JESSE N. JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 25, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 1999-CA-002683-MR
AND
NO. 2001-CA-002234-MR
JESSE N. JONES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN T. DAUGHADAY, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 94-CR-00039 AND 97-CR-00103
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Jesse N. Jones has appealed from two orders of
the Graves Circuit Court entered on October 6, 1999, and
September 14, 2001, which denied his motion for pre-release
probation pursuant to KRS1 439.575, and his motion to vacate, set
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
aside or correct sentence filed pursuant to RCr2 11.42,
respectively.
Having concluded that his motion for prerelease
probation was properly denied because KRS 439.575 has been held
to be unconstitutional, and his RCr 11.42 motion was
procedurally barred as a successive motion, we affirm both
orders.
On November 21, 1994, in Case No. 94-CR-39, the
circuit court sentenced Jones to five years’ imprisonment on a
guilty plea to the amended charge of assault in the second
degree,3 but suspended the term of imprisonment and sentenced him
to probation for a period of five years.
While on probation,
Jones was indicted in June 1997 in Case No. 97-CR-103 for
trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) in the first
degree4 involving the sale of cocaine to a confidential
informant, and being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree (PFO II).5
On January 22, 1998, a jury found Jones guilty
of trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) in the first
degree and recommended a sentence of ten years.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3
KRS 508.020.
4
KRS 218A.1412.
5
KRS 532.080(2).
2
Immediately
thereafter, Jones entered a conditional guilty plea6 to the PFO
II charge pursuant to a plea agreement with the Commonwealth,
which recommended an enhanced sentence of 12 years.
On March 9,
1998, the trial court sentenced Jones to serve 12 years
consistent with the Commonwealth’s recommendation in Case No.
97-CR-103.
At the same time the trial court revoked Jones’s
probation in Case No. 94-CR-39 and ordered the 12-year sentence
to run consecutively to the revoked five-year sentence, for a
total sentence of 17 years under both indictments.
On March 19,
1998, Jones filed a notice of direct appeal,7 which resulted in
an affirmance.
In August 1998 Jones, acting pro se, filed his first
RCr 11.42 motion to vacate.
In the motion, Jones raised
questions concerning potential bias of one of the jurors, the
racial composition of the jury, the chain of custody of the
cocaine evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
On
August 18, 1998, the trial court entered an order denying the
motion without a hearing stating the chain of custody
evidentiary issue should be raised in the direct appeal and the
other issues of jury selection and ineffective assistance of
counsel were clearly refuted by the record.
6
See RCr 8.09.
7
Case No. 1998-CA-000755-MR.
3
Jones did not
appeal the denial of this RCr 11.42 motion.
On April 7, 2000, Jones filed his second pro se RCr
11.42 motion raising three issues involving ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Jones alleged trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to testimony that the confidential
informant had identified him following the drug-buy from a book
containing arrest subjects.
He further alleged that counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to testimony by the confidential
informant that she had told the police she could purchase drugs
from individuals that she knew or had seen sell drugs in the
past.
Finally, Jones claimed counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to a statement by the prosecutor during voir dire that
the venire members may be familiar with some of the facts in his
case based on their participation in a previous drug trial.
On April 18, 2000, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion because it was unable to review the court
record, which was in the possession of the Court of Appeals for
consideration of the direct appeal.
The trial court stated
Jones could refile the motion at a later date.
Jones filed a
motion to amend the order pursuant to CR8 52.02 and CR 59.05
asking the trial court to hold the RCr 11.42 in abeyance, rather
than deny it, because of the three-year time limitation in RCr
8
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
4
11.42(10).
On May 9, 2000, the trial court summarily denied the
motion to amend.
On September 6, 2001, Jones refiled the same RCr 11.42
he had submitted in April 2000.
On September 14, 2001, the
trial court summarily denied the motion.
Jones has appealed the
denial of this RCr 11.42 motion in Case No. 2001-CA-002234.
Meanwhile, on April 22, 1999, Jones filed his first
pro se motion for prerelease probation pursuant to KRS 439.575.9
On May 24, 1999, the trial court denied the motion on the
grounds that Jones had not been certified as eligible for the
release program by the Department of Corrections and the statute
violated the separation of powers provisions of the Kentucky
Constitution.
On July 1, 1999, Jones filed a second motion for
prerelease probation, which the trial court denied on July 15,
1999, stating the same grounds as in the prior denial.
On
September 23, 1999, Jones filed his third motion for prerelease
probation in which he argued that the statutory prerelease
program was constitutional and asked the trial court to order
the Department of Corrections to prepare a risk assessment
evaluation and to certify him for eligibility.
On September 6,
1999, the trial court entered an order identical to the prior
9
Jones’s motion erroneously refers to KRS 439.119, which does not exist.
5
two orders denying the motion.
in Case No. 1999-CA-002683.
Jones appealed the latest order
On May 31, 2000, this Court granted
Jones’s motion to hold this appeal in abeyance pending
resolution of the issue concerning the constitutionality of KRS
439.575 before the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Case No. 1999-CA-
002683 has been taken out of abeyance and the two appeals were
designated to be heard together.
First, we address the issue of prerelease probation.
In Prater v. Commonwealth,10 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
the prerelease probation program created by KRS 439.575 was
unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine embodied in Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
Despite use of the word “probation” in the
statute, the Supreme Court stated that the prerelease statutory
procedure was more akin to “parole” because of its post-judgment
character involving suspension of execution of a sentence,
rather than suspension of imposition of a sentence before final
judgment.
The Supreme Court held that KRS 439.575, in violation
of the Kentucky Constitution, impermissibly authorized the
judiciary to exercise the purely executive function of granting
parole which was reserved for the executive branch.
10
Ky., 82 S.W.3d 898 (2002).
6
Thus, the
trial court correctly denied Jones’s requests for prerelease
probation on constitutional grounds.
With regard to Jones’s RCr 11.42 motion, it was
properly denied under the successive motions principle.
RCr
11.42(3) provides: “The motion shall state all grounds for
holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge.
Final disposition of the motion shall conclude all issues that
could reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding”
[emphasis added].
In Gross v. Commonwealth,11 the Supreme Court
discussed the procedures for challenging a criminal conviction
and stated that the structure for attacking a final judgment is
not haphazard or overlapping.12
A defendant must first bring a
direct appeal when available and state every ground of error of
which he or his counsel is reasonably aware.13
Next, a defendant
in custody must utilize RCr 11.42 to raise errors of which he is
aware or should be aware during the period this remedy is
available.14
“Final disposition of that [RCr 11.42] motion, or
waiver of the opportunity to make it, shall conclude all issues
11
Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983).
12
Id. at 856.
13
Id. at 857.
14
Id.
7
that reasonably could have been presented in that proceeding.”15
The rule prohibiting successive RCr 11.42 motions is
well established in case law.
In Caudill v. Commonwealth,16 the
Court affirmed the denial of a second RCr 11.42 motion stating:
“Neither our Rules of Criminal Procedure nor our case law
provides for a second assault to be made upon the judgment of
conviction.
The proper procedure for Caudill to have followed
was the timely filing of an appeal to this court from the
original judgment denying the relief he sought under his first
RCr 11.42 motion” [citations omitted].17
A major purpose of the
rule prohibiting successive motions is to promote efficient
utilization of court resources by imposing finality and
requiring comprehensiveness for post–judgment motions.
In
Hampton v. Commonwealth,18 the Court upheld denial of a second
RCr 11.42 motion that raised four issues presented in the first
RCr 11.42 motion, plus two new issues.
“The courts have much
more to do than occupy themselves with successive ‘reruns’ of
RCr 11.42 motions stating grounds that have or should have been
15
Id. See also McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 70, 71
(1997)(“[Claimant] is precluded from raising issues in a successive RCr 11.42
motion which were or could have been raised in the first motion”).
16
Ky., 408 S.W.2d 182 (1966).
17
Id. at 182.
18
Ky., 454 S.W.2d 672 (1970).
See also Satterly v. Commonwealth, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 144 (1969).
8
presented earlier.”19
As the Court stated in Bell v.
Commonwealth,20 “[e]very person charged with [a] crime is
entitled to at least one fair and impartial trial, but it is
absolutely absurd to take the time of the courts with continuous
filing and refiling of motions for the same relief under the
same proceedings.”
Moreover, failure to receive a decision on the merits
on appeal from denial of an earlier RCr 11.42 motion does not
preclude dismissal of a subsequent motion.
In Szabo v.
Commonwealth,21 the Court held that a petitioner who abandons the
appeal of his initial RCr 11.42 motion is not entitled to relief
on a second RCr 11.42 motion even though there has never been an
appellate post-conviction review on the merits of his initial
motion.
Similarly, in Lycans v. Commonwealth,22 the Court upheld
denial of a second RCr 11.42 motion even though the appeal of
the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s first RCr 11.42 motion
19
Id. at 673. See also Burton v. Tartar, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 168, 169
(1964)(second RCr 11.42 motion denied as attempt at “trifling with the
court”); Case v. Commonwealth, Ky., 467 S.W.2d 367 (1971)(second RCr 11.42
motion denied because it involved “nothing, which was not or could not have
been presented originally”); and Shepherd v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d
798 (1972)(fourth RCr 11.42 motion dismissed for failure to demonstrate
reasons why issues were not raised in earlier motions).
20
Ky., 396 S.W.2d 772, 772-73 (1965). See also Warner v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
398 S.W.2d 490 (1966)(subsection 3 of RCr 11.42 was intended to protect the
courts against abuse of successive proceedings to vacate the same judgment).
21
Ky., 458 S.W.2d 167 (1970).
22
Ky., 511 S.W.2d 232 (1974).
9
had been dismissed for failure to properly file a notice of
appeal.
The Court said, “when a prisoner fails to appeal from
an order overruling his motion to vacant judgment or when his
appeal is not perfected or is dismissed, he should not be
permitted to file a subsequent motion to vacate . . . .”23
In the current case, Jones filed his initial RCr 11.42
motion in August 1998.
The trial court denied the motion
rejecting the evidentiary issue on procedural grounds, that
being it should have been raised in the direct appeal, and
rejecting the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and
juror selection on the merits.
Jones’s motion indicates that he
was aware of the successive motions principle because it states,
“RCr 11.42 requires that I put into this motion all of my
possible grounds for setting aside my conviction, and I need a
lawyer to look at my case and see if there are other things I
could have put in it.”
Although the trial court denied the
motion without appointing an attorney to assist him,24 Jones
failed to appeal the denial of this motion.
Jones’s second and
third RCr 11.42 motions raised three identical issues of
23
Id. at 233. See also Crick v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 534
(1977)(second RCr 11.42 motion barred despite failure to appeal denial of
first RCr 11.42 motion).
24
We note that Jones was represented by and received assistance of counsel in
his direct appeal, which was still ongoing at the time he filed his initial
RCr 11.42 motion.
10
ineffective assistance by his trial attorney.
Jones has not
argued that those issues could not have been raised in his
initial RCr 11.42 motion.
The facts supporting those complaints
occurred during trial and were available at the time Jones filed
his initial RCr 11.42 motion.
Consequently, Jones’s second and
third RCr 11.42 motions were procedurally barred under the
successive motions principle and RCr 11.42(3).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the
Graves Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Pam Clay
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney Generals
Frankfort, Kentucky
11
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