FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. IAN PETER COULSON AND JEAN IRENE COULSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF PAUL M. COULSON; HENRY PITTS AND JENNIFER H. PITTS, INDIVIDUALLY; HENRY PITTS, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF FRANCES E. PITTS; IAN GODDEN AND CHRISTINE ANN GODDEN, NEXT FRIEND OF TRACY GODDEN, A MINOR; TRACY GODDEN; AND MARGARET SCHULTZ
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RENDERED: May 23, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001931-MR
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
NOS. 2001-SC-801-D, 2001-SC-809-D,
2001-SC-810-D & 2001-SC-811-D
v.
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00232
IAN PETER COULSON AND JEAN IRENE
COULSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
ESTATE OF PAUL M. COULSON;
HENRY PITTS AND JENNIFER H. PITTS,
INDIVIDUALLY; HENRY PITTS, AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF FRANCES E. PITTS;
IAN GODDEN AND CHRISTINE ANN
GODDEN, NEXT FRIEND OF TRACY GODDEN,
A MINOR; TRACY GODDEN; AND
MARGARET SCHULTZ
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
Judge.1
1
COMBS AND GUIDUGLI, Judges; and JOHN D. MILLER, Special
Senior Status Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the
Kentucky Constitution.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE. This matter is before this Court on remand from
the Kentucky Supreme Court pursuant to an opinion and order
entered January 15, 2003.
Said opinion and order set forth the
following:
The motions for review are granted, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated,
and the cases are remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further consideration in light of
Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company,
Ky., 83 S.W.3d 483 (2002).
Following remand, this Court entered an order returning the case
to the Court’s active docket and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous briefs addressing the impact of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Sand Hill Energy, on the present appeal.
The parties
have complied with this Court’s order and filed briefs addressing
this issue.
Having reviewed these briefs, the entire record
before us, and the facts of the case in light of Sand Hill
Energy, we affirm.
We set forth the facts as previously presented in the
original opinion rendered July 13, 2001.
Ford Motor Company (hereinafter "Ford") appeals from a
judgment of the Scott Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict in
favor of Ian Peter Coulson, et al., in their products liability
action against Ford.
This action arose as a result of a tragic automobile
accident which occurred on the morning of August 6, 1995, in
Scott County, Kentucky.
A Ford E350 passenger van was being
operated by Peggy Schultz ("Schultz") in a southbound lane of
2
Interstate 75.
Schultz, who was a volunteer with the United
States Pony Clubs, Inc. ("Pony Club"), was part of a group of
approximately 28 people traveling on a multi-state tour.
contained 15 passengers including Schultz.
The van
Only two of the van's
15 occupants were wearing seatbelts.
It is uncontroverted that as the van was traveling
southbound in the right lane, a vehicle in the left lane passed
the van and struck it at least once.
The impact, or Schultz's
reaction, or both, caused the van to move onto the right
shoulder.
The rear of the van then slid to the right, such that
the vehicle was approximately perpendicular to the roadway and to
the direction of the van's travel.
Lay and expert testimony
would later reveal that the van's rear tires were in the grass to
the right of the roadway, with the front tires sliding across a
"rumble strip" of raised serrations on the shoulder.
At some
point during this process, when the van was turned between 10 and
90 degrees relative to the roadway2 it began to roll.
The van
"barrel rolled" approximately three and one-half times.
While the van was rolling, passengers Paul Coulson
("Coulson"), Frances Pitts ("Pitts"), and Tracy Godden ("Godden")
were ejected from the vehicle.
Coulson and Pitts died as a
result of head injuries, and Godden sustained a severed limb and
other serious injuries.
Schultz broke bones in her left hand and
arm, and injured her neck or back.
2
The parties are not in
The testimony is conflicting on this issue.
3
agreement as to whether Coulson, Pitts, and Godden were partially
or fully ejected when their injuries were sustained.
The following year, the families of Coulson, Pitts, and
Godden initiated the instant action.
They asserted causes of
action against Ford, as maker of the van; Schultz as driver; the
Pony Club as the organization for which Schultz was acting; and
Ralph Keaton ("Keaton"), the driver of the vehicle that struck
the van.
Ford cross-claimed seeking indemnification against
Schultz, the Pony Club, and Keaton.
Schultz filed a cross-claim
against Ford and Keaton.
In the following months, the Coulson, Pitts, and Godden
families (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Coulson et
al.") settled with Schultz, the Pony Club, and Keaton, and those
claims were dismissed.
claim was dismissed.
Schultz settled with Keaton, and that
And lastly, Ford dismissed its cross-claims
against Schultz, the Pony Club, and Keaton.
The sole surviving
claims at trial were those of Coulson et al. against Ford, and
Schultz's cross-claim against Ford.
A jury trial commenced on April 12, 1999.
As the
proceedings got underway, the circuit judge determined that four
(4) peremptory jury challenges would be given to each of the
following: a) Coulson et al.; b) Schultz; and, c) Ford.
Ford
objected, both on and off the record, to Schultz receiving four
(4) peremptory challenges.
In support of the objection,
argued that Schultz was a plaintiff and, as such, was not
4
Ford
entitled to peremptory challenges in addition to those received
by Coulson et al.
record.
The objection was raised and denied on the
Each of the parties (a, b, and c above) received and
used four (4) peremptory challenges during voir dire.
The trial proceeded with Coulson et al., and Schultz,
asserting a product liability claim centering on the argument
that Ford was negligent in the manufacture and sale of the E350
passenger van because of the van's alleged propensity to tip over
and/or roll when loaded with passengers.
denial.
Ford asserted a general
After an extensive trial, the matter was submitted to
the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Coulson et al. and
Schultz.
Coulson et al. collectively were awarded damages of
almost $20,000,000, and Schultz was awarded approximately
$572,000.
This appeal followed.
Ford's first argument is that the trial court committed
reversible error per se by giving four peremptory challenges to
Schultz in addition to the four challenges given to Coulson et
al.
Specifically, Ford points to CR 47.03 for the proposition
that each opposing side in civil litigation is entitled to the
same number of peremptory challenges.
It maintains that under CR
47.03, co-parties are each entitled to four peremptory challenges
only where their interests are antagonistic.
Ford argues that
since Schultz interests were not antagonistic to those of
Coulson et al., Schultz was not entitled to four challenges in
addition to those received by Coulson et al.
5
Finally, Ford
argues that the failure to properly allocate peremptory
challenges is error per se entitling it to a new trial.
In response, Coulson et al. maintain that its interests
and those of Schultz were antagonistic, and that Schultz was not
a co-party.
They note that they initially sought damages from
Schultz, and that Schultz was at all times referenced as a
defendant and cross-claimant in court documents.
As such, they
argue that the circuit court acted properly in allocating four
(4) peremptory challenges to Schultz.
CR 47.03(1) states that, "[I]n civil cases each
opposing side shall have three peremptory challenges, but coparties having antagonistic interests shall have three peremptory
challenges each."
Section (2) goes on to provide that, "[I]f one
or two additional jurors are called, the number of peremptory
challenges for each side and antagonistic co-party shall be
increased by one."
In the matter at bar, it is uncontroverted
that additional jurors were called, resulting in the allocation
of four rather than three peremptory challenges to the respective
parties.
The dispositive question, then, is whether Coulson et
al., Schultz and Ford were each an "opposing side" in the
litigation under CR 47.03(1), and if not, whether Schultz's
interests were antagonistic to those of Coulson et al.
In the original opinion, this Court, relying upon
Bowling Green Municipal Utilities v. Atmos Energy Corp., Ky., 989
6
S.W.2d 577 (1999), concluded that Coulson, et al. and Schultz
were not on “opposing side[s]” of the litigation and that their
interests were not antagonistic.
However, upon further review
and in light of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Sand
Hill Energy, supra, we now believe Coulson, et al and Schultz
should be considered as “opposing side[s]” and that their
interests were, in fact, antagonistic requiring this Court to
affirm the trial court’s ruling on this matter.
In Sand Hill Energy, our Supreme Court addressed the
issue of CR 43.01 and peremptory challenges as follows:
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court upon its allocation of peremptory
challenges and we will first address this
issue. To properly analyze this issue it is
necessary to examine the structure of the
litigation.
Initially, the Smith Estate and two
Smith individual parties brought a products
liability claim against Ford and Mideast Ford
Mercury, Inc. Ford then filed a third party
complaint against Sand Hill Energy, Inc., the
decedent’s employer, because prevailing case
law required active assertion of a claim to
entitle Ford to an apportionment instruction.
(Floyd v. Carlisle Construction Co., Ky., 759
S.W.2d 430 (1988)). In response to the third
party complaint, Sand Hill brought a
counterclaim against Ford alleging its
liability for some $200,000 in regulatory
fines and increased workers compensation
costs it had incurred as a result of the
accident. Thereafter, Ford dismissed its
third party claim against Sand Hill. Thus,
the basic structure of the litigation was
that Smith sued Ford and Ford brought in Sand
Hill by means of a third party complaint.
(Footnote omitted).
7
At trial, however, the court
restructured the case and designated the
Smith Estate and Sand Hill as plaintiffs
against Ford as the defendant. Ford then
asserted that the Estate and Sand Hill should
share peremptory challenges, but the trial
court ruled otherwise and allowed the Estate
and Sand Hill separate peremptory challenges.
The Court of Appeals adopted Ford’s
argument that at the time of trial the
interests of the Smith Estate and Sand Hill
were not antagonistic. The Court quoted but
did not entirely observe CR 7.03(1),
(footnote omitted), giving little or no
attention to the fact that despite
restructuring at trial, the Estate and Sand
Hill were opposing sides. Instead the court
focused exclusively on whether they had
antagonistic interests, the portion of the
rule that allows separate peremptory
challenges to co-parties with antagonistic
interests.
There can be no doubt that the Smith
Estate and Sand Hill were not co-parties but
were opposing sides. While the Smith Estate
did not bring an action against Sand Hill,
presumably due to the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers Compensation
Act,(footnote omitted), Ford did bring Sand
Hill before the court as a third party
defendant. Its purpose may be presumed to
have been to obtain an instruction allowing
apportionment of all or part of the liability
against Sand Hill thereby relieving Ford of
any part so apportioned. As such, Ford
placed the Smith Estate and Sand Hill on
opposing sides, and there was no error in
allowing them separate peremptory challenges.
While a strict application of the rule
would be sufficient, we make additional
observations that bear upon the question of
proper allocation of peremptory challenges.
The gist of Ford’s argument is that by
bringing in a third party defendant for
purposes of its own and the trial court’s
determination, for simplicity at trial, that
the third party defendant should be required
8
to share peremptory challenges. This
argument borders on an assertion that the
defendant should be able to adopt a strategy
for its own benefit that simultaneously
diminishes the plaintiff’s ability to pursue
its own strategy. At the least, this
argument appears at odds with notion of fair
play. A party should not be able to create a
community of common interests between other
parties and then assert that interest to
their detriment. But for Ford’s decision to
bring Sand Hill before this court so that it
could reduce its own exposure, there would be
no question about the plaintiff’s entitlement
to separate peremptory challenges as Sand
Hill would not be a party to the litigation.
Moreover, under these circumstances, it
would be extraordinary to find reversible
error. While it may appear in retrospect
that the Smith Estate and Sand Hill lacked
any substantial antagonistic interest, such
could not have been known by the trial court
at the time the jury was selected.3
(Footnote in original opinion). It has been
suggested that the positions parties take at
trial should determine whether they have
antagonistic interests, but such a rule is
utterly unworkable. At the time a trial
judge must make the allocation of peremptory
challenges, there can be no certainty as to
what the evidence will show or precisely what
the claims or defenses will be. Moreover,
the instant trial court, after having
determined that by virtue of their being on
different sides, entitling all parties to
separate peremptory challenges, nevertheless
physically separated the three parties and
directed that they have no contact with one
another in exercise of their peremptory
challenges. We have carefully reviewed
Bowling Green Mun. Utils. v. Atmos Energy
Corp., [Ky., 989 S.W.2d 577 (1999)] and
determine that it is factually
3
Mackey v. Greenview Hospital, Inc., Ky.App., 587 S.W.2d 249, 259
(1979), makes it clear that the time for determining the allocation of
peremptory challenges is when the jury is selected. Despite
subsequent dismissal of physician cross-claims, the Mackey Court
relied on the existence of cross-claims at the time the trial
commenced as a factor establishing antagonism of interests.
9
distinguishably from this case in that the
parties to whom were awarded the excessive
number of peremptory challenges were all
plaintiffs, most of whom were represented by
the same counsel. Accordingly, we reverse
the Court of Appeals on the peremptory
challenges issue and affirm the actions of
the trial court in this respect.
In that we believe the case before us to be more in
line factually with Sand Hill Energy, supra, than Bowling Green
Mun. Utils., supra, and in that we are bound to follow
precedent set forth by our Supreme Court [SCR 1.030(8)], we now
find no error in the trial court’s ruling allocating both
Coulson, et al. and Schultz four (4) peremptory challenges.
Ford next argues that the trial court erroneously
refused to submit the comparative fault of the Pony Club to the
jury, and that it thwarted Ford's efforts to submit proof showing
that fault.
It notes that the Pony Club was a settling tort-
feasor, and maintains that as such it was entitled by statute to
In response, Coulson et al.4
an apportionment instruction.
maintain that the trial court properly excluded the Pony Club
from apportionment because Ford only plead that the Pony Club was
vicariously liable for Schultz's alleged negligent operation of
the van.
In our first opinion, we determined that this claim of
error was moot in light of our reversal of the judgment on the
issue of peremptory challenges.
4
However, since we have now
Schultz offers no response to this argument, stating her belief
that it does not affect the judgment in her favor.
10
affirmed the judgment on that issue, we must proceed to address
Ford’s argument relative to the comparative fault of the Pony
Club.
KRS 411.182(1) requires apportionment in “...all tort
actions, including products liability actions...” involving the
fault of more than one party.
The instructions shall include the
fault of persons who have been previously released from
liability.
Id.
Ford contends apportionment is mandatory,
not
discretionary, and thus, the trial court was obligated to include
the Pony Club in any apportionment instructions.
Citing Stratton
v. Parker, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 817 (1990) and Floyd v. Carlisle
Construction Co., Ky., 758 S.W.2d 430 (1988), Ford maintains that
the Pony Club, a named defendant and a settling party, must be
included in an apportionment instruction pursuant to KRS
411.182(1).
Appellees, on the other hand, argue that Ford’s only
theory of liability in its pleadings against the Pony Club was a
vicarious liability theory.
This theory was based upon the
undisputed fact that Schultz, as the driver of the van, was
acting as the Pony Club’s agent.
Ford argued at trial that
Schultz failed to ensure that the children passengers wore seat
belts and that she was unaware of the Pony Club’s policy to
enforce the wearing of seatbelts, were substantial factors in
causing the deaths and serious injuries of the children.
Ford,
thus, argues that these failures create a separate, independent
11
cause of action against the Pony Club as opposed to the mere
negligence of Schultz as an agent of the Pony Club.
We disagree.
First, we believe the fault for any damages sustained is
inseparable as between Schultz, the agent the Pony Club, and her
principal.
See Baldwin v. Wiggins, Ky., 289 S.W.2d 729 (1956);
cf. Kevin Tacker & Assocs. v. Scott & Ritte, Ky.App., 842 S.W.2d
873 (1992).
In fact, Ford’s cross-claim against the Pony Club
contained only the following specific allegations:
Ford alleges, on information and belief, that
Schultz and Keaton were each negligent in the
operation of their respective vehicles at the
time and upon the occasion mentioned in the
Complaint, and that their negligence caused
or contributed to the injuries and damages
claimed by the Plaintiffs.
Ford further alleges, on information and
belief, that Schultz was acting as the agent,
servant or employee of the U.S. Pony Clubs at
the time of the accident, and therefore that
U.S. Pony Clubs is vicariously liable for her
negligence in the operation of her vehicle.
Thus, Ford’s failure to plead a separate, distinctive cause of
action, if any existed, as to the Pony Club limits the relief
sought by Ford.
However, even if Ford can get past its
pleadings, the fact remains that the Pony Club could only be
liable through its agent, Schultz.
In this case, the court did
instruct the jury as to apportionment for Schultz’s action.
For
whatever reason, the jury apportioned all liability against Ford
despite being properly instructed as to other potentially
negligent parties.
The Pony Club, according to Ford’s own
pleadings, could only be vicariously liable for the actions of
12
its agent, Schultz.
Thus, even if the trial court erred in this
matter, which we do not believe it did, any error would be
harmless.
CR 61.01.
Thus, despite our dicta in the original
opinion as to a possible apportionment instruction relative to
the Pony Club’s liability, upon further review, we believe the
court properly instructed the jury in this matter and no error
occurred as alleged by Ford.
Lastly, Ford argues that a test run of a sample Ford
van conducted by Robert Hooker (hereinafter "Hooker") was
improperly admitted into evidence at trial because the test
failed to replicate the conditions of the accident.
It maintains
that such out-of-court experiments are admissible only if they
are conducted under conditions substantially similar to those of
the event at issue. It also argues that a computer simulation
created by Dr. Thomas Wielenga (hereinafter "Wielenga") should
have been excluded as well for the same reason.
Coulson et al.
and Schultz reply that the Hooker test and Wielenga computer
model were not offered to replicate the accident, but rather to
indicate to the jury how the vehicle would perform from a
rollover/stability standpoint in various known and accepted
driving maneuvers.
As such, they maintain that both were
properly admitted.
The Kentucky Supreme Court examined the issue of outof-court experiments in Stevens v. Commonwealth, Ky., 462 S.W.2d
182 (1970), and stated as follows:
13
Generally speaking, the results of outof-court experiments are admissible in
evidence if such evidence tends to enlighten
the jury and enable them to more
intelligently consider the issues or if they
provide evidence more satisfactory or
reliable than oral testimony. Lincoln Taxi
Co. v. Rice, Ky., 251 S.W.2d 867 (1952). Such
evidence is never admissible, however, unless
the conditions under which the experiment was
performed were substantially similar to the
case under consideration. Ohio County Drug
Co. v. Howard, 201 Ky. 346, 256 S.W. 705
(1923). The trial judge is vested with a
broad discretion in determining both the
question of substantial similarity of
conditions and, if substantial similarity
exists, the admissibility of the evidence. 29
Am.Jur.2d, Evidence-ExperimentsAdmissibility, Sections 818-824.
Id. at 186.
Coulson et al. and Schultz stipulate that the Hooker
test was not offered for the purpose of re-creating the accident.
They point to Kentucky case law supportive of the notion that
such evidence is admissible even though the out-of-court
experiment and the accident were dissimilar.
In Current v.
Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 139 (1964), for
example, the former Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of
dissimilar out-of-court experiments where the dissimilarity was
made clear to the jury.
In Current, experiments conducted on a
space heater and water heater were properly admitted even though
neither was in the same condition as when the injury occurred.
Since the Current jury was apprised of the differences between
the experiment and the accident, the experiment was found to be
14
properly admitted.
Coulson et al. and Schultz also direct our
attention to federal case law supportive of the same result.
In examining this issue, we are persuaded by the
following: 1) KRE 401 provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible, subject to limited exclusions;
2) the former Court
of Appeals has affirmed the introduction of dissimilar out-ofcourt experiments; and 3) the trial judge is vested with a broad
discretion in determining the admissibility of the evidence.
Ford was availed of the opportunity to highlight the
dissimilarities before the jury, and we must rely upon the jury
to digest these arguments and reach a proper conclusion.
Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial judge committed
reversible error on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Scott
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
15
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, IAN
COULSON AND IAN GODDEN:
B. Todd Thompson
Amy C. Sullivan
Sallie J. Stevens
Louisville, KY
Samuel E. Davies
Barbourville, KY
Charles H. Adams, Jr.
Lexington, KY
Paul F. Hultin
Lee A. Mickus
Denver, CO
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES,
IAN COULSON AND IAN GODDEN:
Craig Morgan
Michael Eady
Austin, TX
Samuel E. Davies
Barbourville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES, HENRY PITTS AND
JENNIFER H. PITTS:
Craig Morgan
Austin, TX
Linda M. Hopgood
Lexington, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, CHRISTINE ANN
GODDEN AND TRACY GODDEN:
Robert L. Elliott
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, MARGARET
SCHULTZ:
Christopher Baxter
Moorestown, NJ
Richard M. Rawdon, Jr.
16
Georgetown, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
MARGARET SCHULTZ:
Richard M. Rawdon, Jr.
Georgetown, KY
17
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