WILLIE DEAN THOMAS v. WILLIAM TWYMAN, Individually; WILLIAM TWYMAN, Superintendent, LARUE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; LARUE COUNTY, KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
DECEMBER 5, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2000-CA-001294-MR
WILLIE DEAN THOMAS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00049
WILLIAM TWYMAN, Individually;
WILLIAM TWYMAN, Superintendent,
LARUE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
and THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
LARUE COUNTY, KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE; AND
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE.
This action arises from the non-renewal
of Willie Dean Thomas’s continuing contract of employment as the
assistant principal of the Larue County Middle School and from
her assignment to a teaching position at a privately owned and
operated group home in Larue County for mentally retarded and
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580. This opinion was prepared and concurred in prior to the
expiration of the Special Judge assignment on November 25, 2003.
developmentally disabled children.
She filed this action
alleging claims based on contract, tort and civil rights
violations, all of which were summarily dismissed by the trial
court.
In 1994, Thomas was hired to fill the position of
assistant principal at Larue County Middle School under a
continuing contract of employment.
She served in that capacity
throughout the 1994-1995 and the 1995-1996 school years.
However, on February 9, 1996, the superintendent of the Larue
County School District, William Twyman, orally informed Thomas
that her contract would not be renewed for the 1996-1997 school
year, which he confirmed by letter dated February 12, 1996.
The
reason stated in the letter for non-renewal of the contract was
that her effectiveness as an administrator was such that it made
the action necessary.
Twyman also informed Thomas that she
would be reassigned as a teacher in the Larue County schools.
Although between February and August 1996, Thomas
applied for open positions in the Larue County School District,
Twyman did not forward her applications to the principals or to
the Site Based Decision Making Councils.
By letter dated July
9, 1996, Thomas was informed that her teaching assignment for
the 1996-1997 school year would be as an “alternative school
collaborative teacher” at a privately owned and operated school
known as The Life Connection.
-2-
Thomas brought this action against Twyman in his
official capacity as superintendent of the Larue County School
District, against Twyman individually, and against the Board of
Education of the Larue County School District.
The action seeks
injunctive relief in the nature of reinstatement with back pay
for attendant benefits, as well as compensatory and punitive
damages.
Thomas alleges that Twyman improperly terminated her
as assistant principal; that he failed to follow statutory and
regulatory procedures prescribed for demotion and assignment of
teaching personnel; and that she was improperly and illegally
assigned to The Life Connection by Twyman.
Thomas also asserts
that her civil rights, as well as her contract rights, were
violated.
As a result of these violations she contends she has
suffered, and continues to suffer, monetary loss, mental
distress, anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation, and damage to her
reputation and career.
She maintains that, therefore, she is
entitled to an award of compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as reinstatement to her former position as assistant
principal with back pay and attendant benefits.
Thomas contends that her assignment to The Life
Connection was “wrongful” because it is not a “common” school
within the school district.
“A common school is a school taught
in a district laid out by authority of the school law, under the
control of trustees elected under those laws, by a teacher
-3-
qualified according to law to teach.”2
She argues that since The
Life Connection is neither funded nor controlled by the local
school district, her assignment was unauthorized.
KRS3 161.760
makes it clear that a teacher either under a limited or a
continuing contract is employed in the school district and not
in a particular school or position.
Thus, even if this court
accepts that the definition of a “common school” excludes The
Life Connection as such a school, we fail to find anywhere in
KRS 161.760, or other applicable statutes, where a common school
is referred to, and in fact, it refers only to employment in the
school district.
The Life Connection is not only physically
located in the Larue County School District but the district
supplies instructors and its residents are counted as students
in the school system.
We agree with the trial court that
Thomas’s assignment to The Life Connection was employment in the
school district, and therefore, an authorized assignment.
In the letter dated February 12, 1996, Thomas was
informed that she was being demoted from her administrative
position to a teaching position.
KRS 161.720(9) defines a
demotion as “a reduction in rank from one position of the school
district salary schedule to a different position on that
2
Hodgkin v. Board for Louisville and Jefferson County Children’s Home, Ky.,
242 S.W.2d 1008, 1010 (1951).
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-
schedule for which a lower salary is paid.”
Thomas’s continuing
contract of employment provides that her salary as a teacher is
determined by the salary schedule for the Larue County School
District.
The schedule is based on the teacher’s rank and
corresponding years of experience.
Although the February notice
did not specifically state the exact amount of Thomas’s future
salary, we can assume she was aware of her employment contract
and of the salary schedule.
Notice of a proposed demotion is
necessarily notice of a reduction in salary and reassignment.4
Thomas also complains that the February notice did not
state the position to which she was assigned.
Citing KRS
161.760(2) she contends that notice of her assignment to The
Life Connection had to be received prior to July 15, 1996.
The
record contains a letter dated July 9, 1996, from Twyman
addressed to Thomas at her home address informing her of her
assignment to The Life Connection.
According to Twyman’s
testimony, he did not actually mail the letter but it was mailed
by an employee in his office.
Thomas denies that she received
the letter until August 7, 1996.
KRS 161.760(2), in effect at
the time of Thomas’s demotion, provides:
Transfer or change in appointment of
teachers after July 15 shall be made only to
fill vacancies created by illness, death, or
resignations; to reduce or increase
4
See Miller v. Board of Education of Hardin County, Ky. App., 610 S.W.2d
935, 938 (1980)(superseded by statute on other grounds, Estreicher v. Board
of Ed. of Kenton County, Ky., 950 S.W.2d 839 (1997)).
-5-
personnel because of a shift in school
population; to make personnel adjustments
after consolidation or merger; or to assign
personnel according to their certification
pursuant to KRS 161.010 to 161.120 provided,
in the latter instance, that the teacher was
appointed to a position outside his or her
field of certification in the previous year.
It does not state that a teacher must be informed of the
specific location of an assignment prior to July 15.
When read
in conjunction with subsection (4) of that same statute, the
plain meaning is that the teacher need only be notified of a
transfer or reappointment to a new position in the school
district for the upcoming school year by July 15.
Thus,
assuming that Thomas did not receive the letter until after July
15, 1996, notice of her demotion and transfer occurred well
before the July 15 deadline.
In the February 12th letter Twyman informed Thomas that
her demotion was the result of her “effectiveness as an
administrator.”
In Board of Education of McCreary County v.
Williams,5 this court held that the charges against a teacher
must be “specific enough for him to prepare a defense.”6
Thomas
was an administrator with less than three years experience, and
therefore, there is no administrative appeal process provided to
her as provided for in KRS 161.765(2) and the preparation of a
5
Ky. App., 806 S.W.2d 649 (1991).
6
Id. at 650.
-6-
defense to her demotion would be futile.
Of course her demotion
could not be for any reason which would violate either our
Kentucky or United States Constitutions.7
The letter was sent as a follow-up to a meeting
between Twyman and Thomas at which Thomas admits she was told
that “confidence in her as an administrator was lost.”
Twyman
was sufficiently specific when he informed Thomas of the reason
for her dismissal.
Thomas was given specific grounds which she
could either accept or, if she believed the reason to be other
than that stated, she had sufficient information to either
confirm or contradict the reason.
There is nothing in the case
or statutory law which requires the notice to include specific
allegations but requires only that the reason for the dismissal
be stated.
Thomas’s final statutory claim is that under KRS
160.345 Twyman was required to forward to the principal at the
Larue County Middle School applications she made for vacant
positions at the school.
Most recently, in Robinson v. Back,8
this court considered whether the statute requires a
superintendent to provide the Site Based Decision Making Council
additional applicants for a principalship when qualified
applicants are available and when requested by the council.
7
8
Miller, supra, at 937.
En Banc (Court of Appeals No. 2001-CA-001922-MR).
-7-
In
that case, the superintendent sent only four names to the
council, and although other applicants were available, refused
the request of the council for additional names.
We held that
if applicants qualified according to statute were available,
once requested by the council, the superintendent is required to
send all such applications to the council.
In this case, Thomas applied for a teaching position
which the principal, in consultation with the Site Based
Decision Making Council, is authorized to fill.9
As in the
Robinson case where the council is responsible for hiring, the
superintendent is required to submit additional applications
only when requested.
An affidavit by Brent Holsclaw, principal
of Larue County Middle School at the time Thomas’s applications
were submitted, stated that although Twyman informed him that
Thomas had applied for a vacant teaching position, he informed
Twyman that he did not want her application since he found a
desirable candidate and did not want Thomas to return to the
middle school.
It is undisputed that at no time did Holsclaw
request any additional applications, and in fact, discouraged
Twyman from forwarding Thomas’s application.
There was no
violation of KRS 160.345.
As to Thomas’s remaining claims, all have their roots
in the various alleged statutory violations which we have found
9
KRS 160.345.
-8-
without merit.
There are no constitutional rights implicated in
the termination or demotion of an administrator with less than
three years of service.10
There is no allegation that her
demotion was for a constitutionally impermissible reason and
therefore no basis for the remainder of Thomas’s claims.
We need not address any issues of immunity since we
find, on other grounds, no basis for Thomas’s claims.
judgment of the Larue Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
10
See Hooks v. Smith, Ky. App., 781 S.W.2d 522 (1989).
-9-
The
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
John S. Hoffman
STOLL, KEENON & PARK, LLP
Henderson, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
John R. Martin, Jr.
LANDRUM & SHOUSE
Louisville, Kentucky
James T. Whitlow
WHITLOW & SCOTT
Hodgenville, Kentucky
Sun S. Choy
MORGAN & POTTINGER, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Sun S. Choy
Louisville, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.