STEVE MARTIN v. PASCHALL TRUCK LINES; DONNA TERRY, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 18, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000362-WC
STEVE MARTIN
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-00510
PASCHALL TRUCK LINES; DONNA TERRY,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND MILLER, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE: The single issue in this appeal is whether
the Workers’ Compensation Board correctly concluded that
appellant’s employer, Paschall Truck Lines, is entitled to a
dollar for dollar credit for voluntary overpayments made pursuant
to the terms of a written agreement concerning those payments.
In reaching the determination that such credit should be allowed,
the Board found that the credit did not substantially impair
appellant’s entitlement to future benefits nor was it contrary to
the dictates of Triangle Insulation and Sheet Metal Company v.
Stratmeyer.1
Because we are in complete agreement with the
Board’s reasoning and analysis of applicable case law and, with
Judge Gardner’s most lucid and erudite opinion, we affirm its
decision in this case.
The facts pertinent to resolution of this appeal
commence in November 1996, when appellant sustained a workrelated shoulder injury which necessitated extensive medical
treatment and several surgeries.
Commencing on the date of
injury, the employer paid appellant temporary total disability
benefits at the maximum rate through September 25, 1998, the date
on which Dr. Daniel Dethmers, appellant’s treating orthopedic
surgeon, expressed his opinion that appellant had reached maximum
medical improvement.
Through counsel, appellant subsequently
sought an extension of voluntary payments and sent a letter to
Paschall’s counsel which contained the following agreement:
Mr. Martin and I have no choice but to agree
that any benefits received at this time be
credited dollar for dollar against future PPD
benefits.
My client is destitute.
this payment?
Can you expedite
At the end of the typed portion of the letter is the following
handwritten statement signed by appellant: “I consent to allowing
credit against PPD for benefits paid.”
Voluntary payments were
then continued from September 26, 1998, through May 25, 2000.
After Paschall indicated that it no longer intended to
make voluntary payments, appellant’s claim was removed from
abeyance and assigned to an Administrative Law Judge for
1
Ky., 782 S.W.2d 628 (1990).
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resolution.
After a hearing, the ALJ concluded that Paschall was
entitled to credit for its overpayment of the voluntary income
benefits paid to appellant.
Upon petition for reconsideration,
the ALJ amended her previous order to reflect the following
findings: (1) that the defendant-employer shall be entitled to
credit “to the extent that Plaintiff’s future benefits are not
affected;” and (2) that any credit against past due benefits
would be on a week to week basis.
In its appeal to the Board the employer argued that it
was entitled to a dollar for dollar credit for the overpayment of
voluntary benefits paid.
Appellant alleged in a cross-appeal
that the ALJ erred in awarding any credit for overpayment of
benefits because the employer’s entitlement to such credit had
not been raised as a contested issue.
In a thorough and well-
reasoned opinion, the Board not only rejected appellant’s
contention that the ALJ erred in awarding the employer any credit
for voluntary overpayments, but also concluded that the employer
was entitled to a dollar for dollar credit as set out in the
parties’ agreement.
We find no error in the Board’s decision.
First, as to appellant’s contention with respect to
failure to list entitlement to the credit as a contested issue,
we agree with the Board that based upon the controverted facts of
this case, it is questionable whether this was in fact a
contested issue.
It appears that there was some miscommunication
between appellant’s Kentucky counsel and his Illinois counsel who
had negotiated with the employer for the continuation of the
voluntary payments.
While it may be that Kentucky counsel was
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surprised to learn of the agreement for a dollar for dollar
credit at the hearing before the ALJ, that does not, to use the
words of the Board, “create a contested issue where previously
there was none.”
Next, appellant argues that the Board erred in
enforcing the agreement for a dollar for dollar credit for the
voluntary overpayments, insisting that Triangle Insulation,
supra, permits dollar for dollar credits only where future
benefits are not affected.
Like the Board, we are convinced that
appellant takes too narrow a view of that decision.
In
addressing the question of how credit for overpayment of
voluntary benefits is to be handled, the Kentucky Supreme Court
offered the following explanation:
The two methods of computing credit
[dollar for dollar versus week by week] are
not mutually exclusive. It is important to
encourage employers to make voluntary
payments to injured employees. Employers are
not obligated to pay benefits until a claim
has been litigated and an award entered.
Such payments are voluntary. The
circumstances involved in each specific case
must be carefully evaluated so that the
employee is not unduly harmed and the
employer is encouraged to make voluntary
payments. (Citations omitted).
A rigid limitation on the method of
credit by an employer works an ultimate
disservice to an employee. There is a
considerable social and economic benefit to
an employee who obtains voluntary income
benefits in the initial stages of an injury.
(Emphasis added).2
The court goes on to hold that an employee who has
benefitted from an overpayment of income benefits should not be
2
782 S.W.2d at 630.
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deprived of future income as a result of the credit for the
overpayment.
In this case, the Board carefully examined the
impact that a dollar for dollar credit would have on appellant’s
future benefits and concluded that he would not be unduly harmed
“nor his entitlement to periodic payments substantially
impaired.”
We agree.
Under the specific and undisputed facts of this case,
it is clear that appellant has not been deprived of any
compensation; rather, at his own request, he simply received that
compensation in advance of the date on which it was due.
Having
negotiated an agreement with his employer that he would continue
to receive voluntary payments on the basis that the employer
would be entitled to a dollar for dollar credit, appellant cannot
subsequently renege on that agreement by complaining that future
payments may be affected.
Appellant received the benefit of his
bargain and thus we agree with the Board that the dictates of
Triangle Insulation have not been offended.
The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE PASCHALL
TRUCK LINES, INC.:
Jackson W. Watts
Bradly Slutskin
Versailles, Kentucky
E. Frederick Straub, Jr.
WHITLOW, ROBERTS, HOUSTON &
STRAUB, PLLC
Paducah, Kentucky
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