RONNIE WAYNE TURNER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 11, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000431-MR
RONNIE WAYNE TURNER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00206
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Ronnie W. Turner brings this appeal from a
February 21, 2002 judgment of the Henderson Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
Appellant was indicted by the Henderson County Grand
Jury upon first degree burglary, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
511.020; first degree wanton endangerment, KRS 508.060; fourth
degree assault, KRS 508.030; and terroristic threatening, (three
counts), KRS 508.080.
It appears that the victim, one Sabrina
Kelly Barnes, was appellant’s girlfriend.
At preliminary
hearing, Barnes testified that appellant forced his way into her
apartment, assaulted her, and pulled on her what she thought to
be a gun.
At trial, however, Barnes testified that she lied at
the preliminary hearing and to the police.
At the jury trial,
appellant was found guilty of second degree burglary, fourth
degree assault, and terroristic threatening.
a total of five years’ imprisonment.
He was sentenced to
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends that the circuit court committed
reversible error by allowing the jury to consider evidence of his
“prior bad acts.”
Angela Strong, a friend of Barnes, was called
to testify for appellant.
During direct examination, defense
counsel asked Strong: “Have you ever seen Ronnie [appellant] show
a temper tantrum?”
She answered:
“No, I haven’t.”
In his
brief, appellant objects to the following cross-examination of
Strong:
MR. WOOD:
MS. STRONG:
MR. WOOD:
MS. STRONG:
Ms. Strong, you indicated
you’ve never known the
defendant to have a “temper
tantrum?”
Um-hum (affirmative).
Would you include assaulting
other people?
Yes.
. . . .
MR. WOOD:
MS. STRONG:
MR. WOOD:
Were you familiar with an
occurrence in this county
involving the defendant in
his assault upon Sabrina
Kelly Barnes that occurred in
this county on or about the
29th day of July of 1999 for
which he was arrested and
charged with Fourth Degree
Assault upon Kelly Barnes?
No, I’m not.
Were you aware that he was
convicted under a plea
bargain agreement of a lesser
offense of harassment of her
that conviction being
returned by the Henderson
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MS. STRONG:
MR. WOOD:
District Court on August the
4th of 1999.
No, I didn’t.
Were you aware as well that
Mr. Turner was arrested for
the offense of disorderly
conduct on March the 30th of
1997.
No, no I’m, I’m not. I lived
in Newburgh for a little
while but I never heard that.
And pled guilty to that
offense and was convicted of
that offense on April the 15th
of 1997. Were you aware of
that?
No, I wasn’t.
Likewise were you aware that
he was arrested and/or
charged or arrested for the
violation of a domestic
violence order on August the
23rd of 1996.
No, but I don’t know how this
works. I’ve never done this
before, but can I say
something.
Were you aware of that?
No, but.
Were you aware that likewise
based upon that charge he
pled guilty and was convicted
of violation of the emergency
protection order by the
Henderson District court on
June the 29th of 1997.
No, I wasn’t.
MS. STRONG:
MR. WOOD:
MS. STRONG:
MR. WOOD:
MS. STRONG:
MR. WOOD:
MS. STRONG:
MR. WOOD:
MS. STRONG:
Appellant’s Brief at 4-6.
Appellant specifically claims it was error to admit the
prior criminal acts into evidence.
The circuit court concluded
that such prior criminal acts were admissible during crossexamination because appellant had “opened the door” by placing
his character in issue.
Appellant claims that defense counsel’s
question to Strong “[h]ave you ever seen Ronnie show a tempertantrum?”, did not put his character in issue.
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Appellant argues
that “Strong was not asked to testify about [appellant’s]
character; her answer was neither ‘reputation or opinion’ as
required by KRE 405(a).
She merely stated that she personally
had never seen him have a temper-tantrum.
character in issue.”
We must disagree.
This did not place his
We believe the question
directly related to the specific character trait of violence.
We
think the question tantamount to asking Strong if, in her
opinion, appellant possessed a violent propensity.
As such, we
are of the opinion that appellant did, indeed, put his character
in issue.
Appellant alternatively argues that the Commonwealth
improperly utilized his prior criminal acts in its crossexamination of Strong.
In Broyles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267
S.W.2d 73, 74 (1954), the Court held:
[I]t is the rule in this state that where the
defendant introduces evidence of his good
reputation, the witness so testifying may be
asked on cross-examination whether he has
heard reports of particular acts of
misconduct by the defendant. (citations
omitted). But the rule is not absolute.
When there is an objection to such evidence
or a motion to limit its effect, the court is
required to admonish the jury that it is
admitted only for the purpose of testing the
accuracy and credibility of the witness’
testimony and not as substantive evidence of
defendant’s guilt. (citation omitted).
Moreover, inquiry may be made only about
those acts of misconduct having some relation
to the particular trait of character which
the defendant has put in issue. (citations
omitted).
Upon the above authority, we are of the opinion that specific
acts of misconduct can be used on cross-examination of a
character witness.
Here, we think it showed that Strong lacked
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reliable knowledge upon which to base her opinion concerning the
non-violent tendencies of appellant.
We also believe that these
acts bear a direct relation to the particular character trait at
issue.
The particular trait of character put in issue by
appellant was his non-violent tendencies; the particular acts of
misconduct used by the Commonwealth were all violent offenses.
Hence, we think the Commonwealth’s cross-examination of Strong
concerning prior bad acts of appellant was proper.
We observe that appellant’s counsel objected to the
introduction of the prior bad acts, but did not ask for an
admonishment to the jury.
Ky. R. Evid. (KRE) 105(a) states as
follows:
When evidence which is admissible as to one
(1) party or for one (1) purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and admonish the jury accordingly. In
the absence of such a request, the admission
of the evidence by the trial judge without
limitation shall not be a ground for
complaint on appeal, except under the
palpable error rule. (emphasis added).
We thus must determine whether the circuit court’s failure to
admonish the jury constituted palpable error.
Ky. R. Crim.
P.(RCr) 10.26, our palpable error rule, reads as follows:
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error. (emphasis added.)
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The requirement of “manifest injustice” means that
there is a substantial probability that the result of the trial
would have been different, but for the error.
Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
See Partin v.
Upon the whole, we do
not think that manifest injustice was involved in this case.
We
view the evidence as substantial upon appellant’s guilt.
Officer Shannon Gibbs, of the Henderson Police
Department, testified at trial for the Commonwealth.
Officer
Gibbs was dispatched to Barnes’ residence in response to a 911
call.
Upon arriving, Officer Gibbs testified that the apartment
showed evidence that a struggle had taken place, and that Barnes’
upper arms were red and swollen.
Officer Gibbs also recounted
that Barnes stated appellant had forced his way into the
apartment, assaulted her and pulled a gun on her.
Another
witness, Karen Ligon, Barnes’ mother, testified that Barnes
called her on the day in question and claimed that appellant had
threatened Barnes with a gun.
Simply put, we cannot conclude
that there was a substantial probability the jury would have
acquitted appellant if the admonition had been given.
Appellant next asserts that the Commonwealth violated
his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
that appellant testified upon his behalf at trial.
It appears
In his brief,
appellant specifically cites this Court to the following
testimony.
MR. WOOD:
MR. TURNER:
Now you talked about this is
the first time anyone has
ever heard your story I agree
with that.
I believe you’re right.
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MR. WOOD:
MR. TURNER:
MR. WOOD:
MR. TURNER:
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
WOOD:
TURNER:
WOOD:
TURNER:
WOOD:
TURNER:
WOOD:
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
TURNER:
WOOD:
TURNER:
WOOD:
MR. TURNER:
MR. WOOD:
MR. TURNER:
MR. WOOD:
That’s your choice though,
wasn’t it?
I don’t think that it was.
You could have turned
yourself in. The day it
happened you knew they were
looking for you. Is that
correct? After talking with
Jay Workins?
After talking to Jay Workins
I knew that the police were
looking for me and I
explained to him exactly that
I needed time for counsel
after he told me these
charges are very serious
Ronnie, there — he said it
started off as one charge and
it is building. He said
there’s several.
And that was on Friday.
Yes, it was.
The day this happened?
Yes, it was.
And you hung out for three days.
Absolutely.
During that time — you know how to
write don’t you?
How to write?
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir, I do.
So you could have written down
whatever you wanted to write down
and mailed it to anywhere, mailed
it to Ms., to Officer Gibbs,
mailed it to Jay Workins, mailed
it to me, mailed it to Charlie
McCollom, County Attorney. You
could have mailed it to anybody.
I didn’t know you at that
time, sir. Like I said this
is the first time I’ve laid
eyes on you. No, I saw you
yesterday.
You knew the police were looking
for you.
Yes, I did, and I believe I
tried to tell Jay what
happened and he said Ronnie
it would be better if you
didn’t talk to me about this.
I object to hearsay
about what Mr. Workins
told him.
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[emphases in original].
Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.
Appellant argues that the above questions by the
Commonwealth concerning his “silence” violated his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
We believe the Commonwealth’s
line of questioning certainly implicated appellant’s
constitutional right.
The right to remain silent carries with it
freedom from prejudicial comment.
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the defendants
changed their story at trial.
Over objection of counsel, the
Court permitted cross-examination as to why they had not offered
the exculpatory explanations at the time of arrest.
Their
convictions were reversed with the Court pointing out that the
right to remain silent prevented impeachment by use of their
stance.
In the case at hand, however, there was no objection to
the Commonwealth’s line of questioning.
We must, thus, review
the allegation of error under the palpable error rule.
RCr
10.26.
In Salisbury v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 556 S.W.2d 922
(1977), the Commonwealth commented upon Salisbury’s silence
following his arrest.
questioning.
His trial counsel failed to object to the
The Court held that line of questioning did not
constitute palpable error and reasoned thusly:
Even though Salisbury’s substantial
rights were involved by the Commonwealth’s
comment on his post-arrest silence, it does
not necessarily follow that there was
palpable error. . . . When a defendant’s
attorney is aware of an issue and elects to
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raise no objection, the attorney’s failure to
object may constitute a waiver of an error
having constitutional implications. In the
absence of exceptional circumstances, a
defendant is bound by the trial strategy
adopted by his counsel even if made without
prior consultation with the defendant. . . .
Id. at 926-927.
Reviewing the cross-examination, under the palpable
error rule, we are not constrained to find reversible error.
There is ample evidence in the record to sustain appellant’s
conviction.
At the time of the incident, the victim suffered
obvious injuries.
The police officers noted that the apartment
was in disarray, and showed signs of a struggle.
The victim’s
mother offered evidence suggesting that appellant had made prior
threats.
Upon the foregoing testimony, we think there was
sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction, even in
the absence of the cross-examination of which complaint is made.
Appellant finally maintains that his trial counsel
was ineffective.
Generally, appellate courts only review claims
of error that have been presented to the trial court.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 832 (1973).
See Caslin
The claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel may be reviewed on direct
appeal if there is a trial record or an evidentiary hearing held
on motion for new trial and the trial court rules upon the issue.
See Hopewell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 641 S.W.2d 744 (1982).
The
record herein, however, does not demonstrate that the issue has
been properly preserved for our review.
76.12(c)(v).
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Ky. R. Civ. P.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Henderson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William F. Polk, Jr.
Henderson, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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