PAUL MOORE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 13, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000434-MR
PAUL MOORE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 86-CR-00046
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Paul Moore appeals from an order of the Shelby
Circuit Court denying his motion, filed pursuant to RCr 11.42, to
vacate his 1987 conviction for murder and first-degree burglary
on grounds of alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Upon review of Moore’s arguments in light of the record and
applicable law, we affirm.
In October 1986, a Shelby County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging Moore with murder and first-degree burglary.
The indictment charged that on September 7, 1986, Moore broke
into the apartment occupied by his ex-wife, Charlotte Moore, and
her live-in boyfriend, Tim Spencer, and that he stabbed Charlotte
to death.
After the indictment was issued, the Commonwealth
notified the trial court that it would pursue capital punishment
in this matter.
The court ordered Moore to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation to determine his capacity to stand trial.
The results
of the psychiatric evaluation showed that Moore was competent.
Further, the evaluator found that Moore did not suffer from any
mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged offenses.
On March 27, 1987, after discussing the facts of this
matter, the elements of the charged crimes, various defenses, and
possible sentencing outcomes with his trial counsel, Stephen
Durham, Moore accepted the Commonwealth’s plea bargain offer.
Moore pled guilty to murder and first-degree burglary in exchange
for a sentence of life in prison for the murder conviction and
twenty years in prison for the burglary conviction.
The trial
court accepted Moore’s guilty plea and imposed the recommended
sentence.
On November 6, 1996, Moore filed a pro se RCr 11.42
motion to vacate and set aside his conviction alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The trial court
appointed counsel who filed a supplemental memorandum in support
of this motion.
In these motions, Moore alleged that Durham
failed to inform him of all possible defenses that were available
in 1987 and that the guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently entered.
The trial court did not hold a hearing concerning
Moore’s RCr 11.42 motion until January 12, 2001.
At this
hearing, Moore testified that Durham discussed the facts of the
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case with him, the elements of the charged crimes and the
possible penalties if the case proceeded to trial.
Moore further
testified that he entered his guilty plea pursuant to Durham’s
advice, even though he did not truly understand the nature of the
proceedings.
Durham also testified at this hearing.
During his
testimony, Durham stated that he discussed intoxication, extreme
emotional disturbance, and criminal trespassing defenses with
Moore, despite his belief that the extreme emotional disturbance
defense was not available given the facts of this matter.
Durham
also pointed out that Moore, after throughly considering the plea
bargain offer, decided to enter a guilty plea.
Durham stated
that Moore apparently desired to terminate these criminal
proceedings and avoid the death penalty.
Based upon this
testimony and the written record, the trial court denied Moore’s
motion to vacate his convictions.
This appeal followed.
Moore brings forward two assertions of error for our
review.
First, Moore argues that the trial court improperly
rejected his RCr 11.42 motion because the record clearly shows
that Durham was ineffective for failing to inform him prior to
the plea of all possible defenses.
We find this assertion to be
without merit.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a movant must satisfy a two-part test showing that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
caused actual prejudice affecting the outcome of the proceeding.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
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(1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed.
2d 724 (1986).
Where an appellant challenges a guilty plea
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that
trial counsel made serious errors outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance and that the deficient
performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process
that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable
probability that the appellant would not have pled guilty but
would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Phon
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 51 S.W.3d 456, 459-460 (2001); Casey v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 994 S.W.2d 18, 22 (1999).
The burden is
on the movant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance was constitutionally sufficient.
Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v. Pelphrey, Ky., 998
S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
In reviewing the record of Moore’s guilty plea, we find
no evidence that his trial counsel was ineffective.
The trial
court explicitly asked Moore whether he discussed his case with
trial counsel and whether he was satisfied with trial counsel’s
advice.
Moore affirmatively answered both questions.
Further,
in the petition to enter a guilty plea filed in the record, Moore
acknowledged that he had discussed with his counsel “the nature
and cause of each accusation against me as set forth in the
Indictment and as to any possible defenses I might have.”
Moore
also acknowledged that trial counsel advised him concerning the
punishments that accompanied conviction for the charges and that
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he fully understood all of the charges made against him.
Notwithstanding this record, Moore asserts that counsel did not
discuss the potential defense of extreme emotional disturbance
(EED).
At the post-conviction motion hearing, however, Moore and
Durham both acknowledged discussing this case, and Durham
expressly recalled their consideration and rejection of an EED
defense.
Thus, the record clearly refutes Moore’s claim that
trial counsel failed to discuss possible defenses with him.
Moore also argues that his guilty plea was not made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
In support of this
argument, Moore claims that he was not aware of the charges for
which he was entering a guilty plea and that the trial court
failed to determine if he understood the exact nature of the
charges.
Again, we find this claim to be without merit.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Moore
was not fully aware of the nature of the charges at the time he
agreed to plead guilty.
In determining the validity of a guilty
plea, the test is whether the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open
to the defendant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.
Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
The record must reflect the
fact that the court questioned the accused and that he had a full
understanding of the implications and consequences of entering a
plea of guilty.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).
Finally, in determining the validity of
a guilty plea, a reviewing court must consider the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the plea and not rely simply on a
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reference to some verbal formula recited at the time the plea is
taken.
Kolas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978).
The record clearly demonstrates that Moore’s guilty
plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
While entering this
guilty plea, Moore informed the trial court that he understood he
was pleading guilty, he was satisfied with his trial counsel and
that he understood the Commonwealth’s sentencing recommendation.
Further, the record demonstrates that Moore and his trial counsel
signed a completed AOC Form 491, entitled “Waiver of Further
Proceedings with Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty.”
In
obtaining a sentence of life in prison to the murder charge and
twenty years for the burglary charge, it cannot be doubted that
the decision to plead guilty represented an intelligent choice
among available options because Moore avoided being subjected to
capital punishment.
Further in this regard, Moore admitted
having committed the crimes charged.
Thus, we are convinced that
Moore’s plea met the requirements of Boykin and Alford.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Shelby Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul Moore, pro se
Central City, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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