WILLIAM JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 25, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001746-MR
WILLIAM JONES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 99-CR-00190
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
On April 17, 2000, William Jones entered a plea
of guilty to three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.1
Prior to sentencing, the trial court directed that a sexualoffender risk-assessment evaluation be prepared.
On June 23,
2000, Jones’s counsel requested a continuance and a hearing to
challenge the findings in the report.
1
The trial court denied
KRS 510.110. Sexual abuse in the first degree is a class D felony.
KRS 510.110(2).
the motions and proceeded with the sentencing hearing.2
Thereafter, the court sentenced Jones to a total of fifteen
years.
On appeal, Jones argues that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a continuance and for a hearing to
challenge the findings of the evaluator in the risk-assessment
report.
Due to statutory changes, we conclude that Jones was
not entitled to a hearing to challenge the risk-assessment
report.
Hence, we affirm.
In Hyatt v. Commonwealth,3 the Kentucky Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Sexual Offender Registration
Act,4 commonly known as "Megan's Law”.
But while the Court held
that the registration scheme was not penal in nature, it also
held that it was imperative that counsel have time to adequately
prepare for the hearing, that the author of the risk-assessment
report be in attendance at the hearing, and that the sex
offender be afforded the opportunity to present expert testimony
to rebut the opinions expressed by the author of the risk
assessment report.5
Later, in Pendleton v. Commonwealth,6 the
2
The videotape of the hearing indicates that the trial court delayed
the sentencing hearing several hours to allow Jones and his counsel to
review the report.
3
Ky., 72 S.W.3d 566 (2002).
4
KRS 17.500, et seq.
5
Hyatt, 72 S.W.3d at 573, 577.
6
Ky., 83 S.W.3d 522 (2002).
2
Supreme Court added that the due process clauses of the Federal
and Kentucky Constitutions guarantee the right of a defendant to
call witnesses on his behalf.
While due process rights may be
limited in certain proceedings, a defendant is entitled to
notice of the report's contents in order to be able to present
experts to testify during the risk-assessment hearing.7
Thus,
Jones argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for a continuance and for a hearing.
In response, the Commonwealth notes that Hyatt and
Pendleton were decided under the 1998 version of Megan’s Law.
During its 2000 session, the General Assembly made extensive
amendments to the Act.
The 2000 amendments eliminated the
classification of sexual offenders as high, moderate or low risk
for purposes of determining the period of registration.
Rather,
the period of time which a convicted sexual offender must
register is now based solely on the offense for which he or she
was convicted.8
Although the Act retains the use of the sexual-
offender risk-assessment reports, they are now conducted as part
of a comprehensive pre-sentencing evaluation.
The purpose of
such reports are to provide the trial court with a
recommendation assessing the defendant’s risk of re-committing a
7
Id. at 528.
8
KRS 17.520.
3
sex crime, the threat which the defendant poses to public
safety, the defendant’s amenability to sex offender treatment,
and the nature of the required treatment.9
In addition, the 2000
amendments to the Act specifically repealed KRS 17.570, which
provided for a sex-offender risk-assessment hearing, factual
findings by the court designating the defendant’s level of risk,
and a right of appeal from the order designating the level of
risk.
The Commonwealth notes that Jones entered his guilty
plea to the offenses on April 17, 2000 – six days after the
amendments to the Act took effect.
Consequently, the
Commonwealth argues that Jones did not have any right to a
hearing or to an opportunity to challenge the findings in the
risk-assessment report.
We agree with the Commonwealth that,
since Jones entered his guilty plea and was sentenced after the
effective date of the 2000 amendments to the Sexual Offender
Registration Act, he was not entitled to the type of hearing
which would have been conducted under the 1998 version of the
Act.
As noted above, the current version of Megan’s Law
dispenses with the sex-offender risk-assessment hearing.
The
contents of the risk-assessment report no longer affect the
9
KRS 17.554.
See also KRS 532.050(4).
4
classification of a defendant under the Act.
Likewise, the
trial court no longer has a role in determining the period
during which a convicted defendant will be required to register.
The risk assessment report is still considered by the
trial court as part of the pre-sentencing procedure.10
It could
be argued that a defendant has the right under KRS 532.050 to a
hearing to challenge the conclusions in the risk assessment
report.11
However, this Court has previously held that KRS
532.050(4) does not permit a defendant to challenge the contents
or conclusions of a risk-assessment report at the sentencing
hearing.
That statute merely requires the Commonwealth to
furnish the defendant with a copy of the evaluation, which was
done in this case.12
Furthermore, the trial court was not
10
See KRS 532.050(4).
11
See KRS 532.050(6), which provides:
Before imposing sentence, the court shall advise
the defendant or his counsel of the factual
contents and conclusions of any presentence
investigation or psychiatric examinations and
afford a fair opportunity and a reasonable period
of time, if the defendant so requests, to
controvert them. The court shall provide the
defendant's counsel a copy of the presentence
investigation report. It shall not be necessary
to disclose the sources of confidential
information. (Emphasis added).
12
Berg v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 20 S.W.3d 475, 477-78 (2001). But
see Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104 (2001), in which the
Kentucky Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s use of a risk-assessment
report during sentencing. However, the Court suggested that a
defendant’s statements made during the risk-assessment evaluation can
not be used to establish lack of remorse or the appropriateness of the
penalties fixed by the jury. Id. at 121-22.
5
required to conduct a Daubert-type hearing to consider the
admissibility of risk-assessment test results in the sentencing
proceeding.13
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied Jones’s request for a
continuance and for a hearing.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Laurel
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
13
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Douglas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 83 S.W.3d 462, 464 (2002).
6
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