch home, which tended to bolster the
allegations against Fitch, was not an issue in the case.
Again,
as the testimony identified Fitch as the perpetrator of the
abuse, this testimony was highly prejudicial.
Later, on re-direct examination, the prosecutor, in
the form of a question, read from the trooper’s investigation
report and repeated statements made by the victim:
Q.
I would like to read this to you and
see if this is a correct portion of your
uniform offense report. It says “she”, and
it is referring to [K. W.], “told me it
happened at least twice in the living room
on the chair. He would have her promise not
to tell. On one occasion she says that she
told her mom about it, but she did nothing
about it. She says her mother told her it
wasn’t Curt, it was the same little boy.
This is in regard to a boy named Heath who
used to live next to [K. W.] She told me
that Heath never touched her, but that it
was Curt.” (Emphasis added.)
A.
Correct.
14
Pursuant to Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 514
(1995), it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence
of the child’s hearsay statements through the testimony of the
investigating trooper.
In Smith, at trial, the prosecution
called the victim, who testified in detail as to many things she
had already conveyed to the lead detective and others.
On
cross-examination, the defense tried to bring out
inconsistencies between the victim’s statements at trial and her
statements to the detective.
Subsequently, the Commonwealth
called the detective whose extensive testimony reiterated the
victim’s testimony.
The appellant objected to the detective’s
testimony as it was not within the limited scope of hearsay
admissible under KRE 801A(a)(2) as a prior consistent statement.
Analogizing to the long line of cases which have held
that hearsay testimony of social workers is inadmissible and
constitutes reversible error because it unfairly bolsters the
testimony of the alleged victim (see Sharp v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
849 S.W.2d 542, 546 (1993); Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 812
S.W.2d 502, 503-504 (1991); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777
S.W.2d 930 (1989); Reed v. Commonwealth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d 818,
821-822 (1987); Hester v. Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 457
(1987); and Bussey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 139, 141
(1985)), the Supreme Court held that
“[t]he rationale behind
prohibiting hearsay testimony in situations involving social
15
workers is appropriately applicable to the present case of a
police detective relating prior statements by the victim.”
Smith at 516.
The Supreme Court held the admission of the
child’s hearsay statements through the testimony of the
Detective to be reversible error.
We are unable to distinguish
the bolstering effect of the hearsay testimony of Detective
Caudill in this case from the bolstering hearsay testimony in
Smith.
HARMLESS ERROR
We have reviewed the erroneous admission of the
foregoing hearsay statements for harmless error; however, the
importance of this hearsay to the prosecution’s case becomes
apparent when one looks at the limited testimony given by K. W.
The entire testimony covers only nine pages of the transcript,
three pages of which is consumed by colloquy between the court
and counsel.
In the remaining six pages the victim answers only
three questions which incriminate Fitch.
Q.
. . . Did Curtis Fitch ever do anything
to hurt you?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was there anybody else around but you
and Curtis when he did this?
A.
No.
Q.
Just you and Curtis?
16
A.
Uh-Huh.
Q.
What did he do to hurt you, dear?
A.
He stuck his finger in my middle.
Q.
Okay. Can you say that a little bit
louder, dear.
A.
Stuck his middle.. stuck his finger in
my middle.
Q.
Can you take the doll and pull the
doll’s dress up and show the jury where he
stuck his finger. Okay. That’s very good
dear.
In his testimony, Fitch vigorously denied that he had
sexually abused K. W.
W.’s.
Hence it was Fitch’s word against K.
Further, while it is undisputed that K. W. was abused,
Fitch had identified an alternative perpetrator through the
testimony of his wife.
In light of this evidence, we cannot say
that the erroneous admission of hearsay statements was harmless.
RCr 9.24.
CONCLUSION
The issue presented here is a difficult one for the
courts, both trial and appellate.
Many trial judges would agree
with the prosecutor below when he stated “I have never seen an
area of the law that is more weighted in favor of the defendant
than these sex abuse [cases]. . .[the law] needs to be changed
because they have absolutely silenced these children with court
17
rulings on child sex abuse cases.”
Nearly every Supreme Court
decision we have cited excluding the child’s hearsay testimony
contains a dissent, often passionate.
However, in the cases
cited above, the Supreme Court has made its position clear
regarding the admission of hearsay statements in sexual abuse
cases.
In reaching our decision herein, we have only attempted
to follow those decisions.
ISSUES WHICH MAY RECUR ON RETRIAL
Since we have determined that this case requires
reversal, we next consider the appellant’s remaining allegations
of error which may recur upon retrial.
ADMISSIBLITY OF MEDICAL REPORT
We first consider Fitch’s objection to the trial
court’s admission of the report prepared by Dr. Spencer-Allen.
Specifically, Fitch contends that the report should not have
been admitted because it contained the statement “I recommended
that the child not be placed back in the maternal home for the
time being and that she remain with the maternal [sic]
grandmother, aunt, and biological father.”
Fitch also contends
that he was entitled to a mistrial because the jury was informed
that a significant portion of the report had been deleted.
18
Fitch, himself, submitted a redacted version of Dr.
Spencer-Allen’s medical report.
Based upon our review of the
record it appears that the trial court accepted the redactions
as proposed by Fitch with the exception that the trial court
included the language to the effect that Dr. Spencer-Allen
recommended that the child not be placed back in the custody of
her mother and Fitch, but, rather, that she be placed with her
paternal grandmother and her biological father.
To make matters
worse, the language was singled out during the Commonwealth’s
direct examination of Dr. Spencer-Allen as follows:
Q.
. . . Would you read that
recommendation to the jury?
A.
Okay. All right. She should not be
placed back in the home where she could be
in contact with this man, her stepfather.
. . . .
. . . I was significantly worried about this
child and I did something which I only do in
about ten percent of the cases and that was
as soon as I finished my evaluation of her I
sat down and contacted Social Services in
Knott County and Detective James Caudill. I
recommended at that time that the child not
be placed back in the [Fitch home]. . .
Fitch contends that this language is wholly irrelevant
and serves to reflect favorably on the testimony of the child
that Fitch, and not the alternative suspect, was responsible for
the sexual abuse.
19
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 402 sets out the
general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible and
evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible.
KRE 401 defines
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."
KRE 403 provides the
following exception to KRE 402:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
A trial judge's decision with respect to relevancy of
evidence under KRE 401 and 403 is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.
941, 945 (1999).
Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d
The test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Id. (citations
omitted).
The transcript does not disclose the trial court’s
reasoning for including Dr. Spencer-Allen’s recommendation to
the effect that K. W. should be immediately removed from the
Fitch household.
In our view, however, Dr. Spencer-Allen’s
recommendation and her apparent absolute belief in the child’s
20
identification of Fitch as the perpetrator is of minimal
relevance, while the prejudicial effect was great.
speak louder than words.
Actions
While Dr. Spencer-Allen is an expert
medical witness, her medical expertise does not extend to
qualifying her to express an opinion on whether K. W. was
telling her the truth when she identified Fitch.
703.
KRE 602; KRE
To the extent that there is any relevance, the prejudicial
effect of a respected physician vouching for the truthfulness of
K. W.’s allegation that Fitch was the perpetrator substantially
outweighs its probative value.
Upon retrial, upon proper motion
by Fitch, the statement should be excluded from the medical
report.4
Fitch also contends that he was entitled to a mistrial
because, as the medical report was being submitted into
evidence, Dr. Spencer-Allen commented that a significant portion
of the report had been redacted.
This statement was not so
significant as to require a manifest necessity for a mistrial.
See Lynch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 74 S.W.3d 711, 714 (2002); Maxie
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (2002); and Bray v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 375, 383 (2002).
We note, however,
that the trial court sustained Fitch’s objection to Dr. SpencerAllen’s statement regarding the deletions to the report.
4
While we have discussed this issue as an issue likely to recur on retrial,
we have also considered the prejudicial effect of this evidence, in
conjunction with the hearsay issues, in concluding that reversal is required.
21
Presumably the trial court will rule the same way on retrial,
and Dr. Spencer-Allen need only to be informed beforehand not to
make a reference to the redactions.
INTRODUCTION OF SPECIFIC FELONIES
Next, Fitch contends that the trial court erred when
it permitted the Commonwealth to impeach the appellant’s wife by
showing the particular felonies of which Fitch had been
convicted.
As an element of his defense, Fitch contended that he
was incarcerated at the time that K. W. was sexually abused.
In
his direct-examination of Fitch’s wife (K. W.’s mother), Wanda
Sue Wakeland Fitch, the following exchange occurred between
defense counsel and Wanda Sue:
Q.
Okay. At the time that [K. W.] told
you this story about Heath Murray, where was
Curtis?
A.
Floyd County Detention Center.
Q.
What was he in jail for?
A.
Possession of Drugs.
On cross-examination the Commonwealth questioned Wanda
Sue to the effect that wasn’t Fitch also incarcerated during
this time for trafficking and possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon.
Defense counsel objected and it was determined
that the charges were, in fact, possession of a controlled
22
substance and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.
The
actual charges were clarified for the jury.
Fitch opened the door to the actual charges by asking
Wanda Sue what the charges were that resulted in Fitch’s
incarceration.
The Commonwealth then merely sought to clarify a
misstatement by Wanda Sue regarding the charges.
"[T]he
appellants, having opened the book on the subject, were not in a
position to complain when their adversaries sought to read other
verses from the same chapter and page."
Ky., 497 S.W.2d 422, 430 (1973).
Harris v. Thompson,
Hence it was proper for the
Commonwealth to clarify the actual charges and correct the
record of Wanda Sue’s misstatement of the charges.
On retrial, if the same testimony were to occur on
direct examination, the Commonwealth would again be entitled to
correct Wanda Sue’s misstatement of the charges.
On the other
hand, if the defense does not open the door by questioning Wanda
Sue regarding the specific charges for which Fitch was
incarcerated, the specific felonies would be inadmissible under
KRE 404 and KRE 609.
RESTRICTION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
Next, Fitch contends that the trial court erred when
it denied him the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the
23
examining doctor regarding the healing time-frame for a hymenal
tear.
The attempted impeachment occurred in conjunction with
cross-examination of Dr. Spencer-Allen concerning the healing
time of a hymenal tear.
When Dr. Spencer-Allen had conducted
her examination of K. W., K. W. had been in the custody of her
paternal grandmother the previous ten days.
Dr. Spencer-Allen’s
examination showed extreme redness of the hymen, which the
Doctor described as “much more than what you normally see,” and
as “remarkable.”
Defense counsel then sought to establish that
hymenal tears can heal in as little as a week, and the following
exchange occurred with Dr. Spencer-Allen:
Q.
. . . My next question has to do with
the healing. This was a healed hymen,
wasn’t it?
A.
Yes, totally healed.
Q.
How long does it take to heal?
A.
Those structures heal very fast.
Q.
A week?
A.
No.
Q.
No?
A.
It still – the edges still would have
been red at that time and would have looked
a little bit raw. I would say two to three
weeks. Frankly, you’re dealing with
something that would heal completely in two
to three weeks. Thereafter it would remain.
So this injury could have been three weeks
24
old or it could have been three months old
or it could have been six months old. You
just really don’t know. It was a wellhealed injury.
Q.
Okay, but you take issue that it could
not heal in a week, because I got that from
you, Doctor. Everything I know about this I
have learned from you.
A.
Well, it would do most of its healing
in a week, yes. But I think you would still
see some redness there. Some increased
vascularity to the tissue.
Q.
Do you remember trying to explain it to
me saying that these things can heal in a
week. Try to think of . . .
. . .
A.
No, I don’t think I said completely in
a week. Huh-uh. Not absolutely completely
in a week.
At this point the Commonwealth objected and the
parties approached the bench.
Defense counsel explained that he
was seeking to impeach Dr. Spencer-Allen with testimony she had
given in another sexual abuse trial to the effect that a hymenal
tear could heal in a week.
The trial court sustained the
prosecution’s objection to the impeachment, but permitted
defense counsel to submit the prior testimony into the record by
avowal.
The testimony defense counsel sought to use to impeach
Dr. Spencer-Allen was as follows:
Q.
You described – in your medical report
you described this injury as an old injury.
25
A.
By that I mean it was healed. These
things can even heal in a week sometimes.
Q.
In a week?
A.
In as soon as a week. In two weeks
having had this injury occur, unless the
child was re-injured, that it would be
healed.
Q.
Well, this really goes against what
I’ve learned in the eighth grade about
cherries, that’s what we called them then.
A hymen can heal?
A.
Sure. But I mean, when it heals, in
this case, because it was ripped all the way
through and through, when it healed it
didn’t go back together. It healed torn
apart. The edges each healed.
Q.
But it’s still torn?
A.
Yeah, yeah.
back.
It doesn’t knit itself
Q.
But the edges were no longer –
A.
Raw.
Q.
Raw.
A.
And bleeding.
Q.
And that could have occurred in as
little as two weeks?
A.
A week.
Q.
Or as long as?
that?
Do you have a guess on
A. No. A week to two weeks. I’m not going
to specify it anymore than that. It’s
basically similar to the tissue inside your
mouth. Think about how fast that heals.
Let’s say you go to the dentist and get an
26
injection of novocaine and then you happen
to chew your cheek as a hamburger and it’s
nasty for a couple of days but then it heals
fast.
In this case the abuse was alleged to have occurred
“on or about July 1998.”
K. W. was removed from the Fitch home
and placed with her paternal grandmother on February 16, 1999.
Dr. Spencer-Allen performed her examination on February 26,
1999.
Because at the time of the examination K. W. still had
“extreme redness” of the hymenal area, the defense was
apparently attempting to pursue a theory that the hymenal
injury, as evidenced by the extreme redness, was not healed and,
since hymenal injuries can heal within a week, the injury Dr.
Spencer-Allen observed may have occurred during the ten days
that K. W. was in the custody of her grandmother immediately
preceding the examination.
The trial court properly excluded the testimony as the
proffered impeachment was impeachment on a collateral issue.
In
the present case, Dr. Spencer-Allen testified that the hymenal
injury was a “well--healed injury” which could have been
anywhere from three weeks to six months or more old.5
As we
construe the testimony, Dr. Spencer-Allen’s opinion was that,
although there was still extreme redness, the hymenal injury was
completely healed at the time of the examination.
5
It follows
Later in the testimony Dr. Spencer-Allen testified that the age of the
hymenal injury could be “[s]everal months up to a couple of years.”
27
that if the injury was completely healed, then there was no
underpinning to the defense theory that an unhealed injury had
occurred within the previous ten days.
In other words, even if
Dr. Spencer-Allen had conceded that a hymenal injury could heal
within a week,6 this would not have supported the defense theory
that the redness Dr. Spencer-Allen observed on February 26,
1999, was associated with an unhealed injury which had occurred
during the previous ten days.
Under these circumstances, defense counsel’s attempted
impeachment of Dr. Spencer-Allen with her previous testimony
that a hymenal tear can heal within a week was a collateral
issue.
Impeachment by contradiction regarding collateral facts
is prohibited.
Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694, 705
(1994) (citing Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook (3d
Ed.1993) § 4.10.).
Hence it was proper for the trial court to
exclude Fitch’s attempted impeachment of Dr. Spencer-Allen with
her testimony from the prior trial.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Next, Fitch contends that the trial court erred by
permitting improper cross-examination of him, that the
prosecutor exceeded the permissible limits in his closing
6
Later in the cross-examination Dr. Spencer-Allen essentially concedes the
point when she testifies, “Let’s say there is a hymen. Okay. You make a
little cut here. And I might agree with you that something that small might
be pretty darn well healed in a week.”
28
arguments, and that the prosecution improperly argued for jury
nullification in the penalty phase.
Fitch raises eight
instances of alleged improper conduct by the prosecution.
As
noted by the Commonwealth in its brief, few, if any, of these
alleged errors are preserved.
As no objection was made to
these alleged errors, there is no indication that the trial
court would not make the proper rulings on retrial, and we need
not review these issues individually.
Upon retrial, Fitch
should direct his objections concerning these issues to the
trial court.
EX POST FACTO APPLICATION OF KRS 17.544
Finally, Fitch contends that the trial court violated
ex post facto when it applied KRS 17.554 by requiring Fitch to
undergo a pre-sentence sex offender risk assessment when there
was no proof that the crime occurred after the effective date of
the statute.
KRS 17.544 establishes a procedure for the
establishment of a comprehensive sex offender pre-sentence
evaluation.
The indictment alleged that the sexual abuse in
this case occurred in July 1998.
The evidence presented at
trial was consistent that the crime occurred during this time
period; however, it was not ascertained whether the crime
occurred before or after the effective date of July 15, 1998.
29
However, because Fitch was not incarcerated or sentenced until
after the effective date of the statute, the statute applies.
The annotations to KRS 17.544 note that “1998 c 606, §
199, eff. 7-15-98, reads: The provisions of Sections 138 through
155 of this Act shall apply to persons individually sentenced or
incarcerated after the effective date of this Act.”
Hence, the
legislative intent was for the statute to apply to any persons
incarcerated or sentenced subsequent to the effective date of
the statute without regard to when the crime actually occurred.
As to whether ex post facto was violated, we first
note that the record does not reflect that Fitch gave notice to
the Attorney General of a constitutional challenge to the
statute. CR 24.03; Brashars v. Commonwealth, Ky., 25 S.W.3d 58,
65 (2000).
Further, in Hyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 72 S.W.3d
566 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the application of the
registration for sexual offense registration was not an
application of ex post facto.
Based upon the rationale stated
in Hyatt, the presentence evaluation required under KRS 17.544
is likewise not an improper application of ex post facto.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Knott
Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new
trial.
30
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
David T. Eucker
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
William L. Daniel II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
William L. Daniel II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
31
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