ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS v. CYNTHIA K. HALL, DECEASED; JAMES C. HALL, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF CYNTHIA K. HALL; PEYTON'S INC.; HON. DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; HON. SHELIA C. LOWTHER, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 20, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-001586-WC
ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FUNDS
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-93-27664
CYNTHIA K. HALL, DECEASED;
JAMES C. HALL, SURVIVING
SPOUSE OF CYNTHIA K. HALL;
PEYTON'S INC.;
HON. DONNA H. TERRY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
HON. SHELIA C. LOWTHER, CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Robert L. Whittaker, Director of Workers’
Compensation Funds, Successor to Special Fund (hereinafter “the
WCF”) has petitioned this Court for review of the Workers’
Compensation Board’s June 26, 2002, opinion affirming two
decisions of the Administrative Law Judge.
As set out in the
WCF’s brief, the two issues on appeal are whether the Board had
jurisdiction to rule upon Peyton’s, Inc.’s motion for
clarification and to reopen the case and whether the WCF should
be responsible for the payment of benefits when the surviving
spouse remarries after an award but before the expiration of the
employer’s payment period.
We affirm.
Our standard of review in workers’ compensation actions is
well-settled.
In Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827
S.W.2d 685 (1992), the Supreme Court addressed its role and that
of the Court of Appeals in reviewing decisions in workers’
compensation actions.
“The function of further review of the WCB
in the Court of Appeals is to correct the Board only where the []
Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
Id., at 687-88.
We have reviewed the Board’s decision and have
determined that it did not overlook or misconstrue controlling
statutes or precedent.
Because we cannot improve upon the
Board’s excellent opinion, we shall adopt it as our own.
This matter is before this Board for a
third time. Workers’ Compensation Funds
(“WCF”)appeals from the Administrative Law
Judge’s determination finding it responsible
for payment of benefits when a surviving
spouse remarries after an award but before
the expiration of the employer’s payment
period (the first half of the actuarial life
expectancy). WCF first argues the ALJ lacked
jurisdiction to consider Peyton’s, Inc.
(“Peyton’s”) motion for clarification and/or
motion to reopen. It further contends the
ALJ’s apportionment of benefits pursuant to
KRS 342.730(3)(e) was erroneous as a matter
of law.
This case has a long procedural history
before this Board and the appellate courts.
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Issues of extent and duration of liability
and payment of the award have previously been
decided by this Board and the appellate
courts. A short review of the facts and
procedures is necessary for determination on
the issues before us.
Cynthia Hall sustained work-related back
and hip injury on July 15, 1993 in the course
of her employment with Peyton’s. On January
28, 1997, ALJ Denis Kline awarded Hall a 50%
permanent partial disability. Benefits were
apportioned equally between the employer and
the Special Fund. Hall appealed to the Board
and we determined remand was necessary. The
supreme court, in an opinion rendered
September 23, 1999, remanded the claim to ALJ
Kline for a determination of the extent of
Hall’s occupational disability.
On October 7, 1999, Hall died of
nonwork-related causes. Her husband, James
C. Hall, was substituted as a party by order
of March 16, 2000. On May 2, 2000, Chief ALJ
Shelia C. Lowther awarded total disability
benefits. Benefits were apportioned equally
between the employer and the Special Fund
commencing October 29, 1993.
In an order rendered July 24, 2000, the
CALJ corrected her award, taking into
consideration that Hall was deceased.
Benefits were ordered payable to Hall’s
estate from October 29, 1993 to October 7,
1999. Hall’s husband was awarded 50%
survivor’s benefits from October 8, 1999 for
the “remainder of Mrs. Hall’s life expectancy
period.” The order also provided, “[i]n the
event that Mr. Hall remarries prior to the
expiration of the compensable period,
benefits are to be paid pursuant to KRS
342.730(3)(e).”
Thereafter, the WCF filed a petition for
reconsideration and the CALJ, in an order
rendered September 20, 2000, directed that
all benefits awarded were to be apportioned
equally between the employer and the WCF.
Peyton’s was ordered to pay all benefits
initially subject to its proportionate share.
Both Peyton’s and the WCF appealed once
more to the Board. In an opinion rendered
January 24, 2001, we affirmed the ALJ’s award
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of total disability benefits. We also held
the ALJ correctly apportioned the award based
upon reality (knowledge of date of death)
rather than speculation (life expectancy).
On October 26, 2001, the court of appeals
affirmed this Board, holding the ALJ did not
err in apportioning the ascertainable value
of the award. The court of appeals
specifically stated:
The Special Fund argues that
because Hall died, the initial
assessment of one hundred percent
liability from the date of the
injury until her death would have
been during Peyton’s payment period
and that pursuant to Williamson v.
Island Creek Coal Co., Ky.App., 899
S.W.2d 499 (1995), the CALJ erred
in apportioning the benefits
equally between Peyton’s and the
Special Fund. The Special Fund
argues that instead of apportioning
the ascertainable value of the
award, the CALJ should have
apportioned the life expectancy
time period thus leaving each party
responsible for the amount of the
award during its respective time
period. In its brief to this
court, the Special Fund
acknowledged that ‘the issue
presented herein is pending before
the Supreme Court.’
On September 27, 2001, the
Kentucky Supreme Court rendered its
opinion in the case of Whittaker v.
Patrick, 2000-SC-1095-WC. Therein,
the court held as follows:
We conclude, therefore,
that where a worker dies
before receiving an award
of income benefits, the
benefits that accrue
before his death and any
benefits that continue to
his survivors after his
death must both be viewed
by the ALJ as parts of
the same award. As a
result, any benefits that
are payable to the
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worker’s estate and any
remaining benefits that
are payable to survivors
must be treated as parts
of a whole, and the sum
of those benefits must be
apportioned. By
operation of KRS 342.120,
the employer must then be
ordered to pay its
apportioned share of all
benefits awarded, after
which the Special Fund’s
payment period begins.
Based on the Patrick case, we
conclude that the Board did not err
in ordering the known value of the
award to be apportioned equally
between Peyton’s and the Special
Fund.1
No appeal was taken from the court of
appeals decision, which became final November
25, 2001.
On January 4, 2002, Peyton’s filed a
motion for clarification wherein it stated
that Hall’s widower remarried on May 26, 2001
during the pendency of this appeal. Peyton’s
requested that the court give clarification
so that the WCF and the employer could
resolve their respective responsibilities to
Hall since they knew that Hall was remarried
and the total amount of liability of the
claim would be ascertained. The WCF
responded, arguing that the ALJ had lost
jurisdiction of the claim and pursuant to the
final award, the WCF was not obligated to pay
benefits until April 20, 2010. It argued
that since the widower had remarried before
that date, it had no liability for payment,
citing Pennwalt Corporation v. Beale,
Ky.App., 840 S.W.2d 830 (1992). Thereafter,
Peyton’s filed a “Motion to Reopen and for
Clarification.”
This matter was transferred from the
CALJ to ALJ Donna H. Terry who entered an
1
We note for the record that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Whittaker v. Patrick was unpublished, and therefore is not
binding upon this Court or any other administrative body.
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order on January 28, 2002, directing the
parties tender position papers documenting
the amount of the award and calculating the
amount to be paid by each defendant. She
overruled the WCF’s objection to the
employer’s motion for clarification on
procedural grounds. She noted that from the
record, it was clear the parties had been
unable to agree upon apportionment of the
award given the unforeseen circumstances
following its rendition and the motion for
clarification was treated as a motion to
reopen. Therefore, ALJ Terry ordered the
matter reopened pursuant to Wheatley v.
Bryant Auto Service, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 767
(1993), for the purpose of rendering a more
explicit award. ALJ Terry specifically
stated:
3. The undersigned Administrative
Law Judge finds that the Fund is
liable for payment of half of the
total benefit awarded, including
those benefits paid in lump sum to
James C. Hall pursuant to KRS
342.730(3)(e). While the Fund has
vigorously argued that it has
little or no liability in this
claim because of Mr. Hall’s
remarriage during the defendantemployer’s proof period, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that
the Fund is liable for one-half of
all benefits awarded. This is
based upon not only its stipulation
of liability for half of any award,
but also the award rendered by
Judge Lowther, which was eventually
affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
that the Special Fund should be
liable for one-half of all
permanent benefits awarded. It is
noted that the court of appeals did
not accept the Fund’s similar
argument following plaintiff’s
death and held that the Fund was
liable for one-half of the known
value of the award. There is no
discernible legal distinction
between the question presented to
the Court of Appeals and the issue
raised by the Fund herein. Like
the Court of Appeals, the
undersigned Administrative Law
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Judge finds that Whittaker v.
Patrick, 2000-SC-1095-WC (Kentucky
Supreme Court, Rendered September
27, 2001), is controlling precedent
for equal apportionment of all
known benefits in this workers’
compensation claim.
Thereafter, the WCF filed a petition for
reconsideration on February 12, 2002, again
contending that ALJ Terry had lost
jurisdiction and the employer was required to
pay benefits in accordance with the award.
Meanwhile, the parties had complied with ALJ
Terry’s order regarding proof of remarriage
and payment of benefits. ALJ Terry rendered
an order on March 4, 2002, overruling WCF’s
objections on the jurisdictional grounds and
sustaining the motion for clarification. She
noted the WCF cited unpublished opinions of
the Board and the supreme court. ALJ Terry,
in her March 4, 2002 order, again addressed
the issue before her, stating:
While the Administrative Law
Judge must remind the Funds that
these decisions cannot be cited as
authority, she has read same and
finds that they are not applicable
to the instant workers’
compensation claim. The Funds are
reminded that Judge Lowther has
already ruled that it has liability
for one-half of all permanent
benefits awarded and that the Court
of Appeals did not accept the
Funds’ similar arguments following
the death of plaintiff Cynthia K.
Hall. There simply is no
discernible legal distinction
between the question presented to
the Court of Appeals regarding
apportionment of an award and the
issue raised by the Fund herein.
Like the Court of Appeals, the
undersigned Administrative Law
Judge finds that Whittaker v.
Patrick, 2000-SC-1095-WC,___SW3d
____, (Kentucky Supreme Court,
rendered September 27, 2001)
controls the issue of equal
apportionment of all known benefits
in this claim. Because the Funds’
petition for reconsideration and
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amended petition for
reconsideration merely seek to
reargue the arguments previously
presented to Chief Administrative
Law Judge Lowther and to appellate
bodies, and which were previously
presented to this Administrative
Law Judge, the petition and amended
petition are OVERRULED.
On March 20, 2002, Hall’s widower filed a
copy of his marriage license. Peyton’s has
paid all benefits pursuant to the ALJ’s order
and the issue remaining concerns liability
for the second half of the award.
In this third appeal to the Board WCF
now maintains, as it did below, that the ALJ
lacked jurisdiction to consider Peyton’s
motion for clarification and/or motion to
reopen. It further contends, pursuant to KRS
342.730(3)(e), and the ALJ’s apportionment of
benefits was erroneous as a matter of law.
The WCF’s position is that the ALJ’s
award became final with the finality of the
court of appeals opinion on November 25,
2001. It argues that the motion for
clarification did not fall within one of the
four statutory grounds of reopening: fraud;
new discovered evidence; mistake; and change
in disability. It further contends that the
ALJ erred in considering it a motion to
reopen pursuant to Wheatley v. Bryant Auto
Service, supra.
In support of its argument, the WCF
cites to numerous unpublished opinions of
this Board, the court of appeals, and supreme
court. It argues that the issue of the
widower remarrying was foreseen and the
appeal could have been placed in abeyance and
the claim remanded to the ALJ for
consideration of apportionment of the two
year lump sum payment pursuant to KRS
342.730(3)(e).
In response, Peyton’s first counters the
WCF’s petition for reconsideration from the
ALJ’s order rendered January 28, 2002 was
untimely filed. Regardless, the ALJ rendered
an order on March 4, 2002, sustaining
Peyton’s motion for clarification and the
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WCF’s appeal filed April 2, 2002 was timely
filed.
Peyton’s also argues that no “legal
vested rights” of the WCF were adversely
affected by the motion for clarification and
the court of appeals decision in the herein
matter set the rights of Hall’s widower, as
well as the obligation of Peyton’s and the
WCF.
Hall, in his response, requests costs
pursuant to KRS 342.310.
After having reviewed the ALJ’s decision
and arguments of the parties and applicable
law, we determine the ALJ did not err in
ruling on Peyton’s motion for
clarification/motion to reopen and ultimately
holding the WCF liable for half the
ascertainable award.
In Wheatley v. Bryant Auto Service,
supra, the supreme court held that an
Administrative Law Judge’s own motion under
KRS 342.125 to correct a mistake in the award
was proper. There, the ALJ originally
limited a lifetime duration to 425 weeks
instead of a lifetime award as authorized by
statute. The court stated:
[W]e believe that the ALJ was
acting properly and in the interest
of justice when he availed himself
of the statutory remedy set out in
KRS 342.125 to correct his admitted
mistake in applying the law in this
compensation proceeding, just as
could have been done under CR 60.02
had it been a civil proceeding.
Since the authority for correcting
this mistake was statutory, there
was no prohibition by reason of the
finality of the decision against
making the correction, such as
there would be had there been a
court decision where finality had
attached.
Wheatley, Id. at 769.
We believe the significant impact of
Wheatley is to emphasize that in certain
circumstances, form should not take
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precedence over substance. In the case sub
judice, the court of appeals opinion held
that the WCF was liable for one-half of the
known value of the award based on the reality
of the claimant’s death. The court, as did
the ALJ, determined that Whittaker v.
Patrick, 2000-SC-1095-WC (rendered September
27, 2001, and ordered not to be published),
was controlling precedent for equal
apportionment. Contrary to the WCF’s
implication, nothing would have been gained
by Peyton’s appealing the court of appeals
decision in the herein claim. Instead, the
contingency of the widower’s remarriage
necessitated a reopening so that the award
could conform with reality. Thus, applying
the logic of the court of appeals decision
based on Whittaker v. Patrick, the award
required modification so as to conform with
the reality of the widower’s remarriage. As
pointed out by Peyton’s, contrary to the
WCF’s argument that its period of payment for
benefits would not commence until the year
2010, the court of appeals clearly held that
the ALJ “did not err in ordering the known
value of the award to be apportioned equally
between Peyton’s and the Special Fund.”
In conclusion, now that we know the
total amount of the award due to the fact the
widower remarried, the ALJ did not err in
apportioning payment of benefits equally
between Peyton’s and the WCF. Thus, we
disagree with the WCF’s second argument that
the ALJ erred as a matter of law in
apportioning benefits equally pursuant to KRS
342.730(3)(e). The WCF relies on the case of
Pennwalt Corporation v. Beale, supra, for the
proposition that the employer owes all of the
benefits because the WCF’s payment period was
never reached.
As explained above, the court of appeals
determined, based on the supreme court’s
decision in Whittaker v. Patrick, supra, that
the apportionment of the award must be based
on reality knowing that the claimant had
died. Thus, we agree with the ALJ’s
determination that “[t]here is no discernible
legal distinction between the question
presented to the Court of Appeals and the
issue raised by the Fund herein.” Therefore,
we conclude the ALJ did not err in ordering
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the WCF be liable for one-half of all
permanent benefits awarded.
Hall has urged this Board to impose
sanctions on the WCF pursuant to KRS 342.310
on the grounds he has been forced to defend
this action without reasonable grounds.
Although we have not been persuaded by WCF’s
arguments on appeal and we acknowledge that
Hall’s entitlement to benefits is not at
issue, we believe that the WCF was acting in
good faith in prosecuting its appeal.
Therefore, we decline to impose sanctions.
See, Roberts v. Estep, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 544
(1993).
Accordingly, the decision by Hon. Donna
H. Terry, Administrative Law Judge, is hereby
AFFIRMED and the appeal by Robert L.
Whittaker, Director of the Division of
Workers’ Compensation Funds, is hereby
DISMISSED.
We further add that the “law of the case” doctrine
clearly applies in this case to the apportionment of the award.
In Siler v. Williford, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 262, 263 (1964), the
former Court of Appeals held that “[w]hen an appellate court
decides a question concerning evidence or instructions, the
question of law settled by the opinion is final upon a retrial in
which the evidence is substantially the same and precludes the
reconsideration of the claimed error on a second appeal.”
This
Court later applied this doctrine in a workers’ compensation
action, Pennwalt Corp. v. Beale, Ky.App., 840 S.W.2d 830 (1992).
In Pennwalt, we were prohibited from further reviewing a question
that had previously been resolved in a final decision.
Here, an
earlier panel had already issued an opinion addressing the
apportionment of the known value of the award after the
claimant’s death, holding that the value should be split equally
between the employer and the Special Fund.
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Therefore, we are
bound by our prior final decision and are precluded from
reviewing the issue any further.
For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s opinion
affirming the decisions of the ALJ is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, CYNTHIA
AND JAMES HALL:
David W. Barr
Frankfort, KY
Edward A. Mayer
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, PEYTON’S,
INC.:
Walter E. Harding
Louisville, KY
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