DAVID S. GEX v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 13, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000212-MR
DAVID S. GEX
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CR-001171
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
David S. Gex (“Gex”) appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion for relief pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 from a criminal
conviction and sentence.
After reviewing the issues raised by
Gex, the record and the applicable law, we affirm.
On March 10, 1992, a jury convicted Gex of wanton
murder in connection with the shooting death of Ronald Sadler.
Gex was sentenced to twenty-three (23) years imprisonment.
The
Kentucky Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this conviction on
April 21, 1994 in an unpublished opinion.
The Supreme Court
denied his petition for rehearing on September 1, 1994.
Gex filed a motion to vacate or set aside judgment
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 on
December 19, 1995.
In his RCr 11.42 motion, Gex alleged that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing
phase of his trial and that the trial court erred by giving the
jury a wanton murder instruction while ignoring a claim of selfdefense.
The trial court denied Gex’s RCr 11.42 motion.
appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court.
Gex
However, on
October 30, 1996, this Court dismissed Gex’s appeal due to his
failure to file a brief.
Gex filed a motion with this Court for
a belated appeal, which was ultimately denied.
On December 5, 2001, Gex filed his CR 60.02 motion with
the trial court.
In this motion, Gex revived the arguments
originally made in his RCr 11.42 motion.
Gex’s CR 60.02 motion.
The trial court denied
This appeal followed.
In Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983),
the Kentucky Supreme Court established the procedure for
appellate review in criminal cases.
The Supreme Court stated
that the structure for appellate review is not haphazard or
overlapping.
Id. at 856.
A criminal defendant must first bring
a direct appeal when available, then utilize RCr 11.42 by raising
every error of which he should be aware.
Id.
CR 60.02 should be
utilized only for extraordinary situations not subject to relief
by direct appeal or by way of RCr 11.42.
Id.
The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the procedural requirements set out in Gross in its
opinion in McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415 (1997):
A defendant who is in custody under sentence
or on probation, parole or conditional
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discharge, is required to avail himself of
RCr 11.42 as to any ground of which he is
aware, or should be aware, during the period
when the remedy is available to him. Civil
Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an
additional opportunity to relitigate the same
issues which could “reasonably have been
presented” by direct appeal or RCr 11.42
proceedings. RCr 11.42(2); Gross v.
Commonwealth, supra, at 855, 856. The
obvious purpose of this principle is to
prevent the relitigation of issues which
either were or could have been litigated in a
similar proceeding.
Id. at 416.
Gross and McQueen clearly establish that “[a]n issue
raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be litigated [in an
RCr 11.42 proceeding] by claiming that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel,” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d
905, 909 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025 (1999).
This same
logic applies to CR 60.02 motions since, by the very terms of the
rule, it provides “extraordinary relief” just as RCr 11.42 does.
CR 60.02.
In order to be eligible for CR 60.02 relief, Gex must
demonstrate why he is entitled to such special, extraordinary
relief.
Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (1998).
In his brief, Gex once again raises concerns about the
propriety of the instructions given to the jury by the trial
court.
These concerns were raised, and ultimately rejected, by
the Kentucky Supreme Court on direct appeal.
Consequently, Gex
is barred from raising these issues again by a CR 60.02 motion.
Additionally, Gex failed to exercise due diligence in
pursuing his claim.
Under CR 60.02, a motion must be filed
within a reasonable time if the motion is based upon an
extraordinary reason justifying the relief sought.
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Here, Gex
waited until December 5, 2001 to file his CR 60.02 motion with
the trial court.
A delay of over nine years is not reasonable
and does not comply with CR 60.02 requirements.
Therefore, the
trial court did not err in denying Gex’s CR 60.02 motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David S. Gex, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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